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Abstract 
This study entails a theoretical reading of the Iranian modern history and follows an interdisciplinary 
agenda at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and politics and intends to offer a novel 
framework for the analysis of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran in the modern era. A brief 
review of Iranian modern history from the constitutional revolution, to the oil nationalization 
movement, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the recent Reformist and Green movements 
demonstrates that Iranian people travelled full circle. This historical experience of socio-economic 
underdevelopment revolving around the bitter question of “why are we backward?” and its 
manifestation in perpetual socio-political instability and violence is the subject matter of this study. 
Foucault’s conceived relation between the production of truth and production of wealth captures the 
essence of hypothesis offered in this study. Michel Foucault (1980: 93-4) maintains that “In the last 
analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to 
produce wealth in the first place”. Based on a hybrid methodology combining hermeneutics of 
understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this study proposes that the failure to produce wealth 
has had particular roots in the failure in the production of truth.  At the heart of the proposed 
theoretical model is the following formula: The Iranian dasein’s confused preference structure 
culminates in the formation of unstable coalitions which in turn leads to institutional failure, creating 
a chaotic social order and a turbulent history as experienced by the Iranian nation in the modern era. 
The following set of interrelated propositions elaborate further on the core formula of the model: Each 
and every Iranian person and her subjectivity and preference structure is the site of three distinct 
warring regimes of truth and identity choice sets (identity markers) related to the ancient Persian 
empire (Persianism), Islam, and modernity. These three historical a priori and regimes of truth act as 
conditions of possibility for social interactions, and are unities in multiplicities. They, in their 
perpetual state of tension and conflict, constitute the mutually exclusive, contradictory, and confused 
dimensions of the prism of the Iranian dasein. The confused preference structure prevents Iranian 
people from organizing themselves in stable coalitions required for collective action to achieve the 
desired socio-economic change. The complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the 
state of belatedness makes it impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work, and 
language to achieve the desired social transformations, turning Iran into a country of unstable 
coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels. This in turn leads to failure in the 
construction of stable institutions (a social order based on rule of law or any other stable institutional 
structure becomes impossible) due to perpetual tension between alternative regimes of truth 
manifested in warring discursive formations, relations of power, and techniques of subjectification 
and their associated economies of affectivity. This in turn culminates in relations of power in all 
micro, meso, and macro levels to become discretionary, atomic, and unpredictable, producing 
perpetual tensions and social violence in almost all sites of social interactions, and generating small 
and large social earthquakes (crises, movements, and revolutions) as experienced by the Iranian 
people in their modern history. As such, the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-
political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social assemblages 
and their affiliated hybrid forms of regimes of truth in the springs of freedom and repressive states of 
order in the winters of discontent. Each time, after the experience of chaos, the order is restored based 
on the emergence of a final arbiter (Iranian leviathan) as the evolved coping strategy for achieving 
conflict resolution. This highly volatile truth cycle produces the experience of socio-economic 
backwardness. The explanatory power of the theoretical framework offered in the study exploring the 
relation between the production of truth, trust and wealth is tested on three strong events of Iranian 
modern history: the Constitutional Revolution, the Oil-Nationalization Movement and the Islamic 
Revolution. The significant policy implications of the model are explored. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Honestly, I prefer to be a bird with two wings 
rather than a tree with deep roots. Sahar Bayani 
(2014) 
"Are we [puppets] made of wax ([aya] ma ra az 
mum sakhta-and)?" he asked with a strain of 
self-contempt. “In this world there are no 
human beings like us”. Nasir-al-Din Shah 
(Amanat, 1997: 252) 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
A brief review of the Iranian modern history demonstrates that at least three strong 
events (the constitutional revolution, the oil-nationalization movement, the Islamic 
revolution) shaped the trend and pattern of socio-economic development and were 
associated with large scale confrontation between the forces inside and outside the 
country, creating a history of instability, upheaval and social violence alongside 
generating large-scale restructuring of socio-economic institutions and unstoppable 
waves of migration.  
Many commentators and observers are puzzled by the seemingly unending and 
unpredictable waves of incessant turbulence in the Iranian society, never settling 
down in the form of a steady social order based on the establishment of a set of 
stable institutional arrangements and steady and predictable positions in terms of 
internal socio-economic policies and external foreign policies. The Iranian society 
seems to be in a state of perpetual flux and permanent turmoil. The sense of 
disillusionment and bewilderment is equally shared between the Iranians and non-
Iranians alike.  
1.2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
This study aims to explore, explicate and critically analyse the enigma of experience 
of socio-economic (under)development in modern history of Iran.  In other words, 
this work purports to conduct a case study on the violent experience of socio-
economic underdevelopment in Iran by offering a novel model for the analysis of the 
Iranian enigma based on an interdisciplinary approach at the intersection of 
philosophy, economics and politics. The study basically aims to develop a theoretical 
model through grounded theory to be tailored to the social reality of the modern 
history of Iran and to be specifically applied to three strong events in the Iranian 
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history in order to demonstrate its potency in explicating the root causes of the 
historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment.   
In fulfilling these aims, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) A hybrid methodological approach is constructed based on cross-
fertilization of three approaches of reductionism, complexity science, and 
psychoanalysis to combine three principles of embeddedness, emergence 
and incommensurability in the analysis of social phenomena including 
the historical experience of socio-economic underdevelopment. 
(ii) A theoretical framework for the analysis of the historical experience of 
underdevelopment in Iran is constructed based on the two notions of 
inbetweenness and belatedness. 
(iii) Based on the methodological insights and the theoretical framework, 
three strong events of the modern history of Iran are explicated to unravel 
the underlying patterns and trends at work in the reproduction of the bitter 
experience of socio-economic underdevelopment and its associated 
cycles of violence.    
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MOTIVATONS 
Within the identified aims and objectives, the main research question is: “what are 
the root-causes of the experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in the 
modern history of Iran?” Or simply put: “why does Iran remain a backward 
country?”. 
For more than a century the house of Iran has been on fire and I have been directly 
experiencing and watching its effects on the repeated waves of social and individual 
meltdown. I have been determined to search for the root-causes and to avoid easy 
answers and sound-bite solutions.  In my quest for the answers I noticed that the 
three aforementioned strong events of the modern Iranian history demonstrate 
various failed attempts made by the Iranian people to achieve socio-economic 
development and to incorporate modernity.  
Why have these attempts been so consistently unsuccessful (or at least perceived to 
be unsuccessful)?  What was the set of discourses in currency and in circulation in 
these three situations on the issue of what the roots of Iranian socio-economic 
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backwardness are and what was deemed to be the way forward? What was the 
interplay of texts and contexts in the sense that which texts and in what exact forms 
were evoked to analyse the roots of the social malaise and how they were used to 
entice actions and to inform policies?  
Do these three movements and revolutions represent a linear progression towards 
achieving a sustainable level of socio-economic development or do they manifest a 
chaotic history with no social destination and as such manifesting a cyclical voyage? 
How can we make judgement?  What were the achievements and shortcomings of 
these three strong events? Can they tell us something about the patterns and trends 
repeating themselves throughout the modern history of Iran or are we facing 
different issues at different times and consequently have to acknowledge that there 
are no unifying themes connecting them together? Is Iranian society learning from its 
past mistakes and failures? Is there any accumulation of knowledge on the past 
experiences or are the same experiences being reproduced in different shapes and 
forms?  
Many commentators maintain that our questions and problems are basically the same 
as what they had been at the age of the Constitutional Revolution (see Malek-
Ahmadi, 2003; Ajoodani, 2003, for example); does this mean that we are moving in 
a circular fashion and have travelled full circle during a century of bitter and violent 
social experiments? If we define socio-economic development in terms of 
sustainability, i.e. the activated capacity of a society to repair and modernize itself in 
the face of cultural, social, and economic crises and shocks, and in its ability to 
establish stable institutions of conflict resolution away from perpetual violence; does 
Iranian experience meet these criteria or not? 
This research, hence, aims to develop and propose a theoretical model constituting 
persuasive responses for these research questions. 
 
1.4. CONCEPTUALISING THE PROBLEM:  THE PROPOSED MODEL 
At the core of the proposed model is the notion of tragedy of confusion emanating 
from the state of belated inbetweenness with its associated confused preference 
structure. Iranians have been captivated by three rival regimes of truth and identity 
markers of Islam, Persianism (the idea of pre-Islamic Iran), and Western modernity. 
In the context of belatedness (being late to modernity), these three regimes of truth 
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were deployed to design three projects of reverse social engineering, namely 
Persianization (bastan-geraei), Islamization (Islam-geraei or Islami kardan), and 
modernization. These three projects of reverse social engineering have been adopted 
intermittently in different periods of Iranian modern history to achieve social 
transformation. Thus, the state of belatedness prompts the translation of three 
regimes of truth into three projects of reverse social engineering. 
In the complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of 
belatedness it is impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work and 
language to achieve the desired social transformations, which leads to Situational 
Impossibility Theorem. This implies that the Iranian confused preference structure 
leads to the emergence of Iran as a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in 
macro, meso and micro levels; which in turn leads to persistent experience of 
institutional failure, which can be defined as the inability to construct stable and 
functional institutions such as modern nation-state, or market economy based on 
property rights or any other stable forms of institutional arrangements. 
Consequently, Iran is turned into the country of institutional dysfunctionalities and 
deformities. The outcome, therefore, is the chaotic order, through which the 
experience of tragedy of confusion with its associated unstable coalitions and 
institutional dysfunctionalities frequently leads to the emergence of widespread 
sense of discontent and disillusionment.  
This in turn triggers the emergence of large- and small-scale social movements and 
revolutions culminating in the experience of constant waves of socio-political 
instability, where the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political 
anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social 
assemblages in the springs of freedom and repressive states of order in the winters of 
discontent. In every round of the truth cycle the order is restored based on the 
emergence of final arbiter (Iranian leviathan in coordination or in conflict with the 
international leviathans) as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict 
resolution. The end result in each of these projects of reverse social engineerings, 
hence, has been socio-economic underdevelopment and stagnation. 
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1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Attempting to understand the experience of (under)development in Iran led this 
study to an interdisciplinary approach involving different strands of literature at the 
intersection of philosophy, economics, and politics, organized in the form of political 
economy of truth, in order to make the hyper-complexity of the Iranian social reality 
intelligible.  
This interdisciplinary model was inspired by Williamson’s (2000) work in situating 
the experience of underdevelopment in four levels of analysis starting from prices 
and moving to governance, institutions and mind. Exploring the mind and its 
preference structure, leads us to viewing social phenomena as Deleuzian social 
assemblages whose evolution are governed by three principles of embeddedness, 
emergence, and incommensurability. These social assemblages need to be studied 
through developing a hybrid methodology incorporating causational analysis 
(Cartesian cogito), complexity-system analysis, and articulation of worlds of 
signification (Heideggerian dasein).  
Based on this combined approach, the subject matter of the study, the question of 
Iranian socio-economic backwardness, needs to be located in the wider context of 
the Iranian social order and its evolution in time. The characteristics of Iranian social 
order and its strong and weak events alongside its social phenomena like poverty, 
inflation or political violence and how they correlate and co-evolve to generate 
Iranian experience of socio-economic underdevelopment needs to be identified based 
on the general characteristics of social assemblages and how they come to take a 
particular shape.  
Social assemblages are immersed in the interplay between finitude and infinitude, 
and are characterized, in this study, using the Lacanian-Zizekian formulation where 
each social order is a hybrid phenomenon, and constituted of three orders of ‘real’, 
‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’. The negating dimensions of symbolic order are 
characterized using the Lakanian-Zizekian notions of repression, disavowal, and 
foreclosure.  
The affirmative dimension of ‘symbolic’ is characterized using the Focauldian trinity 
of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Foucault, 1980, 2003; Flynn, 2005). The 
affirmative dimensions of ‘imaginary’ are characterized using Castoriadis’s (1987) 
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theory of imagination, while the affirmative dimensions of the ‘real’ are 
characterized using Deleuzian theory of differential philosophy. The Deleuzian 
theory (Hallward, 2006; Parr, 2010) shows how the vertical and horizontal 
movements of ‘real’ are organized in corporeal and virtual forms through the process 
of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. The negating facets of ‘imaginary’ and 
‘real’ are characterized using the Lacanian-Zizekian notions of ‘ideology and 
phantasy’ and ‘disruption’. The movement in life, work and language is organized in 
the assembled wholes called world of signification or regimes of truth through the 
territorialized and de-territorialized movements in the real, symbolic and imaginary 
dimensions of social assemblages. As such social assemblages are constituted of a 
’symbolic-imaginary’ regime of truth alongside an indefinable real at its heart.  
In effect, social assemblages are known by their identifiable regime of truth and 
unknowable dimension of real. To know a social assemblage (an event, an 
experience, a text, or units such as individuals, organizations or societies), we have 
to know the emergence and evolution of its organizing force of regime of truth and 
how it is frequently destabilized by the movement of real beyond its reach of control 
and intelligibility.        
After completing the structure of theoretical model deployed for the study, the 
analysis of modern history of Iran has to be entered upon. The experience of 
rebuilding a civilization as late as Safavid era (1501-1723) demonstrates that the 
Iranian social order possessed the ability to adapt to its historical situation up to that 
point of time (see Newman, 2006 for example). However, something seems to have 
gone seriously wrong from the point of encounter with modernity in the early half of 
19
th
 century.  
The Iranian social order in its more than two millennia of history had gone through 
the frequent processes of decline and revival whose general characteristics described 
by Ibn-e Khaldun (Polk, 2009: 58-63; Ashfaq, 2009). However, this time the context 
seems to be entirely different. In this study, the essence of new context is captured in 
the Malinowskian notions of context of culture and context of situation (see: Robins, 
1971: 44). The notion of context of culture was designed to capture the nature of 
historical embeddedness of a social assemblage while the notion of context of 
situation refers to the topological space of neighbourhood of social assemblages 
interacting with each other and vying for overcoming multiple forms of finitude 
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(developing coping strategies to overcome despotisms of nature over man, man over 
man, and the terror of death).  
The new situation troubling Iranian social order, in contradistinction with all other 
historical experiences of decline and revival in the past, is captured through the study 
of interplay between the context of culture as manifested in the notion of 
inbetweenness and context of situation as encapsulated in the notion of belatedness. 
The notion of inbetweenness refers to the state where Iranians have been equally 
attracted and repelled by the three regimes of truth (Islam, the West and Persianism) 
constituting their historical embeddedness.  
The state of inbetweenness, thus, represents the context in which alternative regimes 
of truth battle for Iranians’ allegiance and affiliation, and their love, commitment and 
passion. These warring regimes of truth possess their own abundances and lacks, and 
their own black and white books of records. Each offers something special to the 
Iranian dasein while lacking in other dimensions of Iranian dasein’s desires and 
preferences. While modernity has offered elements of communicative and 
emancipative rationalities in its truth package, its true speciality is deemed to be 
largely in the realm of instrumental rationality (overcoming the finitude of nature). 
Islam’s speciality has been largely focused on emancipative rationality (liberation 
from the terror of death) while Persianism’s strong point has been in offering the 
space for communicative rationality (common linguistic and non-linguistic heritage 
engendering the sense of bonding and belonging to a community). As such Iranians 
cannot afford to commit themselves to one package of truth at the expense of 
alienating the alternatives. They desire to have them all in a harmonious whole.  
The task of synchronizing and harmonizing these seemingly incommensurable and 
mutually exclusive sets of truth packages is a monumental task of cosmic proportion. 
Iranian subjectivity and social order, as a result, have fallen victim to the heaviness 
of the burden of judgement and its associated tragedy of confusion, and as such 
suffer from discursive homelessness.  
In the context of situation, Iranians have found themselves trapped in the state of 
belatedness and catch-up model of development, emanating from the global, 
universal and totalizing nature of modernity. The global triumph of modernity 
endowed the pioneer countries with a sense of supremacy (happy consciousness or 
happy slave) and the rest of the globe with the sense of backwardness and its 
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associated emotional economy of the sense of inferiority (unhappy consciousness or 
unhappy slave). This puts almost all belated communities in the position to embark 
on the act of reverse social engineering to fill the gap in the level of progress.  
Modernity with its discourse of progress has defined the terms and space of 
interaction between alternative social assemblages with their associated regimes of 
truth. As history attests every dominant regime of truth forces its rivals to play in its 
own game. Modernity establishes the game of progress and calls for other producers 
of truth about the world to demonstrate their competence in terms of achieving 
progress. Modernity, for instance, globalized the ‘Olympic Games’ (see Roche, 
2000; Ruprecht, 2002; Preuss & Liese, 2011) to achieve physical and mental 
excellence; if Islam had become the global dominant regime of truth it would have 
globalized the game of pilgrimage to Mecca (and other holy places), for instance, to 
achieve moral and spiritual excellence. The challenging regimes of truth, in 
response, try to establish their own games and incorporate the games of the 
incumbent force inside their own world of signification.  
Modernity with its universalism, and attempts to reshape the whole world and even 
universe in its own image alongside the need for achieving liberation from the state 
of belatedness prompted the prevalence of a Cartesian conception of social 
phenomena as the object of intelligent design rather than the outcome of 
evolutionary processes of chaotic synchronization, where wheels (technological 
progress, democracies, development, human rights, etc.) are reinvented in new and 
different historical backgrounds. This turned the transformation of social orders into 
a case of being subjected to different forms of projects of social engineering.  
Taqizadeh’s (in)famous call for wholesale Westernization of society (Tavakoli-
Targhi, 2002: 22) fully captures the spirit of the state of belatedness; almost all 
movements and programs of different persuasions have been “set out to change the 
fabric of social life in Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 20). In summary, while the state of 
inbetweenness created the tragedy of confusion for the Iranian dasein the state of 
belatedness subjected it to brutal experiences of reverse social engineering of 
different ideological brands.    
In effect, based on the experience of the state of inbetweenness and the historical 
presence of the three regimes of truth, as mentioned above, three projects of social 
transformation has emerged in Iran in order to cure the ailments associated with the 
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state of belatedness. The three large projects of social engineering constituted of 
modernization, Persianization, and Islamization, where each project has attempted to 
assimilate the elements of the alternative projects under its own appellation, 
producing nine forms of subprojects.  
The Iranian modern history has been a site of the rise and fall and re-emergence of 
these three regimes of truth and their associated projects and subprojects of social 
engineering. This study demonstrates that in the compound state of belated 
inbetweenness, the social order is the outcome of the interplay of forces, voices and 
faces, where the three forces (regimes of truth) combine through application of the 
operations of addition and subtraction to engender hybrid voices, in turn, inhabiting 
faces. Voices, as a collection of memes, go viral and frequently migrate from one 
face to another.  
This study, thus, formulates the dynamism of their rise to prominence and eventual 
fall only to remerge in new forms and how their interactions have shaped the Iranian 
experience of instability and underdevelopment using four phases of tragedy of 
confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, the emergence of dysfunctionalities and 
deformities in the social order due to the experience of institutional failure, and the 
ultimate emergence of a chaotic order.  
The forces, voices, and faces operating in each period associated with each strong 
event of Iranian history is analysed in this study based on the accounts of the 
historical actors, deploying the three processes and principles at work in the 
emergence and evolution of social phenomena (namely, embeddedness, emergence 
and incommensurability) and the cartography of the constitutive registers of social 
assemblages and their affirmative and negative axes.  
The reflexive methodology adopted in this research is based on careful blend of 
‘hermeneutics of understanding’ and ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ to achieve the 
understanding of alternative regimes of truth, their associated projects and 
subprojects of reverse social transformation and their associated hybrid voices and 
their inhabited faces, and how they all combine to give rise to strong and weak 
events of the Iranian modern history. This approach strives to avoid the cardinal sin 
of counter-transference and achieve non-combative understanding of the radical 
others operative at the heart of the Iranian self and her grid of intelligibility through 
exercising the art of listening, suspension of disbelief and being devil’s advocate in 
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order to understand the complex nature of Iranian subjectivity and its selfhood 
embedded in the warring worlds of signification and their associated structures of 
power and knowledge. This study sets out to understand how the Iranianness is 
configured and transformed in the modern history of Iran in the dynamic interaction 
between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness, ultimately producing 
the state of backwardness frequently experienced in the modern history of Iran.           
This study explores the Iranian situation where we are faced with a series of daunting 
questions in the interface between Islam, modernity and Persianism. The Iranian 
dasein is struck with the Kiearkegardian question of “how can we become Christian 
(Muslim) in a Christendom (Muslim order)?” (the question of religious reformation; 
how can we feel content and fulfilled with being a Muslim in the sense of living in 
the discursive land of Islam despite all the dark sides of the social experiences 
associated with living in the Muslim order selling itself as the republic of virtue?) 
We also encounter the question of “How can we become Persians in a Persian 
order?” (the question of reconstruction of communal bonding in how we can become 
at ease with our Persian identity despite all the dark sides associated with the 
historical experience of being a Persian?) We simultaneously face the question of 
“How can we become modern in a modern order (with all its dark sides)?”  
This latter question refers to the question of how we can justify ourselves in adopting 
the modern identity, discursive and non-discursive practices, institutional 
arrangements, and life styles despite all the demonic experiences associated with 
modernity.  In a sense, the overall question revolves around “how can we find 
redemption in our Islamic, Persian, and modern identities while each is under severe 
and sustained attacks from the alternative camps?”. Here we are faced with 
debilitating arrays of internal and external conflicts in all sites of social interactions.  
Each regimes of truth and its associated project and subprojects of reverse social 
transformation attempts to attain monopolistic position in production of truth about 
life, work, and language. As such, each regime of truth resorts to demonization of the 
other and glorification of the self. The process of idealization of one identity marker 
and demonization of the others is deeply unsettling and disconcerting for the Iranian 
dasein caring for all sides of the truth divide.  
Here, the claim is that we are not faced only with the need for religious reformation 
but reformations in Persian identity and in modern identity as well alongside the 
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daunting task of achieving a dynamical harmony among them. This means that we 
cannot treat any of these three regimes of truth as a benchmark and ask the other two 
to adapt and adjust to its basic standards of truth, goodness and beauty; instead what 
is needed is a complex readjustment of each and every one to the other in an 
evolutionary dance of chaotic synchronization. Iranians strive to synchronize the 
alternative rationalities offering liberation from despotisms of nature, man, and 
death. In this ‘context’, the Iranian dasein suffers from discursive homelessness, as 
there is no legitimate combined regime of truth available to satisfy all of her truth 
needs.   
It should be noted that confusion in the mind and chaos in the situation mutually 
reproduce and reinforce each other. As such, this work is an attempt in cultural 
psychoanalysis of Iranian social order, as Shayegan (2012a) encourages us to 
conduct (see also Rashkin 2008 and Ross 1995 on the notion of cultural 
psychoanalysis). The cardinal sin of any form of psychoanalysis, including the 
cultural one, is committing counter-transference in projecting the analyst’s grid of 
intelligibility, and analyst’s relation of power and emotional economy on the social 
agents, their actions and emotions and their associated worlds of signification and 
their affiliated regimes of truth and accompanied dictionaries of denotations and 
connotations, and how they all unintentionally combine to produce tragic and 
traumatic episodes of the Iranian modern history.  
This study, thus, has been set out to achieve a non-combative, compassionate, and 
loyal understanding of the radical others inhabiting the landscape of the Iranian 
selfhood, and how they come to combine to form different phases and events of the 
Iranian modern history. It is a voyage of self-discovery, paradoxically requiring 
faithful understanding of a set of radical others as one needs to know the radical 
other to be able to know oneself, especially in the state of belated inbetweenness.  
 
1.6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
The main contribution of the model proposed by this study is to offer a new indepth, 
integrative and interdisciplinary understanding of the developments in Iranian 
political economic history. In doing this, however, this study avoids relying on out-
of-shelf theories and devises its own theoretical framework to fit the social realities 
of Iranian modern history. Ashraf (2007), Katouzian (2010), and Rajaee (2007), 
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amongst others, call for the new theoretical understanding of the familiar events of 
the Iranian history. This study, thus, strives to ‘think outside the box’, ‘push thought 
to extreme’ (Althusser, as cited in Chakrabarty, 1992), ‘think the unthinkable’ and 
‘de-familiarize the familiar’ by breaking away from the traditional approaches to the 
analysis of Iranian history.  
It is expected that a potential objection may be raised to the broad nature of the 
research questions identified by this study and the proposed model; the rationales 
behind such a broad apparoach are detailed through the contributions made by this 
study as follows:  
 
(i) Inevitable Generalizations alongside Offering A Novel Conceptual 
Framework:  
In the current climate of war against terrorism and various divides between good and 
evil there are already so many unexamined generalizations floating around about 
Iran with possible devastating implications on the lives of the Iranian people, the 
Middle East and the whole world (see some of these generalizations, for example, in 
the following collections of essays on Iran, Gheissari, 2009; Atabaki, 2009, 2012; 
Katouzian and Shahidi, 2007; Jahanbegloo, 2004; Foran, 1994, among others). What 
this research aspires to do is to put these generalizations to the test of a very 
scrupulous and thorough analysis based on the reservoir of theoretical and historical 
resources.  
Some of these generalizations, in random order, are as follow: Iranian people are 
ready for an irreversible move toward democracy and market economy and a big 
push from outside can act as a catalyst and remove the irrational obstacles; Iranian 
people are deeply religious and will never succumb to the outside pressure and will 
never lose their Islamic identity; the change in Iran is imminent and only a minority 
of powerful groups with deeply-entrenched vested interests are preventing the 
change; the powerful outside forces always prevented Iran from achieving socio-
economic development; we are heading towards a gradual and evolutionary but 
irreversible transformation in the Iranian nation and all the encouraging signs are 
there and this process will bring its fruits if only the powerful outside forces could 
abstain from interfering in the internal evolution of Iranian social order; the 
geographical position of Iran in a region with explosive combination of God, gun 
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and oil is at the root of our problem; the root of our problems is the historical tyranny 
and despotism experienced by the Iranian people generations after generations and 
has been deeply enshrined in all aspects of Iranian lives; we are suffering from an 
understanding of Islam deeply out-dated and obsolete and the only way forward is to 
modernize the language and traditions of religious teachings and practices.   
The main themes emerging in these discourses are as follow: the emphasis is placed 
on the detrimental and conspiratorial role of the powerful outsiders, which strives to 
send the message ‘leave us alone and we will develop’; we ourselves are to blame 
with our addiction to despotism and our lack of democracy and rule of law; our 
region and neighbourhood is at the root of our historical malaise; we are suffering 
from lack of religious reformation and as such the traditional religion is at the root of 
our problems.  
In the novel framework of this study, a systematic study of Iranian modern history is 
attempted to form an examined judgement on the enigma of the Iranian experience 
of violence and underdevelopment; it is used to vigorously probe the validity, 
potency, and relevance of the aforementioned claims and counter claims. This will 
help to deepen and enrich the plane of understanding of the Iranian enigma inside 
and outside Iran and to form a set of more informed and consensual judgements on 
both sides of the Iranian border in order to achieve steady progress towards a stable 
and fulfilled society at ease with itself and at peace with others.  
The understanding offered in this study, although deeply engaged with the pressing 
issues of the time, has adequate detachment to be able to analyse the issues involved 
by developing an interdisciplinary approach and by drawing on the interplay of texts 
and contexts in the framework of a historical perspective in order to find stable 
solutions for the perpetual violence of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran. It 
is hoped that this analysis will trigger a paradigm shift in the understanding of what 
causes Iranian socio-economic underdevelopment and Iran’s history of social 
violence.  
The research question posed here is the mother of all questions and demands serious 
attention. It is said that in South Africa Apartheid was the only problem and mother 
of all problems; similarly in contemporary Iran the question of experience of socio-
economic backwardness, despite having the experience of civilization-building in the 
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form of Persian Empire or the Islamic civilization, is deeply puzzling for all people 
and is at the root of all questions.  
In a sense the point is that generalizations about the Iranian socio-economic 
experience are facts of life in all circles and walks of life whether academic or non-
academic, everyone smuggles their unexamined assumptions about the nature of 
Iranian society and its macro-level trends and directions into analysis of any 
particular issue; let us put these inevitable and unavoidable generalizations under the 
microscopic gaze of a historically-informed interdisciplinary analysis and see how 
much of the current unexamined opinions will survive the test.  
All social assemblages re-examine their foundations and embark on soul-searching 
and take a journey of self-discovery when they experience breakdowns (see 
Heidegger, 1962: 63-4 for his famous ‘hammer and door knob examples’ and how 
the invisible background becomes visible in the breakdown experience) and 
encounter crises as in the example of the recent financial crisis in the West where the 
axioms of the economic system are being questioned and re-examined. Iran has been 
suffering from such civilizational crisis for more than a century and it is a natural 
reaction to examine the foundations of Iranianness under the rubric of the questions 
emanating from the state of belatedness.  
(ii) Comparative Study  
My next reaction to the question of why we need to take the whole modern history of 
Iran with its three strong events as the subject-matter of the study is that we need to 
take stock of the literature on these three events and see whether we may gain novel 
insights into the inner workings of the Iranian society by conducting a comparative 
analysis of these strong events in the framework of a logic of intertextuality and 
intercontextuality. Using a philosophically-empirical and empirically-philosophical 
analysis of the history of the present in the spirit of Foucault and Deleuze may help 
us to free ourselves from addiction to reductionism endemic in the traditional 
analysis inside specific disciplines or academic traditions.  
Pluralism in theory and in historical experiences may enable us to broaden our minds 
and discursive repertoire to allow us to construct a suitable conceptual framework 
through the process of cross-fertilization in order to address the pressing questions of 
our time. The cross-fertilization and criss-crossing prevalent at the level of ‘real’ 
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needs to be mimicked at the level of ‘symbolic’, in a Deleuzian-inspired slogan of 
“conceptualize as you go” (see: Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).  
The hyper-complexity of our ‘situation’ may put pressure on us to say farewell to the 
principle of simplicity and parsimony (the principles which served us well in the 
framework of traditional reductionist sciences but now even in the modern physics 
and biology are under question and there is a burgeoning demand for introducing 
complexity in the social analysis) and develop more hybrid forms of models 
encompassing “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) for understanding our increasingly 
complex social reality. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach allows us to avoid the 
hazards of grand theories as well as the pitfalls of reductionism resulting from 
scientism.   
(iii) The Examination Of The Discourse Of Change  
As Ajodani (2008) points out, for so many times in their history, Iranians said to 
themselves that this time it is different, and it was not. The promise of a sustainable 
change has been with us for so long but no radical change, no irreversible breaking 
of the barriers of socio-economic underdevelopment, seems to have happened. 
Iranians seems to have embraced, resisted, ridiculed, and subverted all forms of 
social orders and experimented with all types of blueprints for change, but were 
never settled into any of them, waiting for the blueprint-to-come. They migrated 
from one discursive land to another in an endless process of nomadic movements 
(yeelagh-gheshlagh). They welcomed and rejected the old and the new, the left and 
the right, the secular and the religious, the liberal and the authoritarian, the 
nationalist and the internationalist. Adoption of historical perspective may help us to 
shatter this unexamined axiom of change by putting together the missing parts of 
historical jigsaw and providing a cognitive mapping of Iranianness, followed by 
putting forward a whole set of prerequisites for a sustainable transformation to occur.  
 
1.7. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The implications of the study are as follows: 
(i) Refinement of the Conceptual and Theoretical Landscape 
 One of the possible important implications of the study may involve an invitation to 
set aside or downgrade a whole set of conceptual dichotomies frequently used for the 
analysis of the Iranian issues; concepts such as tyranny/freedom, despotism/liberty, 
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Mafia rules/accountability, rent-seeking/competitive markets, 
totalitarianism/liberalism, fascism/democracy, fundamentalism/toleration, 
populism/civil society, among others.  
This research attempts to offer a new set of concepts such as tragedy of confusion, 
inbetweenness, belatedness, ambiguity, projects and subprojects of social 
engineering, tension, regimes of truth, logrolling, idealization of the self and 
demonization of the other, zombie categories and zombie institutions, 
dysfunctionalities and deformities, truth cycle, innocent brutality, final arbiter, 
among others. This is to practice what Deleuze preaches on the art of 
conceptualization or movement in thought mimicking the movement in real. 
Furthermore, the study endeavours to demonstrate the inadequacy of many of the 
current theories invoked in the analysis of the Iranian problems and to probe 
deficiencies endemic to their suggested policies and solutions.  
 
(ii) National and Personal Reconciliation 
The study purports to pave the ground for national reconciliation and emergence of a 
society of non-violence. Establishing a society of non-violence in the context of 
Iranian social order requires persuasion in order to stop the process of idealization of 
the self and demonization of the other.  Through the proposed model, this study 
approaches the modern history of Iran not as the war of good against evil (which has 
meaning and functionality inside a homogenous order with a dominant regime of 
truth) or truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, or forces of progress versus 
forces of darkness, or forces of modernity versus forces of tradition but as a history 
of confusion and warring sets of partial truth permeating Iranian embeddedness 
(historical a priori) and Iranian historically-constructed consciousness.  
This study may also seriously challenge the value of studies relying on the notion of 
‘transition’ from tradition to modernity. The logical implication of this model may 
involve viewing almost all sides of the historical divisions in Iran on an equal 
footing, and avoiding value judgements about them, and finding them rational in 
their own terms and their own specific frame of reference and paying attention to 
how and why they resonate for the Iranian dasein. The study purports to offer a 
science of singularity, which combines generality with particularity. The proposed 
model attempts to pave the way for a social search for the theoretical reconciliation 
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of Islam, Iran, and the Western modernity and aims to set aside the epistemic and 
linguistic violence as well as the physical one. The main step in the process of 
construction of an Iranian model of reconciliation is the reconciliation with the self 
and its contradictions, and the realization that we have a hyper-complex task in 
producing adequately-rich discursive homeland for our subjectivities to be able to 
reside in peace and in the spirit of cooperation and reciprocity.  This may call for the 
beginning of the end of intermittent feelings of self-infatuation or self-hatred felt by 
the Iranians in different periods of their history.   
This study hopes to provide a potent and powerful theoretical support for the 
attempts made by figures like Nategh-e Nuri and Jahanbeglo, among others, to 
achieve national reconciliation. It may provide philosophical and theoretical support 
for the late Ezzatollah Sahabi’s call for “removal of hatred” (keeneh-zodaei) from the 
Iranian social space (see his last interview before his death) as the condition of 
possibility of sustainable development and collective fulfilment.  
(iii) Towards Colonization of High Theory and Constant Engagement with 
History 
One of the implications of the model, in its spanning of the landscape of historical 
experiences and the landscape of theoretical frameworks, is to give us courage to 
embark on the colonization of the landscape of high theory. The sense of inferiority 
in the realm of theory construction and its application to the real issues (see Fanon, 
1961; Mahbubani, 1998; Mignolo, 2011; Dabashi. 2013) is one of the serious 
obstacles to a sustainable socio-economic development; a society which does not 
have adequate confidence in itself to produce theories fitting its own historical 
situation is bound to imitate the theoretical movements and policies designed for 
different contexts of culture and situation, like following the Marxist theories and 
theories of post-colonialism and imperialism at one time and blindly adopting the 
neoliberal theories of privatization and liberalization at another.  
The interdisciplinary approach adopted in this study represents an attempt in creating 
a sense of ownership in the landscape of high theory and demonstrate how 
imaginative adoption of these global theories can be tamed for localization to shed 
light on our own hyper-complex and singular situation; here we strive to reconcile 
globalization trends in theory with the urgent need for the localization of theory. We 
achieve globalization in terms of mastery of the language of high theory in 
philosophy, economics, or politics but reconstruct them to fit the local complexities 
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of a social order with a unique history; in the process we achieve “convergent 
divergence” (Gourevitch, 2003: 325). This allows simultaneous engagement with 
abstract thoughts and concrete realities of our history of the present.    
(iv)The Question Of Binaries  
One of the implications of this study is the downgrading of the importance of the set 
of dichotomous concepts such as the binary of revolution/evolution. 
majority/minority, left/right, secular/religious, as Ayatollah Khomeini used to stress, 
but for different reasons. In addition, this study hopes to establish two points: the 
hyper-complexity of Iranian situation defies the application of any one theory in any 
one discipline and requires a combined approach and secondly, we need to colonize 
the high theories of philosophy, economics and politics to address ‘our’ own special 
problems.  
I do not sustain any special allegiance to any theory, set of theories, or disciplines; I 
am fully committed to making the subject matter of the research intelligible rather 
than attempting to establish a specific disciplinary identity, allegiance, or 
professionalism. Colonization of the landscape of high theory gives us courage to 
begin to break the monopoly of the West in the production and application of high 
theory. The prominence in the production of high theory gives the West undisputed 
dominance in the realm of knowledge with devastating effects in the distribution of 
power and in the design of policies to achieve socio-economic development.  
I further hope to disrupt the duality of inside/outside, self/other, and indigenous/alien 
and demonstrate that they are not rich enough to be able to shed light on our situation 
and mind-set. We will progress further in understanding and solving our problems by 
tapping into the trend of the new and burgeoning tradition of interdisciplinary 
approach matching the trend of globalization where alongside the gradual 
disappearance of national borders the disciplinary boundaries are progressively 
vanishing and new and exciting horizons are emerging to match in theory the hyper 
complexity of an increasingly globalized-localized reality (convergent divergence). 
This study, thus, aims to apply the Deleuzian commandment of creative thinking 
where thinking follows the movement of real and creates new concepts in its road 
journey of singularities, ‘haecceity’, ‘thisness’, and ‘indexicality’ of social 
assemblages (social phenomena, events, and orders).  
(v) To Establish a Logic of Non-combative Mutual Understanding 
26 
 
One of the implications of the model proposed in this study is the attempt to 
establish a logic of compassionate mutual understanding rather than pursuing 
currently-detrimental logic of critique. It claims that in the state of inbetweenness 
what we need is mutual understanding entailing understanding the radical other. 
Deployment of critical approaches is a kind of counter-transference and involves the 
projection of set of pre-defined categories of thought on the action, emotion and 
intention of social actors and their unintended consequences. In the state of belated 
inbetweenness we lack common grounds and common set of standards of rationality 
and as such we need hermeneutics of understanding much more than hermeneutics of 
suspicion. 
 
1.8. AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The study constitutes of a theoretical framework, a methodological analysis and 
three case studies aiming to test the explanatory power of the theoretical model 
devised to make sense of Iranian history of experience of underdevelopment. 
Chapter 2 offers the methodological debates relating to the nature of social 
phenomena and social enquiry and develops a methodological structure fit for the 
purpose of understanding the Iranian experience of underdevelopment. Chapter 3 
develops the study model and the theoretical framework supporting it.  
Chapter 4 applies the theoretical framework and its associated methodological 
insights to the experiences and events associated with the Constitutional Revolution, 
while Chapter 5 applies the model to the Oil-Nationalization Movement. 
Furthermore, Chapter 6 applies the model to the Islamic Revolution. It should be 
noted that all three large case study chapters are organized around four stages of the 
evolution of social order through tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable 
coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order.   
Chapter 7 concludes the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY  
The whole of science is nothing more than an extension of 
everyday thinking. 
                           Albert Einstein (quoted in Jaccard and Jacoby, 2010: 6) 
The word should be the wind itself; the word should be the rain 
itself (vazheh bayad khode bad vazheh bayad khod-e baran 
bashad). Sohrab Sepehri
1
      
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to produce the necessary insights and tools for the analysis 
of the empirical data covering the three strong events of modern history of Iran. This 
chapter delves into deep philosophical waters of ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological foundations and presuppositions of empirical investigations in order 
to tailor the methodology of the research to the particular requirements of the 
empirical research. It strives to produce novel insights into the nature of social 
inquiry in general and international political economy, the experience of 
development, Iranian history, society, economy and polity in particular.     
2.2. WHAT METHODOLOGY FITS THE NATURE OF SOCIAL 
PHENOMENA? -  (TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF SINGULARITY) 
The chief question in the study of development is why some countries develop and 
others do not. This profound question preoccupies minds and affects lives at 
academic and non-academic levels, policy circles, and everyday existence. To 
address the question, academic scholars, policy makers and ordinary people follow, 
subliminally or consciously, a mode of reasoning in order to construct a valid 
argument, which deploys a research method or a combination of research methods to 
explore the roots of historical episodes of developmental failures and successes.  
                                                          
1
 The Iranian contemporary poet; see Daniel & Mahdi (2006: 86-7) on Sepehri. 
28 
 
In this section, hence, we aim to explore the characteristics, relevance, effectiveness, 
and scope of applicability of different research methods and methodologies available 
in the market for ideas and to evaluate their ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions and their ethical underpinnings and public policy implications. The 
ultimate aim of this section is to develop a novel approach to the study of social 
phenomena in general and socio-economic development in Iran in particular.  
It should be noted that the issue of underdevelopment is the subject of everyday 
experience. People of developing countries feel the pains and bitterness associated 
with it in their everyday experiences in all spheres of life, in the states of their social 
policies, public services (health, education, public utilities), in their transportation 
system (in roads, railroads, and air travel), in their economy (unemployment, 
inflation, inequality and economic growth), in their chaotic politics, in their art and 
science, in their social relations, and generally in their status and prestige in the 
league of nations. The separate realms of experience in arts and sciences, polity, 
economy and family echo a general state of affairs in their countries, a malaise called 
‘socio-economic underdevelopment or backwardness’.  
This bitter experience of underdevelopment becomes part of individual and national 
psyche and trickles down into everyday discursive and non-discursive practices, 
conversations and small talks at micro level and public discourse at the macro level. 
Consequently, this feeling of backwardness breeds the emotions of discontent, 
disillusionment, frustration, and depression, and triggers a set of responses ranging 
from a theoretical search for answers to migration to the developed lands, and to 
social and political movements for change and their ensuing upheavals. Bodies curl 
themselves into question marks. Why? Why are we so backward?  
The critical analysis in this study revolves around the questions and the answers 
related to the central problematic of ‘Why are we backward?’ with a range of 
reactions from voting with hands (direct attempts for change, either through 
democratic procedures like elections or via resort to direct actions, instigating social 
movements, revolutions, and the like) to voting with feet (physical migration, 
ideological migration through conversion to alternative philosophical and ideological 
camps and their manifestations in changing names, dress codes, etc.), all enshrined in 
a set of discursive and non-discursive responses to this profound question in the 
modern history of Iran.  
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It should be noted that the theorisation of such a bitter everyday experience of failure 
to achieve sustainable development at a collective level is the subject matter of this 
study; as Whitehead maintains:  “[the] elucidation of immediate experience is the 
sole justification for any thought” (cited in Griffin, 2008: 6). Thus, this study aims to 
peel the multiple layers of any form of experiences, including the experience of 
underdevelopment. Experience is the archaeological site of knowledge and the 
genealogical ground of power, all fused in the affectivity of subjectivity. This study, 
hence, attempts to specify a particular methodology that allows locating this 
complexity and determining how it can be used to understand the experience of 
socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran. 
In doing so, this study aims to establish the uniqueness and singularity of social 
phenomena and social orders alongside the prevalence of family resemblances 
between them by supplying a methodology of understanding the radical other and 
applying it to the experience of underdevelopment in Iran in order to demonstrate 
that it can reveal much of the hyper-complexity of human life in its singularity and 
uniqueness. This research, thus, demonstrates that in order to understand social 
phenomena we need to ground our analysis in the three principles of embeddedness, 
emergence, and incommensurability.  
Within the identified research aims of this study, this chapter attempts to address the 
following questions indicating the methodological foundations of this study: ‘How 
do we think about the social issues such as socio-economic underdevelopment?’, or 
‘How do we conduct social inquiry and social reasoning at academic and non-
academic levels?’; ‘What logics do we follow when we begin to problematize issues 
and when we strive to formulate an analysis of the problematized issues?’; ‘How 
problems are disclosed as problems?; ‘What makes us see a state of being as 
problematic?’; ‘What is thought?’; ‘What is reasoning and making judgement and 
making decisions?’. 
These are immensely important set of questions as they direct us towards the 
condition of possibility of our mode of thinking and analysis, centring on the 
question of ‘Why do we think and reason the way we do?’ 
We do not start from research questions but from the issue of condition of possibility 
of problematization or the grid of intelligibility un-concealing things as problems, in 
the sense that we try to understand the understanding and question the questioning, 
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on how things introduce themselves and are counted as ‘something or another’ and 
are ‘disclosed’ as problems and how the research questions are produced. This level 
of analysis, thus, questions the act of questioning. This demonstrates that the chief 
question in the study of development is not self-evident and obvious, but it is rooted 
in a specific and contingent grid of intelligibility, which makes us identify something 
as problem and ignore others.  
‘How can we question our questions and our method and style of questioning?’ 
Embarking on the analysis of Althusser’s conception of the alleged reversal of Hegel 
by Marx, Lechte (1994: 41) reminds us that,  
a problematic marks out a horizon of thought: it is the ‘form in which 
problems must be posed’; it limits the language and concepts which are 
available for thought at a particular historical conjuncture; finally, the 
problematic constitutes the ‘absolute and definite condition of possibility’ of 
a ‘definite theoretical structure’. 
 
We draw upon a wide variety of intellectual resources in order “to break with forms 
of knowledge which, to be validated, relied on the ‘obviousness’ of immediate 
experience” (Lechte, 1994: 41). In this sense we do not take the question of ‘Why 
are we backward?’ as self-evident and obvious, rather, we question the condition of 
possibility of such a question arising in the first place.   
The implications of searching for the condition of possibility of problematization 
manifest themselves in our attempt to understand how we formulate the research 
questions and how we operationalize and measure them. We could problematize a 
state of being across incommensurable set of measures, for instance: according to 
spiritual or moral status of a nation or its state of happiness; or the number of good 
deeds, good talks and good thoughts produced in a an average day; the number of 
smiles directed towards complete strangers; the number of minutes walked in the 
wilderness, the number of times God’s name was praised in grace; the number of 
times hearts filled with excitement and exuberance of discovery or love; the number 
of stable friendship per person; the amount of joy and delight (utility) gained out of 
shopping and consumption; the number of times radical experience of fullness have 
occurred for a person in a life time; the amount of time spent in the state of calmness 
and contemplation in a day; the level of wisdom accumulated in a life time and the 
mechanism of transferring them to the next generation; the quality of 
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intergenerational relations in a nation (just to name a few); and devise a set of 
research questions and indicators to measure them.  
In a sense, all these measures – however plausible or implausible they might seem, 
depending on our addicted grid of intelligibility- are related to at least three realms of 
instrumental rationality, communicative rationality and emancipative rationality and 
how they are prioritized and how a specific grid of intelligibility problematizes 
issues and self-organizes forms of life. The transcendental level of analysis (at the 
level of condition of possibility) addresses the multiplicity of modes of thoughts and 
ways of approaching subject matters of social enquiry and explores how social issues 
are problematized, presented as a problem, demanding our attention and articulation. 
It also deals with how theories and explanations are constructed or fashioned, and 
how the processes and procedures of persuasion, acceptance, rejection, resistance or 
refinement are formed.  
The methodological research in this chapter also addresses questions like the 
following: ‘Is social inquiry rule-governed or arbitrary?’ and ‘How do we need to 
select or combine different logics of inquiry to best fit the nature of our subject 
matter?’ 
The time of breakdown and crisis, the bitter time of underdevelopment, prompts the 
disclosure of the holistic nature of thought, human existence, and social phenomena. 
This is what Derrida (1983: 19) alludes to as the time of reflection and meta-
reflection:  
The time for reflection is also the chance for turning back on the very 
conditions of reflection, in all the senses of that word, as if with the help of a 
new optical device one could finally see sight, could not only view the natural 
landscape, the city, the bridge and the abyss, but could view viewing. As if 
through an acoustical device one could hear hearing, in other words, seize the 
inaudible in a sort of poetic telephony. Then the time of reflection is also an 
other time, it is heterogeneous with what it reflects and perhaps gives time for 
what calls for and is called thought.  
 
Rorty (1979: xiii) puts it in a more succinct phrase:  
a ‘philosophical problem’ was a product of the unconscious adoption of a set 
of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the problem was stated - 
assumptions which were to be questioned before the problem itself was taken 
seriously.  
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We have to ask why we ask about socio-economic underdevelopment; what are the 
conditions of possibility of its turning into a devastating and life-changing problem? 
This is a call for the problematization of the problem. Deleuze, as reported by 
Colebrook (2009: 9), guides us in the same direction when he states:  
[O]ne ought not to accept any already given and actualised form but should ask 
how such a form emerged, what that emergence can tell us about the life from 
which any actuality has taken shape, and how such a life – beyond its already 
created possibilities – might yield other potentials. History, then, should not 
take the terms already given, such as man, subjectivity, the polis, the speaking 
subject or the family, as its point of departure. Rather, history needs to account 
for the genesis of the subject.  
 
Taking the transcendental inquiry to its logical conclusion, as Surin (2010: 161) 
reports, we arrive at Deleuze’s plane of immanence:  
Deleuze is emphatic that abstractions explain nothing, but rather are 
themselves in need of explanation. So the new philosophy that will experiment 
with the real, will eschew such abstractions as universals, unities, subjects, 
objects, multiples, and put in their place the processes that culminate in the 
production of the abstractions in question. So in place of universals we have 
processes of universalisation; in place of subjects and objects we have 
subjectification and objectification; in place of unities we have unification; in 
place of the multiple we have multiplication; and so on. These processes take 
place on the plane of immanence, since experimentation can only take place 
immanently.  
 
The question of why we think and behave the way we do takes us far back to the 
plane of immanence. In a sense, as Zizek (2011) puts it “the way we perceive the 
problem can be itself part of the problem. … There are not only wrong answers there 
are also wrong questions”. Chakrabarty (2000: 93) gives us the sense of enormity of 
the task of questioning our addicted modern scheme of conceptualization in the study 
of experience of different countries like India:   
It is not enough to historicize “history,” the discipline, for that only uncritically 
keeps in place the very understanding of time that enables us to historicize in 
the first place. The point is to ask how this seemingly imperious, all-pervasive 
code might be deployed or thought about so that we have at least a glimpse of 
its own finitude, a glimpse of what might constitute an outside to it. To hold 
history, the discipline, and other forms of memory together so that they can 
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help in the interrogation of each other, to work out the ways these immiscible 
forms of recalling the past are juxtaposed in our negotiations of modern 
institutions, to question the narrative strategies in academic history that allow 
its secular temporality the appearance of successfully assimilating to itself 
memories that are, strictly speaking, unassimilable—these are the tasks that 
subaltern histories are suited to accomplish in a country such as India.  
 
Here we see that the unassimilable other is the key for seeing our seeing. It seems 
that the only possible platform or standpoint available for imagining otherwise is the 
one from the radical other whether a contemporary or a historical one (over time or 
across space). In the case of Iran, we frequently encounter the questioning of the 
questions as the product of political economy of truth in the state of in-betweenness 
where each Iranian is a collection of radical others. The radical other is the way to 
see the seeing, as Griffin (2008: 104) maintains:  
“reality is indescribably, probably infinitely, complex, whether one is 
discussing reality as a whole or any particular thing, such as the human body 
or even a single living cell. But our minds, our cognitive processes, are 
thoroughly finite and fallible, prone to invincible ignorance, sinful distortions, 
and simple mistakes of numerous sorts. Part of our finitude and fallibility is 
that we necessarily perceive and think about the world in terms of the 
perspective or framework that we inherit from a particular tradition. As Paul 
Knitter says, this conclusion leads to what David Lochhead calls the 
“dialogical imperative,” because it is through dialogue with members of other 
religious traditions that “we can expand or correct the truth that we have,” 
thereby overcoming the “limitations of our own viewpoint.” Through such 
dialogue we can partly overcome the mismatch between the infinite 
complexity of reality and our limited perspectives”.  
 
The Iranian state of in-betweenness provides the inevitable encounter with the 
radical other (due to the processes taking place on the plane of immanence), 
constitutive of the self in the urgent situation of the state of belatedness (being late to 
the process of development).  
2.3 TWO WAYS OF ANALYZING SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
The basic questions we face in any methodological argument about social 
phenomena are as follows: What are social phenomena and how can we analyse 
them? Are they objects or texts or a combination of the two and in each case how 
can we know them?  
34 
 
Considering that our ontology defines our methodology, this study strives to 
establish that social phenomena, like the bitter experience of socio-economic 
underdevelopment in Iran, are both objects and texts, and as such are embedded, 
emergent, and incommensurable assemblages composed of forms and contents. 
Their forms are universal and composed of the three orders of symbolic, imaginary, 
and real with their affirmative and negating dimensions, and their contents are 
particular and manifested in various instantiations of regimes of truth. Both their 
forms and contents, as objects and things of this world, are subject to the forces of 
the principle of embeddedness and emergence, and as such their formation and 
transformation should be studied using the tools and resources of hermeneutics of 
suspicion including process ontology, complexity science and reductionism. Due to 
the emergence of meaning (whose features we investigate in the following sections 
of this chapter) in the chain of being, the contents of social phenomena cannot be 
accessed from an external point of view (the principle of incommensurability) and 
can only be accessed from inside a particular regime of truth using the resources and 
tools of hermeneutics of understanding including the psychoanalytic method of free 
association. In this study, the final hybrid methodology selectively incorporates the 
elements of Foucauldian approach consisting of archaeology of knowledge, 
genealogy of power and problematization of subjectivity, possessing elements of 
both hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of understanding. The combination 
of universal form and particular content defines the shared singularity of each social 
phenomenon. The particular hybrid of hermeneutics of understanding and 
hermeneutics of suspicion, therefore, defines our science of singularity and forms the 
core of our methodology of social analysis. The following sections of this chapter 
strive to develop these themes step by step. 
At the most general level, there are two ways of analysing human phenomena: 
explanation (causal: search for causes) and understanding (teleological: search for 
inner meanings and narratives; explication) or formalism and hermeneutics as 
Foucault puts it (see Flynn, 2005) or hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of 
understanding as Ricoeur formulates them (see Leiter, 2004; Davis, 2010). There are 
fundamental ontological differences between these two approaches. In the process of 
explaining social phenomena (actions, speeches, emotions, experiences, activities, 
events, individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, communities, nations, and 
international order) they are treated as objects, subject to the forces of causation and 
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complexity systems. In contrast, in the process of understanding (hermeneutics) 
them, they are treated as texts pregnant with meanings, requiring interpretation. As 
Von Wright (1992: viii) puts it  
The ‘causalist’ and the ‘actionist’, … knit differently the conceptual web 
against whose background they see the world—and they therefore see the 
world differently. When set in a historical perspective their world views 
become linked with the two traditions of thought.  
 
Explanation, in its most common form, is represented by positivism, characterized 
by “emphasis on the unity of scientific method, on mathematical exactitude as an 
ideal of perfection, and on the subjection of phenomena to general laws” (Von 
Wright, 1992: xi).  
Explanation is predominantly organized based on a reductionist approach. The 
reductionist approach is either based on providing law-like explanations or 
explanations based on complexity science.  It is worth noting that ‘complexity 
theory’ can be used reductively or non-reductively (see Sawyer, 2005; see also 
Connolly 2011 and the notion of global resonance machine).  
This study, hence, attempts to demonstrate that both reductionist and complexity 
approaches, if they are adopted as the main and dominant modes of analysis, have 
fundamental flaws essentially, because the human phenomena emerge as meaningful 
entities, embedded in forces and fields, forces of symbolic orders and fields of 
signification. To understand the problematic of underdevelopment in the symbolic 
order of particular history of a nation we have to position our analysis in a method of 
articulation employing hermeneutics of understanding in combination with 
hermeneutics of suspicion.  
In responding to current shortcomings and inadequacies in the realm of social 
inquiry, a coherent framework is to be developed in this chapter based on the works 
of Heidegger, Foucault, Taylor, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Isiah Berlin’s history of 
ideas, complexity science and Williamson’s transaction cost economics in order to 
incorporate explanation into explication, leading to the construction of a combined 
and hybrid approach to social phenomena. This research, drawing upon such 
contributions, demonstrates that the emergence of meaning drastically changes the 
dynamics of formation and transformation of social phenomena and subsumes their 
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complexity and reductionist properties under the holistic phenomenon of world of 
signification or regimes of truth.  
We start with Heidegger’s existential phenomenology (Dreyfus’s version of 
Heideggerian phenomenology), which establishes the nature of dasein (human 
existence) as being-in-the-world. To characterize dasein as a compound being we 
deploy Lacan's triad (imaginary and symbolic orders intertwined with the order of 
real) and characterize them using Foucault’s positivity (historical a priori or positive 
unconscious) based on three axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity, 
complemented by Deleuz’s process ontology and Lacanian-Zizekian negativity 
(foreclosure, repression, and disavowal alongside negating dimensions of imaginary 
order and order of real). We will elaborate on the fact that each social phenomenon is 
a social assemblage (whether experience, event, or social entities such as individuals, 
organizations, institutions, nations, or community of nations). Through such 
processes, this study establishes that social assemblages possess shared forms and 
unique contents, as social assemblages are embedded, emergent, and 
incommensurable phenomena and their form can be characterized by the Lacanian 
three orders and their negating and affirmative dimensions.  
This study, furthermore, utilises, Foucault, Deleuze, and Corbin and Castoriadis, 
amongst others, to characterize the negating and affirmative dimensions of social 
assemblages. After characterizing the common form of social assemblages, this 
study embarks on gaining access to their unique content through tailoring the 
psychoanalytic method of free association to the features of social assemblages.  
In summary and in reflection, at the most basic level, we need to know why things 
are the way they are; in our case why socio-economic development and wealth of 
nations have been achieved for some and not for others (the enigma of the origin of 
the wealth of nations). We are faced with the long history of this research question 
ranging from Smith, to Landes (1998, 2003), Olson (1982), and modern 
development economics (see Besley and Persson, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012, among others) and development studies. To address this question we need to 
combine hermeneutics of understanding, where we treat social phenomena as texts 
and pay detailed attention to the accounts of the historical actors, with hermeneutics 
of suspicion, where we treat social phenomena as objects and unravel their 
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unintended consequences. We need to combine “thick” and “thin” descriptions to 
fully map a social phenomenon.     
It should be noted that the nature of this research is a problem-oriented inquiry (see 
Glynos and Howarth, 2007) into the enigma of underdevelopment in Iran. Almost all 
problem-oriented researches follow social crises or dilemmas. Problem-oriented 
research is prompted when a nation or an individual is sruck with the sense that 
something fundamentally has gone wrong with its/her way of life and is forced to 
ask difficult questions on its/her identity and roots of its/her problems, prompting the 
emergence of a set of basic wh-questions on why, how, what, when and where of the 
lived experiences of being-in-the-world.  
We identified three research programs of reductionism, complexity science, and 
hermeneutics as alternative methods of analysis of social phenomena and declared 
that this study is a way to combine them in order to reveal the uniqueness of social 
phenomena, drawing on the resources offered by three principles of embeddedness, 
emergence, and incommensurability. Ultimately, this study aims to show how, the 
particular and the universal, the causal link and the complexity connection and the 
relation of meaning are enshrined in each instant of singularity of social phenomena, 
where the hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion are 
deployed to reveal its multi-layered form and content of dynamic being/becoming. 
The detailed investigation of the two broad philosophical approaches underpinning 
the ontological and methodological arguments on the nature of social phenomena 
was not included in this work due to word limitations. 
2.4 CHARACTERIZATION OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD 
The preceding discussions in this chapter initiated the methodological analysis with 
problematization of the issue of underdevelopment in Iran and asked about the most 
appropriate analytical approach for exploring and illuminating the issue of 
underdevelopment in Iran and for investigating the reason why such a question is 
asked in the first place. The question was positioned in the binary space of 
‘understanding’ versus ‘explanation’ (dasein versus cogito).  Following this line of 
argument, This chapter explores the notion of ‘dasein’ describing our compound 
existence as a being-in-the-word (worldhood), and the concept of ‘cogito’ reducing 
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the art of understanding social phenomena into a subject-object relation
2
. The 
following sections of this methodological chapter develop the ‘dasein/cogito’ binary 
opposition more extensively in order to come up with an effective methodology of 
social analysis.  
In the following sections, this chapter introduces and develops three notions of 
embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability
3
 in order to explore the generic 
features of ‘dasein’ and being-in-the-world with the objective of producing an 
analytic of ‘dasein’. These three principles establish the singularity of social 
phenomena in their embeddedness in diverse regimes of truth and in their features as 
emergent events pregnant with meaning, which makes them incommensurable to 
each other and, as a result, unsuitable candidates for the application of the 
reductionist method of ‘compare and contrast’. Each social phenomenon- whether 
crime, unemployment, migration, violence, or socio-economic development- 
emerges in a ‘world’ with specific characteristics (like specific plants growing in 
specific types of soil in regions with specific climates).  
In this, the notion of embeddedness is meant to capture this feature of social 
phenomena, i.e. their being rooted in the specificity of spatiotemporal worldhoods. 
The notion of emergence is deemed to take into account the nature of social 
phenomena as unintended consequences of interaction of multiplicity of historical 
forces immanent to the specificity of the spatiotemporal worlds and beings-in-the-
world.  
The notion of emergence furthermore grasps the dynamics of change in these forms 
of spatiotemporal embeddedness. Emergent social phenomenon gets sedimented to 
the riverbed of embeddedness and changes its nature in an unintended and 
irreversible fashion. Embeddedness hints to the fact that each phenomenon emerges 
in the middle and no mortal thing acts as origin of things. Everything starts from the 
middle and everything is rooted in something else and originates from and is located 
                                                          
2
 As Bass (2006; 39) suggests “Subject and object are metaphysical illusions synonymous with the 
privilege of consciousness”. Bass (2006; 78) maintains that dasein “is not a subject which is then 
brought into relation with objects but only exists as being-with”. Dasein is always outside itself while 
cogito is self-contained and sovereign. The “motherbaby matrix” (Bass, 2006: 112) or agent-
environment interaction in situated robotics (Sawyer, 2005: 50) are powerful images of the networked 
and assembled nature of dasein. 
3
 The principle of incommensurability (Isaiah Berlin; 1990; Bhabha (1990b: 209); Chang 1997 and 
Crowder 2002) describes a default position in which singularities cannot be compared and contrasted 
according to a set of common or universal measures. 
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in a larger whole
4
; the notion of embeddedness captures the holistic characteristics of 
this state of ‘being-always-already-in-the-middle’ and this larger whole in which and 
from which every phenomenon arises.  
On the other hand, the notion of emergence alludes to how embedded forces give 
rise to new phenomena and how these new phenomena in turn produce the dynamics 
of change in this embeddedness and in this larger whole. In a sense, embeddedness 
gives rise to emergence and emergence changes embeddedness.  The notion of 
embeddedness discerns the ‘thisness’ (haecceity)5 (see Bates 2010), the belonging 
and the rootedness of social phenomena while emergence points to the nature of 
social phenomena as ‘events’. The movement of embedded forces produce emergent 
events and the latter, in turn, add new layers to the configuration and constellation of 
embedded forces. This interplay of embeddedness and emergence produces social 
orders, which are singular and incommensurable and cannot be understood through 
approaches employing universalist and essentialist notions, methods and tool kits.  
The three features of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability, hence, turn 
social phenomena into social assemblages. Social phenomena (from experiences to 
events, and social entities such as individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and 
nations) as things of this world are emergent, meaningful and embedded compounds, 
which are unintended consequences of interaction of forces.  
The task of a productive methodology, then, turns into constructing multitude of 
bridges between the incommensurable plates of singularities out of the materials 
available in our being-in-the-world. Here the constitutive image of singularities is a 
set of partitioned islands in need of elaborate bridges to overcome the initial situation 
of separation and disconnectedness. This analogy is, however, not entirely fruitful, as 
singularities, as opposed to islands, come into contact with each other, intermingle, 
trade with or invade each other, cooperate or clash with each other, form symbiotic 
                                                          
4
 Empedocles (cited in Tom Holland (2005: xxx)) alludes to this fact in the following terms: 
Listen now to a further point: no mortal thing 
Has a beginning, nor does it end in death and obliteration; 
There is only a mixing and then a separating of what was mixed, 
But by mortal men these processes are named ‘beginnings’.   
5
 The notion of “thisness” implies that we do not encounter social phenomena in general categories of 
“violence”, “development”, “poverty”, “love” or “inflation”. What we are faced with are “violences”, 
“developments”, “poverties”, “loves” or “inflations”; in this sense what we have is “this violence”, 
“this development”, “this poverty” , “this love” or “this inflation” emerging in “this” local regime of 
power-knowledge-subjectivity and out of “this” local spatiotemporal trajectory of events. This is 
highly significant point in our methodological expedition; we will explore the notion of indexicality 
(rather than universality) at the heart of social concepts a great deal more later on in this chapter.  
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relation with or hostile antagonism against each other; but despite all of these various 
forms of encounters and exchanges, they remain isolated and separated in the walls 
of their own symbolic orders. In a sense, they are ‘gated communities and ghettos’ 
(see, for example, the notion of ‘parochial mental ghettos’ in Zerubavel (2006: 38-9).  
The default position for each social assemblage is what Sartre (1989: 45) famously 
stated in the form of ‘hell is other people’. As Burt (2004: 351) suggests “The 
defining features of the social structure are clusters of dense connection linked by 
occasional bridge relations between clusters”. In this study, thus, the art of 
overcoming incommensurabilities through understanding of the radical other in her 
own terms alongside exploring how social assemblages in their interactions give rise 
to emergent ‘events’ is called- following Highmore (2006) and Karpik (2010) – ‘the 
science of singularities’.  
2.5 THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA  
This section embarks on a voyage of discovery to explore “what Keith Ansell-
Pearson aptly calls an ‘ethology of assemblages’”(Mark Hansen; 2000: paragraph 6) 
or an ethology of beings-in-the-world
6
 (Martin Heidegger,1962) which means the 
study of assemblages in their natural environments (in the context of everyday life). 
To study social assemblages, we require three notions of embeddedness, emergence 
and incommensurability.  
The concept of embeddedness has emerged to account for the notion that social 
phenomena are assemblages and compounds which are always already located in a 
bigger order. This is inspired by the works of Deleuze and Guattari, where they 
“prefer to consider things not as substances but as assemblages or multiplicities, 
focusing on things in terms of unfolding forces - bodies and their powers to affect 
and be affected- rather than static essence” (Tamsin Lorraine; 2010: 147; added 
emphasis).  
The concept of emergence is embedded in an attempt to capture the notion that social 
phenomena are not the product of intelligent design and voluntary construction 
(Cartesian notion of construction as Hayek [1967: 85, 92-4] formulated it) rather 
unintended consequences of a series of complex interactions, and evolutionary and 
                                                          
6
 Or the ethology of worldhoods in the language of subaltern literature. 
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rhizomatic processes. Here, the argument of this study departs from the common 
notion of causation. Spinks (2010: 183) notes:  
As Nietzsche argues we do not need to relate actions back to a subject or 
‘doer’, nor do we need to see events as effects or as having a pre-existing 
cause. These ideas provided Deleuze with a way of developing a philosophy of 
immanence and an understanding of being as univocity.  
 
At this stage, the notion of immanence (or emergence or spontaneity) replaces the 
common notion of causality (we will develop this point more extensively later in this 
study).   
The principle of emergence (having family resemblance to the notion of immanence 
in Deleuze’s vocabulary) has a Nietzschian spirit to it where: “For Nietzsche, 
phenomena, organisms, societies and States are nothing other than the expression of 
particular configurations of forces” (Spinks, 2010: 184). Alan Bass (2006; xii) 
alludes to the same notion where he states that:  
In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1983) Deleuze emphasizes Nietzsche’s much 
misunderstood notion of will to power. He makes it clear that will to power is 
not about any individual’s attempt to exert domination over another. Rather, it 
is a way of understanding all phenomena in terms of conflicts between 
nonconscious differentials of force.  
 
In reflecting on all these conceptual issues, the concept of event (and phenomena 
being the expression of a particular configuration of non-conscious forces) is one of 
the main methodological insights we deploy in understanding the socio-economic 
underdevelopment in Iran. We distance ourselves from the common conceptions of 
causation, reason and agency in their widespread circulation and instead describe the 
negative and affirmative dimensions of continuum of consciousness/unconsciousness 
in line with Nietzsche’s active and reactive forces and will come up with two types 
of agencies, type 1 and type 2.  
In type 1 agency, the individual or doer is the agent of a force or a configuration of 
forces in the sense that forces act through him/her, while in type 2 agency the 
individual (or any other forms of social assemblage) cultivates and achieves agency 
by turning herself into a force. In this framework, embeddedness and emergence 
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create a plane of immanence where causes and reasons operate. The notion of 
rhizome is at the heart of emergence. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987; 21) put it:  
In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of 
communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, 
nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an 
organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of 
states
7
. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to 
the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and 
artificial—that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of 
‘becomings’.8  
 
The notion of incommensurability alludes to the point that social orders are worlds 
of significations and cannot be ordered and ranked in terms of common and 
universal set of scales and measures (Berlin, 1990).  As Bhabha (1990b: 209, 
original italic) reminds us:  
The difference of cultures cannot be something that can be accommodated 
within a universalist framework. Different cultures, the difference between 
cultural practices, the difference in the construction of cultures within 
different groups, very often set up among and between themselves an 
incommensurability. However rational you are, or 'rationalist' you are 
(because rationalism is an ideology, not just a way of being sensible), it is 
actually very difficult, even impossible and counterproductive, to try and fit 
together different forms of culture and to pretend that they can easily coexist. 
The assumption that at some level all forms of cultural diversity may be 
understood on the basis of a particular universal concept, whether it be 
'human being', 'class' or 'race', can be both very dangerous and very limiting 
in trying to understand the ways in which cultural practices construct their 
own systems of meaning and social organisation”.  
 
                                                          
7This is a philosophical understanding which has family resemblances with the Hayek’s notion of 
“unintended consequences”, and “spontaneous order”, Smith’s notion of “invisible hand”, Dawkin’s 
notion of “blind watch maker”, or the notion of self-organization in complexity sciences. The 
philosophical foundation of emergence is Deleuze’s rhizomatics; what we have is a dynamic process 
of emergence and embeddedness (sedimentation) which can, at times, generate dysfunctionalities and 
dissonances enshrined and captured in the art form of tragedy (and hence the notion of tragedy as one 
of the main concepts in this study) and inherent randomness of life (Bernard Williams; 1983; on the 
role of randomness), which becomes extremely pertinent to our understanding of the enigma of 
underdevelopment in Iran. 
8
 As Mark Ridley (2010) said, in a simplified and non-philosophical version, this point refers to 
“when ideas have sex”; when ways of being have sex through unconscious imitation and learning; 
through the power to affect and be affected. 
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Incommensurability is the outcome of the other two principles, which produce 
multitude of topologies and ecologies of neighbouring assemblages, differing in their 
worlds of signification and in their regimes of truth.  
These three principles are deemed to establish the uniqueness and singularity of each 
and every social assemblage which is rooted in difference-in-itself as the default 
ontological principle, while the related Wittgensteinian (1953/2009: 67-77) notion of 
‘family resemblance’ explores the connectivity and distinctiveness of every 
instantiation of creation through repetition; what stays the same and repeats itself in 
every instant of creation is novelty and difference (the Deleuzian conception of the 
famous Nietzschian notion of ‘the return of the same’).9  In this framework, 
methodology becomes all about how to overcome the default position of 
incommensurability through the principle of free association (the logic of 
rhizomatics) and thick descriptions
10
 to take a voyage of discovery in the wonderland 
of the other. This is ultimately a journey into the bizarre realm of everyday life and 
how it is the site of the interface between order and disorder (chaos). This is as 
strange as our voyage of exploration into the realms of very large (the universe) and 
very small (the atoms).  
2.6 METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND FLOW IN THIS STUDY 
Based on the preceding discussion so far, briefly the methodological structure of the 
argument that constitutes the framework for this study proceeds as follows (see 
Diagram 1 in Appendix 1): 
(i) The subject matter of the study is the bitter historical experience of 
underdevelopment in Iran with all its ramifications. The question is ‘How 
can we analyse it?’. 
(ii) The two large philosophical candidates (modes of thinking) for the 
analysis of social phenomena are Heidegger’s existential phenomenology 
(explicated in Dreyfus (1991)) as opposed to Descartes’ subject-object 
relation (‘dasein’ versus cogito or understanding versus explanation). 
                                                          
9
 We will elaborate on these notions more extensively later on in this chapter. 
10
 Thick description is a term coined by the renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, Chapter 
1). Here I take it to mean deploying the principles of embeddedness and emergence to map out the 
singularity and uniqueness of each and every social order through extensive and detailed descriptions 
of its history and biography, and showing how individual is the name of the collective; and 
demonstrating that what is central to the understanding of social phenomena is not the binary 
opposition between centre and margin, or individual and society (as in methodological individualism), 
rather, order versus disorder and ultimately between finitude and infinitude (analytic of finitude). 
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(iii) These two philosophical positions are rooted in two contrasting 
philosophical traditions going back to Aristotle's metaphysics of substance (as 
Nietzsche would put it) serving as the genealogy of the Cartesian cogito and 
Heraclitus' philosophy of process-relation as the ancestry of Heidegger’s 
‘dasein’. There are also important connections with Islamic philosophy and 
Eastern philosophy.  
(iv) This study suggests that each social phenomenon (as manifestations of 
dasein) be studied based on three notions of embeddedness, emergence, and 
incommensurability. 
(v) Embeddedness is formulated based on Heidegger's being-in-the-world and 
the notion of emergence is mapped drawing upon the intellectual resources from 
Deleuzian process and differential philosophy, the invisible-hand tradition in 
classical political economy, Mises and Hayek and New-Austrians, and 
complexity sciences. The notion of incommensurability will be developed 
mainly by drawing from Isaiah Berlin (1990) and the associated literature. 
(vi) Ultimately we see social phenomena as assemblages, and social assemblages 
are characterized by Lacan’s three registers of symbolic, imaginary and real. The 
symbolic is characterized in its affirmative facets (positive unconscious in 
Foucault's term) by resorting to Foucault’s three axes of genealogy of power, 
archaeology of knowledge and problematization of subjectivity (Flynn, 2005). 
Lacan’s and Zizek’s notions of repression, foreclosure, and disavowal are 
utilized to characterize the negative (lack or negative unconscious) dimension of 
the symbolic order. Alongside these two characterizations, the place of two 
orders of imaginary and real with their own affirmative and negating facets will 
be extensively investigated. The interaction between the orders of symbolic (and 
its associated imaginary) and real is conceptualized based on the interplay of 
finitude and infinitude.  
(vii) After fully developing the Heideggerian existential framework as 
embeddedness, the insights from the Deleuzian process philosophy, invisible-
hand tradition (especially the burgeoning tradition of complexity sciences; see 
Harrison, 2006) related to emergence (co-evolution as one of the central concepts 
in the emergence of emergence) is integrated into this framework and are added 
to the insights from the Cartesian reductionist tradition. This hybrid framework 
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gives rise to the methodology of critical hermeneutics based on the method of 
‘free association’ (drawing on the two notions of metaphor and metonymy) in 
psychoanalysis.    
(viii) This framework and methodology should be filled with thick descriptions 
originating from the logic of free association which tracks down the historical 
and imaginal links, connections and trajectories made through social formation 
and transformation of social assemblages at all levels. This process endows each 
social assemblage with a regime of truth.  
(ix) The promises offered by this hybrid and multidisciplinary methodology will 
be investigated through its application to a few examples; its effectiveness and 
productivity in understanding the hyper-complexity and singularity of the 
experience of underdevelopment in Iran will be demonstrated through the 
application of the notion of regime of truth.  
(x) This study begins with the binary opposition of ‘dasein-cogito’ (which in its 
rigidity possesses an imaginary nature) and then moves to a set of trinities (which 
has a symbolic nature in its multitudes of divisions and segmentarities and their 
fuzziness) and end up with a hybrid methodology (which follows the rhizomatic 
and arborescent logic of movement and creation). As such it strives to mimic the 
structure of all assemblages and is an assemblage itself.  
2.7 THE STRUCTURE?
11
 OF SOCIAL ASSEMBLAGE: ARTICULATING 
THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This section of the analysis constitutes mapping out the internal structure of the 
assemblage, as part of the methodology of this research, and its being-in-the-world 
through deploying philosophies and theories which can pave the way for developing 
a deeper understanding of the hyper-complexity of social reality and human 
existence in its being (structuration or territorialisation) and becoming (de-
structuration or de-territorialisation). In a sense, it is an attempt to understand ‘what 
                                                          
11
 Placing question mark on and in some words like structure is part of the Deleuzian tradition where 
it attempts to highlight the paradoxes associated with using words such as structure in indicating a 
kind of fixity and constancy where the whole analysis is trying to show movement and change. This 
technique, alongside the Derridian technique of erasure, is meant to demonstrate the inevitability of 
the use of these terms alongside the need for transgressing them. The use of compound concepts by 
Heidegger alongside Derrida’s erasure and Deleuze’s question mark are ploys deployed to break the 
grip of highly addictive universalist and essentialist way of thinking; they are attempts to break our 
intuitive habits of thinking and driving us to think counter-intuitively.  
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being a human means’ and ‘what being a thing means’ (Dreyfus, 2001, 2011) in 
relation to this research; in other words it is a commentary on human condition. We 
aim to understand the generic properties of social assemblages (Connolly, 2008b) 
irrespective of their sizes and scales (micro=experience, event, individual, 
meso=organization, group, macro=communities, nations or empires) or their 
contents. The ultimate target of the analysis in this research is the perpetual question 
of highest significance in everyday life and in academia: ‘How can we understand 
social phenomena (including our specific research question: ‘Why are we backward’; 
‘the enigma of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran’)?’.  
In preceding analysis so far, we maintained that every social phenomenon, whether 
crime or development, individual or community, war or love is an embedded event, 
in the sense that social phenomena, human existence, and experiences are always 
processes which are already part of larger orders (worldhood) immanently evolved 
within alternative histories. This philosophical understanding has been reinforced by 
“the recent consensus in cognitive science (including AI) that behaviour can only be 
understood when viewed systemically, i.e., as a component in a larger system or 
assemblage” (Mark Hansen; 2000: paragraph 6).  
We may ask: What does embeddedness precisely mean and what are its main 
components? The notion of embeddedness lays the ground for exploring the pre-
ontological and pre-individual forces constituting ‘the world’ we were born in, which 
constitutes the condition of possibility and historical a priori of human experiences 
in all their forms (seeing, believing, and behaving).  ‘Belonging’ and ‘rootedness’ 
acts as the condition of possibility for any manifestations of being and becoming (see 
Guignon, 1993). Our mapping of the notion of embeddedness (= being-in the-world= 
social assemblage) will proceed as follows: we will demonstrate that beings-in-the-
world or social assemblages are composed of three registers of ‘symbolic’ (or 
positive unconscious, the term used by Foucault [1989; xi]), ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’. 
Each one of these registers possesses negating and affirmative dimensions. The 
affirmative dimension of the order of symbolic consists of knowledge, power and 
subjectivity (Flynn, 2005); a trinity which is one in three and three in one; you start 
with any one and almost always end up with the other two
12
.  
                                                          
12
 The positive and affirmative facet of symbolic order was mapped by Foucault on three axes of 
knowledge, power and subjectivity based on three modes of thought called archaeology, genealogy 
and problematization (Flynn; 2005). Each is embedded in the other and embedding the other in a 
dynamics of multiplicity and unity reminiscent of Christian trinity. Foucault demonstrates that from 
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Knowledge, in turn, is composed of statements, discourses, discursive formations, 
archives and episteme, all organized inside narratives and dialogues with small and 
big others. On the other hand, power consists of actions, practices, observations, 
examinations, mechanisms of reward and punishment, and techniques of 
inclusion/exclusion, all organized around tactics and strategies. Subjectivity is the 
embodied instantiation of relations of power and knowledge and is formed through 
the techniques of subjectification including scaffolding, memorization, 
narrativization (a process where we turn traumas and triumphs into narratives 
retroactively), and moral economy of self-control through creation of an emotional 
economy of motivations and emotions (anger, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, shame, 
guilt, and surprise).
13
 The negating dimension of ‘symbolic’ includes repression, 
foreclosure and disavowal.
14
 The negating dimension of ‘imaginary’ consists of 
ideology, fantasy, and consciousness (Nietzsche’s conception of consciousness as a 
reactionary force and Zizek’s notion of interpassivity [2007; xxxi]), culminating in 
demonization of the other and glorification of the self, elevating ‘our way of life’ 
into sacredness, narcissism and sovereignty, seeing the other as lack and as ensemble 
of negations). 
The affirmative dimension of ‘imaginary’ includes positive unconscious or 
embodied and tacit knowledge, which is a source of economy of mind through the 
formation of habits and a landscape of creativity, innovation and novelty. This aspect 
is called ‘imagination’, which is the site where thinking happens in the absence of 
the subject ‘I’. ‘Affirmative consciousness’ or subjectivization reveals itself in the 
form of becoming receptive to the forces of creative imagination, radical other and 
negative and affirmative real. The negating dimension of real, on the other hand, 
manifests itself in disruptive traumas and unexpected events and eventualities 
causing de-territorialisation (tearing apart the walls of territories), while the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
wherever the analysis starts it would end up encompassing the other two; these three are three in one 
and one in three; unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in the oneness; all part of regime of truth. It 
does not matter from where you start; if you follow the internal links you will end up with the other 
two; whether you start with desire, or with power or with discourse. 
13
 Where emotions are basically an internalized mechanism of reward and punishment (the psycho-
social assemblage called individual is subjectfied mainly through the internal mechanism of reward 
and punishment). 
14
 “Bourdieu’s (1977: 188-9) notion of social silence, active forgetting, saying and not doing, and 
doing and not saying” are examples of disavowal. It was said that: “Sufism was once a reality without 
a name, and now it has become a name without a reality,” (John Renard, 2005; 2) Two compound 
notions of “a-reality-without-a-name” and “a-name-without-a-reality” are at work here which will be 
related to the notion of disavowal and deployed in the analysis of social orders. 
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‘affirmative dimension of real’ is divided into content and expression, each having 
vertical and horizontal movements; creating territorialisation and re-territorialisation 
in their rhizomatic and arborescent (tree-like) movements. This completes the 
panoramic map of social assemblage in its embeddedness. 
We commence probing the structure of embeddedness by acknowledging the fact 
that human existence (dasein) is always a type of ‘being-in-the-world’: ‘being-in-
the-world’ is a compound, a multiplicity, a relationality, a process and an 
assemblage. This assemblage (a Deleuzian term), according to Lacan, is composed 
of the orders of symbolic, real and imaginary; they are one in three and three in one; 
once you start with one you almost always end up with the other two.  As 
Stavrakakis (1999; 6) puts it  
the orders of ‘imaginary’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘real’ are the three most important 
categories, or registers, through which Lacan maps human experience.  
 
This is a kind of trinity which is three in one and one in three and can transform and 
re-form into each other, and move, convert and transgress the boundaries and 
frontiers of each other. Furthermore, as Zizek (2001) maintains, each one of these 
three orders, in turn, can be subdivided into their own three orders of symbolic, real 
and imaginary, which produces nine categories of orders.  
Our being and becoming is housed in a web, as Wrong (1994:45) maintains,  
a web of social relations that is constantly being spun, broken, and spun 
again, invariably (unlike a spider’s web) in slightly different form.  
 
This web of social relations constitutes what we call the symbolic order. In a sense, 
symbolic order is a web of webs; each experience, event, or individual
15
 is a social 
web which is housed in a home, while the home itself being a complex social web 
housing a family, itself being located in a street which is another social web with a 
complex set of written and unwritten scripts, rules, and regulations. Then we move to 
another scale in organizations (groups, firms, clubs, businesses, social groups, 
religious denominations), and from there to the society at large, organized around the 
                                                          
15
 In the section on subjectivity we will elaborate further on how “individual is the name of the 
collective”. 
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compounds of village, town or city, and from there into a larger assemblage of 
nationhood and from there to international order organizing the relation between 
nations; all being housed in a cosmic
16
 order of planetary bodies. These set of orders 
form a plethora of nested abodes, each embedding the smaller one in scale and being 
embedded in larger one in scale (for the notion of nested systems see Harrison with 
Singer, 2006: 26). The relation can be manifested in a set of nested parentheses:  
(cosmic order (international order (nation (province (city (district (village 
(street (home
17
-businesses (individual (event (experience))))))))))).  
 
As Hanneman and Riddle (2005; 6) argue “Most networkers think of individual 
persons as being embedded in networks that are embedded in networks that are 
embedded in networks”. This nested house of houses, network of networks- 
symbolic order as the web of webs or house of being- is carved on the plane of 
immanence in space-time and is mapped on the field of geography-history.   
We, as desiring machines, are plugged in a social grid which is made of materials of 
this world, whether corporeal or virtual
18
 (sounds, images, information, ideas, bricks, 
wood and concrete). Symbolic orders are assembled out of linguistic and/or non-
linguistic components, discursive and non-discursive practices. It is exactly to this 
phenomenon that Markell (2003; 40) alludes when he maintains that “Each of us, 
Taylor (1992; 30-1) suggests, has an “authentic” identity—“my own particular way of 
being,” as he puts it—and so, too, do the cultures and nations to which we belong”. 
As Evans (1996: 203; added emphasis) suggests  
Lacan makes it clear that his concept of the symbolic order owes much to the 
anthropological work of Claude Lévi-Strauss (from whom the phrase 
                                                          
16
 To realize the importance of cosmic order in everyday life of individuals and communities we need 
just to think about the threat of comets colliding with the earth or the disruption in earth atmosphere 
due to solar radiations, among many others.   Global warming can be conceived either as an element 
of this cosmic order or as a component of international order or both.   
17
 Home (family) can be conceptualized as a business focused on the productions of care and love 
manifested in the production of children, sexual pleasure and sense of informality (for this see the 
economics of family). With this conceptualization we can remove the duality of home-businesses and 
use business as a more general concept. Business in its meaning of “busy-ness” can serve as an 
umbrella concept to incorporate all forms of organized activities whether in home, church, state, 
market, or civil society.  
 
18
The counterpart of virtual in modern science is the concept of information which alongside matter-
energy constitutes the world and cannot disappear. What is information? A description, a code of 
“01s” which describes something; this descriptions are as much part of this world as the things 
themselves. See the book on information (Hans Christian von Baeyer, 2004). 
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‘symbolic function’ is taken …). In particular, Lacan takes from Lévi-Strauss 
the idea that the social world is structured by certain laws which regulate 
kinship relations and the exchange of gifts (see also Mauss, 1923). The concept 
of the gift, and that of a circuit of exchange, are thus fundamental to Lacan’s 
concept of the symbolic... Since the most basic form of exchange is 
communication itself (the exchange of words, the gift of speech…), and since 
the concepts of law and of structure are unthinkable without language, the 
symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. Any aspect of the 
psychoanalytic experience which has a linguistic structure thus pertains to the 
symbolic order. However, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic order 
with language. On the contrary, language involves imaginary and real 
dimensions in addition to its symbolic dimension. The symbolic dimension of 
language is that of the signifier; a dimension in which elements have no 
positive existence but which are constituted purely by virtue of their mutual 
differences. 
 
Symbolic order is what Castoriadis (1987: 359) pertinently calls “a world of 
significations”:  
Society brings into being a world of significations and itself exists in reference 
to such a world... And it is only in correlation with this world of significations 
as it is instituted in each case that we can reflect on the question raised: what is 
the ‘unity’ and the ‘identity’, that is to say the ecceity of a society, what is it 
that holds a society together? What holds a society together is the holding-
together of its world of significations. 
 
Here we need to note that symbolic orders emerge in different forms and scales; an 
individual, or a piece of experience like eating fruit or drinking alcohol is as much a 
world of significations as a society. The same verdict applies to symbolic orders of 
medium scales from communities and teams to groups and organizations. With 
regard to symbolic orders, size (micro, meso, and macro) does not matter. Each 
symbolic order is an instantiation of being, functioning as the “house of being”, as 
Heidegger (1958: 20, 26) put it.  
Alongside each and every symbolic order there is a force which threatens to break it 
down, to tear its fabric; a force which manages to generate holes in the house of 
being and that disruptive force is the order of real
19
. The symbolic orders are 
constantly tormented by the black holes of finitude at their heart. This finitude 
                                                          
19
 As beautifully put by the Iranian thirteenth century great poet Sa’di (see Homa Katousian; 2004) 
“Saydya gar fakand syele fana khane omr” (O’ Sa’di, if the flood of demise breaks the house of life) 
here the flood of demise is real and the house of life is the symbolic.   
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always echoes the sounds of death and destruction, while death is the limit of the 
symbolic orders and their condition of possibility. Faced with the threats and 
realization of degeneration and collapse, the order of imaginary was evolved as a 
coping strategy to bestow an illusion of fullness, oneness, and closure to the 
symbolic. Its main mission is to make the symbolic look solid and impenetrable. 
This order with its ideologies and fantasies attempts to cover the lack (finitude) at the 
heart of the symbolic.  
Finitude hints to the lack at the heart of any symbolic order; as Alan Bass (2006; 
108; original emphasis) put it “That which is missing something is finite”. In a sense, 
the register of symbolic (world of significations) is ultimately about achieving 
control (whether cognitively or non-cognitively, discursively or non-discursively, 
linguistically or non-linguistically) through ordering and organizing the things of this 
world, while the register of imaginary (world of imagination), in its original 
Lacanian formulation at least, is about achieving closure and completeness, a state of 
fullness and impenetrability, where it declares “everything is under control”20.  
In a sense, while the symbolic organizes life and rescues it from a state of chaos and 
indeterminacy, the imaginary elevates it to the level of omniscience, omnipotence, 
and omnipresence; it aims to achieve the status of divinity, God’s presence and 
God’s fullness and solidity21.  The register of real, again in its Lacanian conception, 
is what generates destructive pulses into the symbolic and shakes and disrupts the 
web of symbolic and its protective belt of imaginary through traumatic and 
unexpected events, big or small, which creates holes, cracks and ruptures in the 
entire architecture. This function of real is captured in the vulgar proverb ‘shit 
happens’ or ‘whatever can go wrong will go wrong’, or as Deleuze and Guattari  
(1987: 504) put it “there is no social system that does not leak from all directions, 
even if it makes its segments increasingly rigid in order to seal the lines of flight”22.  
                                                          
20
 Conspiracy theories are symptoms of this obsession with total control. See “Everything is under 
control” (Robert Anton Wilson, 1998) 
21
 Cartesian cagito is an instantiation of this register of ‘imaginary’ where the “I” through “thinking” 
achieves the status of God’s eye view, where it gives rise to the emergence of subject-object relation; 
in this sense subject-object-relation is basically an illusionary relation. We will explore the affirmative 
dimension of cogito later in our study. 
22
 This proposition applies to Deleuze’s thought and to this study as well. That is why the 
methodology of social inquiry is supposed to hedge against this structural lack by being open to the 
concrete radicality of the radical other.  
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Any social order or social assemblage is basically a whole of holes and everyday life 
is a hall of wholes of holes
23
.   
It should be noted that this conceptual framework gives rise to a set of cluster 
concepts such as experience, event, and truth (which we will explore more 
extensively later on). Each of these social phenomena is a social assemblage and 
possesses three dimensions of symbolic, imaginary and real. Event, in its dimension 
of real, for instance, serves as the intrusion of real into symbolic and truth manifests 
itself as symbolization of the event (see Hallward, 2003). The unexpected arrival of 
the new reverberates into the whole architecture of social order, consequently, 
nothing stays the same afterwards; like the reverberations and ripples generated by a 
plane crash, a tornado, a volcano overflowing clouds of ashes into the atmosphere 
and disrupting the normal order of things, an earthquake or a tsunami. It is the 
elements of surprise in the events of the real which lays bare the contingency and 
mutability of the symbolic and its protective belt. The event, in its dimension of real, 
shatters the dream of invincibility of the architecture of any social order (such as: the 
attack on twin towers, credit crunch, tsunami in Indonesia, a piece of bone stuck in a 
throat, sudden call of nature in the middle of an important meeting, or any 
occurrences indicating the sudden loss of control at any level or scale). It occurs in 
all forms of social orders at any scale, in subjectivity, in family (like sudden suicide 
in the family), state, and army or in language; it strikes one or one stumbles into 
something new. It is associated with the emergence of something new and 
shocking
24
, such as love, trauma, cancer, crises, and revolutions
25
, beyond the 
calculation and anticipation of the symbolic-imaginary order.  
Lacan identifies four discourses emerging in the encounter with the event in the 
attempt to symbolize the event. They are the discourses of hysteric, master, pervert, 
and mystic (Zizek, 2000: 164-5). As Zizek (2007: xxx) puts it “the Lacanian Real- 
the Thing- is not so much the inert presence which “curves” the symbolic space 
(introducing gaps and inconsistencies) but, rather, the effects of these gaps and 
                                                          
23
 See Burt (2004) for the notion of “structural holes”.  
24
 A prevalent Persian saying goes like this: chee mee-khasteem chee shod  (what we wanted and how 
it turned out) or chee fekr mikardim chee shod (what we were thinking and how it turned out). The 
first phrase was recently used by Ayt. Khamanie in Friday sermon (4
th
 of Feb 2011) to indicate what 
the West wanted to achieve in Iran and in the Middle East and how they turned out to be. This 
invokes the principle of emergence (which is closely related to the register of real), which we will 
elaborate further later on.  
25
 Revolutions unexpectedly emerge out of the actions and interactions of many; there is no 
production line for revolutions or for love. They follow the rhizomatic logic of real.  
53 
 
inconsistencies”.  As such real is our symbolic naming of those gaps and 
inconsistencies. 
It can be argued that while symbolic is an organizing force, imaginary is a totalizing 
one and real is a disrupting one. In other words, symbolic is a bubble
26
, imaginary is 
a shield (a dream), and real is a needle. In this, symbolic bubbles with their 
protective phantasmic and ideological shields frequently burst in their encounters 
with the needle of real. Thus, every human experience, every event, every social 
entity, every thing of this world  (a political act like voting or an economic behaviour 
like saving) is an assemblage of all of these three dimensions, which make up the 
starting point of our characterization of the notion of embeddedness. As maintained 
by Lechte (1994: 217):  
Any political act (an exemplar of contingency) only takes place in relation to a 
set of ‘sedimented’ practices. The sedimented practices are the element of 
necessity without which social life would collapse into pure contingency, that 
is, into indeterminacy. Politics changes social practices, but in order that there 
be any politics there must also be relatively unchanging sedimented practices – 
those bequeathed by history or tradition. 
Embeddedness is the outcome of differential speed of change and movement in 
different layers of social reality, which allows some layers to serve as the sedimented 
background or riverbed for other layers characterized by higher rate of change.  
2.8 ON AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION: ANOTHER LEG OF THE 
METHODOLOGICAL STRUCTURE 
It can be stated that all forms of orders involve affirmation and negation due to the 
‘analytic of finitude’ (Howarth, 2010: 21). We will, therefore, characterise the 
assemblage of ‘being-in-the-world’ with its three registers through their affirmative 
and negating dimensions (the genealogy of the three orders of real, symbolic and 
imaginary was explored but not included in the study due to word limitations). In 
other words, an assemblage has two sets of movements, in ‘expression’ and in 
‘content’ (Patton, 2000: 44). The expressive movements lead to the emergence of 
symbolic and imaginary orders, while move in content is based on a rhizomatic logic 
creating novelty, variation and difference in the realm of real.  We need to note that 
as expressive movements possess its own dimension of real, the logic of rhizomatics 
                                                          
26
 We encounter the notion of bubble in economic literature. This analysis extends it to the symbolic 
orders as well.  
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works at that level as well. Due to the arborescent and rhizomatic movements, both 
the dimension of content and the dimension of expression are under the constant 
forces of territorialisation (self-organization or fusion) and de-territorialisation 
(creative destruction or fission).   
The notions of affirmation (‘what social assemblages affirm’) and negation (‘what 
they negate’) are two productive concepts for exploring the structure of social 
assemblages. Looking from a different angle, what we are doing here is an attempt to 
characterize ‘being-in-the-world’ with two levels of unconsciousness and 
consciousness with their positive and negative dimensions at work in any social 
order. This is to show how one level acts as the condition of possibility and 
sedimented riverbed for the other and how these two general levels interact and how 
things travel from one realm to another, for instance, from affirmative conscious (as 
an openness to emerging ways of handling a new situation) into affirmative 
unconscious in the process of habit formation and in the process of instituting 
embodied skills and tacit knowledge when the situation becomes familiar and routine 
(the process of routinization) in order to free the energy and resources of conscious 
intelligence for upcoming novel challenges (see Kahneman, 2011).  
Following Foucault (1970: xi) who called it ‘positive unconscious’, the affirmative 
dimension of the register of symbolic, is divided into power, knowledge and 
subjectivity. Knowledge refers to a set of discourses (Howarth, 2000) at circulation 
in a social order constituting its world of significations while power points to the 
hierarchical relations ordering and organizing the production of actions and 
interaction in a social assemblage. Subjectivity hints to the embodiment and 
institutionalization of relations of power and knowledge and their linkage through 
the glue of affectivity and its pleasures and jouissance and emotional economy. 
These three axes enshrine the productive and affirmative dimension of the symbolic, 
which is elaborated more extensively on these three axes later in this chapter.  
The negative dimension of the symbolic is partitioned into foreclosure, repression, 
and disavowal. This shows the presence of elements of psychosis, neurosis, and 
perversion in any social order (see Zizek, 2012; Stavrakakis, 2007). These negative 
dimensions work at all levels of social assemblages from experience to events and 
individual (micro), to organization (meso) and society (macro). These three negating 
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dimensions of the symbolic order were explored extensively but were not included in 
this work due to word limitations.  
2.8.1 The Affirmative Dimension of Social Assemblages as Unit of Analysis 
The main question in the study of social orders and social phenomena revolves 
around the unit of analysis. In this study, therefore, we take social assemblages as 
our unit of analysis. Social assemblages are compounds of different (sometimes 
contradictory) synchronized components. The specific structural relation between 
different components defines the unique character of each social assemblage 
(Bryant, 2011).  
Social assemblages entail a wide range of phenomena from experience to events, 
individuals, organization, societies, and regimes of truth. As process ontology 
implies, all social assemblages are events and processes. Experiences and entities are 
two types of events formed based on differential speed of change. The difference 
between various forms of events is in difference in the rate of change (see Lechte, 
1994).   
Structurally, social assemblages are nested phenomena in the sense that social reality 
is composed of nested cascades of social phenomena from smallest level of 
experience to largest one of regimes of truth. Experiences are embedded in 
individuals and individuals are embedded in families, groups, or organizations, 
which in turn are embedded in societies, which are embedded in regimes of truth and 
international order.  
The social assemblages are messy, dynamical, and emergent phenomena and are 
events and are constantly in the state of flux and cover a range, in terms of the 
differential speed of change, form ephemeral and transient phenomena such as 
experiences and more stable phenomena such as individuals, organizations, societies 
or regimes of truth.  It is essential to emphasize that social assemblages are messy, 
rather than seamless and coherent compounds; their messiness stems from the 
rhizomatic and topological movement of real (based on the ‘power to affect and be 
affected’), alongside typological movement of symbolic (the typological process of 
signification) and axiomatic movement of imaginary (the axiomatic process of 
unification and totalization, bestowing the transient sense of closure and 
completeness to the social assemblages). Social assemblages, hence, are the product 
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of ad-hoc coming together of components from diverse origins, which will go 
through the process of symbolic synchronization and imaginary harmonization. As 
Kogler (1996: 301) observes:  
logical contradictions or certain symbolic incoherencies can form an essential 
part of the internal rationality of a symbolic order. One must therefore be able 
to explain why these do not play a role, or how they are symbolically 
integrated into the ‘system’.  
 
In terms of nature, social assemblages can be virtual or corporeal or a combination of 
the two. The topological space populated by various forms of social assemblages 
constitutes the network or ecology of social assemblages. The ecology of social 
assemblages corresponds to Malinowskian notion of context of situation (see 
Manganaro, 2002: 145). The interactions between and within social assemblages, 
hence, create different forms of experiences and events. The conception of social 
phenomena as social assemblages frees us from the traps of methodological and 
ontological individualism or collectivism (Sawyer, 2005: 49, 53; Kaneko, 198) as 
individuals, groups, and societies are different forms of social assemblages 
composed of virtual or/and corporeal components.  
Social assemblages- experiences, events, and entities- are composed of form and 
content (or form and force as Laclau puts it; see Stavrakakis, 2007: 86). While the 
form social assemblages take seems to be universal their contents are particular. 
Each symbolic order is analogous to the other in its formal structure in the sense that 
each is constituted out of the three orders of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their 
corresponding negating and affirmative dimensions. The content of these forms 
differ with each social assemblage (see Kogler, 1996: 172 on the similarity of forms 
and difference in content). For example, the existence of power and its manifestation 
in panoptical observation and surveillance (as institutionalized in gaze), alongside 
examination, exclusion and deployment of systems of reward and punishment are 
almost universal forms power takes in all social assemblages of various size and 
scale. What acts as power is unique to each social assemblage with its unique 
genealogical trajectory. As McHoul (2006: 205) reminds us:  
Power is considered as a set of relations of force. Because these relations are 
local and historically contingent, they cannot be ‘predicted’ by a general 
theory. Only particular investigations – what the early Foucault calls 
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‘archaeological’ investigations, investigations of a specific ‘archive’ – can 
specify them.  
 
This of course does not mean that forms cannot change, as in the ‘process ontology’ 
everything is subject to change, but the change in forms seems to take place at much 
slower pace. The differential rate of change may be at the heart of the binary 
opposition of form and content; otherwise in the extreme long term everything is 
content and subject to change.  
Contents themselves can show relative stability as in the case of regimes of truth; 
Foucault refers to this feature of relative stability of contents as historical or regional 
a prioris, as Flynn (2005: 112; original emphasis) attests:  
Though Foucault is careful to distance himself from deductivist or formalist 
approaches, his archaeological method brings to our attention the necessities 
that these relationships produce. The relations are a priori, albeit ‘historical’ 
or regional a prioris.  
 
With this caveat in mind we embark on describing the forms social assemblages may 
take. Every social assemblage possesses real, symbolic and imaginary dimensions. 
This corresponds to the topological, typological and axiomatic movements
27
, 
elaborated by Foucault (Flynn, 2005; Tizro, 2011). Each one of these registers 
subdivides into the three registers which produces nine forms of sub-registers (Zizek, 
2001).  Each of these three registers demonstrates negating and affirmative facets 
(see Stavrakakis, 2007). The negating dimension of real reveals itself in disruption 
and destruction of the elaborate discursive and non-discursive webs of symbolic and 
imaginary orders. The affirmative dimension of real was formulated by Deleuze in 
the creative and rhizomatic power of ‘real’ in its power to affect and be affected. In 
this, the horizontal and vertical movement of real create new forms and forces in the 
process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. Every thing of this world 
(following Foucault’s [1980: 131] famous phrase of “truth is a thing of this world”), 
whether corporeal or virtual, is subject to the creative and rhizomatic power of real. 
This applies to discursive and non-discursive phenomena as well as images and 
extra-discursive material and non-material things of this world.  
                                                          
27
 See Acemoglu et. al. (2008) on Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies for an example of 
axiomatization. 
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It should be noted that the negating dimension of symbolic entails repression, 
disavowal, and foreclosure (Zizek, 2012: 859-60). The affirmative dimension of the 
symbolic includes axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity. The emergence of 
symbolic order marks the end of unity with the undifferentiated abundance and 
infinitude of the real. While the symbolic is the realm of differentiation and lack the 
real is the undifferentiated realm of “lack of lack” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 74; Fink, 
1997: 177) or abundance (see Connolly, 2008a: 133; Tønder and Thomassen, 2006). 
The emergence of the symbolic is, thus, equivalent to the event of Fall from 
unconscious attachment and blissful unity with the realm of real and separation from 
unity with the mother. Due to the nature of the act of signification, the symbolic 
brings an abyssal gap and a sense of incompleteness and lack, which is filled by the 
negative and positive dimensions of the imaginary.  
The negative facet of the imaginary includes ideology and fantasy (Zizek, 2012: 475, 
685, 689-90), which “as a kind of illusory screen” bestows an illusionary sense of 
completeness, solidity, fullness, and closure to the social assemblage. The negating 
power of the imaginary negates the ‘not-all’, ‘not-whole’ character of the symbolic. 
In a sense the negative force of the imaginary steals the infinitude of the real and 
attributes it to the symbolic. The fantasy in its Janus-like character also serves as a 
symptom demonstrating the irresistible urge to overcome finitude and embrace 
infinitude and experience of fullness (Zizek, 2012: 689-90, 696). As such, fantasy 
and ideology are the sites of impossibility inherent to human condition. Fantasy 
serves as a bridge from the finitude of the symbolic to the infinitude of real. In this 
sense, symbolic order requires the fantasy for its consistency and as such fantasy and 
ideology are indispensable to the social reality. As Zizek (2012: 995-6) maintains:  
Even if reality is "more real" than fantasy, it still needs fantasy to retain its 
consistency: if we subtract fantasy, the fantasmatic frame, from reality, 
reality itself loses its consistency and disintegrates. 
The affirmative dimension of the imaginary entails the creative power of imagination 
in accessing pieces of real through the power of cultivated imagination in different 
realms of life, work, and language from music to art, science, and business. The 
creative role of entrepreneurs in the Austrian school, for example, is an example of 
the power of imagination in partial filling of the gaps in the symbolic. The creative 
power of imagination in poetry and science and the affiliation between science and 
poetry in the Romanticism (Berlin, 2002) is another example of appreciation of the 
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creative power of imaginary order (see Barbour, 1998, on the role of creative 
imagination in science in the ‘context of discovery’). As Einstein maintains, “Logic 
will take you from A to B. Imagination will take you everywhere” (Barrett, 2011: 
144). The notion of ‘imaginal’ in Henry Corbin’s thought (see Wasserstrom, 2001: 
57) is another ontological manifestation of the acknowledgement of cultivated 
imagination in accessing the unexplored regions and pieces of real in the realm of 
religious and mystical experience.  
It is, however, important to differentiate between two forms of creativity. The 
differentiation should be made between creativity in the realm of real which is 
immanent and spontaneous, and occurs based on the power to affect and be affected 
and happens rhizomatically in the realm of extra-discursive (even on symbolic and 
imaginary phenomena from the point of view of their being a thing of this world, in 
their dimension as being a piece of real as symbolic real or imaginary real) and 
creativity in the realm of imaginary which requires training and cultivation in a 
symbolic order in order to prepare the imagination for leaping into the realm of 
unknowns. Without a cultivated musical sensitivity, creativity in the realm of 
musical imagination is highly improbable. The creative flashing or lightening, as 
Freud (Chaitin. 1996: 2) had put it, from the realm of imaginal, as Corbin had put it 
(see Hallward, 2001: 219; Cheetham, 2005: xiii), needs to be symbolized in order to 
enter into the realm of affirmative symbolic. The process of symbolization of initial 
subject-less inspirations from the realm of imaginary is a creative process itself.    
As such, the social assemblage is the site of interplay between the modalities of 
infinitude and abundance of real alongside its state of disorder and chaos and 
finitude of symbolic and imaginary and their associated state of order and harmony. 
The stability of all and every form of combination of symbolic and imaginary is 
disturbed by the creatively destructive power of real. As such, the form of each 
experience, each event, and each entity- as different forms of transient and stable 
events- are constructed out of stabilizing, structuring, and territorializing powers of 
affirmative and negating dimensions of symbolic and imaginary (world of 
signification and regimes of truth) alongside the destabilizing, de-structuring and de-
territorializing power of real alongside its rhizomatic creative power in engendering 
new compounds and novel mutational combinations.  
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In terms of structure, the content of each social assemblage is unique and depends on 
its particular life history. What acts as regimes of truth and as ideology or fantasy as 
well as what particular forms the negative and positive dimensions of symbolic and 
imaginary would take alongside how the real is encountered are different for 
different social assemblages. As Lerude (2005: 1454) suggests:  
when the framework of the imaginary wavers and speech is lacking, when 
reality is no longer organized and pacified by the fantasy screen, the 
experience of the real emerges in a way that is unique for each person [social 
assemblage].  
 
As such understanding each experience- or collection of experiences or events, such 
as the experience of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran with its associated 
strong and weak events in the framework of the social assemblage of Iranian nation- 
requires combining the analyses of universal forms and particular contents via 
identifying how the forces of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their negating and 
affirmative facets interacted to form the experience of Iranianness as well as the 
bitter experiences of socio-economic underdevelopment and its associated strong and 
weak events in the forms of revolutions, social movements, quasi civil wars, external 
wars and small and big social crises.  
It should be noted that, in terms of nature social assemblages are embedded, 
emergent, and meaningful (incommensurable) phenomena. As such three principles 
of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability can capture the singularity of 
each social phenomenon, as social phenomena are almost always embedded in a 
social order with its real, symbolic and imaginary dimensions. The regimes of truth, 
as social assemblages with their three dimensions and affirmative and negating 
facets, determine the truth about goodness (ethics), beauty (aesthetics) and truth 
(ontology) and act as house of being giving a place of residence to all social 
assemblages. As Foucault (1980: 93) observes: regimes of truth form their own 
“economy of discourses of truth” engaging in “the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse”. Foucault (1980: 94) elaborates on the 
productive power of regimes of truth with their affirmative dimensions of power and 
knowledge in the following terms:  
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we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, 
destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true 
discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power.  
 
Social assemblages are emergent phenomena in being the unintended product of the 
interaction between other forms of social assemblages, which are inscribed with 
meaning, and their world of signification is unique as it is the unique unintended 
product of the historical trajectory of their arborescent (tree-like) and rhizomatic 
evolution.  As such each social assemblage - experience, event or entity- possesses 
its own unique dictionary with its own unique denotations and connotations despite 
sharing common regimes of truth or world of signification. Here Berlin’s notion of 
incommensurability, indicating the lack of universal measure of signification, comes 
into play. After the emergence of language (and more generally the sign systems), 
the nature of evolution of things of this world changed irreversibly forever: things 
have become invested and pregnant with meaning and meanings formed wholes in 
the form of world of signification and as evolution of things of this world is 
governed by two principles of embeddedness and emergence, which creates 
differentiated and unique forms of being; worlds of significations have become 
unique and differentiated for each social assemblage despite sharing common 
components.  
The Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance, for example, helps to establish 
the fundamental uniqueness of social assemblages despite sharing common 
components. Social assemblages may have common ingredients in their trajectories 
but the architecture and prominence of these components almost always differ due to 
the uniqueness of the trajectory of evolution of each social assemblage. The interplay 
between embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability turns social phenomena 
into the products of logics of causality, complex systems and free associations. This 
implies that to understand social phenomena in their uniqueness we need to 
understand them through the deployment of psychoanalytic of free association 
alongside the deployment of the logic of non-linear criticality (butterfly effect, path 
dependency) and adaptive self-organization from complexity system and causality 
from reductionism. Each social assemblage is bestowed with its own logic of 
causality and complexity system, in the sense that causality and complexity system 
work inside its unique world of signification (see Bryant, 2011: 286 for the notion of 
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‘system-specific causality’) alongside the fact that the rhizomatic movement of real 
introduces unexpected emergent novelties inside each regime of truth and world of 
signification via the interaction between and within regimes of truth (in the 
intersection between context of culture and context of situation). 
2.8.2 Regimes of Truth as Houses of Being 
Symbolic orders through their productive facet generate systems of knowledge, and 
relations of power in which social entities from individuals to organizations and 
societies are subjectified into functional social beings. They are, hence, constituted 
of discursive packages of knowledge, such as on beauty, goodness, and truth, 
invested into subjectivity through relations of power. The internal compositions of 
the three affirmative components of symbolic order (covering the issues such as what 
is discourse, what is meaning, what is power, and what is passive and active agency) 
were extensively explored but were not included in this work due to word 
limitations.   
2.8.3 The Art of Understanding 
Based on the highly complex nature of social phenomena (their embedded, 
emergent, and incommensurable nature in their enveloping and encompassing 
presence of incommensurable world of meaning in each social assemblage alongside 
the non-meaning facet of them as things of this world) we need to investigate how 
the analyst or any other social actor can have access to the web of meaning and 
understand them in their singularity and uniqueness. As such,  the dilemmas we 
encounter in the analysis of social phenomena (social assemblages) of all kinds, from 
experiences, to events (contemporary or historical events), individuals, groups, 
organizations, or nations with their three registers and their affirmative and negating 
dimensions seem to be fully captured in the Rumi’s (translated by Nicholson, the 
Mathnawi, Book I) poems
28
.      
                                                          
28
Listen to the reed how it tells a tale, complaining of separations 
Saying, “Ever since I was parted from the reed-bed, my lament hath caused man and woman to moan. 
I want a bosom torn by severance, that I may unfold (to such a one) the pain of love-desire. 
Every one who is left far from his source wishes back the time when he was united with it. 
In every company I uttered my wailful notes, I consorted with the unhappy and with them that rejoice. 
Every one became my friend from his own opinion; none sought out my secrets from within me. 
My secret is not far from my plaint, but ear and eye lack the light (whereby it should be apprehended). 
Body is not veiled from soul, nor soul from body, yet to [many ears and eyes this fact is not revealed] 
[this is the translation from Erkan Turkmen which was preferred to the translation by Nicholson]]. 
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The nature of human condition is captured via Rumi’s and Lacan’s notions of 
separation and longing. In the ‘journey of life’ from the state of unity with the real, 
to moving into the state of separation in the order of symbolic and its associated 
fantasy, different social assemblages develop different coping strategies to handle 
the pains of separation and the striving towards return to the state of unity with the 
real and the experience of fullness and total jouissance. The attempt to liberate 
oneself (the social assemblage) from the horrors of finitude is manifested in the 
formation of instrumental rationality (with the aim of liberation from the despotism 
of nature), communicative rationality (the liberation from loneliness and the 
despotism of man, what separates man from man, and what creates the sense of 
belonging to a larger ‘we’, in overcoming the despotisms and inequalities and 
achieving the sense of solidarity with equality), and emancipative rationality 
(freedom from the terror of death and existential finitude; symbolic death, the 
experience of rejection, the fear of loss of control, and fear of failure, and fear of 
invisibility and striving for recognition). This forms the analytic of finitude on how 
to overcome the manifestations of finitude in encounter with nature, with man, and 
with existence itself.  
The social assemblage, hence, originates from infinitude of the real and floats in it 
even in the state of separation and strives to return to it in search of the experience of 
lost jouissance. This process of separation, longing and searching for return forms 
each social assemblage (from any fleeting experience, to events, to more stable 
entities like individual, groups, organizations, institutions, and nations) in a unique 
fashion. The phenomenon of non-linear criticality (butterfly effect) and path-
dependency makes each social phenomenon a unique assemblage of the three 
dimensions of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their affirmative and negating 
dimensions. To analyse them we need to understand them in their embeddedness, 
emergence and incommensurability through thick descriptions. As embedded 
phenomena, they are rooted in a regime of truth, but as things of this world, they are 
subject to the principle of emergence and the work of process ontology (on the 
rhizomatic movement of real in things possessing the power to affect and be 
affected), the work of causation, the work of complexity systems and Markov 
processes. Being subject to the effects of principle of emergence turns social 
phenomena into unique social assemblages in terms of their content. 
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As such social phenomena are universal in terms of their forms (being constituted of 
the dimensions of real, symbolic, and imaginary with their affirmative and negating 
dimensions and being subject to the work of three principles of embeddedness, 
emergence and incommensurability), while unique in terms of their content (what 
functions as their regimes of truth with its symbolic and imaginary dimensions, and 
as such incommensurable to alternative regimes of truth). If this is the case, then, for 
understanding the symbolic-imaginary (meaningful) and real (non-meaning) 
dimensions of social phenomena, we need to combine the hermeneutics of 
understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion. This means that we need to 
understand the meaning invested in each social phenomenon from inside the regime 
of truth constituting that particular social phenomenon and combine it with analysing 
how the rhizomatic movement (as explained through the principles of process 
ontology, causation, and complexity science) affects that particular social 
phenomenon in its interaction with other phenomena. This means that analysing 
social phenomena requires combining understanding of the world of meaning with 
understanding the interaction between social phenomena as objects and things of this 
world (as Ricouer maintains).  
As a result, if we ask why social phenomena are characterized by 
incommensurability and uniqueness, this study’s reply would centre on the 
horizontal and vertical movements (in terms of symbolic, and imaginary and the 
rhizomatic movement of the real), making each phenomenon unique in terms of its 
meaning and non-meaning composition. The butterfly effect and the path 
dependency make each social assemblage a kind of its own and subjects of Markov 
processes. Although things of this world have family resemblance with other things 
of this world in form and content, they are, essentially, unique in their architecture of 
how the three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary are actualized. It should 
be noted that what make things unique is largely the structural relation between 
components and not the components themselves (see Bryant, 2011). This implies 
that to analyse each social phenomenon (experience, event, individual, groups, 
organization, institutions, nations), we cannot understand it under a general law but 
we have to deploy archaeological and genealogical approach to study each social 
phenomenon as a monument and as a unique work of art; as social phenomena and 
social assemblages are considered to be works of art (see Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997, 
for example). Each social phenomenon, as a result, is both imbued with meaning and 
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at the same is the product of interaction of forces, and itself acts as a new force 
forming connections with other forces of the world, creating new experiences, events 
and entities.  
As a result, we need to deploy the logic of causality, complexity science and process 
ontology and incorporate it in the narratives entailing thick descriptions of the world 
of meaning associated with each social phenomenon (see Elliott, 2005: Chapter 6). 
The emergence of diseases, or the geographical position of countries may add or 
reduce elements to their regimes of truth, first through rhizomatic movement of ideas 
through war and trade and then through the process of symbolization, the new 
elements are synchronized with the old (through accommodation, repression or a 
mixture of the two) and produce a new regime of truth. The introduction of 
Christianity, for instance, into the Western world through the military adventures of 
Roman Empire added a new layer to the sedeminted layers of Greek and Roman life-
worlds and created a unique mixture distinct from any other.   
In addition, war, which was justified through the Roman regime of truth, produced 
unintended consequences through the exposition to the new cult of Christianity, 
which in turn transformed Rome itself and created a new hybrid regime of truth. In 
this way, meaning and non-meaning layers of the real interacted to form social 
assemblages.  Consequently, to understand each social phenomenon we need to 
combine the hermeneutics of understanding with the hermeneutics of suspicion, as 
social phenomena almost always stem from particular embeddedness and are subject 
to the forces of emergence and are characterized by incommensurability. As 
Nietzsche conceived, with regard to social phenomena we are faced with the 
phenomenon of the return of the same. What is the same is difference (see Letche, 
1994). Each time we encounter new instantiation of difference and all the time we 
encounter the same as social phenomena seem to be the same in their forms and 
unique in their content.    
2.8.4 Hermeneutics of Understanding 
How can we come out of our uniqueness to understand the uniqueness of each social 
assemblage; for example, a death, a car crash, a war, a marriage, a revolution, a 
smile, a nation bewildered by the question ‘Why are we backward?’, another 
individual, organization or international order.  
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It should be noted that in axiological and ontological terms, the researcher in a 
research process is considered as a social assemblage with its own regime of truth 
and its particular grid of intelligibility and its own particular categorization of the 
world in terms of truth in the sense of defining, for example, beauty, and goodness 
and with its own affirmative facets (such as power, knowledge, subjectivity) and 
negating dimension (repression, disavowal, foreclosure) and its own emotional 
economy (fear, joy, guilt, pride). How can, then, a researcher discover the 
uniqueness of the meanings imbued in each experience, each event, each social 
entity, while he/she cannot think without his/her own categories of mind, her/his 
own sensibilities and affectivities? How can we enter the world of signification of 
others and avoid reducing the difference in their worldhoods into the same of our 
own worldhood? This is where self-reflexivity is inevitable part of social inquiry, 
where we see four layers of research, from formulating research questions and 
gathering data, to entering the world of meaning associated with the data, to 
analysing the rhizomatic relations between phenomena (unintended consequences) 
and the self-reflexive dimension of research (see Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009).  
The researcher, hence, needs to be aware of the obligation to understand the other in 
their own terms and avoid reducing the difference to the logic of the same, and the 
other to the logic of the self.  This requires more than empathy and putting oneself in 
somebody else’s shoes as one brings one’s own grid of intelligibility (one’s head and 
one’s embodiment, one’s sensibilities to sound, smell, and touch along with their 
associations, one’s memory and narrative of life and death) and one’s own sense of 
right and wrong, true and false, beauty and ugliness, taste and distaste, abhorrence 
and delight- which are largely unconscious and routinized- into the process of 
understanding the other. In the language of psychoanalysis, this requires avoidance 
of counter-transference, the cardinal sin of the analyst projecting his own 
associations onto the speech, action, or emotion of the analysand. For this the analyst 
need to develop the art of listening in order to understand the other in his/her own 
terms, her own worldhood and her own regime of truth.  
It should be noted that misunderstanding the other in his/her behaviour, speech, 
emotion and organization of objects is the default position, as people (and generally 
almost all forms of social assemblages), as passive agents, are so immersed in their 
own life-worlds (striving to overcome their own analytic of finitude in their own 
daily life) that they cannot but project their own life-worlds into others. Yamada 
67 
 
(2002), for instance, investigates the persistent misunderstanding between Americans 
and Japanese, where both sides see each other through the spectacles of stereotypes 
where, for example, “Americans think of the Japanese as never really saying what 
they think, and the Japanese think of Americans as not paying enough attention to 
participants in communication” (Yamada, 2002: 25 and 98) or “the Japanese are 
sneaky and evasive, or Americans loud and pushy” (Yamada, 2002: viii)”. In 
exploring the impact of social (or cultural) constructs on communicating and 
understanding each other, Yamada (2002: 34) gives an example of how the rules of 
grammar can cause misunderstanding:  
As a rule, Japanese emphasis is found in word order, while American emphasis 
is shown through intonation. In cross-cultural communication, missing a point 
of emphasis can mean missing a point altogether. In his study of British-East 
Indian interaction, anthropologist John Gumperz shows how a large part of the 
British stereotype of East Indians as ‘rude’ owes itself to the East Indians’ non-
British use of stress and intonation. For example, native British waitresses used 
rising intonation when serving gravy, and said, ‘Gravy?’ whereas Indian 
waitresses used falling intonation and said, ‘Gravy’. The same word with a 
rising intonation was heard by British customers as, ‘Would you like some 
gravy?’ but with a falling intonation was heard as, ‘Take it or leave it. This is 
gravy’. In the same manner, stereotypes about Americans and Japanese emerge 
from their mutual inability to understand their different grammars of emphasis. 
Unexpected uses of stress often end up creating the stereotype that the 
Japanese are monotonic, reserved and cold, while Americans are overly 
emotional and aggressive.  
 
Zizek, as Myers (2003: 105-6, original italics) reports, sees the same problem at a 
philosophical level:  
Ethnic tension is caused by a conflict of fantasies, if, in this regard, we 
understand fantasy as a way of organizing enjoyment. The specificity of their 
fantasy conflicts with the specificity of our fantasy. So, for example, a strand 
of American racism is ‘bothered’ by the way the Japanese seem to enjoy 
working and work at enjoyment. The Japanese, by American conventions, do 
not know how to separate work from play-their relationship to enjoyment is in 
some way disturbed or ‘not normal’. They are therefore a ‘threat’ to the 
American way of life.  
 
Social assemblages set their own life-worlds and their rationalities as the gold 
standard and try to evaluate other actions, speeches, experiences, events and entities 
in terms of their own sensibilities (in violation of the principle of 
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incommensurability). This kind of cultural tribalism seems to be inherent to how our 
being-in-the-world is organized in a particular way where things are closed, 
disclosed, foreclosed, and categorized to us in particular ways in distinction from 
others.  
In everyday life we frequently commit the cardinal sin of reducing the difference to 
the same and the other to the self. This leads to the phenomenon of otherization and 
demonization of the other and glorification of the self, which is at the root of 
violence, brutality, and inhumanity towards the other. The physical violence is 
rooted in the epistemic violence, the inability or unwillingness to understand the 
other in her/his/its own terms. As such transference and counter-transference are 
prevalent in the interaction between selves and identities, as we frequently project 
our own way of thinking, feeling and being on the past, people of alternative gender, 
race, nationality, faith, age, family background, accent, weight, height, and other 
forms of distinction.  This is what Rumi complains about when he says:  
Every one became my friend from his own opinion; none sought out my 
secrets from within me. My secret is not far from my plaint, but ear and eye 
lack the light (whereby it should be apprehended).  
 
In other words, understanding the other using his/her dictionary with its different sets 
of denotations and connotations is an achievement against the immense gravity of 
our own sedimented forms of embeddedness and our own regime of truth, our own 
addicted form of rationality and life style.  
Most of our embeddedness is stored as habits of thought and embodiment and work 
at pre-ontological and pre-conceptual levels and are hard to even notice, but the 
process of encountering with the radical other alongside the ethics of listening (being 
charitable and hospitable to the radical other) and awareness of general principles of 
our embeddedness makes it possible for the researcher to gradually achieve self-
reflexivity and be a vanishing mediator in the process of voyage of discovery of the 
life-world of the other. The encounter with the radical other or “strange stranger” 
(Bryant, 2011: 268) bestows the chance to the analyst to turn himself/herself from a 
‘dasein’ into a ‘cogito’, from a self into a subject by subtracting the relevant contents 
and reducing himself into a form (see Zizek, 2012: 876). This requires the state of 
selflessness and becoming a void or a vanishing mediator (as Zizek conceived it), a 
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gap between the real and the symbolic. The self as embodiment of particular grid of 
intelligibility and its associated economies of power, discourse and affectivity 
alongside its negating facets of repression, disavowal and foreclosure is the condition 
of possibility/impossibility to understanding the radical other.  
Ironically, to understand ‘daseins’ we need to become cogito but before that we need 
to have the experience of being a ‘dasein’ (because without the affirmative and 
productive dimensions of the symbolic we are mere feral children). The researcher 
needs to take a risky voyage of discovery from his own specific content to the 
universal form of ‘cogito’ and move to new content offered by the other (the other’s 
dasein). The journey from one ‘dasein’ (the researcher’s) to another ‘dasein’ (the 
researched, the radical other) passeses through the bridge of universal ‘cogito’. The 
universality of the forms of language, actions and emotions allows this movement 
from content-to-form-to-new-content to be possible. Because all social assemblages 
have the three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary with their negations and 
affirmations, it is possible to understand the other by following the other’s internal 
logic of signification (the other’s chain of signifiers with their particular quilting 
points and master signifiers) in the other’s speeches, actions, emotions or 
organization of objects.  
It should be noted that in any act of signification we have the signifier, the signified 
and the absent presence of a referent. The existence of such a three-term structure in 
any encounter between two social assemblages with markedly different contents 
makes the communication possible. It appears that we move from the signifier, to 
signified and to absent presence of referent and we enter into the world of 
signification of the other through the common absent presence of system of 
references. The fact that we encounter the real as a reference and symbolize it 
through our systems of signs (in words, actions, emotions, and organization of 
objects) is the condition of possibility of communication (even misunderstanding). In 
any encounter we move from a signifier to a signified (which is a chain of signifiers), 
and to an absent presence of a referent (part of a system of reference, the real) and 
then from there we enter the world of signification of the other and her/his own chain 
of signifiers (the signifier and the signified). This applies to everything from tree, to 
water, violence, love, and democracy. Through this process we enter the other’s 
dictionary and its denotations and connotations.  
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In this, thus, the denotations are the arrested meanings of terms and the connotations 
are how the statements (and images, actions, emotions and organization of objects) 
are made to function as the signifier to convey new meanings (see Lechte, 1994; 
Eco, 1976). Thus, in this process what acts as the ultimate bridge is the three-term 
structure involved in the act of signification and symbolization. In relation to Iranian 
realities, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 1953 coup, for instance, 
function as common (absent) referents for alternative forms of symbolizations and 
phatasies. We can enter the world of signification of the other through these common 
absent referents and how they are caught up in the dynamics of symbolic-imaginary 
orders.  
In exploring and giving meaning to all these, Myers (2003: 109) reports how Zizek 
sees the commonality in forms in the following terms: “Instead of vilifying other 
cultures … Žižek enjoins us to come together in the ‘solidarity of a common 
struggle’, when [we] discover that the deadlock which hampers [us] is also the 
deadlock which hampers the Other’… ”. In this, what makes the other unique is the 
other’s unique regime of truth with its distinct denotations and connotations, in the 
sense that the meanings associated with speeches, actions, emotions, or organizations 
of objects are different but the act of signification and how its lack is mended 
through the order of imaginary and how the realm of the real disrupts the symbolic-
imaginary order is the same. In other words, differences in every day articulations is 
understood and justified through all social constructs having the similar formal 
structures. Otherwise, the difference in the content leads to clash of selves (and other 
forms of social assemblages) who misunderstand each other. As Myers (2003: 107, 
added emphasis) states:  
What is the way of avoiding a clash of ethnic fantasies? Žižek's first answer to 
this is to propose a kind of ethics of fantasy. Simply stated, this proposes that 
we try as much as possible not to violate the fantasy space of the ‘other’, the 
specific way in which an individual looks at the world. This does not mean that 
we love our neighbour in so far as he or she resembles ourselves, nor that we 
love our neighbour because of his or her Symbolic mandate, even if we stretch 
that mandate to include his or her status as a human being. In other words, we 
do not respect ‘others’ for any universal feature that they might share with us, 
but rather for what they do not share with us, which is their fantasy. We 
therefore do our utmost not to prove that what they think is a house full of 
significant meaning is actually a ruined old shack as the young man does in 
Patricia Highsmith’s ‘Black House’”.  
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Here we see that the discourse of common humanity may lead to the cardinal sin of 
reducing the content of the other to the content of the self. We have to strictly avoid 
to reduce the content of the other’s regime of truth into a load of irrationalities, 
superstitions, dogmatic beliefs, devilish ways of being and seeing. Frequently, the 
other is seen as the ensemble of negativities such as irrational, emotional, intolerant, 
despotic, imperialist, morally bankrupt, spiritually decapitated or scientifically or 
technologically backward. The aim of understanding, hence, is to negotiate with the 
other in a way which allows us to understand the uniqueness and dissimilarity of the 
other’s world of signification.  
This requires heavy and risky investment in time, energy, effort and emotion and is 
hard to achieve (and therefore the negative, easy and content empty nature of 
‘tolerance’ is used instead). We almost always misunderstand each other and portray 
the worldhood of the other as ‘a ruined old shack’. As Foucault (1981: 8) says:  
One does not have to be in solidarity with them [the opponents of the Shah’s 
regime in Iran]. One does not have to maintain that these confused voices 
sound better than the others and express the ultimate truth. For there to be a 
sense in listening to them and in searching for what they want to say, it is 
sufficient that they exist and that they have against them so much which is set 
up to silence them.  
 
It is not good enough to say that we all eat, sleep, fight, love and hate (the discourse 
of common humanity), we have to understand that we attribute different meaning to 
eating and sleeping, and love and hate for different reasons and prioritize things 
differently. If there is, however, no element of commonality even in the form of the 
act of signification, no communication (even misunderstanding) would be possible, 
and as such we would get the Wittgenstein’s famous saying: “If a lion could talk, we 
could not understand him”. Derrida as reported by Belsey (2005: xii) encounters the 
same problem:  
Jacques Derrida records the unnerving experience of meeting the gaze of his 
cat when he was naked. We easily take cats as objects of our regard, but what 
do they make of us? Anything, or not much? What is it to be a cat looking at a 
human being (Derrida 2002)? We pose the question from our own place in 
culture, but it cannot be answered from there. 
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The principle of incommensurability (Berlin, 1990; Kuhn, 1962) establishes that 
meanings emanating from alternative world of signification cannot be translated to a 
universal or standard system of meaning. Ultimately we are simultaneously universal 
and particular, universal in form and particular in content, and our content becomes 
particular due to the work of universal processes as described in semiotics, process 
ontology, causality, emergence, complexity (butterfly effects, path-dependency, 
Markov processes). What we have is the return of the same and the same is 
difference; form is the same but content is different and this double-edged sword of 
sameness/differences, universality/particularity constitute our singularities. As John 
Stuart Mill (1859: 122) maintains:  
Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their 
susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and 
moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of 
life, they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the 
mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable.  
 
As Boldeman (2007: 78) reports:  
[Elster] does not believe that social norms can be reduced to any single 
principle [of rationality]… He even suggests that a form of irrationality-what 
he calls magical thinking- plays an important role in many decisions to 
cooperate. … Every society and each community will be glued together, for 
better and for worse, by a particular, idiosyncratic mix of these motives. 
 
Elster’s verdict applies to all forms of social assemblages from experiences, to 
events, individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions as well as nations. The 
rhizomatic movement turns social assemblages and regimes of truth into 
idiosyncratic mix of messy, disparate, and sometimes contradictory components. As 
Rapport and Overing (2000: 81) maintains:  
Early on, Malinowski [1948:194] appreciated that: arguing by the law of 
logical contradiction is absolutely futile in the realm of belief, whether 
savage or civilised. Two beliefs, quite contradictory to each other on logical 
grounds, may co-exist, while a perfectly obvious inference from a firm tenet 
may be simply ignored.  
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These diverse components are synchronized and harmonized either through 
compartmentalization and the act of active forgetting and disavowal or are 
synchronized through the act of active symbolization, leading to creation of 
philosophies and rationalities which justify the co-existence of those disparate 
elements, such as the symbiosis between Christianity and Western modernity or 
between constitutionalism and Islam. This demonstrates the principle of multiple 
realizability (Sawyer, 2005: 66), applicable to social phenomena. Each social 
phenomenon - like love, violence, war, democracy, development - is realized 
differently in different historical contexts.  
This indicates, for instance, that there are various distinct paths or mechanisms to 
socio-economic development distinct to each particular context of culture (regime of 
truth) and context of situation (the state of pioneering or the state of belatedness). 
Chan (2002), for example, questions the assumption adopted by many commentators 
on a close connection between liberal democracy and economic development and  
… suggests a new theoretical framework, in which liberal democracy is 
‘decomposed’ into economic, civil and political dimensions that can be 
combined in different ways, allowing for a range of ‘institutional matrices’. 
She then shows, in a case study of Japan and the Asian newly industrialising 
countries, how these seemingly less democratic countries have enjoyed a 
unique mix of economic, civil and political liberties which have encouraged 
economic development without the need to share the institutional structures 
and cultural values of the West.  
 
The key concept here is ‘a unique mix’ and the attempt to understand it rather than 
turning social phenomena into the cases for the application of general covering laws. 
The whole point of our methodological discussions is how through a combination of 
hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion we can come up with a 
better understanding of social phenomena.  
In understanding hyper-complex social phenomena, the study design can have major 
impact on whether the researchers are able to identify the elements of uniqueness in 
the experience of development or ignore it by suppressing it via subjecting the 
development experience to the law-like principles governing all experiences of 
development (see: Elgström and Hyden, 2002; Besley and Persson, 2011).  The kind 
of universalism advocated by Skousen (2008: 8) and reported below is in conflict 
with the nature of social phenomena as embedded, emergent and incommensurable 
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social assemblages: “The principles of accountability, economy, competition, 
incentives, investment, opportunity, and welfare apply to all peoples and all nations”. 
Instead, Foucault’s archaeology, genealogy and problematization are attempts to 
capture the social phenomena in their uniqueness and haecceities. As we elaborated 
throughout this chapter, all social phenomena including competition, incentives, and 
investment are entangled in particular regimes of truth and in each instantiation take 
new meanings.  
The work of social scientist, hence, is to carefully unravel the meanings invested into 
“accountability, economy, competition, incentives, investment, opportunity, and 
welfare”, Skousen (2008: 8), in each particular context of culture (regime of truth), 
in its intersection with the context of situation (the interaction between regimes of 
truth). The meanings attached to these concepts are subtly but significantly different 
in Japan, India, China, and Iran in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian 
countries (see Taylor, 2001 on the drastic difference in the conception and 
institutions of work in the Japanese society compared to the hire-and-fire model of 
work in the Anglo-Saxon context). What is common is the form while the content 
(historically embedded and situated denotations and connotations) is entirely 
different.  
In the realm of social science and in everyday life there is a common misconception 
that because we- humans all over the world- eat, sleep, work, have children, 
communicate through language then we are the same and a common set of laws 
govern our experiences in the realms of life, work and language. While, instead each 
field of experience (economy, sexuality, criminality, etc.) is woven into a 
Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, the sky and the earth with its alternative 
spatiotemporalities. How economy and competition relates to sexuality and 
spirituality, for instance, is different in different context of culture and its associated 
regime of truth. As Chakrabarty (2000: 72, original capital letters) observes:  
A SECULAR SUBJECT like history faces certain problems in handling 
practices in which gods, spirits, or the supernatural have agency in the world. 
My central examples concern the history of work in South Asia. Labor, the 
activity of producing, is seldom a completely secular activity in India; it often 
entails, through rituals big and small, the invocation of divine or superhuman 
presence. Secular histories are usually produced by ignoring the signs of these 
presences. Such histories represent a meeting of two systems of thought, one in 
which the world is ultimately, that is, in the final analysis, disenchanted, and 
the other in which humans are not the only meaningful agents. For the purpose 
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of writing history, the first system, the secular one, translates the second into 
itself. It is this translation—its methods and problems—that interests me here 
as part of a broader effort to situate the question of subaltern history within a 
postcolonial critique of modernity and of history itself.  
 
Here we see how Chakrabarty identifies the relation of labor to the realm of gods 
through rituals and observes how secular history usually fails to practice the art of 
listening and understanding the radical other, and has frequently opted to reduce the 
difference to the logic of the same. In same line, Mbembe (2001: 2) observes the 
same phenomenon in the relation between the West and the rest:  
“We should first remind ourselves that, as a general rule, the experience of 
the Other, or the problem of the ‘I’ of others and of human beings we 
perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed virtually insurmountable 
difficulties to the Western philosophical and political tradition. Whether 
dealing with Africa or with other non-European worlds, this tradition long 
denied the existence of any “self” but its own”. 
 
Mills (2004: 114), in the same line of argument, reminds us that “Said also argues 
that colonised countries were often described in negative terms”. The same cardinal 
sin of social inquiry (reducing the difference to the logic of the same) seems to have 
been committed by Kuran (1993, 2004, 2011) when he sees no identifying 
distinction in Islamic economics but for rituals and as such dismisses the notion of 
Islamic economics and combatively opts to “prove that what they think is a house 
full of significant meaning is actually a ruined old shack”. While the rituals and the 
mere act of appellation by saying ‘In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the 
Merciful’ is meant to relate the mundane realms of life like economy and sexuality to 
the realm of sacred, as Chakrabarty reminded us already, and as such weave 
spatiotemporal existence with the realm of eternity (Rajaee, 2007).  
The same cardinal sin was committed by Hahddad Adel (1981) when he seem to 
have failed to understand the meaning of nudity in the West in terms of West’s own 
regime of truth and projected his own standards of truth on the West and called it 
“culture of nudity and nudity of culture” assuming a universal meaning for the 
notion and practice of nudity irrespective of its historical entanglement, reducing 
Western modernity to modern ignorance (jahiliyyah) in the process, once again 
reducing the house of being of the radical other (this time the Western dasein) to ‘a 
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ruined old shack’ (for the meanings invested in nudity in the West see Barcan, 2004). 
This misunderstanding of the other is frequently repeated with regard to the 
experiences of suicide in Japan, eating dogs in far eastern countries, treating cows as 
holy in India (Adcock, 2010), and gun ownership in America, amongst others.  
In line with this argument, Chakrabarty (2000: 89) calls the writing of history which 
is attentive to difference and incommensurability of the life-worlds history 2 as 
opposed to history 1 (the secular history) which reduces and translates all forms of 
the past to its own life world. According to Chakrabarty, the history 1  
seeks to dispel and demystify gods and spirits as so many ploys of secular 
relationships of power. The moment we think of the world as disenchanted, 
however, we set limits to the ways the past can be narrated.  
 
Here in history 1 the hermeneutics of suspicion is used to suppress and disregard the 
hermeneutics of understanding;  
But the idea of History 2 beckons us to more affective narratives of human 
belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem 
exchangeable through a third term of equivalence such as abstract labor 
(Chakrabarty, 2000: 71).  
 
The extremely important point made here by Chakrabarty (2000) is that the fact that 
social assemblages and regimes of truth and life-world are inevitably open to each 
other and trade and learn from each other does not imply that they lose their unique 
characters, as their layers of sedimented embeddedness and path-dependency 
determines how they select from the rival life-worlds and how they uniquely 
combine them and make sense of them in a new whole. Chakrabarty (2000: 94) 
further alludes to the fact that  
… to talk about the violent jolt the imagination has to suffer to be transported 
from a temporality cohabited by nonhumans and humans to one from which 
the gods are banished is not to express an incurable nostalgia for a long-lost 
world. Even for the members of the Indian upper classes, in no sense can this 
experience of traveling across temporalities be described as merely historical.  
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This clearly demonstrates that the realm of work and economy (productivity, 
investment, saving, inflation, unemployment, and growth) takes different meanings 
in different contexts of culture and there is nothing universal about work and 
economy except its form in the sense of this realm being embedded in a life-world 
and a regime of truth with its three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary, with 
their negating and affirmative dimensions. Yet again what is universal is the form 
and what is particular is the content and that is the story of each singularity, and that 
is what hermeneutic of suspicion (the attempt to explain the interconnection between 
vectors of forces) need to be combined with hermeneutics of understanding to do 
justice to both universal and particular facets of social phenomena.  
 
2.8.5 Free Association 
No one feels another's grief, no one understands another's joy. People imagine they 
can reach one another. In reality they only pass each other by. 
Franz Schubert 
To be able to understand the difference as manifested in the denotations and 
connotations associated with actions, images, words, emotions and organization of 
objects we need to use the method of free association to be able to enter the 
worldhood of the other (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). The method of free 
association allows the internal logic of the social assemblage to emerge, free from 
any imposed, external or universal standard of relevance, significance, or 
meaningfulness.  
This method challenges the established standards of meaningfulness and relevance or 
importance. As De Mijolla (2005: 615) states: “In free association the patient says 
whatever comes to mind without exercising any selectivity or censorship”. Freud, as 
reported in De Mijolla (2005: 216), makes it clear to his patient:  
Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting thread running through your 
remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that may occur to you and any 
side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point. But in this case you 
must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various 
thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of 
certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that 
this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite up important, or nonsensical, so that 
there is no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must 
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say it in spite of them- indeed, you must say it precisely because you feel an 
aversion to doing so. … So say whatever goes through your mind.  
 
Applying the method of free association to the social phenomena means being 
attentive to the internal logic of social assemblages by listening to the totality of the 
meanings expressed in actions, talks, events and organizations of object rather than 
selectively approaching them based on the analyst’s standards of rationality, 
relevance and importance (as Chakrabarty reminded us about two types of history).  
In our case, we use the sum total of the speeches, actions, images, emotions and 
organization of objects produced with regard to the social phenomena to discover the 
life-world underpinning them with its particular regime of truth and its affiliated 
rationalities and structures of power/knowledge, discursive formations, institutional 
arrangements and emotional economies. The point in using the free-association 
method is to break away from the addicted connections, and sense of 
meaningfulness, relevance, and importance embodied in the life-world of the 
researcher and give the researcher the tools and the theoretical justifications to enter 
the wonderland of shared singularity of social assemblages (experiences, events, 
individuals, groups, organizations or nations). This means that in understanding 
social phenomena like London Riot, Islamic Revolution, hostage crisis, 1953 Anglo-
American coup against Mosaddegh in Iran, financial crisis, socio-economic 
underdevelopment, high rate of suicide in Japan, high rate of driving accidents in 
Iran, we need to enter the wonderland of the world of signification associated with 
that particular event, rather than subsuming it under a covering law-like generality.  
The method of free association, hence, frees the researcher from the chains of traces 
of different forms of positivism and scientism plaguing the social inquiry and turning 
social sciences into a form of epistemic violence. Furthermore, it allows the internal 
rationalities of social assemblages to disclose themselves. Free association turns the 
researcher from a master of knowledge into a seeker and listener to the alien voices 
embedded in every experience, event, or social entities like individuals, groups, 
organizations, institutions, or nations. It is apt, therefore, for Shayegan (2012a) to 
invite us to conduct a cultural psychoanalysis in order to understand the roots of 
current problems in Iran. It is worth noting that, as Myers (2003: 20) observes,  
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psychoanalysis is usually narrowly conceived as a field of knowledge, one that 
comprises a method for treating neurotic patients and a set of theories about 
mental processes. In the hands of Lacan, however, psychoanalysis assumes 
cosmic ambitions, vaulting over the boundaries of its own discipline and 
engaging with politics, philosophy, literature, science, religion and almost 
every other field of learning to form a vast theory that has a hand in analysing 
every arena of endeavour in which human beings take part.  
 
We need to deploy the method of free association to be able to practice cultural 
psychoanalysis, as Freud (1900: 110, cited in De Mijolla, 2005: 216) elaborates in 
his ground-breaking book The Interpretation of Dreams:  
the success of the psycho-analysis depends on his [patient’s] noticing and 
reporting whatever comes into his head and not being misled, for instance, 
into suppressing an idea because it strikes him as unimportant or irrelevant or 
because it seems to him meaningless.  
 
We will see that social life and social phenomena have dream-like qualities and as 
such we need the method of free association to interpret them.  
To elaborate why the method of free association possesses clear comparative 
advantage over its rivals, we start by pondering on the nature of understanding and 
offer free association as a proper approach to understand understanding. We 
establish that understanding entails idiosyncrasy and singularity inside commonality 
and sharedness (Schmid et.al., 2008). As we have articulated already the presence of 
commonality per se does not necessitates the sameness and does not justify resort to 
the reductionist search for law-like regularity through the positivist method of 
compare and contrast in an attempt to understand and explain the formation and 
transformation of social phenomena. The sharedness (sharing a common language 
and a regime of truth) is the condition of possibility of emergence of uniqueness. The 
signifiers may be shared but the strings of signifiers (signifeds) are particular; this is 
how particularity is produced out of sharedness, generality and universality (see 
Fink, 1997: 93). In Islamic philosophy, the two notions of verbal sharedness 
(moshtarek-e lafzi) and meaning sharedness (moshtarek-e manavi) can be used to 
generate difference out of sameness and singularity out of sharedness (see Mesbah 
Yazi, 1999: 137). To gain access to the shared singularity of the social phenomena 
we need to adopt the approach of free association.  
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2.8.5 Understanding of Understanding 
Heidegger opened our eyes to the fact that everyday existence is a form of 
understanding and attunement with the world, through which he extended the notion 
of understanding from the interpretation of texts into all human activities, in the 
sense that in everyday life in all fields of experience and in all forms of behaviour we 
are, consciously or (overwhelmingly) unconsciously, engaged in the act of 
understanding, un-concealment or disclosure. As Hoy (1993: 182) states:  
Contrary to present tendencies to think of the reading of texts as the paradigm 
case of interpretation, Heidegger's paradigm cases are everyday activities like 
opening a door or hammering. Even Heidegger’s philosophical Interpretation 
is an interpretation not of a text, but of Dasein. But these cases are analogues 
of texts insofar as Heidegger’s point is that even the most obvious ordinary 
objects taken by themselves do not have their characteristics inscribed in them. 
Instead, the characteristics of the tools come into being in the concrete 
interpretation manifested in the activity of using them. Contrary to an 
empiricist epistemology that presupposes that we first “perceive” objects with 
their particular properties and only secondarily apply or use them, Heidegger's 
suggestion is that this type of perception is not primary. Seeing is not simply 
perceiving the properties of external objects with the bodily eyes (BT [Being 
and Time] 187). Instead of construing seeing as seeing that an object has such 
and such a property, Heidegger construes seeing as already interpreting 
something as something (e.g., seeing something as a hammer, as a door, or as a 
table).  
 
For Heidegger action, or more generally any form of behaviour (speech, affectivity, 
for example), is a particular interpretation of the world. Hoy (1993: 183) further 
elaborates on the holistic nature of understanding: “Meaning for Heidegger thus 
involves the holistic way in which something can become intelligible as something 
in a web of relations (BT 193)”.  
Heidegger, as Hoy elaborates (1993: 183-4), shows how seeing something as 
hammer require seeing it in the larger context of a workshop, which soon if we peel 
the layers of larger and larger contexts involved in the experience of using a hammer 
we arrive at Heidegger’s fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth. The act of 
hammering is almost always embedded in a form of worldhood (characterized by 
particular configuration of relation between mortals and gods, sky and earth) and 
takes its meaning and significance from it.  As Dreyfus and Wrathall (2005: 14) 
remind us: “The fourfold names the different regions of our existence which can 
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contribute to giving us a particular, localized way of dwelling”. Charles Taylor 
(2005: 449-450; see also Edwards, 2005) shows how the notion of fourfold sheds 
light on the holistic nature of understanding in the example of a jug:  
Take a humble entity, like a jug. As it shows up in the world of a peasant, as 
yet unmobilized by modern technology, it is redolent of the human activities 
in which it plays a part, of the pouring of wine at the common table, for 
instance. The jug is a point at which this rich web of practices can be sensed, 
made visible in the very shape of the jug and its handle which offers itself for 
this use. So much for the human life which co-shows up in this thing... the 
human modes of conviviality that the jug co-discloses are shot through with 
religious and moral meaning... If we are not closed to it, the jug will also 
speak of its history as a formed entity, of its emergence from unformed 
matter, of its continuing dependency on the unformed, since it can only exist 
as an entity as long as it is supported by the whole surrounding reality. It 
rests ultimately on the earth, and that is the word Heidegger uses for this 
dimension of co-disclosure. Finally, the jug and the whole round of activities 
it speaks of, and the earth, are open to greater cosmic forces which are 
beyond the domain of the formable, and which can either permit them to 
flourish or sweep them away.  
The alternation of day and night, storms, floods, earthquakes, or their benign 
absence; these are the things which Heidegger assembles under the title ‘sky’. 
They provide the frame within which the earth can be partly shaped as our 
world”.  
 
The work of fourfold in shaping the holistic dimension of existence is succinctly 
manifest in the Khayyam’s poems (as translated by Edward Fitzgerald, 2004: 45) 
centring on the humble entity of a jug: “A Book of Verses underneath the Bough, A 
Jug of Wine, a Loaf of Bread--and Thou; Beside me singing in the Wilderness- Oh, 
Wilderness were Paradise enow!"”. The layered dimensions of being is further 
elaborated in the following Khayyam’s poem (as translated by Ahmad Saidi, 1992: 
132): “The sphere upon which mortals come and go, Has no end nor beginning that 
we know; And none there is to tell us in plain truth: Whence do we come and 
whither do we go”. This form of understanding which encompasses and constitutes 
our being as being-in-the-world can best be understood in its uniqueness and 
singularity through the deployment of the free-association method, because the links 
and associations affiliated with everything is unique to each order. The extremely 
important subject of comparative advantages of free association over rival methods 
of research alongside the issue of hermeneutics of suspicion was explored more 
extensively but was not included in this work due to word limitations.  
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This study, however, endeavours to combine the hermeneutics of understanding with 
hermeneutics of suspicion in making sense of the bitter experience of socio-
economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran. In the analysis of the 
emergence of Khomeini’s Islamic state, for example, in the chapter on the Islamic 
revolution it is shown how the three principles of embeddedness, emergence and 
incommensurability can be used to understand this event as an unintended 
consequence of interacting forces, voices and faces shaped by the warring regimes of 
truth in the state of belated inbetweenness.  
In sum, this study can serve as an example of how hermeneutics of suspicion and 
hermeneutics of understanding can be used as complementary approaches (rather 
than substitute ones) in the production of contextualized knowledge about social 
phenomena. 
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Chapter 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
“In the last analysis, we must produce truth  
                                                                        as we must produce wealth, 
                                                                                              indeed we must produce truth in order to 
                                                                                   produce wealth in the first place”.  
Michel Foucault (1980: 93-4) 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of institutions in the process of socio-economic development is 
being increasingly acknowledged in the literature on socio-economic development, 
liberalization, privatization, and the economics of emerging markets, as manifested 
in the emergence of ‘institutional economics’ as a sub-discipline in economic theory.  
The success of different waves of late-comers such as Japan, and Korea and recently 
China and India is being ever more explained by resorting to the specificity of their 
institutions, and the failures of many countries in Latin America, Africa, Middle 
East, and Russia is analysed through lack of the appropriate institutional structures in 
the historical and current contexts of their evolution.  A consensus has been 
emerging on the fact that lack of natural resources or physical, financial and human 
capital cannot explain the roots of socio-economic stagnation. In a sense, the 
literature on development can be mapped on a conceptual space moving from natural 
capital (the importance of natural resources, and the specific characteristics of nature 
and geography), to physical and financial capital, human capital, and ultimately to 
social capital. The role of social capital and its main component, trust, is highlighted 
as the key prerequisite for the establishment of a stable path towards sustainable 
socio-economic development (see Fukuyama, 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2002; Tilly, 2005, among others).  
As a developing country, Iran has enjoyed, for example, of rich reservoirs of natural 
resources, strategic geographical positioning, almost uninterrupted stream of oil 
revenues, and adequate amount of physical and human capital. Despite starting its 
leap for development with Japan in the second half of 19
th
 century, the gap in the 
level of development between the two countries could not be greater, largely due to 
constant socio-political instability (see Aisen and Veiga, 2013) and intermittent 
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episodes of small and large scale social upheavals experienced in Iran alongside 
Japan being, at least internally, an ‘island of stability’ (Carter’s famous description 
of the Shah’s Iran) (see Gao, 2001, on Japan’s stability). In a century, Iranians have 
encountered many strong socio-political events in the forms of revolutions and large-
scale movements alongside innumerable cases of almost daily socio-economic crises 
(Foran, 1994).  
The history of modern Iran can be summarized in institutional failure, failure to 
construct stable and legitimate set of institutions required to achieve economic 
prosperity through establishing security, peace and order. This research, hence, as 
defined in Chapter 1, addresses and gives meaning to the question of why Iranian 
nation in its repeated attempts to construct institution of modern order, such as 
modern nation-state, modern parliamentary system, banking system, modern 
education system, and legal system failed so regularly and so consistently. If the 
question is traced to the lack of social capital and trust in the Iranian society, the 
research question of this study addresses the problem of why Iranian nation has not 
been able to generate adequate level of trust in the form of social capital in the social 
interactions to enable it to construct effective and efficient institutions necessary for 
achieving sustainable socio-economic development.  
With regard to the fact that the literature on social capital (Evans, 1996; Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Narayan, 1999; Fukuyama, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2002; Huang, 2010)  
points to the significance of social capital in the process of socio-economic 
development
29
, the research question attempted in this study in the context of Iranian 
modern history is the following: What factors are involved in generating large scale 
mistrust in micro, meso and macro levels to increase frictions and to create paralyses 
and dysfunctionalities in the process of socio-economic transactions?  As North 
(1990) maintains economic performance depends on stable institutions constituted 
from formal rules, informal customs and norms, and common belief systems, and 
their enforcement mechanisms. By reducing uncertainty inherent in the socio-
economic transactions, stable institutions, with their three components, reduce the 
transactions costs and remove the frictions in markets and hierarchies and pave the 
way for socio-economic take-off.  In the same spirit, Rodrik (2004, 2006, 2007) sees 
the essence of sustainable development in the establishment of institutions of conflict 
resolution. In the face of bounded rationality and the inherent incompleteness of 
                                                          
29
 For a critique of the concept of social capital see Fine, 2001, 2010a and 2010b.  
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contracts, Williamson (2000, 2002, 2005, 2010), a transaction-cost economist, 
emphasises on the role of informal norms and consensus, and common legal and 
ethical cultures in minimizing the costs of conflict resolution.  
In explaining all socio-economic phenomena, Williamson (2000) distinguishes four 
levels of analysis, level of prices, level of governance, level of institution and level 
of mind, each of which function at its own specific time scale with differential speed 
of change, spanning a spectrum from instant change in prices to a millennium 
required for the change in mind-sets. At the level of prices, for example, the role of 
price signals in allocation of scarce resources in the markets is the focus of attention, 
while at the level of governance the internal structure of power, ownership and 
management, and the incentive mechanisms in socio-economic organizations 
(hierarchies) such as corporations, schools, families, bureaucracies is at the centre of 
gravity. At the level of institutions (such as property rights and institutions of 
conflict resolutions), the formal laws and informal rules defining and grounding the 
institutional structure of human activities are at the pinnacle of analysis, while at the 
level of mind the internal structure of human mind with its conscious and 
subconscious components, its values, beliefs and preferences is the focus of analysis.  
Overall, all these interactive systems produces the co-evolving structure of political 
economies. 
These four levels of analysis can be summarised as follows:  
(i) prices matter - referring to the premise that removing distortionary interventions 
in the signalling function of prices leads for the economy to grow based on its 
comparative advantages;  
(ii) governance matters – referring to the premise that implementing stabilization 
policies at the macro level and organizing the contractual structures at the micro 
level culminates in the growth of the economy (making the rights and obligations of 
stakeholders at macro and micro levels transparent); 
(iii) institutions matter – referring to the premise that ensuring the rule of law by 
designing institutions of conflict resolution and property rights leads for the 
economy to prosper; and  
86 
 
(iv) mind matters – referring to the premise that getting the structure of beliefs, 
values, and preferences right and making them compatible with the requirements of 
modern economy results in the economy to enjoy sustainable socio-economic 
development.  
Removing price distortions and establishing proper governance structure may seem 
easy but arriving at right institutional structure or appropriate preference 
configuration may appear to be a daunting task. As such, Dixit (2003, 2004) 
acknowledges that in many developing countries the institutions of rule of law 
cannot be established as prerequisite of socio-economic growth and development, 
and as a result the state of lawlessness would be the default position in these national 
settings. He strives to develop a theory where the task of conflict resolution is 
achieved through private arrangements in the state of public lawlessness.   
In acknowledging the lack of universal blueprints for constructing development-
oriented institutions and in admitting to the specificity and uniqueness of the 
trajectory of emergence of them, Rodrik (2007, 2008) states that the recent sustained 
rate of growth in China is achieved not through public institutions guaranteeing the 
rule of law as exercised in the Western societies but through the distinctly Chinese 
institutions of district and village ownership developed in the communist era. Many 
researchers of Far East countries such as Japan and South Korea (see: Ha-Joon 
Chang 1994, 2003, 2008; Wade 1990) view their processes of industrialization and 
modernization as an outcome of the close cooperation and negotiation among the 
political, military, bureaucratic, scientific, and business elites of these societies rather 
than the rule of law as formulated and implemented in the Western countries. This 
body of research explicitly or implicitly strives to immunize the researchers against 
the epistemological diseases of Orientalism and Eurocentrism, and prompt us to 
search for country-specific model of socio-economic development away from 
universalism inherent to most social and economic theories. 
Another strand of literature in economic theory takes us to the direction, which 
results in the premise that ‘history matters’ (Tilly, 2006). Arthur (1994, 1997) and 
David (1985, 2000, 2007) demonstrate that whenever increasing return to scale is at 
work in a context, the economy may get locked in an inefficient outcome purely 
because of a (even small) random event; as such the phenomenon of path 
dependency is the result of the work of increasing return to scale. It can therefore be 
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argued that history in the form of random events may determine the economic 
stagnation of a specific country or region.   
The existence and prevalence of path-dependent systems (entailing ‘non-ergodic 
stochastic processes’) make almost all forms of socio-economic analysis historical. 
David (1985: 332, original emphases; see also Arthur 1994, Pierson 2000, Mahoney 
and Schensul 2006, David 2007) emphasizes on this important point in the following 
terms:  
A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important 
influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote 
events, including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than 
systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge 
automatically to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are called non-
ergodic. In such circumstances ""historical accidents" can neither be ignored, 
nor neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic analysis; the dynamic 
process itself takes on an essentially historical character.    
 
Lang (2009: 103) attests that in macroeconomics of labour market, some ‘path 
dependent’ models generate involuntary unemployment “after two shocks of the 
same size but of opposite signs”. According to the literature on economics of 
complex systems (Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur et al., 1997; Blume and Durlauf, 
2006; Hommes, 2013) it is possible to identify some random events that disrupted 
the on-going course of events, with irreversible consequences.  
Due to the widespread presence of phenomenon of increasing return to scale and 
positive feedback mechanisms in the socio-economic systems (norms and beliefs are 
knowledge-based phenomena with strong tendency for increasing return to scale), 
path dependency is prevalent in such entities. The notion of path-dependency will 
transform the social sciences into sciences of historical evolution of social 
phenomena as it necessitates that Geertz’s (1973) ‘thick descriptions’ (equivalent to 
Hirschman’s [1984] ‘against parsimony’) need to replace or complement the 
reductionist thin ones (Solow’s ‘keep it simple’)30. This notion can be deployed, for 
example, to analyse the North-South divide in the international order or ‘the tale of 
two cities’ in New York or London. Pierson (2000, 2004) utilizes the concept of path 
dependency to analyse distinct trajectories of welfare states. The notion of path-
                                                          
30
 To acknowledge how the detailed historical analysis is gradually creeping into highly formalistic 
economic journals like American Economic Review see for example Libecap (2011). 
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dependency leads Hodgson (2001, 2002, 2004) to reject the universalism intrinsic to 
the mainstream economics and argue that there is a need to have different theories to 
analyse different economic phenomena and systems, implying that historical 
contexts must be taken into account by recognising the historically situated 
(embedded and incommensurable) nature of economic phenomena. 
When we combine the two aforementioned strands we reach the conclusion that 
based on five premises of ‘prices matter’, ‘governance matters’, ‘institutions matter’, 
‘mind matters’, and ‘history matters’, we can venture on a historical analysis of the 
country-specific roots of socio-economic stagnation, utilizing an interdisciplinary 
approach at the interface between ‘development economics and institutional 
economics’, fully taking advantage of theories in philosophy (such as the theoretical 
readings of Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze, and Berlin, amongst others), 
psychoanalysis (such as of Lacan), economics and politics.  
Thus, construction of a logic is possible, whereby history embeds and shapes the 
embodied minds which overflows into institutions, governance structures and price 
mechanisms. The basic point is that the historical functioning of the economic 
system through the signalling role of prices at the international and national levels 
generates opportunities for national, regional and local economies to initiate their 
process of development by activating their static comparative advantages (whether 
this comparative advantage is in natural resources, cheap labour, geographical 
positioning as a hub, tourism or any other component) and to start their processes of 
rapid growth and use the yields and surpluses of growth to generate sustainable 
socio-economic development through engendering dynamic comparative advantages 
in higher value-added and knowledge-based sectors and products with increasing 
return to scale, but the whole process requires coordination between all those four 
Williamsonian levels of mind, institutions, governance and prices.  
In a sense, sustainable socio-economic development is a process of generating 
surpluses and accumulation of wealth by moving from static comparative advantages 
to dynamic comparative advantages, but the whole process require a level of 
dynamic cohesiveness achieved through the dance of co-evolution, multilateral 
harmonization, and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization (Mosekilde et 
al., 2002; Foster and Hölzl, 2004) between those four aforementioned levels, which 
by implication involves the functioning of the whole social order within a particular 
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social formation. That is why we require a set of methodologies and theoretical 
frameworks enabling us to study social orders in their wholeness (the dynamic 
movements between those four levels) and in their uniqueness, specificity and 
contingency referring to case specific analysis beyond all forms of content 
universalism.  
Depending on the nature of social order, the process of chaotic synchronization of 
four levels of social assemblages may fundamentally succeed resulting in the 
creation of homogenous societies like the Western countries and Japan, or it may 
produce heterogeneous and highly stratified societies like Lebanon or Malaysia with 
relatively stable consensual system of division of power, or may partially succeed, 
which produce dysfunctional social orders like Iran, Mexico, Pakistan and Russia or 
may totally fail, which engenders failing social orders as in Somalia or Afghanistan. 
There are also categories of countries that have been in transition from one category 
to another such as China and India, moving from the state of dysfunctionalities to a 
state of homogeneity or countries like Yemen, Iraq or Syria, which may be moving 
towards becoming failed states
31
.   
Based on the stability and intensity of social cohesion, hence, there are four types of 
societies: homogenous, heterogeneous, troubled and failed. Iran belongs to the 
troubled category with dysfunctional synchronization while having the traces of the 
other three in its constitution. This is a typological analysis, but as we mentioned 
elsewhere in this study, the typological and axiomatic analysis need to be 
accompanied with the topological ones (see: Tizro, 2011; Flynn, 2005), which we 
embark on throughout this study.  Based on Hodgson’s verdict, which is reiterated in 
the recent reports on development from Wold Bank and IMF (2005), different 
economic phenomena require different theories, and historical contexts and local 
                                                          
31
 Of course in each social order we may have pockets of phenomena or orders with the characteristics 
of the alternative categories. Three phenomena of prostitution (Jeffreys, 2009), drug consumption 
(Gray, 2012) and migration (Doty, 2003) are examples of social phenomena where most Western 
countries are suffering from various degrees of dysfunctionalities and failings manifested in the fuzzy 
status of prostitution between being legal and illegal (the shadow economy of prostitution), and the 
war on drug and its dysfunctionalities and devastating effects on both sides of the border between 
Mexico and the USA and in the whole world with large Western demand and the countries of supply 
in Colombia, Burma, and Afghanistan and transit countries like Iran and Russia or in the case of 
migration between Mexico and the USA or Europe and the rest of the world particularly North Africa 
and Middle East where there is a dysfunctional synchronization between the forces of globalization 
and the forces of nation-states. The positions of the West on drug, prostitution and migration and their 
supply and demand sides are schizophrenic (compare them with supply and demand of alcohol and 
cigarette and the new consensus built on smoking); what is different in Iran is that this schizophrenia 
(Shayegan, 1993) extends to the whole social order, covering almost every small or big issues of life, 
work and language.  
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knowledge (Rodik, 2007; Easterly 2001, 2007a, 2007b; Kalb, 2006) should be 
considered in the analysis.  
Borrowing from different strands of theoretical literature in economics and beyond, 
and inspired by the unique history of socio-economic development in Iran, as 
mentioned previously, this study attempts to develop a unique theory for the analysis 
of Iranian experience of socio-economic stagnation and to apply it to the three major 
events in the Iranian modern history and their associated periods to demonstrate its 
potency in explaining the patterns and regularities inhibiting socio-economic 
development and creating socio-economic underdevelopment and stagnation. The 
philosophical dimension of the work borrows from the binary opposition of 
Heideggerian dasein (Heideggerian term for human existence as being-in-the-world) 
versus Cartesian cogito, or Heideggerian existential phenomenology (Dreyfus, 1991; 
Blattner, 2006) as opposed to Cartesian subject-object relation.  
The Cartesian approach to social phenomena leads to the strand of social analysis 
based on reductionism. The Heideggerian phenomenology culminates in the 
articulation of social order (situating a social phenomenon in its signified and 
contextualized whole), producing a thick description of specificity and singularity of 
life-worlds acting as the background, riverbed, condition of possibility, and historical 
a priori for social phenomena. The analysis based on the features of complex 
adaptive systems serves as the bridge between the other two strands of social 
analysis. In a sense, every social assemblage in its vertical and horizontal movements 
possesses three levels of causational, system-based, and meaning-centred dynamisms 
captured by three strands of social analyses based on reductionism, complexity 
systems, and worlds of significations (captured by cultural psychoanalysis).  
In the methodological analysis undertaken by this study, the Heideggerian being-in-
the-world is characterized by the Lacanian trinity of ‘symbolic’, ‘imaginary’ and 
‘real’ orders. Furthermore, the Foucauldian articulation of power, knowledge and 
subjectivity (Flynn 2005) is deployed to characterize the affirmative dimensions of a 
symbolic order. In addition, Deleuzian process philosophy (DeLanda, 2006) is 
deployed to elaborate on affirmative dimension of ‘real’ and Kristeva’s, Laplanche’s 
and Castoriadis’s theories and philosophies are adopted and adapted to theorize the 
affirmative dimension of ‘imaginary’. Zizekian (1989, 2012) interpretation of Lacan 
(based on three negating dimensions of disruption, foreclosure, repression and 
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disavowal, and ideology and fantasy) is used to characterize the negating dimensions 
of ‘real’, ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ as embedded and embodied in various forms of 
being-in-the-world and social assemblages.   
In a sense, this study has been set up to demonstrate that Rodrik’s (2007, 2008) 
emphasis on local knowledge in designing country-specific recipes for economic 
development and Williamson’s diagnosis of ‘mind matters’ in determining the 
economic destiny of a nation or a community inevitably take us to deep waters and 
uncharted territories of philosophical, psychoanalytic and other interdisciplinary 
theories never fathomed by these economic theorists. The analysis is expected to 
demonstrate that there is no universal cause of economic backwardness; in any 
specific community or nation specific factors emanating from specific situations may 
act to perpetuate the state of socio-economic underdevelopment. The study aims to 
establish the parameters of social science of singularity and situatedness where the 
study of causes is located at the holistic levels of complexity systems and worlds of 
significations by combining hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of 
suspicion, and demonstrate its potency in understanding the enigma of socio-
economic underdevelopment in Iran. The rest of this chapter is organized around 
introduction of the theoretical model in Section 2, and development of four cluster 
concepts of tragedy of confusion, impossibility of stable coalition formation, 
institutional failure, and chaotic order in Sections 3 to 6.    
3.2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL (TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION) 
As mentioned above, following the diagnosis made by Hodgson (2002), Rodick 
(2007. 2008) and the recent IMF report on development (2005), this study aims to 
come up with a conceptual model uniquely tailored to the Iran-specific experience of 
socio-economic (under)development. The main argument of this study revolves 
around the proposition that Iranian experience of backwardness is the outcome of 
failure to produce stable regime of truth (Foucault, 1980) as a result of dynamic 
interplay between the state of culture and the state of situation, as formulated by 
Malinowski (Firth, 2010). In the case of Iran, the state of culture is characterized in 
this work by the notion of ‘inbetweenness’ and the ‘state of situation’ by the concept 
of ‘belatedness’ (Bhabha, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Huddart, 2006; Shayegan, 2007; 
Byrne, 2009).  
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The state of ‘inbetweenness’ manifests itself in the notion of ‘tragedy of confusion’ 
resulting from the warring regimes of truth. The modern history of Iran is littered 
with ample evidence of tragedy of confusion. The Travel Diary of Ebrahim Beg 
(Siyahatnameh-ye Ibrahim Beig) (Maraghaʼi, 2006) written at the end of the 19th 
century and one of the texts behind the Constitutional Revolution captures, as 
reported in Nasri (2007: 89, see also Sohrabi, 2012: 121-3), the Iranian state of 
confusion succinctly:  
everywhere the landscape is disturbed (ashofteh), people disturbed, 
commerce disturbed, imagination disturbed, beliefs disturbed, city disturbed, 
king disturbed, oh God, why is there so much disturbance [everywhere]?  
 
This description is applicable to almost all episodes of Iranian modern history- as 
Movahhed (1999, 2004a, 2004b) uses the notion of “confused (or disturbed) dreams 
(khab-e Ashofteh)” to characterize the oil-nationalization movement, affirming 
Ibrahim Beig’s insight on the nature of Iranian modern social reality- barring for the 
rare and fleeting moments of manifestation of “perfectly unified collective will” 
(Foucault, as reported in Afaray et al., 2005: 95) or rare cases of institutional 
stability. About a century later Simin Daneshvar (1993, 2001), the prominent Iranian 
novelist, explores the same themes of “disturbance”, ‘bewilderment’, ‘perplexity’ 
and ‘confusion’ in her trilogy “Wandering Island (Jazireh-ye Sargardani)”, 
“Wandering Cameleer (Sareban-e Sargardan)”, and “Wandering Mountain (Koh-e 
Sargardan)”.    
The state of belatedness, on the other hand, refers to the state where Iranian social 
order has found itself dwarfed by the shocking arrival of modernity, positioning it in 
the state of catching up (Abramovitz, 1986) and outside-in (rather than inside-out) 
model of development. The interaction between these two states is captured in the 
theoretical model proposed in this study as articulated in the following sections and 
in the previous and next chapters. This model starts from the level of mind as a 
social institution, as elaborated by Arkoun (2006) and the transaction-cost 
economist, Williamson (2000), and explores the implications of the specific 
characteristics of Iranian mind and preference structure in an attempt to develop a 
micro, meso and macro dynamic model in fulfilling the aim of this study. 
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3.2.1 Proposed Conceptual Model 
The proposed conceptual model can be expressed in the following way: Tragedy of 
confusion emanates from the state of inbetweenness with its associated confused 
preference structure, as Iranians have been captivated by three rival regimes of truth 
and identity markers of Islam, Persianism (the idea of pre-Islamic Iran), and Western 
modernity. The state of inbetweenness in its interaction with the state of belatedness 
prompts the translation of three regimes of truth into three projects of social 
engineering. This dynamics results in the emergence of three projects of reverse 
social engineering of ‘Persianization’ (bastan-geraei), Islamization (Islam-geraei or 
Islami kardan), and modernization in order to achieve social transformation. 
Reverse social engineering requires the formation of collective will and collective 
action, which through formation of stable coalitions could achieve its goals. But in 
the state of confusion the formation of such coalitions is almost impossible. This 
leads to a phenomenon described as ‘situational impossibility theorem’ in this study, 
indicating that in the complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the 
state of belatedness (hence, belated inbetweenness) it is impossible to form stable 
coalitions in any areas of life, work and language to achieve the desired social 
transformations (we will see why later). This leads to turning Iran into a country of 
unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels.  This in turn leads 
to the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘institutional failure’ in the form of inability 
to construct stable and functional institutions such as modern nation-state, or market 
economy based on property rights or any other stable forms of institutional 
structures, which turns Iran into the country of institutional dysfunctionalities and 
deformities. The accumulated experiences of ‘tragedy of confusion’, ‘formation of 
unstable coalitions’ and ‘institutional failure’ lead to the emergence of a society 
immersed in a state of ‘chaotic order’.   
The state of chaotic order  can be explained in the following terms: the experience of 
tragedy of confusion with its associated instability of coalitions and institutional 
dysfunctionalities frequently leads to the emergence of widespread sense of 
discontent and disillusionment, in turn, triggering the emergence of large- and small-
scale social movements and revolutions culminating in the experience of constant 
waves of socio-political instability, where the society oscillates between the chaotic 
states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between 
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and within various social assemblages in the springs of freedom, and repressive 
states of order in the winters of discontent. In this process, the order is restored based 
on the emergence of final arbiter or the Iranian leviathan as the evolved coping 
strategy for achieving conflict resolution leading to socio-economic 
underdevelopment and stagnation. 
The following sections, hence, aims to briefly discuss and unpack the components of 
this theoretical model. 
3.2.2 Tragedy of Confusion 
Our voyage of discovery for understanding the complexity, specificity, and 
singularity of Iranian experience of underdevelopment starts with the fundamental 
question of ‘What constitutes Iranianness (in the same vein as Turkishness, 
Britishness, …)?’, as the question of ‘Why are we backward?’ logically leads to the 
question of ‘Who and what are this ‘we’ as Iranians?’.32 With regard to the notion of 
Iranianness and its constitution, Frye (1977: 1-3), the Harvard professor of the 
Iranian history, observes that:  
Of all of the lands of the Middle East, Iran is perhaps both the most conservative and 
at the same time the most innovative. Whereas Egypt and Syria, for example, 
underwent great changes in the course of two millennia of history, Iran seems to have 
preserved much more of its ancient heritage. The Christianization of the eastern 
Mediterranean world brought a profound break with the past for both Egypt and 
Syria... Iran, however, retained its ancient Zoroastrian faith, together with customs and 
practices, unchanged by alliance to a new religion. Politically, too, Iranians never 
forgot the glories of imperial rule... Empires and kingdoms come and go, but the 
memory of a unified great state not only continued to inspire folk bards and poets but 
also to motivate political action... Then came Islam... It was more than a religion. It 
was a way of life and a complete culture and civilization which erased the past.... Iran 
was converted to the religion of Islam, but ... [t]he continuity of ancient Iranian 
traditions down to the present is impressive... Paradoxically ... Herodotus ... said that 
no people were more prone to accept foreign habits as the Persians. Anyone who has 
walked the streets of new Tehran can see all kinds of styles of architecture and the 
latest women’s dress styles from Paris and elsewhere. 
Bernard Lewis (2004: 43) affirms Frye’s observation in the following terms:  
These other countries of ancient civilization, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, 
were Islamized and Arabized in a remarkably short time. Their old religions 
were either abandoned entirely or dwindled into small minorities; their old 
languages almost disappeared. Some survived in scriptures and liturgies, some 
                                                          
32
 There is a burgeoning literature in economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Sen, 2007; Davis, 1994) 
exploring the relation between identity and socio-economic outcomes, which is largely based on a 
reductive approach relying on thin descriptions, and treating identity as a variable rather than a 
worldhood.  
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were still spoken in a few remote villages, but in most places, among most 
people, the previous languages were forgotten, the identities expressed in those 
languages were replaced, and the ancient civilizations of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt 
gave way to what we nowadays call the Arab world. Iran was indeed 
Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained Persians.  
 
Lewis (2004: 46; see also Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001, 2009) further adds that  
We see the difference in a number of ways: in the emergence of a kind of national 
epic poetry, which has no parallel in Iraq or Syria or Egypt or any of these other 
places; and in the choice of personal names. In the Fertile Crescent and Westwards, 
the names that parents gave their children were mostly names from the Qur’an or from 
pagan Arabia—Ali, Muhammad, Ahmad, and the like. These names were also used in 
Iran among Muslim Persians. But in addition, they used distinctively Persian names: 
Khusraw, Shapur, Mehyar and other names derived from a Persian past—a recent 
Persian past, that of the Sassanids, but nevertheless Persian. We do not find Iraqis 
calling their sons Nebuchadnezzar or Sennacherib, nor Egyptians calling their sons 
Tutankhamen or Amenhotep.  
 
These observations demonstrate how the three large forces of Persianism (the 
affiliation to the Iranian ancient pre-Islamic heritage), Islam and Western modernity-
as three distinct regimes of truth (regimes of truth as Foucauldian “things of this 
world” and as Lacanian-Zizekian (2001) pieces of symbolic ‘real’) interact and 
intermingle to shape the minds, institutions (all realms of life from family to 
economy, polity and security), systems of governance, and the configuration of 
prices in the Iranian society.  
Foucault (1984: 73) coins the notion of regimes of truth in the following terms:  
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 
 
He further elaborates on the notion of truth and its intertwinement with power:  
“Truth” is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements. 
“Truth” is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce 
and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it-
A “regime” of truth.  
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The three hybrid packages of (real-symbolic-imaginary) truth of Persianism, Western 
modernity and Islam fulfil Foucault’s definitions. These ‘symbolic’ pieces of ‘real’ 
act as grid of intelligibility and condition of possibility and impossibility for actions, 
affects and thoughts (see methodology chapter). Regimes of truth are social 
assemblages which are subject to the rules and regularities governing the complex 
adaptive systems, and survive and thrive through the processes of ‘reproduction’ 
(constant routine circulation, reproduction, and reiteration of truths about life, work 
and language inside its various platforms and institutions of power, knowledge and 
subjectivity), ‘variation’ (borrowing from alternative regimes of truth through 
assimilation, accommodation, and appellation without losing their integrity and 
identity), and ‘inheritance’ (the use of social institutions and techniques of memory 
and subjectification to transfer itself to next generation of social assemblages).    
Abrahamian (2008: 2) alludes to the affiliation of Iranians with alternative regimes 
of truth in the following terms:  
Iranians identify with both Shi’i Islam and their pre-Islamic history, especially the 
Sassanids, Achaemenids, and Parthians. Names parents choose for their children are 
living proof of this: from Shi’ism come Ali, Mehdi, Reza, Hussein, Hassan, and 
Fatemeh; from ancient Iran, via the poet Ferdowsi and his epic Shahnameh (Book of 
Kings), come Isfandiyar, Iskandar, Rostam, Sohrab, Ardashir, Kaveh, Bahram, and 
Atossa.  
 
Milani (2011b) points to the same fact when he states that:  
Iranian identity is bifurcated, split between the pre-Islamic traditions of 
Zoroastrian and Manichean millennium before Islam, and the Islam-
influenced developments of the last 1,300 years. But there has never been a 
consensus about which side of this bifurcation should be privileged.  
 
The two notions of bifurcation and giving privilege or precedence to one regime of 
truth over another, deployed by Milani in the above quote, play important roles in 
our analysis, as our voyage of discovery strives to combine thick and thin 
descriptions through achieving cross-fertilization and hybridization between 
causational analysis (Cartesian cogito’s reductionism), analysis based on complex 
adaptive systems (lending the notions of bifurcation and butter-fly effects, for 
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example), and articulations achieved through the notion of worldhood (Heidegger’s 
compound notion of being-in-the-world or Foucault’s notion of regime of truth or 
Castoriadis’ notion of world of signification).  
The use of hybrid method of analysis guides us to introduce the three principles of 
‘embeddedness’ (rootedness), ‘emergence’ (the law of unintended consequences), 
and ‘incommensurability’ (viewing social phenomena as texts imbued with 
meanings and significations alongside acknowledgement of the fact that the state of 
misunderstanding and misreading is the default position plaguing the relation 
between social assemblages). This way of analysis acknowledges that social 
phenomena emerge in the interplay between the context of culture (incommensurable 
forms of embeddedness) and the context of situation (the ecology of social 
assemblages encompassing the topological configuration of different emergent social 
assemblages).  
Following Badiou (Hallward, 2003), the best way to see the two notions of context 
of culture and context of situation is to theorize them as two sets. Each psycho-social 
phenomenon is the outcome of the interplay of set of historical embeddedness 
(context of culture) and the set of the geographical configuration of social 
assemblages (context of situation). One relates to how time is configured and another 
to how space is organized. While Milani (2011b) does not include the continuous 
presence of the West in the matrix of Iranian social identity, order, and public 
imagination, Bausani (1975: 44; added emphasis), Italian Orientalist, attests to the 
uninterrupted presence of the West in the Iranian life-world: “we may distinguish a 
slow process of Westernization during the entire course of Iranian cultural history”. 
Milani’s observation was reaffirmed by Sharifi (2013), Shayegan (2007), Soroush 
(1993), Jahanbeglou (2004, 2008), and Rajaee (2007: 3, 24; 2006), Asgharzadeh 
(2007), Mackey (1998), among others, but only by adding the dimension of Western 
modernity to the prism of Iranian identity.  
Shayegan (2007: 87-91) introduces the notion of inbetweenness (‘na in na aani’ 
literally translatable as ‘not thisness not thatness’) and comes up with the grand, 
shocking, and paradoxical observation that “the current state of identitylessness is 
our identity” (Shayegan, 2007: 90).  Javad Tabataba’i (2006: 74), a prominent 
historian of political thought in Iran, endorses the same observation by maintaining 
that “from the perspective of the history of thought, the modern history of Iran 
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commenced in the state of not-this-not-that”.  Following these historical observations 
on the forces at work in the Iranian society, we start our analytical voyage with the 
structure of Iranian embodied and embedded mind (Williamson’s level zero) and 
introduce two notions of ‘confusion’ and ‘tragedy’.  
3.2.2.1 Confusion 
The notion of confusion is intended to capture the fact that each and every Iranian 
person is simultaneously captivated and repelled, affirmatively or negatively, by 
three large historical forces of Persianism (bastan-gerayee, i.e. classicism or 
archaism), Islam, and modernity (tajaddod and its dominant forms of 
Westernism=gharb-garaei). As Nietzsche put it historical (unconscious) forces 
shape and configure subjectivities and their preferences and intentionality (Ferrer, 
2004: 81). The unique and long history of Iranian nation on the Silk Road of 
alternative cultures and civilizations bequeaths them with a distinctive discursive and 
non-discursive reservoir and repertoire of historical resources in the form of three 
grand meta-narratives or regimes of truth originating in the Persian Empire, Islam, 
and Western modernity which function as identity markers overflowing into 
everyday life of the nation in all sites of being and becoming from birth to death, in 
the selection of names at birth to selection of dress code, public spheres and spaces 
(like streets, parks, beaches, mountains etc.), to family, polity, economy, art, science, 
education and entertainment. In this process, every site of social existence becomes a 
battleground for these three proselytizing forces for attaining a monopolistic position 
in the market for production of truth, turning Iranian social order into a site for 
incessant truth war in the search for total allegiance and loyalty.  
In this dynamics, each regime of truth strives to be the dominant force in the market 
for packages of ‘truth about’ life, work and language. When one particular regime of 
truth wins the battle and takes over the formal structures of life, language and work, 
informal guerrilla wars are initiated by the marginalized ones. For example, when the 
coalition between Persian classicism and modernization dominated the socio-
political space in the Pahlavi era, and the Western dress code under the appellation 
of Persianism became the advocated public policy, the Islamic side staged a guerrilla 
war by adopting and developing a new Islamic dress code which became dominant 
in the next era, which in turn invoked another round of backlash guerrilla war from 
the Western style of dress code in this period (see Paidar, 1995; Sedghi, 2007); while 
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Western style fashion designers were the dreaded and decadent cultural elites of the 
Pahlavi era they were turned into revolutionary guerrilla fighters in the Islamic era, 
as manifested in the notion of lipstick jihad (Moaveni, 2005).  
These forces have shaped the material landscape of existence in speech and action 
through alternative structures of power/knowledge, institutional arrangements and 
discursive formations, all materially embodied in memory and in senses, shaping the 
experiences associated with embodiment in the realms of vision, sound, smell, taste 
and touch. These three alternative paradigms of ‘language’, ‘thought’, ‘affects’, 
‘actions’, and ‘organization of objects’ with their distinct ontologies, epistemologies, 
methodologies, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, jurisprudence, mythologies, 
rituals, ceremonies, processions, memories, narratives, and sign systems formed on 
three axes of truth, goodness and beauty and manifested in discursive and non-
discursive practices are dynamically defined in contradistinction to each other in a 
process of constantly changing unities in multiplicities. 
These forces are events and processes, keeping their unities through the narratives of 
trajectories of their evolution (via symbolized and imagined genealogies and 
appellations); these are the retroactive and forward-looking narratives, which weave 
the present to the past and future, and are associated with particular conceptions of 
space-time continuum. Each force has the traces of the other in its constitutional 
make-up. These forces intermingle and generate rhizomatic movements and hybrid 
forms of beings at the level of ‘real’, while at the level of ’symbolic’, each regime of 
truth strives to incorporate the best of the alternatives under its own discursive 
integrity, while at the level of ‘imaginary’ (ideological and phantasy level) attempts 
are made to purify each regime of truth from being contaminated and polluted by the 
alternatives, which instigates the process of glorification of the self, based on its own 
white book of records and its own politics of piety, and demonization of the other, 
based on the black book of the other and her politics of ordinary, which presumes a 
Cartesian logic of subject-object relation and an Aristotelian logic of substance 
ontology. This dynamics generates a heavy burden of judgement and leads to the 
tragedy of confusion for the Iranian dasein. 
The state of belated inbetweenness prompts the emergence of different projects of 
reverse social engineering to counter the sense of backwardness induced by the 
dwarfing effects of the arrival of modernity. As Rothenberg (2011: 1) puts it:  
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In their logic, we find the most common gesture of every political program 
and every call for social change: identify a problem, locate its cause, and then 
eliminate that cause to solve the problem. This logic seems so self-evident as 
to be virtually tautological.   
 
As we addressed in the methodology chapter, taking the approach of reverse social 
engineering is the outcome of the application of Cartesian cogito-based reductive 
method of analysis to the social phenomena. As Borgmann (1993: 35) reminds us: 
“In the Discourse on Method, Descartes explicated his method in four rules: the rule 
of abstraction, of dissection, of reconstruction, and of control.” The application of 
this reductive method in the state of belated inbetweenness turns regimes of truth 
into projects of reverse social engineering. Each regime of truth gives rise to a 
project of social transformation. This process culminates in the emergence of three 
large projects of social change in the forms of Persinaization, Islamization and 
modernization, as each regime of truth historically evolved to specialize in particular 
filed of rationality- Islam in emancipative rationality, modernity in instrumental 
rationality, and Persianism in communicative rationality (these are addressed more 
extensively later in this chapter)- and are deemed lacking and less credible in 
alternative fields of rationality. As such, they attempt to fill the gaps by adopting and 
borrowing from their rivals. Regimes of truth, as things of this world, are engulfed in 
the play of finitude/infinitude (Foucault’s analytics of finitude, see Flynn, 2005) and 
endowed with abundances and lacks, affirmations and negations; they attempt to 
mend their lacks by assimilating the select bright elements of the others as a 
‘defensive strategy’. 
This process leads each project to become constitutive of three wings (subprojects). 
The three wings of Persinization project are: ‘Persianized Persianization’, 
‘Persianized Islamization’, and ‘Persianized modernization’. The three wings of 
Islamization project are: ‘Islamized Islamization’, ‘Islamized Persianization’ and 
‘Islamized modernization’. The corresponding three wings of modernization project 
are: ‘modernized modernization’, ‘modernized Islamization’, and ‘modernized 
Persianization’. As such each project has turned into a hybrid combination of all 
three regimes of truth, while prioritizing one regime of truth over the other two. 
Inside each hybrid project of reverse social engineering there has emerged shades of 
voices emanating from the permutational combination of elements of the three sets 
(regimes) of truth. Voices emerge out of application of operations of addition and 
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subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth. Khomeini’s voice of political Islam, 
for example, can be described as:  
fiqh+ Islamic philosophy+ Islamic mysticism+ revolutionary Islam+ 
progressive clergy- reactionary clergy+ Western constitutionalism+ Western 
science and technology- Western social freedom (sex, drug and rock and roll)+ 
modern social justice- modern godlessness+ Persian poetry- Persian monarchy. 
This, as can be seen, is a particular hybrid combination of the elements of three 
regimes of truth, distinct from Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s voice of cultural Islam 
(Hiro, 2013), Shariati’s voice of political Islam (Rahnema, 1998), Bazargan’s voice 
of liberal Islam (Chehabi, 1990, Bazargan, 1984), or Mujahedin’s voice of Marxist 
Islam (Abrahamian, 1989). We will map the internal composition of these voices 
more extensively in this chapter and in the application chapters, as these voices are 
much more detailed and issue-based than presented at this junction of our voyage of 
discovery.  
It should be noted that voices inhabit faces depending on particular trajectories of the 
biographical and genealogical evolution of social assemblages and social faces 
(individuals, organizations, and groups); the different levels of exposure to the 
different regimes of truth generate different types of voices and faces. Thus, in a 
sense, the faces have become the seat of voices. In ‘face’ and ‘voice’ relationship, 
the faces migrate from one voice to another in a dynamical process where it is not 
possible to attribute fixed identities to them. Forces, voices and faces move in a 
dance of music chair where faces cannot be affiliated to fixed set of forces and 
voices, compared to heterogenized or homogenized societies where faces assume 
stable identities via their stable affiliation to stable set of voices and forces and their 
associated institutions. In the troubled society of Iran, faces frequently convert to 
alternative set of forces and voices as they encounter novel contexts of situation. 
Different contexts of situation, even on a daily basis, prime and activate different 
components of alternative regimes of truth and their emergent hybrid voices. This is 
manifest in the (in)famous saying of Makhmalbaf, the renowned Iranian filmmaker, 
where he confessed that  
I wake up in the morning as Che Guevara, at noon I am Abuzar [the famous 
disciple of the prophet Mohammad, glamorized by Shariati for the purity of 
his egalitarian and revolutionary zeal], in the afternoon I am Forough [the 
distinguished Iranian modernist poet], and in the night Sadegh Hedat [the 
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prominent anti-Islam and pro-Persian and modernist novelist] (Mosavi, 
2013).    
 
This observation applies to almost all Iranians who move back and forth nomadically 
between the boundaries of alternative regimes of truth in various moments of their 
lives and form bewildering variety of constantly changing cultural tribes as a result.  
Therefore, faces become the dynamical texts where forces and voices imprint 
themselves on. As such, in such a bewildering state of belated inbetweenness, 
actions, texts, faces, experiences, and events become different social assemblages 
and sites where warring regimes of truth battle for territory and loyalty. This process 
establishes the ‘confusion’ element of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness as an 
inevitable outcome of Iranian embeddedness, where Iranian dasein is a “projective 
thrownness” (Mulhall, 1996: 127; Aho, 2009) immersed in the tug of war between 
alternative regimes of truth endowed with incommensurable set of truth about life, 
work and language. This throws every Iranian social assemblage (individuals, 
organizations, groups and the whole social order) in a state of tri-polarity. The modes 
and moods of living, thinking and talking ‘bifurcate’ unpredictably between 
alternative regimes of truth and their innumerable voices emanating from countless 
incidences of hybrid combinations and permutations.  
This confusion originates from the fact that the Heideggerian fourfold of mortals, 
gods, the sky and the earth, and their associated brands of rationalities (instrumental, 
communicative and emancipative) are conceptualized and packaged differently in 
each regime of truth. The potentially infinite ways in which the different elements of 
these packages of truth can be combined create irreconcilable differences within and 
between voices and faces. In this state of ‘confusion’ in the Iranian dasein where no 
fixed identity can be assumed for any Iranian social assemblage we see the working 
of embeddedness (rootedness), emergence, and incommensurability as three 
principles constitutive of social phenomena. Social actors and analysts frequently 
misunderstand the meaning of social phenomena and as such commit the cardinal sin 
of counter-transference in the inevitable act of cultural psychoanalysis. In this, the 
notion of incommensurability calls for seeing the social assemblages as worlds of 
signification with their particular dictionaries and their associated denotations and 
connotations. This calls for understanding of Iranian dictionary associated with the 
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dynamic and non-linear interplay between the states of inbetweenness and 
belatedness.  
In the next element (tragedy) we will see the working of the principle of emergence 
more clearly.    
3.2.2.2 Tragedy 
The notion of ‘tragedy’ is meant to hint to the disastrous unintended consequences of 
individual actions (Poole, 2005). In the interface between the Iranian context of 
inbetweenness and belatedness, the interplay between the individual actions, 
speeches and emotions create tragic unintended consequences. In the context of 
belated inbetweenness, the evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization between 
alternative forces, voices and faces produces frequent experiences of failures, 
dysfunctionalities, and deformities without any need for devious plots, intentional 
fallacy, intelligent design, or conspiracy theory. In this tragic context, a series of 
intelligent designers and reverse social engineers of different orientations intent on 
transforming the society from top to toe produce the unintended consequence of a 
history of confusion, instability, deformity, and chaotic order.  
In the genre of tragedy the intentions and actions of characters of the story are 
secondary to the spontaneous doomed plot casting its shadow over their social and 
personal existence. The Greek exposition of tragedy in the story of Antigone and its 
Iranian counterpart in the story of Rostam and Sohrab where the father kills the son 
(filicide) unintentionally and unknowingly (Islami Nadooshan, 2004: 24-5; 
Katouzian, 2010: 22-24; Dabashi, 2011: 92-3), alongside the notion of tragedy of 
commons in the economic theory are three examples of a mode of thought and 
analysis where social events are emergent outcomes of the interaction between 
embedded forces rather than the intended outcome of conscious faces engaged in the 
epic struggle between good and evil, right and wrong, and modern and traditional as 
manifested in the discourses of transition
33
 or the dichotomous or dialectical logics 
of antagonism and confrontation
34
. As Markell (2003; 74-5; emphasis added) puts it  
                                                          
33
 As manifested in the conception of development as structural change based on the shift from 
tradition to modernity or in the share of three sectors of the economy, like Chenery’s and other 
version of the transition theories from big push to take off, to bottle-neck and the rest. 
34
As manifested in all oppositional genres of literature between modern and pre-modern in liberal and 
neo-conservative theories or theories of post-colonialism and cultural studies alongside orientalism 
and subaltern literature like Spivak and Said and anti-development literature.  
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Aristotle makes a famous claim about the relative importance of the 
constituent parts of tragic drama: “The most important of the six [parts of 
tragedy],” he says, “is the combination of the incidents of the story,” for 
“tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life” …. 
Thus, for Aristotle, “the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of 
tragedy is the plot,” while “characters [eˆtheˆ] come second” …; indeed, 
character is included for the sake of the action rather than the other way 
around.  
 
The notion of plot corresponds to the notion of emergence (and not to the plans 
cooked in the minds of the social actors).  
The genre of tragedy (Nietzsche, 1999) captures the interaction between the 
Apollonian force of embeddedness- which gives form and meaning to human 
existence- and the Dionysian force of emergence- the dynamism inherent to ‘being’ 
through its valance (Elster, 1998) and its ‘power to affect and be affected’ (see 
Adrian Parr, 2010 on this Deleuzian notion), generating new forms of beings which 
act as sources of chaos and disorder in the fabric of embedded reality, producing and 
adding new layers to it.  Accordingly, the Iranian embeddedness with its multiple 
forms of regimes of truth generates emergent and unintended consequences of 
‘tragedy of confusion’, which is enacted in texts of discourses and contexts of strong 
and weak historical and biographical events.   
The concept of ‘tragedy of commons’ (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) in economics 
captures the adverse collective consequences of individually rational actions 
culminating, for example, in the devastation of natural resources. In the same way, 
Prisoners’ Dilemma in game theory is a theoretical device designed to capture the 
calamitous and unintended collective outcome of the individually rational actions 
(Dixit, 1999). Put it in a game-theoretic language, the invocation of the notion of 
tragedy in the context of modern Iranian history is meant to indicate that although 
the construction of social orders is a coordination game (a potential win-win 
structure), in the context of Iranian embeddedness it has turned into a prisoner’s 
dilemma game in the form of a lose-lose structure (Hardin, 1995).   
The notion of ‘tragedy’ is closely related to two notions of embeddedness 
(thrownness) and emergence (projection) and to the fact that social orders are non-
linear adaptive worlds of signification, as addressed in the methodological section of 
this study.  In a sense what Iranian dasein is suffering from and is at the heart of its 
105 
 
‘tragedy of confusion’ is the specific nature of its ‘projective thrownness’. The 
doomed plot, in the context of political economy of truth in Iran, is rooted in the 
Malinowskian notion of ‘context of culture’ in its interplay with the ‘context of 
situation’. The context of culture and the notion of embeddedness is actualized in the 
Iranian state of inbetweenness where three large forces of Persianism, Islam and 
Western modernity intermingle via the incessant emergence of new generative and 
rhizomatic forms of phenomena resulting from their interactions in all sites of social 
existence from self, to family, state, street, to arts and culture, economy, security, 
and diplomacy. The context of situation is captured by the notion of belatedness, 
which calls for the wholesale transformation in social order, inspiring the emergence 
of different projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering. When the state of 
belatedness combines with the Iranian state of inbetweenness it provides a recipe for 
disaster in the form of the social calamity of the tragedy of confusion.  
The interplay between the two contexts of culture and situation gives rise to the 
emergence of different projects and subprojects of reverse social engineering whose 
legitimacy and credibility are perpetually contested viciously, through episodes of 
epistemic or physical violence, in wars of attrition being waged against alternative 
truth camps, leading to the erosion of mutual trust and emergence of unstable social 
order, unable to take any form of stable synchronized and harmonized collective 
action and incapable of consistently pursuing any model of sustainable development. 
In the continuum of forces and voices each voice deems itself as pure and 
unadulterated and others to the left and right of itself as too radical or too pragmatic 
and embarks on de-legitimizing them incessantly through activation of religious or 
non-religious brands of discourses of binary oppositions of good against evil by 
demonizing the radical other and glorifying the self. No force, voice, or face is 
capable of granting legitimacy to its radical others and accepting them as its 
legitimate interlocutors in the evolutionary process of social production of truth.  
As such, our voyage of discovery gives rise to a set of novel concepts such as the 
notions of ‘dysfunctionalities and deformities’ alongside the notion of ‘zombie’ (the 
return of the repressed, the rerun of forms of life which looked ‘dead and buried’, 
‘zombie categories’ and ‘zombie institutions’; see Bauman, 2000: 6; Quiggin, 2010), 
amongst others, to describe the chaotic social order produced by the state of tragedy 
of confusion. More extensive and detailed analysis of the notion of burden of 
judgement (and how Iranian dasein becomes confused between alternative regimes 
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of truth, where the black and white books of records (the balance sheets) of each 
regime of truth are assembled and strategically activated and deactivated, avowed 
and disavowed against each other in incessant waves of de-legitimizing and eroding 
war of attrition) was not included in this work due to word limitations. 
These propaganda wars between alternative regimes of truth and their affiliates 
alongside bewildering arrays of radical and pragmatist positions and voices emerging 
out of combination of different components of the three regimes of truth makes the 
burden of judgement for the Iranian dasein even more unbearable and the degree and 
extent of his/her confusion much deeper and wider. The three associated notions of 
topology of voices, zombies, and blame games and victimization were further 
explored but were not included in this work due to word limitations.      
3.2.3 Intertextuality and Intercontextuality 
This section will explore the extent and manifestations of tragedy of confusion in the 
play of forces permeating and interlinking texts and contexts, in experiences of 
intertextuality and in intercontextuality. Intertextuality (Allen, 2000) represents the 
dialogue and interconnection between various texts and intercontextuality points to 
the dialogue and interconnection between diverse contexts (for the notion of 
contextuality, see Dummett, 1981; and for the notion of intercontextuality see 
Medina, 2006: 48-51).  Medina (2006: 50, original emphases) states that  
There is always an elsewhere to which any given context is oriented; in fact 
there is always a multiplicity of elsewhere, composed of past, future, and 
contemporaneous contexts. In this sense intercontextuality can be described 
as a kind of elsewhereness.   
 
This hints towards viewing events and texts as social assemblages acting as the sites 
of operation of regimes of truth. Based on the two notions of intertextuality and 
intercontextuality, we will demonstrate that the current state of socio-economic 
underdevelopment in Iran can be explored and understood in the interplay of five 
texts- the Quran, Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, the Hafez Poetry collection (Divan-e 
Hafez), Resaleh-ye Amaleieh (the self-help book of collection of Shia rulings), and 
Western constitutional and statutory book; and three strong events in the form of 
French Revolution (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990), revelation to Prophet Mohammad and 
Cyrus’ treatment of the Jews in the Achaemenid conquest of Babylon (Brosius, 
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2006: 70; see also Dandamaev and Lukonin, 2004; Farazmand, 2009). The 
interaction between these texts and contexts produced three strong events of Iranian 
modern history: Constitutional Revolution, Oil Nationalization Movement (ONM), 
and Islamic Revolution. The three proto-constitutional treaties affiliated with 
modernity, orthodox Persianism and Shia Islam were Magna Carta, the Cyrus 
Cylinder, and Imam Ali’ letter to Malek-e Ashtar, his newly appointed governor-
general of Egypt in 658-9, respectively (see Amin, 2003: 736; Amanat, 1997: 71). In 
effect, the Iranian dasein faced three forms (with their inevitable numerous 
intermingling) of ‘mirrors for princes’ genre of political writings in the shape of 
Islamic mirrors (Lambton, 1980), Persianist mirrors, and Western mirrors (see 
Brague, 2007: 119, 159; Tabataba’i, 2006). These are the main textual and 
contextual sites through which the play of forces are enacted and manifested.  
While the Quran and Resaleh represent the Islamic dimension (Nasri, 2007: 435), 
the Western statutory book (with its roots in Western philosophy and political 
philosophy) epitomize the modern dimension, and Shahnameh which is called 
Persian Quran (Ghoran-e Ajam) (Islami-Nadooshan, 2007; Omidsalar, 2011, 2012) 
embodies the regime of truth of Persianism. Shahnameh was resembled to the 
China’s wall in its protective function of the cultural empire of Iran (Azmayesh, 
2001: 7) and in its functioning as a house of being for the Persian dimension of 
Iranian dasein (Azmayesh, 2001: 8-9, 14-5). The collection of Hafez poetry is the 
most captivating and magnificent hybrid space created by the Iranian dasein striving 
to combine all historical components of its identity (Persia, Islam, and the West) in 
an organic structure (see Ashouri 2011; Lewisohn 2010; Loloi 2004; Khoramshahi 
1988). This is the closest terrain where all sides of Iranian identity can feel a sense of 
belonging and ownership to, which, hence, provokes the fierce battle between 
Iranian contemporary cultural figures such as Motahhari, Shamlou, Ashouri, 
Khoramshahi, Kasravi, and Kiarostami, among others, over the interpretation and 
ownership of this space. Ali Ferdowsi (2008: 670) alludes to this fact in the 
following terms:  
This apperception of Hafiz is not restricted to any particular group or ideological 
tendency. From the most ardent Aryanist nationalists to the Supreme Leader of the 
Islamic Republic the notion of the intimate bind between Hafiz and the national spirit 
of Iran is shared, even as they disagree over the essence and source of this connection.   
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Ferdowsi (2008: 691) further adds that  
Hafiz and his Divan have become the foci of a shared national sentiment that 
gather Iranians of various stripes, from zealot religionists to ardent 
secularists, into an imagined community of spiritual patrimony.  
Consequently Hafez, as Dick Davis (2012) maintains, “comes closest to being all 
things to all readers”.  
It should be noted that the ‘Blind Owl’ or Boof-e Koor (1989), the famous novel of 
the renowned Iranian novelist Sadegh Hedayat (see Katouzian, 1991, 2008a; 
Mashallah Ajodani, 2006), is the modern battleground where the interaction between 
historical forces of Islam and Persianism is characterized as the relationship between 
a death-bound old man (Islam) and a heavenly girl (pre-Islamic Persia) in the context 
of a modern form of literature, novel (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006). In this work, the 
play of puritanism and pragmatism alongside the hybrid and bastard movements in 
thought and action are displayed in the character of Lakkateh (the loose woman, the 
whore) who represent the rhizomatic and contradictory nature of ‘real’ of Iranian 
social existence, manifesting the intermingling and co-existence of conflicting ways 
of thinking, talking, being and becoming. In the site of this surreal masterpiece, 
modernity acts as the context (context of belatedness) in which the conflict between 
Persianism, modernity, and Islam is enacted (state of inbetweenness). Hedayat’s use 
of modern medium of novel, as the unspoken and given background of the 
interaction, mirrors the universal dominance of modernity as the global context of 
interaction in all forms of textual and non-textual encounters (see Rajaee 2006, on 
the double function of modernity as the dominant civilization and as a contesting 
culture in the melting pot of rival cultures).  
Hedayat’s ‘Blind Owl’ provides a rich textual contemporary terrain and a ‘wondrous 
world’ (Katouzian 2008a), alongside Hafez’s classical collection of poetry, where 
the forces of the West, Islam and Persianism battle over defining who and what 
Iranian dasein (Iranianness) is or can be. Thus, different forces and their associated 
voices and social movements can be mapped in this space by changing who the 
character of heavenly girl represents and who the force of death and decay is and 
what kind of background we should interact in. Ayatollah Khomeini (see Dinani, 
2010b; Harmon, 2005; Algar 1999) in his special version of politics of piety (see 
Mahmood 2005), for example, views Islam as the heavenly girl being gradually 
suffocated by the forces of Persianism (which prioritizes common ancestry and 
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history over the emancipatory and liberating force of faith) and modernity (in its 
godlessness and excessive materialism) and contests the global and universal 
dominance of modernity as the hegemonic civilizational background and attempts to 
replace it with a modern civilizational form of Islam.  
The interaction between purity and authenticity of angelic goodness embodied in the 
character of heavenly girl (whether it is deemed as pure Islam, pure modernity or 
pure Persianism as we mentioned in the notion of white book) and the deathly, 
despicable character of old man (whether it is violent and backward Islam or 
decadent and pernicious modernity or chauvinist Persianism, which is, in this study, 
already captured by the notion of black book) and the impurity and looseness of 
pragmatism captured in the character of Lakkateh (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006: 73-
78), can provide us with a contemporary site to map the dynamics at work in modern 
history of Iran and its tragedy of confusion. The hazy and dreamy atmosphere of the 
novel recreates the confusions and dissonances experienced in all realms of Iranian 
social existence, the dreamy and surreal nature of Iranian social reality as captured in 
the quote from Ibrahim Beig or in the Movahhed’s notion of ‘confused dream’. 
Hedayat with his connection to Khayyam (see Aminrazavi 2005; Dinani 2011), with 
his famous life-affirming celebration of ‘here and now’ as opposed to faith’s death-
affirming celebration of ‘hereafter’, further brings into sharp contrast the modern and 
Persianist spirits with the Islamic one. Shayegan (2012b) refers to how these 
multiple texts, from Hafez to Kant, worked on him and through him, each striving to 
operate as grid of intelligibility for his understanding of life, work and language.   
Among the three historical contexts, the subject matter of the case studies in this 
work, the Constitutional Revolution enshrines the triumph of regime of truth of 
Western modernity and its associated project of modernization (with its three 
subprojects) to capture the public imagination and find the opportunity to attempt to 
modernize Iran based on the logic of rule of law and constitutional government 
(alongside some elements of socialist discourse) and through selectively 
reconfiguring and redeploying the forces of Islam and Persianism in the service of 
establishing modernity. In this era, the dominant position of modernity was severely 
challenged by alternative regimes of truth and their associated projects and 
subprojects of reverse social engineering.     
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The Oil Nationalization Movement (ONM) represents a short reformulated return to 
the project of Constitutional modernization sandwiched between the two 
Persianization periods of the Pahlavi rule. Mosaddegh’s modernization project strove 
to tame the forces of Islam, Persianism and colonial modernity and employ them in 
the service of reviving Iran’s independence from the external forces in order to 
establish a sovereign nation-state required for founding a constitutional order. On the 
other hand, the Pahlavi dynasty represented the triumph of the project of 
Persianization with its own three subprojects, attempting to restore the glory of 
Persian pre-Islamic kingdom through selective assimilation and repression of 
elements of Islam and modernity.  
Islamic Revolution depicts the victory of the regime of truth of Islam and its project 
of Islamization (with its own three subprojects), the force of Islamic revivalism and 
its attempt to shape the terrain of national and international orders by taming the 
forces of modernity and Persianism and bringing them in the service of restoration of 
golden age of Islam.  
In the Constitutional Revolution and the ONM, ‘the idea of’ modernity took the 
centre stage while in the Pahlavi order ‘the idea of’ Persia found official currency 
and in the Islamic Revolution ‘the idea of’ Islam managed to prevail. There is an 
intercontextual dialogue interlinking between these strong events as each is a 
reaction to the lacks and failures of the other, as there is an intertextual dialogue 
between the main texts of Iranian history: Shahnameh, for instance, is in constant 
dialogue with the Quran and Resaleh alongside the statute book of modernity with its 
theoretical underpinnings while striving to revive the Persian monarchy, Persian 
language and the wisdom of Persian religions, Persian forms of life and civilization. 
In Derridian sense there is nothing but text as text finds its way into context and 
context is fed back into text (of course in a Lacanian-Zizekian sense there is always 
an order of ‘real’ beyond the text which disrupts the text’s web of symbolic and 
imaginary orders). The same set of forces imprint themselves either on the paper and 
through words and statements (the realm of virtual being) or on material and 
corporeal being and in the language of action and events. As such both texts and 
events are invested with signification and meaning and as such they are 
interchangeable; texts are events and events are texts.    
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A large set of implications follow this state of tragedy of confusion and its associated 
dynamics of texts and contexts, which will be explored in the following sections of 
this chapter and the following application chapters. 
This process of being torn between rival forces, however, is not unique to the Iranian 
mind and Iranian social reality. Its particular features are unique to the Iranian case 
but it shares a set of common features with a larger set of cases investigated under 
the topic of multiple selves.  
3.2.4 Multiple Selves (Politics of Mind: Individual as an Unstable Coalition) 
Ainslie (1992, 2001) has developed an account of people as communities of internal 
bargaining interests, in which subunits based on short-term, medium-term and long-
term interests face various conflicts that they must resolve. This is a kind of 
reincarnation of Freudian thesis of divided self (between id, ego, and superego). In a 
sense, as elaborated by Critchley (2010: 104), individual is ‘dividual’, and politics of 
the brain and politics of the society are mirror images of each other in their property 
of being divided. If social assemblages at micro, meso, or macro levels fail to 
overcome their internal conflicts and achieve stable outcomes, the ones who manage 
to do so will succeed to outperform them in the competition for scarce resources, as 
America manages to outperform Somalia.  
In the internal conflict within the self, the device of the Hobbesian tyrant is 
unavailable to the brain. Therefore, its behaviour (when system-level psychosis and 
insanity is avoided) is a sequence of self-enforcing equilibriums of the sort studied 
by game-theoretic public choice literature on coalitional bargaining in democratic 
legislatures. That is, the internal politics of the brain entails ‘logrolling’ (Mueller, 
2003: 110; Stratmann 1997: 322). These internal dynamics are then partly regulated 
and stabilized by the wider social games in which coalitions (people as wholes over 
temporal subparts of their biographies) are embedded (Ross, 2005: 334-353). For 
example: social expectations about someone's role as a salesperson set behavioural 
equilibrium targets for the logrolling processes in his brain. In a sense, the politics of 
external social mind (Clark’s and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind) sets up the 
games and agenda for the politics of internal individual brain. In a Deleuzian sense, 
these binary oppositions of internal/external, social/individual are artificial and 
misleading as the internal is the fold of the external and individual is the name of the 
collective. This explains, as Ross (2010) envisages,  
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why it is in the context of stable institutions with relatively transparent rules 
that people most resemble straightforward economic agents like insects, and 
that classical game theory finds reliable application to them as cohesive units. 
The message is that stable institutions produce stable selves, but the 
fundamental question is “Where does this context of stable institutions come 
from in the first place?” and “Why can some countries and communities 
manage to construct a set of stable institutions and others cannot?” 
 
This study addresses the two critical questions raised by Ross in the above passage.  
Following Ainslie’s logic, the formation of identity and selfhood is as an exercise in 
the art of coalition formation in the context of multiple selves. In a wider sense, the 
formation of identity for any social assemblage at any level (individual, organization, 
or nation) is an exercise in the art of coalition formation, as part of the Deleuzian 
process of territorialisation and de-territorialisation. It is interesting that we can 
identify the same dynamics at work in the Iranian mind. We can allude to modernity 
as constituting the short-term subunit of Iranian selfhood, Persianism constituting the 
medium-term component of Iranian selfhood and Islam constituting the long-term 
element of the Iranian selfhood, where the same dynamics of logrolling and striving 
for forging coalitions of different shapes and kinds is at work inside the Iranian 
selfhood (and its subjectivity and preference structure) and in the society at large.    
3.2.5 The Composition of Dasein 
To elaborate on how this trinity of regimes of truth- similar to the trinity in the 
Christian theology, our trinity is full of impossibilities and contradictions- is deeply 
instituted in the Iranian selfhood and how it turns into alternative identity markers 
and choice bundles- in a move from unconscious level of background to the 
conscious level of choice- we start from the fact that for Heidegger (1962) our being-
in-the-world (our worldhood) is characterized by the interplay of four components, 
the Heideggerian four-fold of mortals, gods, the sky and the earth, implying the fact 
that human being (dasein) is an spatiotemporal being, a being-towards-the-end. The 
Heideggerian dasein is a spatiotemporal being with bounded rationality as opposed 
to Cartesian cogito who is an abstract, boundless and timeless thinking machine 
casting its panoptical gaze on the events of material world. Due to its finitude, dasein 
is encapsulated in its spatiotemporality; it is something that has a beginning and an 
end; it is an embedded and embodied corporeality. Due to its having an origin, its 
113 
 
being rooted in something else, it is ingrained in its past which defines its 
embeddedness and due to its having an end it is a projection into future. 
It should be noted that dasein is mortal in its existence; its being is abyssal (see 
Almond, 2004; Chapter 4 on ‘abyssality of being’) from both ends and as a mortal its 
being is defined by immortals and its relation to the sky as its horizon of being and 
the earth as its spatiotemporal house of being. The earth relates self to its beginning, 
its incommensurable embeddedness and the sky to its emergence, as the open 
horizon of its being-towards. Dasein, hence, is the site where the principles of 
embeddedness, incommensurability, and emergence operate. That is why dasein is a 
‘projected thrownness’ or ‘thrown projection’. This conception of man as dasein 
takes us to the intertemporal choices it faces inside rival conceptions of time. As Aho 
(2009: 18) puts it  
For Heidegger, Dasein must ultimately be understood in terms of 
temporality, as the twofold movement of “thrown projection,” which 
represents the frame of reference on the basis of which things can light up as 
intelligible or remain dark and unintelligible. “Ecstatic temporality,” says 
Heidegger, “originally lights/clears (lichtet) the there” (BT, 402). This 
temporal framework is referred to as “Care” (Sorge), an expression that 
represents the basic ground of intelligibility, a ground that is prior to das Man 
and is constituted by the fact that Dasein is always “ahead-of-itself-already-
in-(the-world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” 
(BT, [Being and Time] 237). 
 
As we see, self is as an event or happening, an emergence, an unfolding event of this 
world, between two indefinite points of birth and death, which makes it into a being-
towards. Dasein’s being is ‘directionality’, and ‘care’ towards a (in)definite birth 
(where and when did I really originate from? maybe in the beginning of the time) 
and a certain but indefinite death (see, White, 2005). Dasein is a ‘now’ originated 
and directed towards an embeddedness of the past and a projection, emergence and 
openness of the future.  
The closure/disclosure/foreclosure dimensions of dasein is manifest in the following 
piece on empathy by Aho (2009: 66), where it demonstrates that we do not ex-nihilo 
‘choose’ to show empathy as we are always already embedded in an emphatic world 
of signification:  
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In the case of the embodied experience of “empathy” (Einfühlung), for 
example, Heidegger will argue that it is only because the other has already 
been disclosed as such—as a daughter, a wife, a friend, or simply another 
human being—that we can, in the present, feel affection for them. Again, 
fundamental ontology is primarily concerned with the conditions that make 
the world meaningful, allowing things to show up as such and such. And it is 
not by my present involvement in the world that things make sense to me. 
The world is meaningful because as I invariably press forward into social 
possibilities, I am thrown back into a public situation where things already 
count and matter to me. It is only on the basis of this horizon of “thrown 
projection” that I can interpret myself and the world in one way or another. 
To this end, empathy does not reveal a “primordial existential structure,” 
because the experience of empathy is always mediated in advance by a 
temporally structured familiarity with the other; the other, to some extent, 
already matters and makes sense to me. Thus for Heidegger, individual 
experiences such as empathy are themselves made possible by Dasein (BT, 
161–63).   
 
The whole dynamics of spatiotemporality of dasein locates and interweaves 
temporality of dasein in a fabric of finitude/infinitude, mortality/immortality and 
permanence/impermanence. Embeddedness points to the fact we are born in a world 
of signification, which signifies and discloses things to ‘social assemblages’ 
(Connolly, 2008b) in a specific and particular way through placing him/her/it in a 
signifying chain; and through the act of disclosure and signification constitutes them 
and makes them what they are. This world of signification invests in the self a 
narrative of beginning and end, and how ‘now’ is related to these abyssal points of 
no return. As such dasein is nothing but time, even space is time or a continuum of 
space-time. As Aho (2009: 62) puts it “Dasein is not a being that moves along in 
time. Rather, Dasein—as an already opened clearing of intelligibility—is time”.  
This world of signification, the regime of truth, makes sense of what it means to be 
‘a now’ extended into ‘a past’ and ‘a future’, ‘a being-towards’. The embeddedness 
of the past makes the ‘being’ of my ‘being-towards’ and the projection and 
emergence of the future makes the ‘towards’ of my ‘being-toward’, which together 
in the chain of past-present-future constitutes my being-towards as an event, a 
happening.  Death, in its indefinite certainty, defines the open horizon of my being 
and that is why in Heideggerian term my being is a being-towards-death. In the 
Islamic conception dasein is a being-beyond-death (see Mahmoud, 2007: 13); this is 
manifest in Khomeini’s reversal of the customary formulation of the life-death 
equation: “Dying does not mean nothingness: it is life.” (Brumberg, 2001: 125).   
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3.2.5.1 The Composition of Iranian Dasein 
The subtle point is that there are no universal points of birth and death, beginning 
and end; our world of signification (our embeddedness) makes sense of what our 
births and our deaths and the events in between are. In the language of Lacan, birth 
and death are events of ‘real’ where the ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ orders determine 
the quality and ‘whatness’ of our encounters with the events of ‘real’; they name 
them, signify them through making them part of a signifying chain and house them. 
Through different worlds of signification acting on different conceptions, enactment 
and disclosure of time, the Iranian dasein is invested with diverse beginnings and 
multiple ends, and different continuum of beginnings and ends.  
The Persianist world of signification connects our birth to the emergence and 
evolution of the Aryan people, a story of creation is narrated as related to the 
creation of Aryan people and how they came to inhabit a particular geo-political 
space in a particular time and how their way of life, their language, their polity and 
economy, their religion and civilization and their mythology evolved in 
contradistinction to non-Aryan people (Iranshahr versus non-Iran (an-Iran), 
Daryaee, 2009) and how our death is signified as death of an Iranian with a particular 
glorious and majestic history and a heritage bequeathed to the next generation of 
Iranians (see, Savant, 2013). Our births and deaths, thus, are projected in a timeline 
of Persianist beginning and end. Here my birth and death is made sense of (placed in 
a signifying chain) through its connection to a particular community of people and 
its evolution in the continuum of time-space. This particular world of signification 
constitutes the medium self of the multiple selves of Iranian dasein.  My medium 
self is configured through its connection to the ‘idea of Iran’ (Gnoli, 1989).  
In contrast, the Iranian short-term self is located in a signifying chain narrating the 
birth of modernity (Bayly, 2004) and how it is rooted in Roman and Greek 
civilization, and in affirmative or negating relation with Christianity and Islam (and 
hence the Middle East) and how it has been part of Iranian self through the intense 
entanglement of Persian self with the Greek and Roman others in the dynamics of 
the binary opposition of Iran/an-Iran and the presence of Zoroastrian Persian 
philosophy (Corbin, 1993) in Greek philosophy and the heightened trace of Greek 
philosophy in Islamic rationality (Legenhausen, 2007: 173; Ashouri 2005); and the 
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invasion of modernity in our life-world in the last four hundred years and its intense 
presence in the last 200 years.  
The short-term self is embedded in ‘the idea of modernity’, supplying peace and 
prosperity through adherence to techno-scientific rationality creating a techno-
scientific utopia (future as its land of utopia). Modernity specializes in offering 
increasing levels of freedom from the despotism of nature. In the modern narrative 
my being is a now which is connected to nothingness of a distant past (ground zero 
of Cartesian cogito) and a techno-scientific heaven of an unfolding future. The 
pursuit of the pleasures of the flesh is the main purpose of existence and technology 
is the only way to achieve it and prolong it against the forces of nature such as 
diseases, aging and scarcity. Scientific reasoning, liberal democracy, human rights 
and capitalism are the most promising avenues discovered by the mankind to ever 
higher levels of technological prowess (technological heaven on earth).     
Islam configures our long-term self by locating our births and deaths in a story of 
creation where life originates from impeccable fullness and descends into lesser 
forms of beings. In this conception, life is light, lights upon lights, layers of lights, 
stemming from the fullest light, the light of lights. In this narrative embedded in 
discursive and non-discursive practices, life originates from fullness and infinitude 
and returns to it. This is a story of a fall and return and the story of prophets who 
were missioned to show the way to salvation and emancipation from the finitude and 
darkness of the lesser forms of light, and the terrors of loss, failure, rejection and 
death. This story positions Iranian dasein in yet another chain of signification and 
another chain of being. This life and the next are part of the same fabric of eternal 
being, and this life is nothing but a fleeting moment in the eternal theatre of 
existence. In this regime of truth, the distinction between now and then, short- and 
long-term evaporates as we are already located in the fabric of eternity. The Quran 
warns mankind that this life is only half-a day or even less in the time scale of 
eternity. The connection to eternal and everlasting is the prominent feature of the 
Islamic long-term self of the Iranian dasein. The long-term self is configured through 
“the idea of Islam”.  
These three forms of being-towards-death through ‘the idea of modernity’, ‘the idea 
of Persia’ and ‘the idea of Islam’ characterize the Iranian dasein’s multiple selves. In 
the framework of modernity, the birth of something truly new starts at the end of 
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18th century (Bayly, 2004) and genealogically goes back to 12th century Magna 
Carta and further back to Roman and Greek civilization and further flashbacks to 
Homo-Sapiens in Africa, and the emergence of life on earth and the emergence of 
earth itself and to the big bang. However, for Persianism, the true time starts from 
the time of Aryan people inhabiting the Iranian plateau and their ancestral kings and 
mythical figures of Iranian mythology and the connection to the eternal time of 
Ahura Mazda and Ahreman (here the emphasis is on the history of Aryan people as 
distinguished from other peoples rather than the story of creation). As for the Islamic 
narrative, time is truly everlasting and eternal and the piece of time we inhabit is 
infinitely minuscule and insignificant compared to the vastness and enormity of 
eternal time. These layers of time constitute the multi-layered being of Iranian 
dasein.  
In the language of Chakrabarty (2000: 243), hence, Iranian dasein is trapped in a 
‘timeknot’ (see Mashallah Ajodani, 2006: 148, for the same phenomenon, 
“naahamzamani va darhamzamani”, in the Hedayat’s works). As dasein is time 
Iranian dasein is multiple forms of contradictory and conflicting forms of time, each 
pressing its demands on his/her/its being. As Liu (2010: 306), reporting from Lacan 
(1991: 193), when redeployed to fit into our context, puts it: “the [Iranian] subject is 
always on several levels, caught up in crisscrossing networks”. The ‘trembling’ and 
sometimes ‘horrifying’ effects of the images and statements made in the Quran puts 
Iranian dasein on a different plate of space-time. It warns the believers that this life 
is not more than half a day and that when everything meets its end the blanket of 
regret and the burning wish to return to compensate for the wrong deeds will be the 
biggest torture the ignorant souls will be wrapped into and suffer from.  
It further produces images of rewards and punishments associated with their pious or 
sinful deeds, and warns the believers of falling into the trap of becoming ignorantly 
busy with the accumulation of wealth, children, and status in this passing and 
transient world at the expense of forgetting their own eternal happiness. In the 
Quranic discourse, raining daily on people through different platforms, God is a site 
of combination of opposites in being the beginning and the end, the appearance and 
the substance, and a transcendental immanence (Almond, 2004: 61), and is closer to 
man than the veins in his neck.  
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Discourses like these which are iterated and reiterated, and are in circulation in 
different social landscapes, while becoming part of everyday cheap talks of the 
nation, can transform Iranian dasein from one mood/mode into another in a blink of 
an eye. Iranian dasein, therefore, is called to attune itself with alternative discursive 
homelands (for the notion attunement, see Taylor, 2001). Heidegger conceptualizes 
understanding as attunement (Taylor, 2007) and Iranian dasein becomes confused 
due to alternative demands and requirements made on him to attune his being with 
(seemingly) irreconcilable and incommensurable universes of knowledge and power.  
The shocking ontological news by Islamic founding fathers, as reported in Almond 
(2004: 113), puts the Iranian dasein on the plane of eternity: “All men are asleep in 
this world; only when they die do they wake up”. The awareness of dreamy nature of 
material existence calls for “lifting of the veil of ignorance”, which requires “love of 
the Absolute” (Schimmel, 1975: 4). In the same vein, when Khomeini offers his 
vision of the ontological and deontological composition of this world through his 
speech indicating that “universe is the seat of presence of God, do not commit sins in 
the presence of God”, which appears on the advertising boards and walls throughout 
the country, the intensity and shock value of the insight, compared to the vision 
offered by modernity or Persianism on their advertising boards, shakes Iranian 
dasein to the core, and turns him/her being entangled into a daily voyage between 
parallel universes housed in packages and master signifiers of Islam, Persianism and 
modernity.  
The Islamic regime of truth, thus, offers a regime of training and discipline to keep 
the believer from deviating into the wild temptations of pleasures of the flesh 
through committing to the codes of Islamic morality and jurisprudence. Elster’s 
(1979, 1983, 2000) constraint theory reveals the rationale behind such programs of 
constraints based on the possibility of addiction to the addictive substances (see also 
Ainslie, 2001). Here For Islam the addictive pernicious substances are modernity and 
Persianism.  
In the Islamic discourse, the excessive and ignorant pursuit of pleasures of the flesh 
with its transient, impermanent and decaying qualities prevent the believer from 
attaining liberation from the terror of death. Rajaee (2007: 13-4) points to the hold 
such regime of constraints has on the Iranian dasein:  
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the centrality of Islamic-revealed law, shari῾a, which comprises two main 
parts: prayer (῾ebada, regulating man’s relation to God for eternal salvation), 
and transaction (mo῾amela, regulating man’s relations with his fellow man so 
that worldly transactions, smoothly conducted, will pave the way for eternal 
salvation). Both are devotional acts, whether one recites the word of God or 
concludes a business transaction. Here lies the root of the inseparability of 
religion and politics in Islam. An average Muslim, therefore, by the sheer 
dictates of his faith, must be both secular—that is, concerned with the 
profane and serious about worldly affairs— and religious—that is, pious and 
free from worldly attachment—while remaining aware that “the world is the 
cultivating ground for the hereafter” (ad-Donya Mazr῾a al-Akhera). In other 
words, the average Muslim should be a saint in addition to whatever else he 
does: a saint-merchant, a saint-soldier, a saint-politician, a saint-doctor, a 
saint-professor, and so on, combining the idealism of what ought to be with 
the realism of what actually is.  
 
In the Islamic regime of truth, thus, the Iranian dasein is tasked with achieving a 
form of complementarity between this-worldly and next-worldly concerns by 
investing heavily in the activities of this world to achieve spiritual growth and 
salvation from fear of death and eternal happiness in the next world, or falah at both 
existential levels (see Motahhari, 1993).  
As such, the believer is encouraged to engage intensely in the activities of this world 
from sexuality to economy, and polity, and art and culture and sport, as grounds 
where he/she can practice his religious commitment to attain spiritual excellence. 
This task requires living a contradiction in simultaneous engagement with different 
layers of time as demanded from the believer in the following saying of the Prophet 
of Islam: “Plan for this world as if you expect to live forever; but plan for the 
hereafter as if you expect to die tomorrow” or in another version “Do for this life as 
if you live forever, do for the afterlife as if you die tomorrow”. The believer is, 
hence, charged with reconciling (seemingly) irreconcilable positions in order to be 
able to attain salvation or falah at both levels of existence. This appears to be the 
coping strategy evolved to overcome the terror of death without harming the level 
and intensity of engagement with the world, or paradoxically a program of achieving 
salvation through intense engagement with the material world. The task is to invite 
the sacred in without quitting the profane, or remove the duality of sacred/profane in 
the first place. This is the political, the site of the emergence of new truth, according 
to Badiou (Hallward, 2003) and Ranciere (Davis, 2010).  
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It should be pointed that the nature of supply of and demand for regimes of truth was 
further explored but was not included in thiswork due to word limitations.   
3.2.5.2 Death and selfhood 
To demonstrate how these philosophical understandings are directly related to the 
analysis of concrete historical realities, we resort to the subtle observation made by 
Frye (2005) in the book ‘The Greater Iran’ on the critical role of ‘death’ in 
understanding civilizations. Frye observes that civilization is a response to the 
problematic of death and different civilizations address it differently (see also 
Shayegan, 2007, Chapter 4 on death and Bourdieu’s, 2000, exposition of Pascalian 
meditations on the issue of death). Frye (2005: xiii) addresses the issue in the 
following terms:  
If asked to explain the history of world civilizations in one word it would be 
‘death’. Of all animals man alone knows he will die, and this has fashioned 
his approach to life, and indeed to all existence.  
 
Frye perceives different civilizations as different coping strategies evolved to handle 
the issue of awareness of death (see also Cave, 2012).  
Furthermore, the insights from two Beckers may shed more light on the centrality of 
the phenomenon of death in establishing how three types of worlds of significations 
or regimes of truth turn into three types of selves and then into three types of choice 
bundles or identity markers. One Becker resides in cultural anthropology, Ernest 
Becker (1973) and the followers of his research program in Terror Management 
Theory (TMT) (Goldenberg et al., 2000; Burke et al., 2010); and another in 
economics, Gary Becker (1996) and his followers in economics of family, human 
capital, economics of religion (Iannaccone, 1998, 2006) and household-allocation-
of-time models. Goldenberg et al. (2000: 201) maintain that  
Cultural worldviews assuage the terror associated with the fear of death by providing 
answers to fundamental cosmological questions such as How did I get here?, How 
should I live my life?, and What happens after I die?, structuring perceptions of reality 
(e.g., clocks, calendars, tarot cards, and horoscopes), and providing standards through 
which individuals and their behavior can be evaluated and perceived as meaningful 
and valuable.  
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In line with this, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975: 512) emphasize on the role of the 
afterlife motive in their seminal paper on religious participation, maintaining that: 
There is one crucial element ... that distinguishes an analysis of religious participation 
from an analysis of participation in other activities. All previous household-allocation-
of-time models assume that the expected stream of ‘benefits’ which an individual 
plans to receive terminates at the time of his death. This assumption is inappropriate 
for a model of religious participation because most religions promise their members 
some form of an afterlife. Furthermore, the expected afterlife benefits are often 
viewed by individuals as being at least partially related to their lifetime allocation of 
time to religious activities. This suggests that household participation in church-
related activities should be analyzed in the context of a multiperiod household-
allocation-of-time model which allows for "afterlife consumption," with this variable 
being at least partially a function of the household's investment of members' time in 
religious activities during their lifetimes. 
 
Based on this long-term view of the continuum of this life and the next, Islam, as 
main defining component of the long-term self in the Iranian context of culture, acts 
as a distinct choice bundle offering wide range of cultural products and symbolic 
goods in contradistinction to classic Persian identity, as the main component of the 
medium-term self, and modernity, as the main constitutive part of the short-term self. 
With regard to the distinctive character of Islam (and most religions) as the space of 
permanence, a regime of truth and a multi-product manufacturer of supernatural 
commodities, Iannaccone (2006: 21-2) maintains that  
A fundamental characteristic of religion is that it constitutes a uniquely 
general technology. There is literally nothing that falls beyond the theoretical 
limits of supernatural production and exchange. Consider the consequences. 
People call on religion for everything: health, wealth, salvation, power, long 
life, immortality, eternal bliss, military victory, and even good sex. Major 
religious traditions thus evolve into immense systems of beliefs, behavior, 
and institutions with links to every conceivable human activity and concern. 
Strong religious organizations almost never specialize in just a few niche 
products or a few niche needs. Diversity of output … mirrors the advantages 
of product bundling. Commercial firms use product bundling to persuade 
different types of customers to pay the same relatively high price for a 
collection of products, such as a newspaper, a year-long theatre subscription, 
or a three-day pass to all the attractions in Disneyland. In a similar manner, 
many different types of people can be persuaded to join and remain loyal to a 
religious group that offers members an array of benefits, including, for 
example, intense camaraderie, status, honor, identity, purpose, an exalted 
calling, dramatic rituals, powerful emotional experiences, and the prospect of 
heavenly rewards. Single-purpose groups are more fragile, being susceptible 
to defection whenever a member loses faith in the group’s one product, 
purpose, or principal activity.   
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Iannaccone (2006: 19) further suggests that  
One may seriously question a cleric’s claims that action “A” will lead to 
afterlife reward “R,” but this much is sure: no strictly secular system can 
offer any hope of “R” at all. 
 
What can be inferred from Iannaccone’s analysis is that religion creates a space of 
permanence- what he calls “the supernatural content of many religious 
“technologies” ” as “the defining feature of religion” (Iannaccone, 2006: 19)-
alongside its holistic nature as a regime of truth  which he tries to capture in the 
economic notion of “product bundling” and the fact that it offers jouissance and 
experience of fullness which transcends the normal logic of cost-benefit analysis and 
is reflected in his use of adjectives such as “intense”, “exalted”, “dramatic”, 
“powerful”, and “heavenly” in his description of benefits offered by religion (this is 
what modernity also offers via sex, drug, alcohol and rock and roll alongside 
sanitized forms of the eureka in the experience of scientific discovery and 
westernized version of eastern spirituality). This reaffirms Taylor’s (2007) 
identification of religion as the space of “experience of fullness” which is fully 
supported by the mystical dimension at the heart of almost all religions alongside 
their philosophical and legal facets.  
Iranian dasein is embedded in the spatiotemporal space created by the intersection 
and interface of three worlds of Islam, classic Persian Empire and modernity. Iranian 
dasein lives and negotiates his/her/its life in the space between spaces. In this state of 
inbetweenness, its ‘real’ is a rhizomatic movement of abundance in the plane of 
hybridity and multiplicity, while its ‘symbolic’ has been struggling to construct a 
legitimate discursive and non-discursive house of being for such hyper-rich forms of 
‘real’. Iranian dasein is care; it cares about all these three wondrous worldhoods, and 
its body and mind, emotions and thoughts are woven through and into these worlds.  
These various forms of worldhood go far beyond conscious choices and envelope all 
layers of conscious and unconscious being and becoming. They are not variables, 
they are life-worlds creating and affecting all variables.  Dasein as care is more than 
choice and consciousness; care is about fabric of being and condition of possibility 
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of action and emotion, cognition and affection, disclosure and foreclosure. As Hoy 
(2009: 64) puts it:  
the worldhood of the world is the way that the world presents itself, the way in which 
the whole is disclosed. Worldhood is prior to objectivity, and makes objectivity 
possible. No worldhood, no objects. Worldhood is not itself a specific content. 
Instead, it is that which makes it possible for content to appear as content, that is, as a 
feature of the world.  
 
This state of intense, engulfing, and overwhelming entanglement with 
incommensurable life-worlds characterizes the Iranian sate of ‘tragedy of confusion’. 
It should be noted that the characteristics of the regimes of truth as economic firms 
were extensively investigated but were not included in this work due to word 
limitations; the genealogies of the three regimes of truth were also extensively 
explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations.  
3.3 THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORMATION OF STABLE COALITIONS 
The state of belatedness calls for collective action (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982; 
Sandler, 1992; Medina, 2007), which requires the formation of collective will which 
itself requires formation of stable coalitions to make institutional investments 
feasible and to start and finish tasks in areas such as birth control, vaccination, 
education, health, security, diplomacy, gender relation, ethnicity, inflation, 
employment, or economic growth. However the state of inbetweenness with its 
associated tragedy of confusion and irreconcilable differences within and between 
various social assemblages would act as condition of impossibility for the formation 
of stable coalitions. The state of belated inbetweenness leaves Iranians incapable of 
fully and irreversibly committing to the implementation of any project of social 
transformation. In a sense, Iranians have put into practice what Zizek (2008: xv) 
perceives as lack of full commitment in the realm of virtualized games on the 
Internet:  
“if the thing doesn’t work out, I can always leave!” If you reach an impasse, 
you can say: OK, I’m leaving the game, I’m stepping out! Let’s start again 
with another game!  
 
124 
 
In a similar vein, the Iranians stepped out of Taqizadeh’s Constitutionalist version of 
modernization game to start the Pahlavi’s Persianization game, only to abandon that 
one as well to start Mosaddegh’s independence-based constitutionalist modernization 
game, only again to leave it shortly and go back to the Pahlavi’s Persianization 
game, only to once again leave it to start Khomeini-Shariati’s Islamization game, 
once again on the verge of abandoning this and going back to another round of 
modernization game through two strong events of Khatami’s Reformist Movement 
and most recently Mousavi’s Green Movement. The state of belated inbetweenness 
would not allow Iranians to stand the full course of implementation of a project or a 
program.  
This lack of commitment is rational and is due to the sheer multiplicity of voices and 
their inhabited faces, which has made the emergence of stable consensus on any 
issue impossible. The voices and faces could not find and found adequate common 
grounds to be able to agree to disagree and achieve unity without uniformity. The 
horizontal and vertical movement in ‘real’ has created multiplicity of forms of 
‘symbolic’ wholes. The enormous multiplicity of voices can be grasped when we 
note that in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness we have three regimes of truth, 
each having at least two major orthodox and non-orthodox branches (the Shia-Sunni 
divide in Islam, liberal-socialist divide in modernity, and monarchy-poetry divide in 
Persianism).  Inside each orthodox or non-orthodox divide we encounter further 
instances of orthodox and non-orthodox divide like four schools of Sunni Islam or at 
least four versions of socialism/communism in revolutionary, religious, democratic 
and nationalist forms of socialisms, for example. Each one of these branches has 
their own white and black books, their own radical and pragmatic versions, and their 
own politics of piety and politics of ordinary.  
The common ground between two large brands of modernity (socialism and 
liberalism) is the pursuit of realization of techno-scientific heaven on earth, one 
through central planning and collectivism, and another through trinity of liberal 
democracy, capitalism and human rights.    
It should be noted that each regime of truth has roots in the other, like madness being 
the affirmative and negating condition of possibility for reason and vice versa. In the 
Focauldian language, as reported by Koopman (2010: 551),  
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these terms are reciprocal but incompatible: they can neither be fully 
liberated from one another nor totally assimilated to one another... and at the 
very same time, these terms could never be fully detached from one another.  
 
Accordingly, each regime of truth is the manifestation of madness for the other and 
embodiment of reason for itself. In a sense, the other (madness) forms the core of the 
self (reason); namely everything is what it is not.  
As such, Islam in its actualized form is Greek from top to toe; in its textual research 
methodology of jurisprudence, it is (largely) Aristotelian; in mysticism and 
philosophy it is largely (but not exclusively) Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic, which 
ultimately in its evolution ends up into a form of Heraclitus-type process philosophy 
of “you cannot step into the same river twice” in Molla Sadra (see Rizvi, 2013; 
Soroush, 2007). Thus, Islam can be considered as Greek and it is not: it starts with 
Greek but evolves in the riverbed of religious texts and contexts, which changed it 
drastically into a non-orthodox form of philosophy, a process philosophy, which is 
again Greek of different type. The dependence of fiqh or the Islamic jurisprudence 
on Greek logic is apparent in the chasm between Usuli’yun (Principalists) and 
Akhbari’yun (Literalists) (see Gleave, 2000, 2007) as Literalists (and the proponents 
of School of Separation) allude to the contradictions and sense of irony in use and 
development of the fiqh research methodology where Greek logic and philosophy are 
deployed to infer rulings from the Islamic sacred texts and contexts. This, for 
instance, was one of the constant lines of attacks by first president of Iran Banisadr 
against the methodology of inference in fiqh (see Dabashi, 1993). This is to the 
extent that in response to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s (2011) assertion that Greek 
philosophers had preserved monotheism Banisadr (2013) declares that “The clergy is 
the oldest Westernizers in the history of Iran; they have turned the Aristotelian logic 
into the tool of despotism for 14 centuries”.   
The Greek-dominated methodology of inference was deemed not to be fit for the 
purpose of inference from the sacred texts and contexts. It was deemed heretical to 
borrow from outside the terrain of religion for the sake of inference of religious 
obligations, asking “Imam Plato” and “divine Aristotle” (Javadi Amoli, 2010; 
Legenhausen, 2007: 173) to help in the understanding of the Quran and Imam Ali. 
This is the contradiction pointed by Literalists, which was eventually defeated by 
Behbehani’s violent uprising against Literalists and was reformulated 
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methodologically by Sheikh Ansari (see Armstrong, 2000; Dahlen, 2003; Boozari, 
2011). The emergence of School of Separation (Maktab-e Tafkik) in Shia Islam is 
indicative of the perceived impurity at the heart of Islam and Shia Islam (see Davari, 
2005: 7-8 on Maktab-e Tafkik).  
The emergence of modernity owes much to Islam (Lyons, 2010; Rubenstein, 2003; 
Gutas, 1998; Hanif, 1997: 350-1, among others), which makes Islam constitutive of 
modernity. Persianism especially in the form of Persian poetry has deep roots in and 
inseparable affiliations to the Islamic religious texts; and Persians contributed 
immensely in the development of Islam from a nascent faith to a mature civilization 
(Motahhari, 1970).  
Persians and Greeks have been twins from the beginning of their historical and 
mythical time, each looming large in the imagination of the other and each 
constitutive of the identity of the other, to a lesser or larger degree, in negative or 
affirmative forms (for the mutual fascination between the Greeks and the Persians 
see Crawford and Whitehead, 1983: 183; and for a philosophical treatment of the 
relation between ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘he/she/it’ see Buber 1937: 15, among others). 
Compared to other civilizational zones like China or Latin America, the West in its 
multiple forms of Greek philosophy and sciences, the Alexandrian Invasion of Iran, 
Roman Empire, Crusade, and Western modernity has always loomed large in the 
Iranian imagination (see Dabashi, 1993: 576 on how, for example, Banisadr 
incorporated these components in the definition of the West and also see Malkam 
Khan, 1891, on the role of Crusade and Christian theology in the negative 
conception of the West in the Muslim and Iranian imaginations). As Holiday (2011: 
155) maintains  
relationship with an external ‘other’ is integral to Iranian national identity 
construction. Mostly this ‘other’ has been the ‘West’.  
 
As we mentioned before, each regime of truth has orthodox and non-orthodox 
branches. The significance of Persian poetry as the non-orthodox branch of 
Persianism needs to be further elaborated and emphasized. The status of Persian 
poetry as the non-orthodox form of Persianism is confirmed by Ali Ferdowsi (2008: 
686 added emphasis; see also Dabashi, 2012) when he maintains that:  
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In fact the true monarchs of Iran are its poets who have ruled the hearts of this nation. 
Persian poets forever have set up their humble tents across from the lofty palaces of 
mighty and opulent kings, but destiny’s decree has never been issued against their 
lordship, and the age of their sovereignty has continued down to our time without 
interruption. No turn of events, even the invasion of the Mongols, has managed to 
subvert their power. 
 
This leads to the emergence of what Ashouri (1990) calls ‘the empire of Persian 
poetry’ and Shamlou (2007: 38’) dubs ‘poets as prophets’. The non-orthodox 
Persianism of Persian poetry immediately forms its own branch of orthodoxy and its 
own form of non-orthodoxy. Each regime of truth immediately gives rise to its own 
Sunni and Shia forms. In terms of its relation with the regime of truth of Persian 
monarchy, three are three traditions of Persian poetry, according to Sadri (2011); 
some Persian poets deployed their business of production of truth in the service of 
the kings and enjoyed king’s generous patronages, others kept their distance and 
ardently preserved their independence, and still minority of others who cooperated 
with the kings productively but from the position of independence (also see Sharlet, 
2011; Scott Meisami, 1987). Ansari (2012: 34, 56-7, 176-7) attests to the tensions 
and incongruences between orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism (in the case of 
how to approach and appropriate Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, particularly in the reign of 
the second Pahlavi).    
Each branch and sub-branch of regimes of truth further divides in terms of its high 
and low cultures, the ‘politics of piety’ (Mahmood, 2005) and the ‘politics of 
ordinary’ (Cavell, 1988; Mulhall, 1994; Dumm, 1999) alongside its philosophical 
and ritualistic dimensions (each sub-branch having its own jurisprudence, mysticism, 
and philosophy or Shariat, tarighat and haghigat corresponding to the organization 
of action (embodiment), emotion (heart), and thought (mind) (see Chitick, 2000). 
Each branch and sub-branch has its own bright and dark sides (white and black 
books
35
) and its radical and pragmatic divisions, depending on how it attempts to 
organize its relations with rival regimes of truth based on three principles of 
substitution, complementarity and subsumption. Greer and Lewis (2005: xxvi), for 
                                                          
35
 On the white and black books of different regimes of truth see Zarrinkoob 1957, 1969; Scaff 1989; 
Taylor 1991; Avini (1997); Courtois et al. 1999; Young 2000; Sedgwick, 2004; Mann, 2005; Lincoln, 
2007; Mignolo 2011; Alexander 2013;  Ibn Warraq 1995, 2013;  Daryaee 2009,  among others, where 
we encounter statements like ‘why Islam is the best’, ‘why west is the best’, or ‘why Persia is the 
best’ affirming the white books or statements like ‘why I am not a Muslim’, ‘why I am not a modern’, 
or ‘why I am not a Persian’ referring to the black books.  
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instance, refer to the notion of “the good and the bad of the West” and state the 
following about the bad West:  
This is the image of the West as seen by its victims, enemies, and critics. The 
features of the Bad West include imperialism, class conflict, the manipulation 
of the masses by the elite, genocide, racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, 
environmental pollution, consumerism, and dumbed-down mass 
entertainment. Among its misdeeds over the centuries are gladiatorial 
combats, the burning of heretics, the African slave trade, the Nazi death 
camps, million gallon oil spills, porno Web sites, Third World sweatshops, 
and the atom bomb. … So far as the West ever did anything right, it was as a 
result of stealing ideas from non-Western civilizations without giving them 
any of the credit.   
 
Greer and Lewis (2005: xxv) refer to the good West in the following terms:  
The features of the Good West include, for example, freedom, democracy, 
respect for law, reasoned debate, forgiving one’s enemies, scientific 
discovery, technical progress, pluralism, gender equality, and material 
comfort and leisure for all. Among its heroes are such figures as Socrates, 
Jesus, Leonardo da Vinci, Abraham Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony, Albert 
Einstein, Winston Churchill, and Martin Luther King.  
 
The same good and bad sides apply to Islam and Persianism (which due to lack of 
space we do not address here). These multiple forms of regimes of truth operate 
inside the three projects of reverse social engineering and their internal subprojects. 
The proliferation of formal branches of regimes of truth is further exacerbated by the 
dynamics of generation of unique and hybrid issue-based voices out of the 
multiplicity of forms of regimes of truth. The operation of addition and subtraction 
on three sets of regimes of truth and their internal divisions would generate 
multiplicity of hybrid voices.  
This dynamics can be manifested in numerous examples, one of which is Shariati’s 
voice. Shariati’s voice (Rahnema, 1998; Jafarian, 2007; Nasri, 2007), as a particular 
brand of political Islam, entailed Islam minus the clergy, which was added to 
modernity (especially revolutionary, post-colonialist, and socialist form of 
modernity) minus consumerism and capitalism, and Persianism minus monarchy. 
This is one example among many on how voices emerge out of the application of 
operations of addition and subtraction on three sets of regimes of truth. The voices 
have densely populated the three dimensional space created by three axes of Islam, 
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Persianism and modernity. Each voice, depending on its position on the spectrum 
may consider the voices on the left and right of itself as too radical or too pragmatic 
as Shariati regarded Nasr’s voice as too pragmatic and an example of a form of 
Islamic ecstasy (Jafarian, 2007), reminiscent of Marxism’s depiction of religion as 
opium of the masses, and Nasr regarded Shariti’s voice as madly radical (Jafarian, 
2007; Nasri, 2007). This was despite the fact that Mujahedin-e Khalgh considered 
Shariati as pragmatist, lacking adequate revolutionary credentials and in collusion 
with the Shah’s regime (see Abrahamian, 1989).  
In the state of belated inbetweenness, the social agents are engaged in the business of 
rhizomatic form of truth portfolio construction (Guerard, 2009). Each voice is a truth 
portfolio constituting of elements from alternative regimes of truth and evolved as a 
coping strategy against the terrors of various forms of finitude in Iranian context of 
inbetweenness and its hyper-complex interplay with the state of belatedness. 
Depending on the biographical and genealogical trajectories of different faces, they 
become hosts to these diverse voices. As each social assemblage is subjected to the 
different combination of the three regimes of truth, they attain their passive 
subjectivity and agency based on lexicographical ordering of different regimes of 
truth and their components.  
Each face’s selfhood, hence, is formed based on particular combination of general 
and local preference orderings. As such, depending on his particular biographical 
and genealogical trajectory, the second Pahlavi (see Milani, 2011a), as a social 
assemblage, was subjectified in Persianism, modernity and Islam, in that order, as 
his general preference ordering alongside a set of local preferences for food, music, 
art, cinema, etc., which were selectively borrowed from all three regimes of truth. 
This formed the pyramidic and prismic dimensions of his subjectivity and selfhood 
(see Tizro, 2011 and Flynn, 2005: 172, on pyramidic and prismic nature of 
selfhood). Depending on their trajectories of social and individual experiences, 
different social assemblages at micro, meso, and macro levels float between these 
alternative packages of truth. Different context of situation primes different 
components of this general or local preference ordering (for the notion of ‘priming’, 
see Mikulincer and Florian, 2000: 262, 271; Burke et al., 2010: 155-6, 186). Social 
agents move between forces and voices in search for a complete package of three 
forms of (instrumental, communicative and emancipative) rationalities. Different 
context of situation awakens different dimensions of Iranian selfhood. This constant 
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movement between and within general and local preference orderings makes the 
formation of stable coalition impossible.  
At the time of crisis, social assemblages revert to their general preference ordering 
and their pyramidic selfhood. At normal times, they take their general preference 
ordering as given and act within their local preference structure and prismic 
selfhood. In contrast to the Shah, Khomeini’s subjectivity was, for example, formed 
inside the regimes of truth of Islam with modernity and Persianism deployed as 
complementary elements. Inside this general preference ordering, he was invested 
with particular set of local preferences, which idiosyncratically combined various 
elements of all regimes of truth. For instance, he was reported to have developed a 
taste for Western female fragrances or used to practice Persian poetry. In the case of 
Mosaddegh, for example, his general preference ordering was based on giving 
precedence to modernity followed by Islam and Persianism as complementary 
components. His local preference ordering was once again a unique combination of 
the elements of the three regimes of truth, for example, in his tendency towards play-
acting or his stubbornness (see Mirfetros, 2011; Rahnema, 2005).  
Each social assemblage at a particular time is a particular and unique combination of 
the three forces, and their combinatory voices, and their associated general and local 
preferences. Depending on the change in context of situation, social assemblages 
move between different forces and voices, and either convert to new general 
preference and affiliate themselves to new regime of truth or change the elements of 
their local preference and adopt different permutation or ordering of local 
preferences (preference reversals; see Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). The 
asymmetric structure of preference is such that what is lacking gains bigger weights 
in the consumption basket. This can be explained by a series of cluster concepts 
known as “loss aversion”, “endowment effect” and “contrast effect”. As Tversky and 
Kahneman (2004: 902) state:   
The basic intuition concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes below 
the reference state) loom larger than corresponding gains (outcomes above 
the reference state). Because a shift of reference can turn gains into losses 
and vice versa, it can give rise to reversals of preference.  
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With regard to endowment and contrast effects Tversky and Griffin (2004: 917) 
maintain that:  
a salient hedonic event (positive or negative) influences later evaluations of 
well-being in two ways: through an endowment effect and a contrast effect. 
The endowment effect of an event represents its direct contribution to one’s 
happiness or satisfaction. Good news and positive experiences enrich our 
lives and make us happier; bad news and hard time diminish our well-being. 
Events also exercise an indirect contrast effect on the evaluation of 
subsequent events. A positive experience makes us happy, but it also renders 
similar experiences less exciting. A negative experience makes us unhappy, 
but it also helps us appreciate subsequent experiences that are less bad. The 
hedonic impact of an event, we suggest, reflects a balance of its endowment 
and contrast effects. 
 
Whatever dimension of Iranian identity which manages to capture the centre 
gradually loses its priority and significance and the society gradually moves towards 
the marginalized dimensions of identity. This is due to the fact the new project of 
social engineering with its demonization and/or marginalization of the alternative 
regimes of truth activates the loss aversion, endowment and contrast effects; as the 
default position of Iranian preference structure is a state of tri-polarity, due to the 
process of subjectification, the demonization and marginalization of the other 
regimes of truth is deemed as loss by the Iranian dasein and as such it moves 
towards reversing its loss by adhering to the marginalized regimes of truth even 
more enthusiastically. This creates a recurring gap between state and society 
(Katouzian, 2010; Abrahamian, 2008) where if the state is Islamized the society 
moves towards Persianization and modernization and when the state is Persianized 
the society moves towards Islamization and modernization and when it is 
modernized the society moves towards Islamization and Persianization, which is the 
outcome of the state of belated inbetweenness and not the cause of it.  
This process creates a topological space where even voices and faces residing in 
close proximity cannot find adequate common grounds to form stable coalitions. 
This is due to the fact that each social assemblage finds the idiosyncratic structure of 
forces and voices in other social assemblages as either too radical or too pragmatic, 
alongside the fact that selfhood as a coalition itself is highly volatile and unstable. 
This process creates a highly volatile set of unstable coalitions at individual, 
organizational and societal levels. This dynamics makes the landscape of Iranian 
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social order filled with different brands of cultural tribes replacing more stable forms 
of old ethnic tribes. The Shah, Khomeini, Mosaddegh and Taqizadeh are amongst 
the Iranian social order’s cultural warlords engaging in waves of de-legitimizing 
wars of attrition against each other. Any social relation is a field of possibilities and 
as such a battleground for alternative regimes of truth; theses social terrains are 
fought over by fleeting and floating tribes scattered all over the social space. 
The transition from the state of socio-economic underdevelopment to the state of 
sustainable socio-economic development requires change in purpose, direction, 
vocabulary, institutional and governance structures and socio-economic policies, 
which can be formulated in the framework of political parties or any other stable 
forms of coalitional alliances. The consistent collective action required to achieve 
sustainable development in Iran is impossible due to a process similar to Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1956; List, 2002; Gehrlein, 2006; Gehrlein and 
Lepelley, 2011). If we have six persons and three choices, differently ordered- for 
example God, family, and country which demand different set of loyalties and 
commitments (this example is taken from Sara Palin’s statement when she decided 
not to run for the presidency in 2012) - when they come into conflict, the 
lexicographic orderings determine what is given precedence over what and what are 
sacrificed for what. These three elements can be ordered in six different ways (see 
Gehrlein, 2006: 229; List: 72), which makes coming to stable consensus on a 
particular course of collective action impossible.  
At normal times, the different elements of the preference orderings can act as 
mutually reinforcing and complementary, leading to the emergence of prismic self. 
But when the different components come into conflict, for example when the pursuit 
of God requires some sacrifice in terms of the interests of family or country, the 
selves turn into pyramid structures dictated by the lexicographic nature of their 
preference orderings. In this example, we have a set of two God-dominated 
preference orderings (God-family-country, God-country-family), which we call God-
dominated set. We also have two distinct sets of family-dominated and country-
dominated preference orderings. Furthermore, if at time 1 particular preference 
ordering happens to rule the other two at the collective level, the proponents of the 
other two preference orderings can form a coalition and overthrow it. The victors 
will suffer from internal strife immediately after victory and the conflict has to be 
resolved by resort to some form of final arbitration (randomization or violence). 
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Even the proponents of particular set, after victory, will be plagued by internal strife 
as their orderings differ with regard to the second element of their ordering structure; 
if in opposition to God-dominated set, the family-dominated set becomes the final 
victor after eliminating the country-dominated set, they have to embark on internal 
fighting as they differ in terms of whether after family, God should be given 
precedence to country or the other way round.  
The above case implicitly assumed that the individual voters have stable preference 
orderings and are not plagued by preference reversals. But if we have fluid 
preference orderings where the agent A at time t1 has God-dominated preference 
ordering and at time t2 has family-dominated preference ordering and at time t3 
country-dominated ordering, the dynamics of coalition formation and collective 
actions would become even more complex. In this social order populated by agents 
with time-inconsistent preference orderings (see Loewenstein and Elster, 1992) and 
preference reversals, the shift in orderings can happen within and between sets 
(creating our two important notions of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ 
(see: Jackson, 2003: 45)). In this state of belated inbetweenness, the unit of analysis 
cannot be individuals or other forms of social agents but preference orderings 
themselves. For example, in our case, two notions of forces (regimes of truth) and 
voices define these preference orderings and social agents are treated as faces who 
are dynamic and unstable carriers of the forces and voices. The individuals do not 
possess well-defined, consistent, and stable preference structures. This fluidity of 
identity for social agents makes them move within a particular set from one 
preference to another or they may convert to alternative sets. In the case of Iranian 
dasein instead of God, country, family, we have Islam, Persianism and modernity. 
The constant changes in preference structures makes coalitions highly unstable and 
volatile and the formation of stable collective actions and institutions impossible. 
Preference reversals lead to coalitional reversals and institutional reversals. The 
change in dominant regime of truth happens when these highly fluid preference 
structures unexpectedly, through the accumulation of discontent at a critical mass 
level, converge towards a common alternative, as the description of Islamic 
revolution by Foucault (in Afary and Anderson, 2005: 95) indicates, “a perfectly 
unified collective will”. These instances of perfectly unified collective wills occur 
negatively and against common enemies (which are the incumbent cultural tribes), 
culminating in change in the incumbent regime of truth and its associated project of 
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reverse social transformation. Soon after a short period of honeymoon, the ‘unified 
collective will’ starts to degenerate into multiplicity of warring wills, leading to the 
emergence of civil strife, which in turn motivates the emergence of the final arbiter 
as the coping strategy for conflict resolution against incessant and widespread levels 
of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ plaguing the Iranian social 
landscape.  
Westwood (1965: 124) attests to this fact in the following two observations: 
“Iranians have found it exceptionally difficult to trust one another or to work 
together over time in any significant numbers”. The notion of ‘over time’ refers to 
the time-inconsistency of Iranian preference structure and ‘significant numbers’ to 
the floating and unstable nature of identities. Westwood (1965: 129, added 
emphasis) further adds that:  
Political parties have been nonexistent in any real sense. Party labels have proliferated 
from time to time, but most have been tiny and tenuous factions who saw advantage, 
for the moment, in the symbolism of numbers and unity. The Majlis [parliament] has 
been a collection of individuals and tiny factions, none dependent upon party for their 
seats, without stable majority coalition. Men have coalesced on particular issues, 
usually against the government, have been prepared to leave this coalition on the next 
issues and have expected others to do so. 
 
Based on this observation, coalitions are issue-based and highly unstable and 
volatile. The incidences of ‘difference between’ occur due to the antagonistic and 
binary logic of good against evil prevailing between affiliates to alternative regimes 
of truth. The incidence of ‘difference within’ occurs due to lack of consensus on 
different positions within the affiliates of any regime of truth. The sudden and 
disorientating encounter with modernity has thrown the Iranian subjects to the state 
of belatedness, not bestowing them adequate time and space to form new stable and 
largely tacit and unconscious consensus on different positions related to life, work 
and language.  
As such in the camp of Shia Islam, we encounter violent differences on ontological, 
epistemological, methodological, ethical and jurisprudential positions alongside 
differences in political philosophy, economics and aesthetics. The voices inside the 
set of regime of truth of Shia Islam, differ antagonistically with regard to ontological 
positions, for example, such as whether the universe has been eternal or emergent 
phenomenon, or whether the next-worldly resurrection is only in soul or has bodily 
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manifestation as well, or the relation between God and creation whether it is unity in 
multiplicity or in total dissimilarity. Furthermore, there are violent differences on 
how to harmonize reason with revelation between different approaches in Shia 
jurisprudence and between intellectual and clerical versions of Islam.  
Inside the fiqh community there is violent differences between those who advocate 
the literal truth of almost all Islamic rulings- for example on adultery, theft, capital 
punishment, abortion, inheritance, murder, veiling, usury, or apostasy- and their 
immutability and the obligation for their universal application in all times and places. 
There are irreconcilable differences on whether Shia rulings can be the subject of the 
principle of ‘secondary rulings’ (Ahkaam-e sanaveeyeh) and be suspended 
temporarily for the pursuit of bigger common good of the community and on which 
rulings cannot be subject to suspension. Furthermore, there are significant 
differences between intellectual and clerical versions of Shia Islam on whether some 
Quranic rulings (for example on retribution or ghesas and capital punishment) can 
be abolished altogether as examples for the topic of ‘the abrogating and the 
abrogated or nasikh va mansukh’ (Wild, 2006: 3-6).  
The confusion and incessant differences, hence, on, for example, what constitutes 
usury and how to abolish it from the economic system and how to harmonize the 
Islamic economic system with the wider international economic system creates 
widespread and debilitating levels of dysfunctionalities, reversals, and abortions in 
the banking and economic system (see Lafraie, 2009). The issue of abolishing usury 
(riba) achieves high level of urgency and significance for Muslims as the Quran 
banned it explicitly and resembled it to ‘eating fire’ and the hadith (sayings from the 
infallibles of Shia Islam) likens ‘engaging in usury to be worse than sleeping with 
one’s own mother 70 times in the house of God (Kaba)’. The shock value of this 
statement cannot be underestimated (for the most recent rant about the prevalence of 
riba in the economic system see Abbasi, 2013). The decentralized nature of the 
clergy and the Shia community makes the task of reaching agreement on any issue 
almost impossible. Every possible solution is disputed by some voices, which can act 
as cultural tribes and soon take over the centre.  
The trouble becomes even more exponentially devastating when we see that there is 
no consensual method to resolve differences, or to ‘agree to disagree’ (see List, 2002 
for two concepts of agreement, and Dryzek and List (2003) and Gehrlein and 
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Lepelley (2011) for the relevant notion of single-peakedness) or achieve ‘unity 
without uniformity’ (Zibakalam, 2008) as the differences extend to the methods of 
conflict resolution themselves as well. There is no consensus on whether the 
irreconcilable differences on small and big issues of life, work and language should 
be resolved democratically, by resort to the experts in religion or science, or by 
resort to the experts in communal wisdom like poets or even the wisdom of the 
kings. Islamic, Persianist, and modernist textbooks comes into bitter truth war with 
each other (see Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, on the strife between Roughani Zanjani and 
Nili on the side of the modern economic textbooks and the war-time prime minister 
Mousavi on the side of the Persianist and Islamic textbooks over the organization of 
Iranian economy in the Iran-Iraq war period). As such the emergence of consensus 
on the level of “meta-preference” (Grofman and Uhlaner, 1985) is blocked and the 
dynamics of coalition formation converges towards issue-based transitory and 
fleeting forms of coalition formations, as attested by Westwood (1965: 129).  
These cases of ‘difference within’ can be found in the voices and faces affiliated to 
the regimes of truth of modernity and Persianism as well (as we elaborate in the case 
study chapters). The existence of irreconcilable differences on method of conflict 
resolution is the defining feature differentiating the Iranian state of belated 
inbetweenness from the experience of multiculturalism in the developed societies. In 
the developed societies, there is a historical (largely tacit and unconscious) 
consensus on liberally democratic method of conflict resolution alongside, more 
importantly, stable arrangements institutionalizing the historically-formed 
consensus. In addition, in the advanced societies there is a stable common ground 
upon which the fluidity of postmodernity and multiculturalism can be introduced, 
leading to the incremental change in the sedimented embeddedness of these 
societies. This is incomparable to the state of belated inbetweenness, where there is 
no stable common ground and no shared stable embeddedness and no way to agree 
to disagree or achieve unity without uniformity and there is no stable institutional 
background. As such importation of methods or solutions from the advanced 
societies (like independence of central bank or inflation targeting or liberalization 
and deregulation) is totally counterproductive for the countries immersed in the state 
of belated inbetweenness.  
The fluidity of Bauman’s (2000) ‘liquid modernity’ or Lyotard’s (1984) ‘postmodern 
condition’ (Loyard acknowledges that his analysis only applies to the developed 
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societies) is entirely incommensurable with the fluidity of Bhabha’s (1994) state of 
hybridity and inbetweenness (especially when combined with the state of 
belatedness) (see: Huddart, 2006). Fluidity of identity and its fragmentation in the 
state of belated inbetweenness is drastically different from (seemingly) similar 
phenomenon in the state of multiculturalism or liquid modernity in advanced 
societies with synchronized and harmonized embeddedness and its associated 
institutional stability. Nomadic behaviour in a stable institutionalized background is 
playful and enriching while nomadic behaviour in a liquid embeddedness creates 
psychosis, disintegration, and collapse. Hybridity in such a context breeds discontent 
(Brah and Coombes, 2000). That is why Shayegan’s (2001) universalization of the 
phenomenon of fragmented identity, for example in the book ‘Modern Enchantment: 
40-piece identity and fluid thinking’ is a less than satisfactory analysis of the 
particularity of the Iranian situation of belated inbetweenness. As Ross (2010) 
reminds us stable institutional structures bestows stability to the self, as selves act as 
coherent and predictable entities (as ants or happy slaves) in the contexts of situation 
where institutions are stable. The stable societies produce happy slaves while the 
troubled societies immersed in the state of belated inbetweenness produce unhappy 
slaves (for the notion of happy slave see Herzog, 1989; see also Milgram, 1974).  
The state of belated inbetweenness can be further contrasted with other theoretical 
constructs as well. Fukuyama’s (1992) narrative of the end of ideology and 
Huntington’s (1996) narrative of clash of civilization bring the clash between stable 
selves and identities to the fore. Civilizational analysis (Arjomand, 2004) assumes a 
coherent and stable civilizational identity, which hardly exists in the state of belated 
inbetweenness. The postmodern “metanarrative of death of metanarratives” (Wright, 
1999: 8) equally does not apply to the Iranian context of belated inbetweenness. 
Rawls’ call (1971, 1993, 1999) to appeal only to a shared family of political 
conceptions of justice could not work in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness as 
hardly any such set of shared frameworks exist. As such, the notions (and debates 
surrounding them) such as multiculturalism, liquid modernity and postmodernity and 
their associated packaged and cluster concepts such as liberal democracy, open 
society, critical realism, end of ideology, clash of civilizations, secularism, 
fundamentalism, despotism, Mafia, totalitarianism, fascism, Nazism, populism and 
the like, which are used widely and frequently to make sense of Iranian human 
condition, are largely the case of epistemic violence and counter-transference, 
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misdiagnosing and mis-categorizing the novel situation of Iranian form of belated 
inbetweenness.    
By exploring the logic of collective action and the calculus of group and coalition 
formation (Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Wilke, 2000; Diane, 2004; Demange and 
Wooders, 2005; Poulson, 2006; Ray, 2007; Jones, 2010; Fadaee, 2012), this study 
demonstrates that the confusion between alternative identity markers and packages 
of truth produce agents with time-inconsistent and context-specific preference and 
choice structures (agents who listens to the voice of short-term self one minute and 
medium-terms self the next, and the long-term self at the third; an agent-in-crisis), 
which create short-lived alliances and unstable coalitions, hence, making sense of the 
stylized fact of Iran being known as the country of short-lived alliances (Nategh, 
1983; Abrahamian, 1989; Azadi, 2011). Lambton (1954: 16) attests to this 
phenomenon in the following terms: “factional strife, in one form or another, has 
been a marked feature of Persian life” (see also Abrahamian, 1974: 17). Almost 
every Iranian person or face is an example of the process of short-term alliance at 
micro level. Frequent migration to alternative discursive lands leads to Iran being 
known as a country of unstable coalitions. This is not restricted only to the realm of 
polity but is endemic to all realms of life, work, and language (like the incessant 
fights at all levels over language and language policy). This research demonstrates 
that the phenomenon of instability of coalitions is not restricted to particular 
ideological or doctrinal affiliations and plagues all ideological orientations and 
persuasions from left to right and from religious to secular (if such categorization is 
ever applicable to people immersed in the state of inbetweenness) and emanates from 
the exposure to the state of belated inbetweenness and warring regimes of truth.  
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
At the next step, this chapter, consequentially, aims to show how institutions cannot 
be built, grounded, and sustained as a direct consequence of multiplicity of regimes 
of truth and its associated confused selves and unstable alliances.  
Some theorists (Binmore, 1994, 1998, 2005) model the emergence and change in 
institutional landscape of societies using the tools of game theory. The work of game 
theorists demonstrated that the process of establishing institutions can be modelled 
as a coordination game. Lewis (1969) modelled the emergence of language, 
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convention, and propositional justification and belief as a coordination game. Ross 
(2010, added emphasis) demonstrates that:  
The basic insight can be captured using a simple example. The word 
‘chicken’ denotes chickens and ‘ostrich’ denotes ostriches. We would not be 
better or worse off if ‘chicken’ denoted ostriches and ‘ostrich’ denoted 
chickens; however, we would be worse off if half of us used the pair of words 
the first way and half the second, or if all of us randomized between them to 
refer to flightless birds generally. This insight, of course, well preceded 
Lewis; but what he recognized is that this situation has the logical form of a 
coordination game. Thus, while particular conventions may be arbitrary, the 
interactive structures that stabilize and maintain them are not. 
 
Ross (2010) further observes that:  
In coordination (and other) games with multiple NE [Nash Equilibria], it is 
known that what counts as a solution is highly sensitive to conjectures made 
by players about one another's beliefs and computational ability. 
 
This is exactly where the problem arises in the Iranian context. In the context of the 
confused agents, reading the mind of the other and even their own minds become 
problematic and achieving an stable equilibrium of, for example the case regarding 
rules of the road, ‘all drive on the left’ or ‘all drive on the right’ becomes impossible.  
The dilemmas and crises depicted by a simple coordination game with multiple 
equilibria can shed considerable light on the institutional failure in the Iranian 
context. The Iranian case of multiple equilibria can be seen as a social order 
organized around Persianism, Islam or modernity, or a viable and stable combination 
of them. The presence of irreconcilable difference between and within social 
assemblages turns the win-win cooperation game of institutional building into the 
lose-lose PD game of institutional failure, where no long-term equilibrium can be 
established. Hardin (1995) shows how the Yugoslavian civil war of 1991-95, and the 
1994 Rwandan genocide can be analysed “as Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PDs) that were 
nested inside coordination games” (Ross, 2010).   
Due to the failure in achieving a stable outcome in the framework of the coordination 
game and the ensuing social disorder and personal dissatisfactions, the dynamic of 
the search for a unified and coherent identity triggers a chain of reactions leading to 
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strong events such as revolutions and large social movements in order to solve the 
problem of non-coordination once and for all. In this context, coordination game 
turns into prisoner’s dilemma through the play of identity game. Here one 
component of Iranian multiple identity strives to eradicate the traces of the others 
once and for all by either incorporating the main attractive ideas and practices 
affiliated to the other packages or/and eliminating them from the public discourses 
and practices and annihilating their main outspoken figures and loyal followers. In 
other words, the logic and language of ‘either with us or against us’ is at its full force 
and is practiced by all sides. While in reality, Islam, Persianism, and modernity, 
which are themselves unities in multiplicities (Flynn, 2005), interact and combine in 
innumerable forms of permutations to generate different shades of multiplicities of 
ways of being, seeing, and speaking, the violence of unified identity (negating 
dimension of ‘imaginary’ order) ignores (or is unable to find a new satisfactory 
unified identity) these multiplicities in search of pure unities in order to solve the 
urgent issue of non-coordination.  
A brief example of how these paradigms of truth interact in reality to produce new 
combinations are as follows: modernity is materialized through the establishment of 
nation-states, which requires a national identity which further fuels a demand for 
resources embedded in the Shia Islam and/or Persianism. This puts a demand to form 
a viable narrative out of resources of Islam and/or Persianism, made compatible with 
modernity. This in turn leads to the emergence of three incompatible forms of 
Islamic nationalism, Persianist nationalism and modernist nationalism, and a variety 
of combinations of them with different priorities, emphases, elisions, and silences. 
The three strong events of the modern Iranian history (the constitutional revolution, 
the oil-nationalization movement, and the 1979 Islamic revolution) are the 
manifestations of the efforts to find a stable equilibrium for a sense of national 
identity as a case of multiple equilibria (this will be addressed extensively in the 
application chapters). 
If we adopt three criteria offered by Hilbert (consistency, completeness and 
decidability) for the assessment of mathematical systems (see Floridi, 2004) as a 
heuristic guide for the assessment of socio-economic philosophies and policies (as 
Foucault’s typological and axiomatic moves require), we will demonstrate the 
disorienting array of inconsistencies, incompletenesses, and undecidabilities at the 
heart of social life throughout Iranian history. As such, all areas of life from 
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economy, to culture and art, to family, education, health, security and crime, justice, 
social freedom, morality, legal arrangements, and relation with the foreign others 
have become the battle grounds for alternative regime of truths without ever settling 
in any coherent set of vocabularies, philosophies, or policies. Institutional 
investments encounter abortions, reversals or deformities and dysfunctionalities. 
Hence, this study shows how these constant undecidable battles over fundamentals 
of social life have produced constant shifts in the position of individuals and formed 
unstable coalitions and alliances. Some brief examples of these battles over 
languages, philosophies, and policies are as follows:  
In the realm of economic life, the questions about the truth of things revolve around 
the questions such as the following: should we give priority to the pursuit of self-
interest (which is condemned in the language of religious and Persianist texts but 
deeply rooted in the language of modernity at least in its current form) or should we 
order our economy based on the will to serve (God and/or people)? This battle over 
the vocabulary and content regarding the binary of interest/service has paralysed 
economic life in Iran for a century (see Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, for example). Or how 
can the institution of property rights and its associated discursive and non-discursive 
practices be harmonized with the needs and requirements of social justice and/or 
belief and commitment to faith? In his London speech, Malkam Khan (1891: 239), 
one of the leading figures of the constitutional revolution, summarizes the relation 
between property rights and prosperity in the following terms:  
certain facts are self-evident. Without security of life and property, no 
progress- without justice, no freedom- without freedom, no national 
prosperity, no individual contentment and peace.  
 
How can the institutionalized respect for “security of life and property” be reconciled 
with the need for political stability and security where in the state of belated 
inbetweenness the economic power is frequently deployed to change the political 
system, tuning economic activities into issues of national security? How can the 
excessive use of sexual signs and symbols as inputs in the production of goods and 
services be reconciled with the Islamic laws of chastity and Persianist ethics of 
public decency?  How can the notion of Halal and Haram investments in Islam or 
banning of riba (interest or usury?) be coordinated with excessive permissiveness of 
the modern business world and modern banking system? What is the road map 
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through which we can reach a viable consensus on the parameters of the business 
atmosphere, setting the stable, formal and informal, terms of “licence to operate” 
(see Sadler, 2002, chapter 10) to generate trust and optimism amongst investors and 
entrepreneurs towards the socio-economic system? 
No option seems to be able to overcome the other in order to gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people and no consensus appears to be ever emerging. Another example 
is in the realm of defining relations with the West and Arabs, the first world and the 
third world. Should we form stable alliances with the West and Israel against Arabs 
(as the dominant philosophy of the last kingdom in Iran was) or should we form 
stable coalitions with our Muslim brothers (inside the larger notion of ummah) and 
the oppressed third world against the oppressors of the West and Israel (as the 
philosophy of the current order in Iran implies)? Should we prioritize our national 
interests or should we sacrifice our interests for the good of Islamic community at 
large and the oppressed people of the world (modern nationalism versus Islamic and 
oppressed-people-of-the-world internationalism)?  
None of the possible solutions has gained legitimacy and supremacy over the other 
so that they could irreversibly be turned into the axioms of foreign policy, which 
turns it into a perfect case of undecidability. Whatever policy is pursued, a wave of 
discontent and disillusionment is created (just like Sophie’s choice in the 
concentration camp; see McConnell, 2010) leading to constant tensions and sudden 
shifts and zigzag metamorphoses in policy. In the realm of economy, for instance, 
should we allow direct foreign investment in the country or not?  In the case of 
letting the foreigners in, should we be content with ‘infidels’ taking charge of 
Muslim affairs and lands and properties or should we not care as long as they 
generate employment, wealth and prosperity? If we let the foreigners in would not 
they bring their own life styles and philosophies in direct opposition to our way of 
life and our ethos, which would contaminate our purity and our pride and corrupt our 
youth and erode our morality and social fabric alongside our prospect of eternal 
salvation? (see: Euben, 1999; Tripp, 2006; Zaidi 2011)  
Would it be wise to exchange the impermanent benefits of this world at the expense 
of losing permanent payoffs associated with eternal salvation? Is it not true that such 
an exchange is utter madness? Would not they use the realm of economy to change 
our faith? What is the price we are ready to pay for establishing a normal relation 
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with the outside world? Should it be at the cost of losing our eternal happiness in our 
hereafter? Or is the fact that these foreigners (largely westerners) are not infidels, 
they are our brothers in Aryan race and Indo-European language family and we have 
to form stable alliances with them against the true aliens like Arabs and/or Russians?  
Ultimately, how can we reconcile the three distinct forces of Persianism, Islam, and 
modernity with their three distinctive structures of power/knowledge, discursive 
formations and institutional arrangements, and their associated negating facets of 
repression, disavowal and foreclosure in different realms of life from diplomacy, to 
polity, to economy, art, security, family and gender relation, to education and 
entertainment? All these are entirely unclear and society has become an experimental 
lab for alternative solutions implemented through the mechanism of reverse social 
engineering due to the requirements of state of belatedness, leading to constant 
reversals, abortions and restructuring and waste of resources which marks the socio-
economic stagnation in Iran. The preference reversals ultimately lead to money-
pump cycle (see Munro, 2009: 62; Goldman, 2008: 103; Santos, 2010: 167) and 
socio-economic underdevelopment.  
The experience of institutional failure and its associated dysfunctionalities and 
deformities, hence, breeds discontent and waves of social upheavals, which will be 
elaborated more extensively by bringing historical evidence into play and uncovering 
the repeated patterns and subtle regularities which have roots in the tragic ‘context of 
multiple regimes of truth’ in interaction with the state of belatedness and its 
manifestation in Iranian confused mind and identity crises. For this, this study uses 
all types of evidence to fully elaborate on the regularities and irregularities of Iranian 
social life leading to socio-economic stagnation. This will suggest a general 
equilibrium (or disequilibrium) and co-evolutionary theory of Iranian social life 
relating economy to politics, religion, morality, culture, and mind whereby a hybrid 
and interdisciplinary analysis is attempted.  
It should be noted that such a theoretical framework starts to fill the gap in the four-
level analysis offered by Williamson (2000), especially at the level of mind and its 
associated layers of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. In a sense, 
there is almost always a social process behind the mechanism of price formation (see 
Zafirovski, 2000, on this important point) and this study is an attempt to unravel the 
“underlying forces operating beneath supply and demand” (Zafirovski, 2000: 277) 
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and the hyper-complex processes working behind the price signals guiding the 
allocation of scarce resources and determining the nature of governance structures, 
institutional arrangements, and socio-economic development. This relates to the 
relation between wealth-creation and truth-creation as Foucault (1980: 93-4, 
emphasis added) conceives it:  
In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, 
indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place.  
 
This statement, in a way, succinctly captures the hypothesis of this study. The failure 
in the production of truth in the Iranian modern history has led to the failure in the 
production of wealth.  
In a sense, this study is an attempt to have another go at the Foucault’s attempt to 
map the Iranian regime of truth:  
the events in Iran, he proposed, cannot be captured by traditional categories 
like Marxism, for Iranians ‘don’t have the same regime of truth as ours’ 
(Moaddel, 2011: 127).  
 
The tragedy of confusion alongside the impossibility of formation of stable coalition 
and failures in establishing functional institutions has culminated in the emergence 
of a chaotic order in the modern history of Iran, shaping the price and non-price 
factors involved in determination of the nature of socio-economic development.  The 
following section addresses the fourth stage of the four-level social mechanism of 
socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran.  
3.5 CHAOTIC ORDER 
The experience of discontent and disillusionment emanating from living within 
dysfunctional and deformed institutions (reminiscent of Ibrahim Beig’s ‘disturbance 
evaluation’) endemic to the interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the 
state of belatedness culminates in the emergence of large social movements and 
revolutions leading to the collapse of the old order. The collapse of the incumbent 
regime of truth with its associated project and subprojects of social transformation 
and its affiliated shades of voices leads to the emergence of a spring of freedom 
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where all the marginalized regimes of truth and their associated projects/subprojects 
and voices erupt into the social space producing multitude of groups, societies, and 
associations. The irreconcilable differences between and within alternative forces, 
voices and faces culminate in the emergence of state of chaotic civil strife where the 
social order converges to the state of total disorder and collapse. The sweet taste of 
freedom turns into bitter experience of civil war, anarchy, and chaos.  
The war of attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their associated cultural 
tribes results in the production of limit-experience of degeneration and collapse, 
where Iran verges towards and touches upon the symptoms of failed states.  But 
frequently the process of degeneration does not end in the collapse of the whole 
order as the same forces which plotted its state of near-collapse coalesce to save the 
country from the brink of total breakdown. Depending on the nature of old order, it 
is expected that a new final arbiter would emerge to put an end to the state of civil 
strife and act as a device for conflict resolution. The final arbiter (Iranian leviathan 
re-emerging time and again in different disguises) resorts to the repressive strategies 
to eliminate the rival forces, voices and faces from the social order and to establish 
itself as the new incumbent force and to restore a semblance of order to the social 
life of the nation.   
The marginalized forces, voices and faces lay dormant in the short euphoric 
honeymoon period of the new incumbent regime and soon they come back with 
vengeance and start a new round of war of attrition with its incessant waves of de-
legitimization and discrediting, severely eroding the legitimacy, credibility and 
popularity of the new incumbent regimes, ultimately making them incompetent in 
establishing functional institutions, which culminates in its collapse and the same 
truth cycle (similar to business cycles in economics) recommence, whereby the 
population migrate (exit) in mass to the new regime of truth by voting with hands or 
feet (see Fleck and Hanssen, 2013; Hirschman, 1970). The ease at which Iranians 
can freely enter and exit the alternative regimes of truth is mind-blowing. The 
existence of such alternative set of options is at the root of such a state of chaotic 
order and is endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness. Naturally, there is no 
irreversible commitment to a particular regime of truth and its associated project and 
subprojects of reverse social engineering. The minute you are unhappy with a 
particular state of affairs you have the option of moving to alternative regimes of 
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truth.  Sudden jump, rather than an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization, 
is the dominant method of social change.  
It is a fact that in ‘troubled societies’ like Iran, trapped in the compound state of 
belatedness-inbetweenness, the social order relies on an scattered army of final 
arbiters to regenerate order and as a result the power appears to be arbitrary, 
capricious, discretionary (saligheh-ye) and atomic. The phenomenon of discretionary 
nature of power (ha’kemee’yat-e saligheh) is equivalent to what Katouzian (1998) 
terms as “licence” and opposes it to liberty. For him liberty is rule-based and always 
operates within consensual constraints while licence is willy-nilly and arbitrary. 
Alternatively, Katouzian (2010: 16-8) calls it “deep-seated personalism” of the 
Iranian society. It is worth noting that what appears as exercise of “licence” or 
“personalism” is exercise of a particular combination of regimes of truth, which for 
the outsiders appears as idiosyncratic, arbitrary and discretionary. The duality of 
licence/freedom or personalism/rule of law seems to be a case of counter-
transference and another application of hermeneutics of suspicion without 
hermeneutics of understanding.  
Even the social actors themselves frequently commit the same cardinal sin and 
classify the positions of others as the cases of rule of discretion (saligheh-yee) while 
classify their own positions as principled and disciplined.  As we mentioned in the 
methodology chapter, there is no arbitrary taste or action; the wills, speeches, 
actions, emotions, and organization of objects are willed by the worldhood and the 
big Other composed of real, symbolic and imaginary orders with their affirmative 
and negating facets. The point is that the actions, speeches and emotions of the 
radical other are frequently manifested to the self as irrational, arbitrary and 
licentious because of addiction to a particular form of rationality and its grid of 
intelligibility. The discourse of licence and arbitrariness is based on poorly theorized 
grasp of social phenomena and human agency. Abrahamian (1974), for instance, 
demonstrates how even the shahs of Qajar who were supposed to be the pinnacles of 
oriental despotism were extremely powerless in terms of access to a powerful army 
and an efficient bureaucracy and their power was rooted in people and their elites 
throughout the country believing in the necessity of the submission to the power of 
the shah as a way to prevent chaos. This belief was rooted in the institution of 
Persian kingship and its associated regime of truth (see Rajaee, 1993; Soudavar, 
2003).  
147 
 
Furthermore, As Amanat (1997) reports, despite having access to as many women as 
he could wish, Nasir-al-Din Shah had to strictly abide by the Shia ruling of having 
only four permanent wives and the distinction between permanent wives and 
temporary wives through promotion to or demotion from the status of being amongst 
the four permanent wives had produced a particular configuration of harem politics. 
This is alongside the fact Mohammad Reza Shah could not even have more than one 
wife due to the penetration of modern regime of truth in the Iranian life world and as 
such he had to resort to secret and illicit relations with other women, as Milani 
(2011a) reports, buying him a bad reputation for being a womanizer. As such, 
regimes of truth almost always set the parameters of “licence to operate” in all 
realms of life, work, and language. Hence, this kind of misclassification in seeing the 
positions of the radical others as arbitrary and spineless, which itself is the product of 
the state of belated inbetweenness, further exacerbates the relentless war of attrition 
between and within coalitions and creates a cumulative atmosphere of bitterness and 
spitefulness, feeding back into the state of chaotic order. 
The nature of diffusion of power in the state of belated inbetweenness is different 
from the decentralization of power in the state of harmonized and synchronized 
embeddedness. In the state of belated inbetweenness power at each particular context 
emanates from contradictory sources of knowledge. In the university context, for 
example, the scientific credentials act as the well of power, which may come into 
conflict with the power generated from the status and discourses of martyrdom 
(religious and/or revolutionary credentials) (Varzi, 2006; Khosronejad, 2013), and 
they both may come into conflict with the powers emanating from the access to the 
“Persian house of wisdom” (Polastron, 2007: 56). Each person in authority or 
outside of it is a biographically-determined idiosyncratic combination of these wells 
of power/knowledge/subjectivity invested with multiple forms of legitimacy. In each 
context of situation different elements of this multi-layered structure of 
power/knowledge/subjectivity are activated or deactivated.  
This makes the exercise of power look arbitrary and discretionary, while in reality it 
depends on the trajectory of evolution of each social assemblage and not on their 
whims or ex-nihilo wills. In a particular context it is not predictable whether the 
person in authority or outside of it activates power predominantly based on modern 
discourses, Islamic discourses, or Persianist discourses and whether their discourses 
are found credible and bought or not. Furthermore, what a social assemblage (like 
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army, a newspaper or a person like Banisadr) does at time A is not a guide or 
predictor for what he/she/it does at time B, as the composition of its hybrid voice 
may change drastically through conversion to alternative regimes of truth or slightly 
but significantly through change in emphases and in the nature of silences, elisions, 
and in the economy of attention (see Zerubavel, 2006; Shariff, 2000; Berman, 1998; 
Bourdieu, 1977). The individual, group or organization is the vessel through which 
multiple forms of networks of power-knowledge come into conflict, while 
intermingling, co-habiting, and reinforcing each other. This dynamics makes power 
look discretionary and atomic, and as such unpredictable.  
This dynamics of atomization of power is manifest in everyday experiences of 
Iranian dasein. The common and popular notion of a mode of governance called 
muluk-al-tawa’ifi  (the rule of chiefs of clans) (see Katouzian, 2010: 6) captures the 
discretionary nature of power in Iran, but in modern times such clan-based power 
emanates from the prevalence of cultural clans and cultural tribes rather than 
traditional clans and tribes; in the state of inbetweenness, a clan (ta’efeh)- the circle 
of people around prominent figures like Beheshti, Rafsanjani, the queen or Hoveida, 
for example- is the coalition which is very fluid and unstable, and has nothing to do 
with geographical territory or any other form of stable affiliations. An entrepreneur, 
for example, may obtain the licence for investing on a particular economic activity 
from a particular authority at time t1, but his ‘licence to operate’ may be revoked or 
ignored and by-passed by the same authority or by another authority at time t2 (see 
Frye, 1984; Milani, 2000; Ahmadi Amoui, 2006, for instance).   
Thus, the power becomes time-inconsistent as preferences are time-inconsistent. 
Consequently, the confusion in the realm of knowledge trickles down to the realm of 
power. That is why Jamalzadeh, the father of modern novel in Iran, implicitly calls 
Iran the house of the insane (dar-al-majanin, translated as lunatic asylum) (see: 
Katouzian, 2013: 250), and Forough Farrokhzad, the prominent modernist poet, 
portrays Iran as a leper colony in her short film (see: Brookshaw and Rahimieh, 
2010). This is due to the nature and bewildering variety of different preference 
orderings inhabiting the landscape of Iranian social order. The irreconcilable form of 
‘difference within’ finds opportunity to reveal itself when the ‘difference between’ is 
not activated or highlighted.  
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The phenomenon of arbitrariness and discretionary nature of power, hence, is the 
unintended and emergent outcome of the dynamics of creation of voices out of the 
application of operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of 
truth. In this process, paradoxically the same three regimes of truth, which create 
chaos in the Iranian social reality save it from degenerating into oblivion. This is 
similar to a dysfunctional family, whose deep familial connections keep them 
together without ever turning into a functional unit. The deep affiliations to the three 
regimes of truth keep Iranians together without ever allowing them to build a 
peaceful and functional house of being. As such the social order fluctuates between 
the state of chaos and the state of order without ever falling into stable states of total 
collapse or stable state of functional order. It oscillates between order and chaos and 
the states of elation and exuberance and discontent and disillusionment, which 
creates dysfunctionalities and deformities in all realms of social life.  
This state of deformity is at the heart of the Iranian bitter experience of 
backwardness and underdevelopment.  In essence, almost no institution works as 
they are supposed to (Akhavi, 1998: 701). This is despite the fact that Iran has 
adopted almost all institutions of modernity from schools, hospitals, to universities, 
prisons, legal system, transportation system, parliamentary system, banking system 
and institutions of culture, sports, entertainment and many more, as almost none of 
them work smoothly the way they are supposed to. The reason has to be located 
within the fitness frame, as they are not fit for purpose due to being transplanted and 
forced to function through different mechanism as opposed to the mechanism for 
which they were created or innovated. In other words, these adoptions were made 
through the process of reverse social engineering without going through evolutionary 
process of chaotic synchronization involving ‘vanishing mediator’ forms of 
adaptations, and therefore, they are vulnerable to delegitimizing challenges launched 
by various forces, voices and faces and as such are embroiled in the state of 
deformities and dysfunctionalities.  
Consequently, adoptions without adaptations are vulnerable to experiences of 
abortions, reversals or deformities and dysfunctionalities. This common experience 
of institutional reversals and abortions is what Katouzian (2010: 17) terms as ‘the 
pick-axe society (jame’eh-ye kolangi)’. This is related to the theory of selection (see 
Runciman, 2009) from alternative social assemblages and their regimes of truth, and 
theory of emergence of new forms of life, work and language (which we have 
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addressed in more depth in the chapter on methodology and case study chapters) and 
the issue of multiple realizability. The story runs almost similarly for the institutions 
affiliated predominantly to the regimes of truth of Islam and Persianism.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussions investigate the constitution of Iranian dasein and 
complete four stages of our theoretical model offered for the analysis of enigma of 
socio-economic underdevelopment in modern history of Iran. The following chapters 
put into test the explanatory power of these methodological insights and the 
theoretical model proposed in relation to understanding of three strong events of 
Iranian history spanning a period of a century, namely the Constitutional Revolution, 
the Oil-Nationalization Movement (ONM), and the Islamic Revolution (up to the 
start of Reformist Movement in 1997).  
In this explorations, this study follows the formula offered by Movahhed (1999, 
2004a) in his seminal book on the ONM and calls the history of Iran a series of 
‘confused dreams’; the confused dream of Mashroteh, oil nationalization and Islamic 
revolution, followed by latest versions of the same dreams in Reformist Movements 
and Green Movements.    
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION  
“Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past.” Marx 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The 1906 constitutional revolution in Iran was a world event both in its causes and 
its consequences (see Kasravi, 1994; Martin, 1989; Bayat, 1991; Afary, 1996; 
Abadian, 2006; amongst others). It happened as an outcome of interplay of two sets 
of Malinowskian conditions: ‘condition of situation’ and ‘condition of culture’. The 
particular configuration of forces, voices, and faces in time and space, in history and 
geography, shaped the events of this era. While the condition of situation constituted 
of the configuration of forces and balance of power/knowledge in the world of 
international order, itself an assemblage of multiple worldhoods (a world of 
worldhoods), the condition of culture enshrined the particularity and singularity of 
historically emerged sedimentation and embeddedness of Iranian social order. The 
site of the constitutional revolution was the scene of intermingling of two social 
assemblages, the social assemblage of international order and the social assemblage 
of Iranian social order.  
In this chapter we investigate how these two sets of social assemblages interacted 
and manifested themselves in and through historical forces, voices and faces, 
culminating in the emergence of a series of epoch-making events known as the 
Constitutional Revolution in the early years of 20
th
 century. This chapter aims to 
explore the rise and fall of the constitutional movement by locating it in the 
framework of the political economy of regimes of truth, the state of inbetweenness, 
in its interaction with the state of belatedness, as manifested in a mechanism 
constitutive of four stages of state of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, 
institutional failure, and the emergence of a chaotic social order of deformities and 
dysfunctionalities, where the society neither disintegrates into a failing state nor 
turns into a normal and functioning country.   
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4.1.1. The Level of Analysis 
This section of the introduction aims to demonstrate that for theorization of the rise 
and fall of the constitutional revolution we need to move from the level of prices, 
governance, and institution to the level of regimes of truth; it is worth noting that this 
study does not intend to be a chronological history of this strong event of the Iranian 
modern history, rather it strives to offer a novel theoretical reading.  
The constitutional revolution is known to be a revolution for the establishment of 
rule of law as manifested in the demand for an order in which “the shah and the 
beggar will be equal within the confines of the law” (Enayat, 2013: 1). The following 
part of Afghani’s (1892: 241) speech in London succinctly captures the spirit of the 
time:  
 
[Afghani was giving a report of his visit to Persia] The people gathered 
around me as about their deliverer. “A code of law! A code of law!” was all 
their cry; “no matter what, only some law; we have no law, no courts of 
justice, no security of life and property; let us be taxed, squeezed, and 
oppressed in moderation; but let us have some law and we will submit!.   
 
Based on this fact and the fact the recent Reformist Movement and Green Movement 
in Iran had practically the same demand as the constitutional revolution (see 
Dabashi, 2011b; Afary, 2013) we can arrive at the conclusion that the analysis of 
Iranian backwardness, both at the level of history and historiography, has not yet 
managed to finally cut the king’s head, as Foucault (1980: 102) suggests: “We must 
eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power”. The analysis frequently gets 
fixated at the level of politics, the rule of law, the state, and the consciousness, while 
this level of analysis at best covers the three Williamson’s (2000) levels of prices, 
governance, and institutions without entering the level of mind and its associated 
continuum of unconscious/conscious regime of truth.  
The contrast between the levels of truth and law is evident in this specimen from 
Seyyed Jamal al-Din Va’ez Isfahani, one of the leading lights of the constitutional 
revolution, as reported in Katouzian (2011: 764):  
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People! Nothing would develop your country other than subjection to law, 
observation of law, preservation of law, respect for law, implementation of 
the law, and again law, and once again law.  
 
Here in Va’ez Isfahani’s interpretation, as well as Katouzian’s, the socio-economic 
development of the country depends on the rule of law, while the establishment of 
rule of law requires, in  Foucault’s conception, the production of truth, which acts as 
the condition of possibility for the creation of wealth. If we delve deeper at the pre-
requisites of the establishment of law we arrive at the level of production of truth; in 
Williamson’s terms we move from the level of prices, governance, and institution to 
the level of mind.  
In a brief assessment of the failure of the constitutional revolution and other attempts 
for modernizations in Iran, Katouzian (2012, 2011, 2000) puts the blame on such 
vague notions as ‘cultural roots’, ‘habits’ and the like, which is evident in the 
following statement that “the old habits of discord and lack of social cohesion and 
cooperation, and the attitude of total gain or total loss – in short, the politics of 
elimination – was too ingrained to make peaceful developments possible” 
(Katouzian, 2011: 773). Here Katouzian resorts to such notions as ‘old habits of 
discord’, ‘lack of social cohesion and cooperation’, and the ‘politics of elimination’ 
being too ‘ingrained’ without adequately theorizing them. This study hopes to be a 
right step in the direction of filling this considerable gap in the level of theorization 
in answering the questions such as why thing are the way they are; why in the 
Iranian context old habits do not change and are not replaced by new habits, while in 
other historical contexts habits clearly do change (Iranians themselves changed their 
habit of practicing Zoroastrianism or agrarian mode of production, for instance, and 
other nations changed their habit of despotism to new habit of democracy), why 
there is not adequate level of social cohesion, and why some things become 
ingrained and others do not. As such, there is an urgent need to offering a theory of 
“cultural roots”, “habits”, “lack of social cohesion”, and “politics of elimination”.  
In actual fact, Va’ez Isfahani, in the rest of the above passage, as reported in 
Katouzian (2011: 764), refers to the level of regime of truth explicitly without being 
able to term it as such:  
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Children must from childhood read and learn at schools that no sin in religion 
and the shari’eh is worse than opposing the law… Observing religion means 
law, religion means law, Islam, the Koran, mean God’s law. My dear man, 
qanun, qanun. Children must understand, women must understand, that the 
ruler is law and law alone, and no one’s rule is valid but that of the law. The 
parliament is the protector of law… The legislative assembly and legislature is 
the assembly which makes law, the sultan is the head of the executive which 
implements the law. The soldier is defender of the law, the police is defender 
of the law, justice means law, prosperity means implementing the law, the 
independence of the monarchy means rules of the law. In a word, the 
development of the country, the foundation of every nationality, and the 
solidarity of every nation arises from the implementation of the law.  
 
Here he moves to the deeper level of making respect for law and understanding of it 
as part of women’s and children’s subjectivities and daily discursive and non-
discursive practices, where the defiance of law is treated as sin. He resorts to the 
notion of sin and cardinal sin, which is a very entrenched notion in the Shia 
theology, and its moral and legal formulations. Alongside Islam he refers to the 
notion of majlis and monarchy and the institutions of modern state like police and 
army. Thus, he brings the two regimes of modernity and Persianism into the equation 
as well. To entrench the culture of respect for law and achieve the culture of law-
abiding citizenry require the deeper engagement at discursive and non-discursive 
level (engaging with the Heideggerian fourfold) and the level of affectivity and 
emotional economy (see Neuman et al., 2007), as people need to feel guilt and 
shame (like the loss of sexual honor which brings the sense of shame) if the 
disregard for law is supposed to be experienced as sin. This needs to be 
complemented with the cultivation of the sense of joy and pride in being a law-
abiding citizen and society alongside the experience of being rewarded eternal and 
material prizes in the case of abidance by law.  
As such, the entire social order comes into play, requiring a cultural revolution, 
which in turn requires deep and sustained engagement of the clergy, the 
intelligentsia, and the Persianist literati and monarchy to reconcile deep differences 
on who has the right to legislate and what are the ontological, epistemological, 
methodological, aesthetic and moral axes of such act of legislation.  There is also an 
urgent and pressing need for the development of a collective dialogue on the issues 
such property rights, freedom, justice, equality, sexuality (prostitution and the sexual 
freedom of two sexes), permanence and impermanence, pleasures of the flesh and 
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spirituality, faithfulness and faithlessness, the issue of social vices (drinking alcohols 
and consumption of drugs and gambling), the nature of good and evil, and nature of 
the healthy society as foundations of new conception of significance of rule of law. 
In particular the whole social order need to see how three conceptions of time 
(Chakrabarty’s timeknot, 2000) and the path of the prophets and the path of mankind 
can be reconciled and how the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth 
can be coordinated. Without engagement at these deeper levels and production of 
philosophical and theoretical consensus, which are implicit in any assertion on any 
social issue including the issue of rule of law, the whole project of establishing a 
functional social order based on the rule of law is doomed to fail as it failed 
frequently.  
Consequently, the debate needs to abandon the obsession with the level of politics 
and law, and engage at the deeper and more fundamental level for the society to be 
able to move from the state of lawlessness to the state of lawfulness. This requires a 
theory of social order and social phenomena, which can investigate how they are 
formed, reformed and transformed in order to be able to understand how the 
transition from lawlessness to lawfulness can happen. This is what is not offered in 
Katouzian’s works, or almost any of the other analysts of the Iranian contemporary 
history, while all of their works are rich repertoires for the traces and materials for 
the development of such a theory or set of theories.  
In terms of the experience of the historical actors in the constitutional era, the level 
of analysis has only moved from ‘cheap bread and meat’ issues, to who should 
govern and how (good governance as manifested in the demand for house of justice), 
and the institutions of good governance (the constitution and the rule of law) as 
evident in the following piece, reported by Arjomand (1988: 38), from the 
constitutional era (in a rally in Tabriz in support of the constitutional movement):  
The people were asked: "What do you want, cheap bread and meat? Or do you 
have another objective?" The mass which was privy to no knowledge said yes, 
we want cheap bread and meat. It was suggested once more to them: "Do you 
want constitutional government (mashruteh)?”' This time they said yes three 
times in a loud voice.   
 
Arjomand (1988: 37) further observes that:  
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For the teleology of the Constitutional Revolution to unfold without 
hindrance, the Constitutionalists had to transcend not only the particularistic 
goals of the clerical estate and the mercantile class, but also the constant 
preoccupation of the masses with bread and meat.  
 
Thus, the three Williamsonian levels of prices, governance, and institutions can be 
easily seen in Arjomand’s observation in the three categories of demands in the 
constitutional era: ‘the demand for cheap bread and meat (bread riots)’, ‘the demand 
for good governance’ as manifested in their protest against the governors of Tehran 
and Kerman and the subsequent demand for the house of justice (edalatkhaneh), and 
the ‘demand for constitution’.  
Alongside these three levels of analysis, the analysis of Iranian modern history is in 
desperate need of transcending obsession with them in the hope of entering the level 
of mind and its hyper-complex and largely unconscious level of regime of truth. This 
study aims to see these four levels as complementary levels via viewing the market 
for truth as the condition of possibility for the production of wealth (as Foucault 
conceived it). As such, the study covers a spectrum from truth to bread; truth is 
manifested in bread, and when we eat the bread we eat the truth we managed to 
produce collectively to support the stable socio-economic structure leading to the 
production of bread. Thus, truth and bread are social twins. Failure in the production 
of truth leads to failure in the production of bread. As we will see later in this chapter 
almost all analysts of Iranian history and the historical actors suffer from the same 
shortcoming; the best they achieve is to travel to the level of ideas and beliefs and 
their associated institutions without locating them in the wider notion of being-in-
the-world and its associated warring regimes of truth.  
The analysis in this chapter, hence, locates the modern Iranian history in the political 
economy of supply and demand for truth or the war between rival regimes of truth to 
dominate the market for truth (see Witham, 2010, for the extension of the notion of 
market to other realms of life, for instance, in the analysis of market for gods). The 
encounter with the real of modernity generated the state of belatedness in the non-
pioneering countries and regions of the world, which in turn prompted the sense of 
discontent with the status quo and steered demand for change. The demand for 
change became a global phenomenon as manifested in reform and revolutionary 
movements in Russia, China, Mexico, Portugal, amongst others, as attested by 
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Kurzman (2008: 4-6) (also see Sohrabi, 1995; Keddie, 1962). Modernity dwarfed 
and derailed almost all pre-modern social orders in an irreversible manner. As such 
what was experienced globally by non-pioneering societies was dwarfment 
(Thomson, 1880: 78) rather than decline. As the encounter with modernity had 
disturbed and derailed the old equilibrium in the market for truth, the demand for 
change instigated a demand for truth about every aspect of life, work and language. 
To catch-up with the Western modernity, the belated countries needed to know about 
where and how and with what pace the transformation needed to be achieved, 
generating the need for a theory of selection from other orders, in turn prompting the 
need for understanding the nature of social phenomena and their logic of formation 
and transformation with their ontological, epistemological, methodological, ethical, 
and aesthetical dimensions.  
This process in turn required deep engagement with ‘truth about’ gods, mortals, sky 
and earth, which created sustained and uninterrupted demand and supply for truth 
about life, work, and language. Foucault (1980: 93-4) refers to how the production of 
truth acts as condition of possibility for the production of wealth:  
In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed 
we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place.  
 
Based on this formulation, the wealth of nations depends on how truths are produced 
by nations. The disruptions and dysfunctionalities in the production of truth are 
translated into the experience of disruptions and dysfunctionalities in the production 
of wealth. The creation of stable and dynamic market for goods and services relies 
on the creation of stable and dynamic markets for truth.   
The (in)famous call of Taqizadeh (one of the leading figures in the constitutional and 
post-constitutional era) for wholesale Westernization (becoming Europeanised from 
top to toe) (Ansari, 2012: 62; Boroujerdi, 2003: 22) is the hallmark of the age where 
all realms of life have undergone a crisis of legitimacy and identity and the demand 
for new truth has emerged. The politicization of all realms of life is another symptom 
or by-product of such a crisis in the production of truth. In the state of belated 
inbetweenness, life, work and language inevitably are experienced as politics (see 
Bayat, 2009). In his tract called “the war of seventy two belief systems” (Jang-e 
Haftad-o du Mellat), resorting to the famous poem of Hafez, Mirza Agha Khan 
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Kermani (1925: 102, emphasis added), one of the leading theorists and activists of 
the constitutional era who was killed almost 10 years before the start of the 
revolution, addresses the issue of ‘truth’ as one of the central issue of the age:  
is there any truth or not and if there is, what is it and where is it and who has 
it and what is its signs and after knowing it how can it be pursued and how 
can it be achieved? 
 
These are the deepest questions residing at the heart of almost all social movements 
and everydayness in the modern history of Iran, including the constitutional era, 
which demands from the researcher to conduct the analysis at the level of regime of 
truth in association with the level of institutions, governance, and prices. 
Interestingly, in the above tract Kermani explicitly and implicitly elaborates on how 
different people have different regimes of truth, without naming it as such, and even 
explores the fact that even people’s taste, physical sensibilities, and emotional 
economies are scaffolded by their particular regime of truth. He offered a set of 
alternative truths and ultimately falls into Hafez’s trap of favouring the unity of all 
religions and what Berlin (1990) calls monism of truth (see Pedersen and Wright, 
2013; Weir, 2012).
36
 
It is worth noting that in the above piece of work, Kermani demonstrates the traces 
of appreciating difference in itself as the default position, while ultimately leaning 
towards taking modernity as the gold standard and trying to harmonize it with a 
version of ‘true’ Islam. Iraj Mirza’s poem as reported in Ajodani (2002: 241), on the 
non-existence of God, where he poses a series of rhetorical questions and expresses 
his atheist conclusion in the form of “Where is God? Who is God? What is God? 
Stop debating uselessly; there is no God (Kou khoda? Kist khoda? Chist khoda? Bee 
jahat bahs makon nist khoda)”, demonstrates how the demand for and supply of 
reform of the old order- triggered due to being dwarfed in the state of belatedness- 
was inevitably translated into the deeper dimensions of search for truth directly 
relating to the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth. We see the 
traces of Nietzsche’s famous declaration of “death of God” in Iran without the same 
evolutionary background. In the pioneer societies catastrophic and sudden changes 
                                                          
36
 Here he reduces difference to the logic of the same following Hafez, saying that these seventy two 
voices are there because they failed to see the Truth and fell prey to the path of the myth; ironically 
Hafez fails to see myth and illusion (afsaneh va afsoon) as constitutive of truth (see Gabriel and 
Zizek, 2009), as we addressed in the methodological chapter. 
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like revolutions (in thought or in social order) happen within a deeper gradual and 
evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization while in the state of belatedness, the 
society faces a series of catastrophic changes imported from without through 
Cartesian projects of reverse social engineering and intelligent design.   
These developments, hence, led to the narrative/strategy of modernization, rule of 
law, and constitutionalism being associated with denotations and connotations of 
atheism, and anti-religion orientations alongside the traces of support for free love 
and the spread of social vices (for example in the work of Akhundzadeh; see 
Adamiyat, 1970), all of which as a whole would generate suspicion towards the new 
regime of truth. This association between the doctrine of rule of law, atheism, 
materialism, and social vices, which demonstrates the co-evolutionary nature of 
social orders as meaningful complex systems, was at the roots of the negativities 
generated and expressed towards modernity at the time.   
The sharp difference between alternative voices and faces manifested themselves at 
all levels from rival ontologies, to epistemologies, methodologies, ethics, aesthetics 
and philosophies of life, work and language with their associated affectivities and 
rituals, in short, in their alternative regimes of truth, worlds of signification, houses 
of being, fantasies, and their conceptions of time and permanence and 
impermanence, pleasures of the flesh and jouissance of the soul, finitude and 
infinitude, life and death, and all levels of Heideggerian fourfold. The demand and 
supply sides of the political economy of truth in this era were further explored but 
excluded from this work due to word limitations.  
In an attempt to theorize the encounter with the problematic of backwardness, the 
subsequent sections go through the four stages of state of confusion, formation of 
unstable coalitions, institutional failure with its deformities and dysfunctionalities, 
and the state of chaotic social order to elaborate how the state of inbetweenness in 
interaction with the state of belatedness shaped the concrete historical experiences of 
the rise and fall of the constitutional revolution.  
 
4.2. THE TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION 
This section addresses the forces involved in the creation of the state of belated 
inbetweenness and its subsequent confusion in the period covering the constitutional 
160 
 
revolution (the period between 1794 and 1925 when the Qajar dynasty ruled the 
country) in Iran.   
4.2.1. Map of Forces 
In this section, we explore the genealogy and archaeology of forces acting as 
historical a priori for the emergence of speech, action, emotion, images, and 
organizations of objects in this period.  
It seems that the following gesture or event more than anything else shows the 
multiple regimes of truth operating in this period. Mozaffar-al-Din Shah who signed 
the Constitutional (Mashroteh) Edict in 1906 a few days before his death, asked to 
be buried in Karbala (Shoukat, 2006: 54). Nasri (2007: 316) reports that before 
signing the edict the Shah asked his associates:  
“What is the purpose of constitutionalism?, the advocates of constitutionalism 
replied: ‘justice and science and progress and building the country’; he said: 
does it mean that Tehran becomes like London? They answered: yes; he said: 
what can be better than this. 
 
He was reported to have achieved one of his dreams by establishing majlis (the 
parliament) (see Martin, 2005, 2008, 2011). Alongside demonstrating enthusiasm for 
modernity with its constitutionalism and his desire to make Tehran like London, the 
Shah was the King of Persia, gaining his legitimacy from the institution of Persian 
monarchy with its structure of power/knowledge (and hence the representative of 
orthodox Persianism). This complex combination of affiliations to modernity and 
Persianism wills to be buried in Karbala (with its profound symbolic meaning for the 
Shia faith as the site of the martyrdom and burial of Imam Hossein) and asks for his 
corpse to be transferred to that place for burial. He does not ask for his corpse to be 
buried in Persepolis or in any other place next to the great kings of Persia or next to 
Ferdowsi’s (the great poet of Persian language) or any other figure of Persian poetry 
and literature.  
For him, modernity and Persianism lacked comparative advantage in the realm of 
freedom from the terror of death. In this period, modernity takes initiative in 
establishing its own agenda on how to organize the terrains of society and polity 
largely but not exclusively through the discursive and non-discursive practices 
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associated with constitutionalism and rule of law. At the time, this new layer was 
added to the deeply sedimented layers of Persianism, Greek philosophy and logic, 
and Islam already operating in the Iranian life-world. The spatiotemporality of life 
and being at work in this context is fascinating. The supply of and demand for truth 
are manifested in the interlink between three spaces of majlis, royal court and holy 
shrines with their corresponding meccas of Paris, Persepolis and Karbala, all 
embroiled in three layers of time, namely, linear short-time of modernity, mythical 
medium-time of Persianism (the mythical time of the origin of a people, the 
foundation myth) and the eternal time of the presence of God.  
These multiple forms of legitimacy were centred on people and their political 
representatives in Majlis and their intellectual voice in the intelligentsia, God and 
His intellectual voice in the clergy, and the Persian king and his house of wisdom in 
the institution of vizier and its court literati, and the institution of Persian language 
and its associated institution of Persian poetry. We see the interplay of Heideggerian 
fourfold (mortals, gods, sky and earth) at work here; the interplay of finitude and 
infinitude is manifested in three rationalities, namely, ‘instrumental rationality of 
progress’, ‘the communicative rationality of belonging to a shared communal life 
and history’, and ‘the emancipative rationality of liberation from terror of death’ and 
‘existential anxiety associated with finitude’.  
The symbolic importance of taking Mozaffar-al-Din Shah’s corpse to Karbala for 
burial should not be underestimated. This event puts death and the whole regime of 
truth surrounding it at the centre stage of Iranian life-world, and challenges the 
dominance of Persianism as the main constitutive facet of the notion of nation-state, 
as unified by the Persian King. Here the Persian King of the land, who is supposed to 
be the symbol of the integrity of the Persianized nation-state against its foreign 
others opts to be buried in the foreign Ottoman land of Iraq, which for him was his 
eternal home due to his scared affiliation to that place according to the standards of 
time of eternity. The divided selfhood of Mozaffar-al-Din Shah was typical of the 
state of the Iranian subject’s state of belated inbetweenness.  
The burial phenomenon was widespread in the 19
th
 century and an industry had 
developed around the cumbersome and near-impossible task of transfer of corpuses 
to Atabat (Shia holy cities in Ottoman Iraq) (see, Ates, 2011) or to the city of 
Mashhad inside Iran. Here we see how a demand and supply side was formed around 
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a preference for burial in holy places in the hope of gaining favours in the hereafter. 
This preference for the Islamic regime of truth was translated in the widespread role 
of the clergy in the constitutional movement. This whole complex structure of 
preferences was reflected in the set of demands made in the period of taking basts 
(sit-ins), ranging from cheaper bread and meat, to governance issues related to the 
governors of Tehran and Kerman and to the demand for House of Justice, ultimately 
leading to the demand for constitutionalism (mashroti’yat), or Islamic or Sharia-
based constitutionalism (Mashroteh-ye Mashroeh) (see Arjomand 1988, Azimi 2008, 
Katouzian, 2010).  
We can see that the Willimason’s (2000) four levels of ‘prices’, ‘governance’, 
‘institution’, and ‘mind’ are conditioned and mediated by the Iranian particular state 
of belated inbetweenness and its warring regimes of truth. The regime of truth shapes 
the likes and dislikes, attraction and repugnance (Roth, 2007), which in turn shape 
the price mechanism and its associated allocation of resources, governance structures 
in firms and other hierarchies, and institutions. Here Shoukat (2006) and many 
others do not identify the great significance of the fact that the King of the Persian 
realm expressed the will for his corpse (he has become the vessel of this will through 
the Islamic regime of truth where death is the main issue of life) to be taken to the 
realm of the Ottoman enemy to be buried (entirely at odds with the logic of modern 
nation-state). In a modern analogy, it is like American president asking to be buried 
in Russia or Mexico.  
With the logic of modern nation-state, which the king advocated in his endorsement 
of the constitution, Karbala is part of alien land while by applying the logic of Shia 
Islam it is part of the spiritual homeland. This fact shows the complex nature of the 
King’s selfhood and his subjectivity as his core resided in the other (as a Persian 
King the core of his selfhood is supposed to be formed by Persianism, while what 
were equally involved in the core were the forces of Shia Islam and modernity) and 
how death organizes life and how this act of the King in transferring his corpse to 
Karbala sends signals to the rest of population on what is desirable and what is 
repugnant (for the signifying effect of actions and organizations of objects, see the 
methodology chapter).  
This is a remarkable fact, which shows how a new reading can highlight the 
importance of the facts other theories opted to ignore. The death industry, the corpse-
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carrying industry, was the manifestation of the intense affiliation of the Iranian 
dasein with the regime of truth of Islam and its promise of eternal happiness 
alongside its warning of eternal damnation. The figure of the king and his selfhood 
and his corpse was the site of forces of modernity, Persianism, and Islam. The king 
was the passive agent of the historical forces operating on the body and soul of the 
Iranian dasein. This act of a Persian king, and its associated death industry, emanates 
from the deep embeddedness and sedimented background of a people and reinforces 
it.  
Mozaffar-al-Din Shah’s subjectivity, hence, was the canvas upon which conflicting 
forces of Islam, modernity and Persianism were hard at work. While his subjectivity 
was the product of these conflicting forces, at the same time it was sending 
conflicting signals to his own people on the regimes of truth of monarchy, 
constitutionalism, and Islam. His ‘unconscious’ was part of the social unconscious, 
and his consciousness was only the pinnacle of the unconscious forces in Iranian 
worldhood and tip of the social iceberg of Iranian world of signification. It is worth 
looking at politicians as the entrepreneurs who supply what is demanded by their 
people and the map of his subjectivity indicates the conflicting signals sent by the 
sum of forces in the Iranian being-in-the-world on the kind of politician and monarch 
they were demanding. The life and death of Mozaffar-al-Din Shah is a mirror 
through which we can read the demand for multiple regimes of truth in the people of 
Iran and their state of belated inbetweenness and its associated states of dissonance 
and confusion.  
Another highly interesting example (see Hairi, 1988) through which the topology of 
forces in the constitutional era can be mapped was extensively explored but excluded 
from this work due to word limitations. 
In this era, the encounter with a fully-formed package of truth, modernity, changed 
the dynamics of Iranian life irreversibly and created a unique and unprecedented 
problem for the Iranian dasein. This problem emerged in the form of the sudden 
availability of a seemingly easy option of conversion to the new regime of truth 
while the society had not developed the capacity, the tacit consensus, and the 
stomach to digest the new way of life, its discursive and non-discursive practices, its 
relations of power, and its techniques of subjectivity.  
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Keddie (1962: 272-3, added emphasis) refers to this fact without exploring the full 
implications of it in creating the tragedy of confusion in the Iranian social order:  
 
The comparison also raises another question often asked by students of modern 
Asian religious thought. Why did not Asian religions develop a theologically 
consistent “Protestantism" in the modern period? … many thinkers who were 
early concerned with religious reform, abandoned inward concern with 
religion as such, and passed over to more modern Western free thought. Also, 
the pressing nature of political problems, which involved questions of national 
survival or revival not faced so acutely by the sixteenth century West, turned 
the attention of thinkers from religion to politics, so that even apparently 
religious writings were often directed to political and nationalist goals.  
 
This rather lucid observation demonstrates that being thrown in the state of 
belatedness creates the sense of urgency and impatience, which prevents the patient 
and painstaking step-by-step work of theorization and philosophization of new ways 
of seeing, thinking, feeling and living to be developed and secondly the existence of 
the ready-made packages of truth apparently made the task of adopting and 
recreating modernity easy. In other words, the West was pioneer and had time to 
develop itself gradually and without any pressure from outside in a spirit of blind 
watchmaking, while the belated countries found themselves under pressure to 
achieve social transformation as quickly as possible; otherwise their mere survival 
was at stake and they would literally go extinct (as the American Indians and many 
other indigenous people experienced such brutal fate). That is where the 
dysfunctional conversion to modernity frequently happened and still happening at 
different levels and degrees.  
Taqizadeh’s messianic mission for modernizing Iran (see Katouzian, 2012) through 
reverse social engineering was a clear example of this phenomenon, where he called 
for the change in every aspect of Iranian life from surface to depth, from top to toe, 
from politics to education, legal system, gender relations, dress code, shaving habits, 
and almost everything else (except ironically for language and religion, which were 
the reservoirs of the other two regimes of truth, Persianism and Islam) in an attempt 
to create modern ‘imagined nation-state’.  
Despite such ardent cases of radicalism Iranian people immersed in the state of 
belated inbetweeness like Mozaffar-aldin Shah, could not sustain their position of 
being in truth limbo and would easily cross the borders between alternative regimes 
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of truth, culminating in a state of being one day a religious reformer and the next day 
a free thinker, as Keddie (1962: 287; added emphasis) attests:  
Consideration of the personal opinions of Malkam, Ruhi, Kermani, and 
possibly Afghani indicates that intellectual development in modern Iran was 
not marked by a gradual change over generations from old ideas to new ones. 
Rather, more and more intellectuals have been exposed to Western ideas, and 
these ideas have tended to change their outlook radically from that of their 
traditional upbringing. As one elderly Iranian who himself experienced this 
change described it to me, the modern and scientific ideas of the West 
penetrated "like a flash of light", overthrowing the earlier ideas held by him 
and his associates. Such a process can be documented in the writings of 
Kasravi, who began as a religious conservative and became an iconoclastic and 
anti-clerical nationalist. 
  
Here we see the lack of mediating effects of “vanishing mediators” (Jameson, 1988: 
25) which are crucial for the development of sense of ownership towards the new 
order, which gradually emerges through an evolutionary process of blind 
watchmaking and chaotic synchronization. The encounter with a fully-developed 
package of truth in the state of belatedness in intersection with the state of 
inbetweenness (where all three regimes had serious truth claims and all three were 
tainted with their dark sides, Islam with religious despotism, modernity with 
occidental despotism and Persianism with oriental despotism, and as such none 
could lay exclusive claim to new truth about the state of backwardness 
unequivocally) resides at the roots of the impotence of all sides to offer deep and 
relevant forms of new truth which could grasp people’s imagination and create a 
theoretically and philosophically sustained support and rationalization for the supply 
of social reform.  
Ajodani’s (2002: 115-7) criticism of Ashouri’s (2005) claim that the intellectuals 
failed to grasp modernity in its totality addresses how a set of contingent situations 
(in terms of the urgency of the situation of backwardness and encounter with dark 
and bright faces of modernity; for two faces of modernity see Hairi, 1987; Rajaee, 
2006, 2007) forced the Iranian intellectuals to embark on the act of reverse social 
engineering in introducing this or that aspect of modernity as the panacea for the ills 
of their society. In reflecting on this, Ajodani (2002) describes the impossible 
situations the intellectuals were facing in the following terms:  
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as a result the intellectuals, on one hand, were pro-modernity and supportive of 
novelty with the acceptance of Western culture and on the other hand, in 
opposition to colonialism they were in search of reviving the exaggerated 
achievements of the ancient past [what Ajodani calls the nationalist and 
religious passions], which were not in tune with the new realities the society 
was facing with.   
 
Ajodani takes the anti-colonialist sentiments as given and does not ask why the 
intellectuals had to be anti-colonialist and could not deploy pro-colonialist position 
as leverage (as potential saviours and liberators) in order to change their backward 
society irreversibly. We need to note that Akhondzadeh did not take such an anti-
colonial approach against the Russian imperialism and was working in their 
administration (see, Cole, 1995). In fact, Katouzian (2010) reports how the presence 
of the embassies of Western powers restricted the absolute power of the Qajar king 
in the act of arbitrarily killing of people occupying high offices who had fallen out of 
king’s favour.  
Ajodani (2002) takes it as given that the intellectuals were bound to fight the 
Western colonialism. What forced them to fight the foreign powers were the other 
two regimes of truth, Persianism with its narrative of the glorious past and its Persian 
language and poetry and Islam with its demonstrative abhorrence for the power of 
infidels over a Muslim society alongside traces of modernity itself where it calls for 
the right to self-determination and freedom from external oppression.  
In critically reflecting on this debate, it seems that what Ajodani and Ashuri both 
failed to grasp is the fact that the Iranian society did not have the chance of 
experience of vanishing mediators and had not endogenously travelled the path and 
owned modernity through the process of multiple realizability. Adoption of new 
truth always happens inside the old truth and through gradual adaptations of the old 
truth to the attractions of the new truth (see Abadian, 2009a, 2009b); this is evident 
in the experience of theorists and reformists like Luther, Locke or scientists like 
Newton who were deeply religious and tried to develop new way of living, engaging 
in market economy, doing science, or advancing liberal philosophy in tandem with 
religion. Nuovo (2011) elaborates on how Locke was attempting to construct a 
coherent theory out of resources of Christianity, Antiquity, and Enlightenment. The 
final outcome of such a process may have turned out to be deeply anti-religion in the 
Western context, but in the process of mediation and transition the process was 
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deeply and passionately religious in almost all realms of life from economy to 
science, liberal and feminist philosophies, and ways of life (on Newton’s religiosity 
and its relation to his science see Christianson, 1995, 2005).  
As such, due to the encounter with the ready-made package of modernity, Iranian 
intellectuals could suddenly and without going through the process of mediation 
convert into modernity and lose their faith of Persianism and Islam. It was the sign 
of their deep rootedness that they could not fully disembed themselves from their 
historical background, where they were forced to revive elements of Persianism and 
Islam to fight the perceived dark sides of Western colonialism and to generate a 
sense of national unity required for adoption of modernity. The state of belatedness 
had invested a pragmatic orientation on the intellectuals, which would prevent them 
from taking a consistent theoretical position, as they needed to save the dying patient 
called Iran. The state of belatedness has inevitably given rise to waves of socio-
political messianism (see Amanat, 2009b; Amanat and Bernhardsson, 2002). As such 
they would try any permutations of solutions including going into fleeting and 
unstable coalition with Islam as well as Persianism (Persian king and the wisdom of 
Persian literature) to save the nation from annihilation.  
The Westerners like Locke, Newton or Luther did not have the pragmatic concerns 
of saving their homeland from the threat of annihilation under the constant threat of 
an external civilization (see Easterly, 2007a, 2007b on a similar point with regard to 
development). The experience of change within the pioneer context was from within 
and inside-out while for the belated context it was from without and outside-in. 
These pragmatic concerns along the fact of state of inbetweenness would not give 
the theorists and reformists time and space to develop their consistent form of 
modernity and to be insistent on it until they could convert majority of the 
population to their new truth. Ironically, Ajodani (2002: 125) issues the verdict that 
these pragmatic considerations were unwarranted and useless, while he 
acknowledged their necessity a few pages back. 
Ultimately what is at stake here is the nature of social phenomena and its three 
dimensions of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability, and how they are 
related to the theory of selection from alternative regimes of truth. The 
methodological arguments of this work have demonstrated that social phenomenon 
are almost always embedded, emergent and incommensurable and as such the 
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Iranian society could not digest the role of woman and sexuality, for example, in 
modernity without going through the gradual change in the meaning of woman and 
sexuality happened in the West. The impasses reported in Ajodani (2003: 219), 
where he essentializes the inability of Iranians of all sides to produce viable and 
potent theoretical and philosophical thoughts, was a contingent phenomenon and 
product of the intersection between the state of belatedness (the call for immediate 
change) and inbetweenness (the need for gradual change involving philosophical 
engagement with all three regimes of truth with their white and black books and their 
orthodox and non-orthodox branches and their associated politics of piety and 
politics of ordinary).  
Ajodani (2003: 219-220; 225)  looks for the freedom of expression as the 
precondition for the development of new forms of truth, while the freedom is the 
outcome and not the precondition for or the engine of the emergence of new truth. 
The outcome (freedom), in a Cartesian move, is conceived as the condition of 
possibility of its own condition of possibility (modernity). The potency, novelty, 
richness, and relevance of new truth can flourish and go viral in short period of time 
even and especially in the worst kind of oppressive and dark environment. The easy 
conversion to the fully-packaged new truth for the sake of saving Iran from total 
annihilation alongside its being tainted with its own black book and lack of vision on 
the state of inbetweenness was at the heart of impasse in the production and 
circulation of vibrant and potent new truth and not lack of freedom or any of the 
oppressive attempts by authorities in the royal court, the religious establishment or 
the colonial force. No finite force is so omnipotent and omniscient to prevent the 
new truth from emerging. Any finite system is defined by its limitations and by its 
cracks and gaps (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 504). Thus, the intelligent design 
approach inherent to the state of belatedness takes society as an object for reverse 
social engineering rather than ensuring active or passive participation of all 
stakeholders in achieving sustainable and stable forms of social transformation, 
where people could enact the new ways of life in their everyday ways of interaction 
in all levels of social interactions.  
The logic of reverse social engineering, whose adoption was inevitable to the context 
of belatedness, was so obvious and so self-evident that almost nobody consistently 
questioned its validity in transforming societies and social orders. This is evident in 
the frequent logic of social actors like Akhundzadeh, (see for example Ajodani 2003: 
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232), where he says that ‘doing this depends on that’ and ‘doing that also depends on 
something more fundamental’. This is the logic of causation which is possibly good 
for building a mechanical bridge, but ignores the logic of complexity science and 
world of signification, and the necessity of willing and thoughtful participation of all 
stakeholders in the act of social transformation and the necessity of dialogue and 
mutual understanding and not acting based on their own best isolated judgement (for 
the role of persuasion and willing participation in the success of social movements 
see Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).  
In the case of belated inbetweenness, even willing participation, as indicated by 
Taqizedeh (Ansari, 2012: 64-5, 95), is not enough as people can commit themselves 
to a particular project of reverse social engineering in a moment of excessive 
exuberance but soon become regretful of their choices due to the gap between meta-
preference and preference levels and its associated time-inconsistency, and 
consequently change side and actively or passively participate in the process of 
reversing the social changes. The history of Iran is fraught with cases where elites of 
different projects of social engineering complain about people’s spinelessness and 
their chameleon-like behaviour and their wax-like identity (which we address later in 
this chapter). To sustain change, a tacit agreement needs to emerge incorporating all 
regimes of truth and their negating and affirmative dimensions. What is important is 
not a particular solution or blueprint but the process of adaptations involving 
vanishing mediators and leading to affectively deep sense of association, belonging, 
and ownership. 
The approach which tries to use freedom as engine of change applies the 
hermeneutics of suspicion and totally ignores- it is foreclosed to it- to see the society 
as a world of meaning and the need for the hermeneutics of understanding. There 
was little or no attempt to understand how different social assemblages and faces- 
individuals, groups, organizations, institutions and societies- understood the world 
around them.  
The curious feature of the encounter with modernity as a fully-developed package 
created the state of belatedness which robbed Iranians from the opportunity of fully 
participating in its development and as such they could not cultivate the sense of 
affective ownership towards it. And secondly, as Ashouri (2005) stated, when Islam 
came to Iran (in contrast with the arrival of modernity) Iranian were not thrown out 
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of their background of attachment to the sacred, but the scared was reaffirmed in 
new guise and in new set of vocabularies, discourses and rituals (see also 
Mohammadi Malayeri, 1996-2003), while the fully-developed modernity (in contrast 
with its developing stage which was intensely religious and deeply engaged with the 
sacred) was fiercely advocating locating human life and society in the profane and 
denying and negating the sacred.  
As such Iranians have not found opportunity- due to no faults of their own or any 
other forces, voices or faces- to separate modernity from the West the way they had 
managed to separate Islam from the Arabs, and in the process fully owning one 
(Islam or modernity) while repelling the other (the Arabs or the West). These two 
curious sets of conditions in the condition of situation (being exposed to modern 
colonialism in the form of being sandwiched between world powers in the Great 
Game and facing modernity as a fully-developed package alongside its negation of 
the sacred) made the task of a successful encounter with the Western modernity and 
its double face immensely more complex compared to all other episodes of 
encounter with foreign invasion in the Iranian history.  
As such, Iranians who were not happy with their inherited regimes of truth in Islam 
(jurisprudence, mysticism or Islamic philosophy) or Persianism (Persian monarchy 
or Persian poetry) could easily migrate to the fully-developed packages of Western 
modernity in its two broad versions of liberalism and socialism (Keddie refers to this 
implicitly). They would not need to go through the agony and ecstasy of the process 
of conception, gestation, birth and development of the new truth out of and in 
dialogue with the old truth in an evolutionary process of blind watchmaking and 
chaotic synchronization. The urgency of the state of belatedness alongside the ready-
made nature of the packages of new truth and its perceived dark sides of colonialism 
and being excessively materialist and excessively anti-religion acts as condition of 
impossibility of “reinventing the wheel” (reinventing modernity), while this was 
exactly what was needed (for the issue of multiple modernities, see: Gaonkar, 2001).     
4.2.2. Map of Voices 
In this section we elaborate only on one specimen of voices and leave out other 
significant voices due to word limitations. The dominant strand of voices 
(manifested in figures like Akhundzadeh or Taqizadeh, among others) which set the 
agenda for social change in this period was the project of modernizing Iran by 
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locating the oriental despotism (in the figure of Qajar monarch and the institution of 
monarchy) as the main cause of Iranian backwardness and the main breeding ground 
for the intrusions of occidental despotism while at the same time would attack 
elements of the religious despotism. This voice favoured total conversion into 
modernity except for support for a reformed version of Persian language. On the 
negating side, the main enemy of this strand was monarchy (orthodox Persianism) 
while attacking occidental despotism (Russian imperialism and British colonialism, 
itself a form of democratic despotism; for the notion of ‘democratic despotism’ see 
de Tocqueville, 2004: 810-22) and religious despotism when and where they were 
deemed as obstacles to modernization.  
On the affirmative side, this strand relied on the bright side of the Western 
modernity, especially on the idea of the constitutional government (belonging to the 
orthodox branch of modernity) and rule of law in order to create a hybrid institution 
of limited and constitutional monarchy, blending orthodox Persianism (monarchy) 
with orthodox modernity (liberal democracy). This was an uneasy hybrid and highly 
volatile synthesis as the spectre of republicanism was lurking over monarchy and the 
spectre of monarchic absolutism was lurking over constitutionalism, which made the 
relationship fraught with mutual suspicion and distrust (see Algar 1980: 253, note 61 
and Rahim Khani, 2004).  Adamiyat (1978: 178) reports how Mirza Agha Khan 
Kermani perceived the message of Mazdak (the heretic prophet of justice and 
equality in the pre-Islamic Sasanian era; see Davaran, 2010: 89-93) to be the 
abolition of monarchy and establishment of a republic.  
Abrahamian (1979: 406) maintains that in the event of taking refuge in the British 
Legation in Tehran, “According to another eyewitness, some of the students from the 
Dar al-Funun spoke even on the advantages of the republican form of government”. 
The spectre of republicanism was lurking under the skin of official discourses and 
was frequently used as a label to attack the constitutionalists, until it found written 
representation in an article written by Dehkhoda in exile after the events of ‘Minor 
Despotism’ (Ajodani, 2003) and establishment of small republic enclaves in two 
provincial cities of Mahabad and Rasht (see Afary, 1995), and finally became a 
formal voice and a political position in 1924 in Reza Khan who wanted to turn Iran 
into a republic like Ataturk’s Turkey (see Rahim Khani 2004; Ettehadieh 2004). 
Republicanism, in the process, also gained the connotations of and was associated 
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with separatism and irreligious or anti-religion tendencies. We see here how free 
association works at the heart of history. 
More importantly Persian monarchy and orthodox modernity belonged to two 
different regimes of truth with their associated discursive and non-discursive 
practices, and emotional economies. They possessed distinct and contrasting 
negating dimensions of repression, disavowal and foreclosure. Through achieving 
reform in the realm of polity by establishing national assembly (Majlis), the 
modernists intended to use it as a factory to produce reform in all other realms of life 
from education, to gender relation, language, legal system, realm of national security 
(establishing modern army, police), economy (tax system and costumes, reform in 
the system of land ownership, foreign investment), religion, and arts and sciences. In 
reforming the realms of economy they embraced element of non-orthodox modernity 
(socialism), especially in the realm of land distribution and social justice. In order to 
instigate a sense of unified modern community in Iranian people and to construct a 
modern nation-state, the sense of nationhood was attempted to be fashioned based on 
the non-orthodox form of  Persianism (Persian language and mythology, and Persian 
literature and poetry) and even some positive dimension of orthodox Persianism (in 
the idea of great monarch such as Cyrus the Great and Anoushirvan the Just by 
pressing on the positive components of ideal model of kingship in preserving justice 
and ethical and non-discriminatory relations and the idea of a gentle and caring 
father-figure king) in order to repel the colonialist dimension of the Western 
modernity and the centrifugal forces of tribalism and promote the sense of 
nationhood.  
In effect this voice was a product of the operations of addition and subtraction on 
three regimes of truth of modernity, Islam and Persianism, all packaged under the 
trade mark of constitutionalism. A combination of a forward-looking will to progress 
with a backward-looking will to a glorious Persian civilization was activated to 
construct a sense of modern nationhood.  To restrict what was deemed to be the 
divisive and discriminatory nature of religious affiliation, this voice favoured the 
separation of religion from politics in the constitution (see Abadian, 2006).  
The rhizomatic and combinatory nature of voices can be clearly seen in the attempt 
to construct a new house of being under the umbrella of modern nation-state. In the 
dual nature of nation-state (nation and state), the package for constructing a modern 
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state was taken from orthodox modernity (constitutionalism) combined with 
elements of non-orthodox modernity (just distribution of resources including land 
and other resources) while the component related to constructing a sense of 
nationhood was offered to be achieved through highlighting the non-orthodox 
Persianism and some selective components of positive dimension of orthodox 
Persianism, as they attempted to retain the idea of the king as a unifying and 
centripetal force (especially against the centrifugal force of tribalism). One example 
of this radical modernist voice was Akhundzadeh. As Kia (1995: 439-40) observes:  
According to Akhundzade, Islam perpetuated inequality between man and 
woman, supported slavery, and opposed the right of the individual to think and 
express himself freely. In a critique written on Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar 
od-Dowle's treatise, Yek Kalameh, (One Word), Akhundzadeh attacked the 
author for arguing that Islam was compatible with the European ideas of 
progress, freedom, and constitutionalism. He reminded Mostashar od-Dowle 
that Islamic law not only stood for inequality between men and women but it 
also imposed veils on women and supported the institution of 'Harem', where 
young men were brutally deprived of their manhood and turned into eunuchs. 
Moreover, Islamic law falsely and foolishly condemned sexual intercourse 
between an unmarried man and woman as adultery. Akhundzadeh argued that 
there was nothing wrong with a relationship of free love between two rational 
individuals and that Islamic law had no right to prescribe rules and 
commandments for thinking adults.  
 
Here we see the issue of sexuality and gender relations at the heart of 
Akhundzadeh’s anti-Islamic discourse. Akhondzadeh was, naturally and inherent to 
the state of belatedness, practicing the act of reverse social engineering and was 
trying to introduce all elements of the European package of modernity into the 
Iranian context.  The issue of sexuality, gender relation and the role of women in the 
Western societies were frequently addressed in negative or positive connotations in 
the travelogues of Iranians at that age (see Tavakoli-Targhi, 1994, 2001: 65; 
Ajodani, 2006: 17; Najmabadi, 2005; Nasri, 2007).  
These radical modernisers’ logic was simple: ‘these Europeans are practicing free 
love and they have a progressive society and they are sane and rational people and 
they are the masters of the world why we should not follow suit’. Thus, sexuality 
alongside republicanism, atheism, materialism, and infidelity are amongst the themes 
lurking in the air at the time and used to emerge occasionally either as an insult or as 
favourable positions but never fully acknowledged or adequately theorized in the 
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official discourse on constitutionalism (largely due to the result- and outcome-
oriented nature and activism of all sides, itself due to the state of belatedness), but 
resurfaces as zombies to haunt all sides throughout Iranian history.  
Akhundzadeh ignores the fact that each of these subjects required adequate level of 
theorization and dialogue to rationalize the new position with regard to the 
Heideggerian fourfold, the different conceptions of good and decent life, and the 
issue of permanence and impermanence and its relation to the pleasures of the body 
and jouissance of the soul. Here once again Akhundzadeh, as a radical believer in 
modernity and in good faith, embarked on the act of reverse engineering and the 
outside-in model of social transformation based on the model of Western modernity. 
Akhundzadeh, as Kia (1995: 440-1) reports, expresses his materialist and atheist 
position as well:  
Akhundzade contended that the universe constituted a 'uniform', 'harmonious', 
self-perpetuating, self-regulating 'cosmic machine', which worked according to 
rational laws and principles. In other words, the existence of the world was not 
dependent on the presence of a supreme being, an external force, or even a 
primary cause. The universe was made out of matter and functioned according 
to its own laws.  
 
This position was not owned or actively promoted by many secular and liberal 
constitutionalists at the time and was repressed or disavowed or actively forgotten in 
order to maximize the support for the constitutionalist cause (as the state of 
belatedness had turned all social actors into activists). These components were 
amongst the positions, which fuelled the liberal intelligentsia but never fully 
theorized or even owned by them.  
Akhundzadeh was also feverishly looking to change the language and its alphabet 
and calligraphy and put great deal of efforts to develop new alphabet and tried to 
make it implemented in practice. As Ajodani (2003: 220) reports he believed that:  
the railroad is urgently needed but the change in alphabet is more urgent, the 
telegraph is urgently needed but the change in alphabet is more urgent.  
 
For educating the whole population they needed to modernize the language as well 
as the religion through the act of intelligent design. We can summarize this 
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voice/strategy in the following formula (based on the operations of addition and 
subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth) manifest in the affirmative and 
negating dimension of this voice:  
orthodox modernity (constitutionalism) + elements of non-orthodox modernity 
(land reform) + non-orthodox Persianism (Persian language, mythology, and 
great Persian poet Ferdowsi) + elements of positive orthodox Persianism 
(invoking the examples of ideals of Persian kings) - official language and 
poetry (reform in language and democratization of its use) - oriental despotism 
(absolutist monarchy = negative side of orthodox Persionism) - occidental 
despotism (colonialism = the negative side of the Western modernity) – 
religious despotism (the negative side of Islam and support for separation of 
religion and politics) – centrifugal nature of tribalism (tribalism represented 
the threat of the despotism of anarchy and the Hobbesian state of the war of all 
against all which justified and created excuses for the emergence of the 
absolutist monarchy in the first place as the Iranian leviathan to create peace 
and order) – negative dimensions of modernity in modern excesses in social 
vices (opposition to semi-modernism and the discourse of good freedom versus 
bad freedom; this element was mixed with great deal of ambiguities and 
silences).  
 
As we see this voice is a hybrid assemblage dominated by modernity but at the same 
time constituted of a set of additions and subtractions emanating from the three 
regimes of truth, their internal divisions and their perceived dark and bright sides. Its 
main project was modernization with three subprojects of modernized modernization 
(reform inside modernity or ‘with modernity against modernity’, critique within 
modernity), modernized Islamization, and modernized Persianization. Keddie (1962: 
288) enlists a specimen of such a set of additions and subtractions (ensemble of 
plusses and minuses): “rejection of Islam, anti-clericalism, agnosticism, Westernism, 
anti-imperialism, glorification of the pre-Islamic past, and hatred of modem Iranian 
actuality”. 
The continuum of voices (voices with predominantly Islamic orientation, voices with 
predominantly Persianist orientations and voices with predominantly modernist 
orientations
37
 with their associated “difference within” and “difference between”) 
could turn to each other by the operation of addition and subtraction, affirmation and 
negation in the topological space of political economy of truth. The voices are the 
product of an operation of giving precedence to something over something else, or 
what is dubbed as preference ordering. What is prioritized over what determines the 
                                                          
37
 The details of these voices were not included in this thesis due to the constraint of word limitations. 
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character of the voice (its preferences and meta-preferences, in the sense of what we 
want and desire alongside what we want to want and desire to desire, plus what we 
do not want and desire, and what we do not want and desire to want and desire) (see 
Sen 1982 and Grofman and Uhlaner, 1985 for the concept of meta-preference). Thus, 
what ultimately define the truth affiliation of voices and faces are not their desires or 
behaviours but what they desire to desire and what they do not desire to desire 
(meta-preference level).  
As such voices and faces, based on their meta-preference (Sen, 1982: 101-2), may 
rebel against themselves and condemn their own un-Islamic, un-modern, or un-
Persianist behaviours and desires, and as such suddenly and unexpectedly (butterfly 
effect) turn against their own normal self and convert from pragmatism to radicalism 
or the other way round within and between regimes of truth (the phenomenon of self-
control is one of the manifestation of the meta-preference; see the literature on the 
economics of self-control, Cameron (2002; 2009), with its application to obesity and 
other forms of addictions). That is why in the state of belated inbetweenness the 
revealed preferences of people in particular period or small window of time is not a 
good guide for predicting what they would do in the future, as the butter-fly effect in 
the state of belated inbetweenness may suddenly shift them towards alternative life 
path. Societies with homogenous or heterogeneous regimes of truth do not encounter 
such a problem compared to troubled societies like Iran. The method of free 
association can uncover the level of meta-preference hidden in behaviour and 
expression of desire (see Methodology Chapter), saving the researcher from falling 
into the trap of judging social assemblages solely based on their behaviours or 
preferences.  
4.2.3. Tragedy of Confusion 
This section addresses how the above-mentioned multiplicity of voices and their 
associated cultural tribes created a state of confusion through the immense heaviness 
of the burden of judgement. Rather than engaging in the art of mutual understanding, 
almost all sides were involved in the art of demonization of the radical other and 
glorification of self. Of course, it cannot be expected of them to have striven to 
understand each other as they were all immersed in the battle of truth against falsity 
and good against evil based on their own regime of truth. The clear example is 
Akhundzadeh and his sincere, honest, and passionate belief in the necessity of 
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applying the European model of critique to the Iranian context and its inhabitant 
forces, voices, and faces. The same applies to Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri who inhabited 
the opposite pole of the spectrum of voices. Thus, all sides embarked on the cultural 
war of attrition leading to mutual de-legitimization which eroded the energy and 
enthusiasm for the social transformation and led to the eventual collapse of the 
whole project of constitutional modernization.  
Almost all sides were plagued by the malaise of misunderstanding, involving 
practicing transference and counter-transference on each other, applying 
hermeneutics of suspicion to the other and hermeneutics of understanding to the self, 
and committing the cardinal sin of intentional fallacy. All sides were engaged on 
practicing “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 150) against each other. For example, 
Akhunzadeh, as Kia (1995: 440) reports, commits the intentional fallacy:  
The ulema wished to keep the people ignorant and superstitious, so that they 
could preserve their privileged status as the intellectual and religious leaders 
of the society.  
 
Akhundzadeh forgets his own inevitable immersion in different form of power 
relation, which is attacked, applying the same perverse logic, by Cole (1996), as the 
traitor and servant of Russian empire. Furthermore, he gives the total agency and 
dominance to the supply side and views the demand-side of the market for truth with 
total passivity and receptiveness. He does not address the question why people do 
not rebel against the clergy and exit Islam in mass. Akhundzadeh does not ask 
himself why people converted irreversibly to modern medicine away from the 
traditional medicine and not irreversibly to modernity away from Islam or 
Persianism. Foran (1991: 810) attributes the position of Nuri “largely” to jealousy 
towards his fellow clerics such as Behbehani and Tabataba’i while accepting the 
involvement of ideological reasons as well:  
Nuri himself seems to have been motivated largely out of jealousy for "the 
two sayyids," to whom he considered himself superior in learning. The 
defense of Islam endangered by "reprehensible innovation" (the following of 
Western constitutional ideas) provided an ideological motivation as well.  
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In another example, Ajodani (3003: 233-4) “understands” the logic behind Moshri-
al-Douleh, the reformist prime minister of Nasir-al-Din Shah, who was involved in 
granting the Reutter concession which was deemed to be detrimental to Iran’s 
national interests (he says Moshir-al-Douleh did it to preserve the independence of 
Iran), but does not try to play devil’s advocate with regard to two mojtahids who 
excommunicated Moshir-al-Douleh and paved the way for his resignation. In yet 
another example of misunderstanding which extends to both the historians and the 
historical actors, Foran (1991: 812) called Mohammad Ali Shah “reactionary” 
without any attempt to understand him in his own dictionary, and its associated 
denotations and connotations, while Nuri make almost no attempt to understand his 
opponents in their own terms and calls them, as Foran (1991: 811) reports, “infidels, 
atheists, and Babi”.  
In almost all of these cases, almost all sides, whether historians or historical actors, 
operate within the binary opposition of good and evil (while their conceptions of 
good and evil are different their dichotomous framework is the same) and each side 
takes the absolute truth of his own side as given and judges the opposition based on 
his own gold standards, frequently applying the hermeneutics of understanding to the 
self and hermeneutics of suspicion to the radical other (as Kogler (1996) reminded 
us). Katouzian (2003: 6-7) demonstrates a glimpse of the hermeneutics of 
understanding in offering a proto-defence of Atabak (Amin-al-Soltan) when he says 
that Atabak, like many other officials at the time, was not a clean man, especially 
when the corruption did not have the same meaning as it had after the Mashroteh 
period but he was an efficient bureaucrat, or when he offers a proto-defence of 
Behbehani and his acceptance of money (similar to campaign money received by 
Western politicians and political parties in elections), when he states that whoever 
had not accepted money at the time would have been a saint like Seyyed Mohammad 
Tabataba’i. He brings the notion of meaning and its difference in different 
dictionaries into analysis, which this study intends to apply more systematically as 
part of a hybrid methodology  combining the ‘hermeneutics of understanding’ with 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and blending the three principles of ‘causation, 
complexity science and world of signification’ inside three notions of 
‘embeddedness’, ‘incommensurability’ and ‘emergence’.   
The widespread presence of transference and counter-transference in the Iranian 
social order, which is due to the intersection between the state of inbetweenness and 
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the state of belatedness, is attested by Katouzian’s (2010) observation on the state of 
Iranian historiography being entrapped in ideological intolerance alongside Frye’s 
(2005: xiii) reversal of the famous statement regarding historiography: “to know the 
past one must also study the present”, or Croce’s ‘all history is contemporary’, which 
indicates counter-transference, as historians frequently project the categories, power 
relations, and the emotional economy of their time on the past events and figures 
(anachronism).  
The current state of affairs and the hatred for the dominant cultural tribe overwhelms 
and overshadows the reading of history. The state of confusion rules the history as 
well as its historiography. This practice may be unproblematic when the society ends 
up with a settled dominant regime of truth, but it is totally unsuited for the state of 
inbetweenness where almost all subjects are confused between alternative warring 
regimes of truth. This kind of historiography takes the cultural war of attrition to the 
level of historiography as well as history itself.  
In the state of inbetweenness, there is no shared and common benchmark and that is 
why the art of critique is impossible (for the notion of critique and social critique in 
the works of Akhundzadeh and other Mashroteh intellectuals see Parsinejad, 2003: 
87 and Vahdat, 2002: 43). In such a state, critique is turned into imposing one’s own 
grid of intelligibility on the radical other. In such a state there is no universal or 
consensual tribunal to judge right from wrong, good from evil or beautiful from 
ugly. In the language of Wittgenstein the meaning reside in use and not in Russell’s 
basic fundamental logical forms (Friedlander, 2001: 111). As Wittgenstein’s theory 
implies, these different people were involved in different ‘life forms’ or ‘language 
games’ and as such what is right in one language game may be wrong in another. We 
cannot understand the meaning of cat, dog, cow, man, woman, mankind, justice, 
freedom, life, death and every other signifier in a disembedded and universalist 
fashion, we have to understand them inside historically evolved and formed 
contingent but holistic life forms and language games (see also Kundra, 1999 on 
different connotations of words like cemetery or demonstration for different 
characters in his story). They are, as Foucault (see Flynn, 2005) maintains, particular 
product of the movement of real in its particular topological, typological and 
axiomatic movements.  
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In other words, meaning is produced through associations and our historical actors 
‘free associate’ differently (form different chains of signifiers) and the job of the 
analyst is to make sense of these contingent and situated associations and their 
denotations and connotations in the context of their world of signification in relation 
to the context of situation and in the structure of power/knowledge they reside and 
the strategy-narrative they operate. The meanings of the signifiers are formed in the 
historical evolution of language communities and their particular life forms and their 
language games. As such, the meaning of “the” shit (meaning the best) in the 
language community of drug addicts (see Peckham, 2012: 223) should be understood 
from insider point of view. In the state of belated inbetweenness the society and 
almost all of its different forms of social assemblages travel between and within 
these different life forms and language games without ever settling in one 
equilibrium as each has comparative advantage on one realm and comparative 
disadvantages on other realms (based on the analytic of finitude and its, at least, 
three forms of rationalities).  
This is what Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1925: 97) addressed in his tract “Seventy 
Two belief systems (Haftado do Mellat) where he says:  
that person used to say I do not have dispute with anyone on why you have 
this belief system or that, but my point is that why you do not abide fully by 
what you believe to the best of your ability.  
 
This is a critique within a regime of truth and cannot be smuggled to the relation 
between regimes of truth. The dispute over theory between alternative regimes of 
truth cannot be extended to or muddled with the dispute over the gap between theory 
and practice within each particular framework. 
Iran at the time and throughout modern age has been the site of the strife between 
seventy two shades of grey (the symbol of extreme multiplicity and variation) in the 
form of different forms of voices and cultural tribes, and as such no undisputed 
common ground exists which can be relied upon for universal form of criticism. All 
forms of criticisms and labelling (like reactionary, atheist, liberal, fundamentalist, 
and the like) without associated logic of understanding only adds to the state of 
confusion and make the burden of judgement for Iranian people much heavier. 
Iranian people are forced to experience the agony and the ecstasy associated with the 
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dilemmas of Sophie’ choice in the concentration camp of the state of belated 
inbetweenness. Ajodani (2002: 272), for instance, criticizes Akhundzadeh and 
Kasravi for going too far in denying the entire mystical heritage of Iranian culture 
and in the case of Kasravi even denying the value and worth of Hafez (also see 
Ridgeon, 2006 on Kasravi as a Sufi castigator). Here in the state of belated 
inbetweenness, what is ‘too far’ or ‘too little’ and what is good comprise or rotten 
compromise is not clear at all. In a sense, Ajodani sees them as radical critiques and 
not moderate critique like himself without understanding why they went to the 
extreme, adding another layer to the layers of transference and counter-transference 
in the Iranian social existence. As such, he replicates the familiar divisions between 
radicalism/extremism (efrat va tafrit) and moderation/pragmatism (e’tedal) 
throughout Iranian modern history.  
We give the following example to provide evidence for how the notion of critique 
was deployed in the spirit of reverse social engineering and how it was offered in 
opposition to the embedded forms of counsel and sermons (va’z va khetabeh). 
Sanjabi (1995: 48) reports how Akhunzadeh’s entire approach was informed by his 
conception of European tradition of social criticism:  
Akhundzada then goes on to admire the European press for providing a forum 
for social criticism: Today in all European countries there are satirical papers-
that is, critique and satire-which every week write and publish the vulgar acts 
of their fellow countrymen. European nations have reached such order and 
progress by means of critique, not by counsel and sermon. The European 
peoples have reached this degree of wisdom and perfection by means of 
critique, not counsel and sermons.  
 
Sanjabi (1995: 41) goes on to say that  
His attention was focused especially on the three elements of religion, 
language and government which he condemned as root causes of Iran’s 
decadence and defeat. This spirit of criticism (qirltika) was at the heart of his 
discourse and a key concept for appreciating his intellectual predispositions.  
 
The attempt in this study is not directed towards critiquing the critique, which 
culminates in falling into the same trap, but understanding it and acknowledging that 
Akhundzadeh was a true believer of the regime of truth of modernity, and as such 
had no choice but to attempt to purify modernity from traces of impurities of 
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alternative regimes of truth, which for him were the embodiment of falsity and 
backwardness and immaturity. This is at the heart of ‘tragedy’ of confusion: all 
sides- whether Akhundzadeh, Malkam, Afghani, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, Na’ini, or 
Mohammad Ali Shah- act and think and criticize based on their favoured regime of 
truth and their own gold standard and the unintended consequence is the tragedy of 
socio-political instability and institutional deformities and discontent, and ultimately 
socio-economic backwardness. 
The traces of instinctive understanding of the limits to the art of critique were present 
in Akhundzadeh’s pragmatic friend Malkam Khan, as Ajodani (2003: 226) reports, 
who warned Akhundzadeh not to apply the art of critique to Islam or Christianity, 
without being able to theorize why.  
As such, the conflict between the rival regimes of truth is based on each working to 
replace the other (the supply side follows the logic of substitution), while the 
demand side was following the logic of complementarity. Even when elements of 
alternative regimes of truth were incorporated in projects and subprojects of social 
engineering, the issue of subsumption (packaging and appellation) was a serious 
point of conflict within and between alternative truth camps. What Iranian dasein 
desired was a happy and functional family of the three regimes of truth while each 
supplier was striving to establish monopoly over the production and distribution of 
truth. This is exactly what was impossible to supply due to the urgency and 
impatience associated with the state of belatedness. 
This makes the unambiguous and straightforward conversion to any of these forces 
and regimes of truth impossible for the Iranian dasein. While the supply side almost 
always tried to offer themselves as the one and only option for all the cure of the ills 
of the Iranian people, pragmatic forces adopted a pick and mix approach under the 
general dominance of one or the other regimes of truth. All these forms of packaging 
and repackaging of truth were faced with the crisis of legitimacy as they lacked 
adequate tri-polar theoretical and philosophical justifications. The constant war of 
attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their radical and pragmatic versions 
created the state of confusion for the Iranian dasein. 
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4.3. UNSTABLE COALITION 
This section aims to elaborate only on general properties of the formation of 
coalition in the constitutional era and address several specimens of unstable 
coalitions through the leading actors engaged in the process, such as the Taqizadeh 
coalition, the Malkam coalition, the Afghani coalition, the Nuri coalition, the 
Behbehani-Tabataba’i coalition, the Shah coalition, and the Russian-British coalition 
(the details of which were extensively explored but excluded from this work due to 
word limitations.).  As discussed so far, the Iranian people after the events of 
encountering modernity were thrown into the political economy of truth, which was 
working as the condition of possibility of formation and transformation of state and 
society. This is equivalent to the level of embeddedness where the entire social order 
was struggling with the fundamental question of what deserves to act as Iranian 
people’s regime of truth, defining and disclosing ‘what is true and what is false’, 
‘what is good and what is evil’, ‘what is beautiful and what is ugly’, and ‘what is 
tasteful and what is repugnant’.  
The encounter with modernity had shattered the Iranian house of being (a fragile 
house of being reconstructed in Safavid era out of the materials and resources of 
Persianism, Shia Islam, and Greek philosophy) and Iranians have been ever since 
plagued with the state of discursive homelessness (for the significance of the notions 
of home and ideal homes in the midst of social transformation see Chapman, 1999 
and also Molavi, 2002: 54). The formation of coalitions was driven by the urgent 
need to form a collective will and collective action to construct a new house of being 
after the violent arrival of modernity in the landscape of Iranian embeddedness.  
4.3.1. Map of Faces 
After considering the nature of forces and voices in the preceding sections of this 
chapter, this section considers the characteristics of faces (coalitions) involved in the 
rise and fall of the constitutional revolution. Based on the three groups of producers 
of truth and their internal division between the radical and pragmatic divisions, we 
will consider seven coalitions: the shah coalition (radical and pragmatic Persianism), 
the Nuri coalition (radical Islamism), the Taqizadeh coalition (radical 
constitutionalism), the Malkam coalition (pragmatic constitutionalism), the 
Behbehani-Tabatabi coalition (pragmatic Islamic constitutionalism), the Afghani 
coalition (pan-Islamism), and the British-Russian coalition. All of these rainbows of 
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unstable coalitions were extensively explored but not included in this thesis due to 
word limitations.   
All of these coalitions were formed to construct collective actions required to 
achieve social transformation, but their preference orderings were drastically 
different. In the Shah coalition, the reform was meant to be achieved in the 
framework of orthodox Persianism (either pragmatic or radical version). As such 
they wanted to make modernity and Islam in the service of Persianism. In other 
words, for this position, modernization and Islamization would be endorsed as long 
as they would strengthen the dominance of orthodox Persianism as the main regime 
of truth. In the constitutionalist camp, the pragmatic and radical modernizers gave 
prominence to modernity over Persianism and Islam and would only accept elements 
of them as long as they could end up helping the rise of the position of modernity as 
the dominant regime of truth. In the Islamic tradition, the radical and pragmatic 
factions were intent to achieve reform through Islamization and would accept 
elements of modernity and Persianism, which would strengthen Islam as the 
prominent regime of truth of the Iranian people.  
It should be mentioned that there were shades of grey within each faction. In other 
words, each coalitional faction was a fleeting unity inside lasting multiplicity; each 
was a transient social assemblage, an amalgam, and a compound. This was due to the 
fact that there were sharp differences within and between coalitions in terms of 
emphases, elisions, silences, and affections. There were conflicts within and between 
coalitions and zigzag movements between them. The main suppliers of truth, the 
clergy, the intelligentsia, and the poet, the king and his literati as well as other 
classes of people could be found in almost all coalitions.   
As such, in the constitutional era, all players formed fleeting coalitions with each 
other and with foreigners, as in the example of fleeting coalitions of the 
constitutionalists with the British or Nuri with the Russians. The notion of ‘coalition’ 
covers a wide range of actors from individuals, to groups, parties and classes of 
people. This study contends that almost all of these players (faces) were unstable 
coalitions. This analysis treats individuals as ‘dividuals’ (Critchley, 2010) with 
divided loyalties to multiple regimes of truth, with global and local preference 
structures, with preferences and meta-preferences, which were primed and activated 
differently in different contexts of situation, depending on the configuration of forces 
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in the context of situation and its intersection with the context of culture. Social 
assemblages (individuals and groups) as texts are the sites of polyvocality and 
intertextuality.  
4.3.2. The Taqizadeh Coalition 
Taqizadeh’s coalition, representing radical constitutionalism, produced the main 
ideological blueprint of the constitutional revolution. They were the true believers in 
modernity and its magical power of progress, science, liberal democracy, rule of law, 
social justice and land reform, equality before law, gender equality, the 
establishment of institutions of modern nation-state and social freedom. As such 
their overriding regime of truth was orthodox modernity (liberal democracy) 
combined with selective elements of non-orthodox modernity (socialism). They were 
radical modernizers and the affirmative dimension of their project of social 
engineering revolved around institutionalization of modernity (modernization) 
through intelligent design and reverse social engineering complemented by selected 
elements of Persianism and Islam to fill the lacks in modernity where and when they 
were required. The whole project was captured in the master signifier of 
constitutionalism.  The negating facet of the Taqizadeh coalition’s project of social 
engineering targeted the oriental despotism, religious despotism, and occidental 
despotism, in that order, as the main obstacles towards institutionalization of 
modernity.  
This coalition contained a spectrum of radicalism spanning from radical radicalism 
to pragmatic radicalism. This spectrum is evident in the case of revolutionary 
assassinations of Behbehani and Amin-al Soltan, for instance, and the ambiguous 
role of Taqizadeh in them (Katouzian, 2013; Shahbazi, 2003).  In such cases, verbal 
violence of the leaders like Taqizadeh, who was deemed by Sheikh Ibrahim Zanjani 
to be the soul of Majlis and the ayatollah of modernity, was bound to be translated to 
the physical side of the equation by the more radical elements. 
Even if one has the best package of truth in one’s repertoire, the society (or any other 
social assemblage) requires a process through which it can own and internalize the 
new package of truth.  This is evident in the following observation by Abrahamian 
(1979: 413, added emphasis), which demonstrates how deeply-ingrained the Islamic 
sensibilities were in public imagination versus the skin-deep penetration of 
modernity:  
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At times of crisis, the public moved into action not with images of 
Cromwell, Robespierre, Voltaire, Tennis Courts, and besieged Bastilles, but 
with traditional concepts of social justice and emotional symbols derived 
from the Shi'i heritage - especially from the martyrdom of Hussein and his 
family. In short, the modern intellectuals were advisers to the revolutionaries, 
but the traditional guild members of the bazaars were the actual 
revolutionaries.  
 
The act of reverse social engineering and intelligent design is evident in the work of 
Akhundzadeh, as Adamiyat (1970: 91) reports, in his allusion to the notion of 
“project” where he says “in the last 15 years I have been continuously sending 
projects to Iran and Rome [Istanbul]”. For him, and almost all other social reformers, 
social transformation is the implementation of a series of projects of social 
engineering, rather than participatory and dialogical work of capacity and consensus 
building. Akhundzadeh correctly identifies the problem when he says, as Adamiyat 
(1970: 103-4) reports, that ““without training people [and their imagination] laws 
would not suffice”, but the issue of imagination takes us to the warring regimes of 
truth in the Iranian state of inbetweenness, which requires new and independent 
waves of dialogical theorization with other interlocutors in the process of social 
production of knowledge and truth.  Akhundzadeh correctly identifies that pragmatic 
processes in constructing rails and banks and even writing laws and establishing 
institutions are not sustainable without the supporting theoretical progress 
(Adamiyat, 1970:104). But it was foreclosed to him that theories cannot be imported 
as a package from other worlds of signification and needed to be reproduced based 
on particular resources available and questions posed in the particular language 
community and context of culture.  
Akhundzadeh never identifies this participatory process and never bestows 
legitimacy to all the participants in the market for truth. Instead, he naturally saw 
others as dead (Adamiyat, 1970:104) as a result of his particular version of 
discourses and narrative of decline and declares “the last 1280 years as the age of 
ignorance” (Adamiyat, 1970:128) and intends to start the history from ground zero.  
This approach ignores the ‘thisness’ property of social phenomena and the fact that 
every social phenomenon (constitutionalism, love, economic development, etc.) has 
to evolve and emerge many times in different forms of embeddedness and different 
contexts of culture (the principle of multiple realizability).  Imposed truth of any 
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colour or persuasion, however well-intentioned, can breed calamity while 
internalized falsity can bring liberation. Akhundzadeh’s vehement attack and 
epistemic violence against religion, language, and monarchy (as the main culprits in 
the narrative of Iranian decline) was ultimately translated into physical violence in 
the assassination of Bebbehani, and Ami-al Soltan (who was deemed to have been in 
the service of constitutionalism at the time of his assassination (Ajodani, 2003: 130)) 
and the attempted assassination of Mohammad Ali Shah, and threatening of the two 
grand Ayatollah’s of Najaf (Ajodani, 2003: 127-8) by the radical advocates of 
modernity in the Taqizadeh coalition. The spitefulness of the critique inspired by the 
discourse of decline frequently breeds immense level of violence. It was inevitable 
for the radical modernists to treat the (supposed) enemies of modernity as germs and 
viruses killing the nation’s chance of achieving real progress and as such embark on 
discursive and physical annihilation of them.  
The verbal violence ranged from spiteful labelling such as being neophobic (kohneh-
parast) or being anti-majlis (Ajodani, 2003: 154-5) to smear campaign and extreme 
insulting (see Katouzian, 2008b on insulting in the constitutional poetry). There were 
different levels of radicalism from polite radicalism of Taqizadeh to insulting 
radicalism of the writers of radical newspapers such as Sor-e Israfil and Mosavat 
(see Katouzian, 2003: 8) or the newspaper Roh-al Ghodos (Ajodani, 2003: 389). In a 
sense, the operations of radicalism and pragmatism were activated within the camp 
of the radical modernizers and they were divided into pragmatic or moderate radicals 
and radical or extreme radicals (see Ajodani, 2003: 381). They were instinctively 
acting like the military and political wings of revolutionary parties (good cop/bad 
cop). In the state of warring regime of truth this is a normal phenomenon as no 
regime of truth is able to (it is foreclosed to them, they cannot think the unthinkable 
of granting legitimacy to what they perceive to be the embodiment of falsity, 
evilness and ugliness) grant legitimacy to rival regimes of truth and as such in the 
state of political economy of truth, “the theory and policy of elimination”, as 
Katouzian (2012, 2010) alludes to, inevitably prevails.  
Mutual tolerance and compromise is only possible when one regime of truth 
manages to win the tournament for truth and to act as the dominant regime of truth. 
In spite of being non-religious, anti-religion, or strong supporter of the separation of 
religion and state, the radical supporter of modernity were occasionally forced, 
seemingly largely out of desperation for avoiding to be ex-communicated, to defend 
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their own adherence to Islam and declare the congruence between Islam and freedom 
of speech and equality before law (Ajodani, 2003: 141, 183-4) or land distribution 
(Ajodani, 2003: 417), which because of their general outlook as secular, was not 
credible to any side. This demonstrates that there was a demand for the religious 
element and the radical modernizers were driven to achieve horizontal integration by 
supplying an Islamically-baptized program of social change, which could enhance 
their chance of success in achieving real reform, which in the state of belatedness 
was their dominant concern. Almost all sides were full of self-censorship and 
secrecy, and all sides knew that behind the scene and in private conversations these 
radicals, for instance, were against religion, the clergy, and the monarchy with 
different degrees of intensity and they would not dare to express it in public due to 
the requirements of the state of belatedness.  
This common knowledge gap between the private and public face of the historical 
actors was a white elephant in the room and was disavowed, but frequently erupted 
in the form of Shabnamehs (nightly letters) (Ettehadieh, 2004), even in the period of 
the victory of the constitutional order (see Ajodani 2003). Ajodani (2003) maintains 
that this self-censorship with regard to Islam, despite the excessive freedom to attack 
and even severely insult monarchy, was due to the fact that they were not free to 
criticize Islam and it was associated with the threat of extreme punishment. This 
analysis ignores the fact that freedom is the outcome of process of change and not its 
pre-requisite or its engine. No established system allows freedom to those who want 
to destroy it.  
As such, the freedom to attack monarchy was not there in the first place and was 
gained through the process of resistance, rebellion, and revolution by a coalition of 
religious and non-religious forces. This could be achieved against religion as well. 
But the radicals, because of their practical concerns, were either unwilling to open a 
new front against religion before elimination of the oriental despotism or were not 
strong enough in terms of support amongst ordinary people and elites to launch 
attack on the clergy and religion and pay the price for it as well in the form of going 
to exile or being killed or worst killing the whole project of constitutionalism 
prematurely. This is the route which was taken by the Babis, who launched a double-
edged ideological and military attack on monarchy and Shia religion, which 
provoked even a reformer like Amir Kabir to embark on suppression of them (see 
Amanat, 1989, 1997).  
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This lack of clarity and prioritization of elimination of oriental despotism plus the 
futile example of Babi anti-establishment movement and lack of adequate 
philosophical and theoretical development in the indigenous language, all 
contributed to the silence on outright and direct attack on Islam. The lack of freedom 
is the condition of possibility of emergence of new truth and not an obstacle against 
it. Christianity managed to capture Rome not because it was welcomed by the 
Roman establishment but exactly because it was suppressed by it; it had the potency 
in the market for truth to capture the market from the incumbent. The existence of 
informal market for truth (in the form of shabnamehs and imported newspapers and 
books flooding the market) leaves the market for truth almost always contestable. It 
is a myth that modernity and constitutionalism could not succeed because there was 
no free public space for it to flourish. Sufism and Greek Philosophy in the Shia land 
survived and even occasionally thrived despite being severely suppressed; even 
Islam itself thrived in the environment of severe oppression.  
The fact is that people of Iran were converted to Islam, and Shia religion, and could 
be converted to anything else if the alternative force could meet the demand of  
Iranian people for its desirable regime of truth, which later on appeared in the 
language of Shariati in the form of demand for “spirituality (erfan), equality 
(barabari), and liberty (azadi)”, which is a call for a house of being which can 
combine and harmonize, emancipative, communicative and instrumental rationalities 
as manifested in Islam, Persianism, and modernity. Because of immersion in the 
state of belatedness and adoption of a ready-made package of modernity, they were 
not able or willing to invest on carving a consistent position for themselves, which 
could stand up to smear campaigns and attacks from all sides and be able to convert 
people to their own stable and coherent positions.  
 
4.3.2.1. The Instability of the Taqizadeh Coalition 
The Taqizadeh coalition formed alliance with religious constitutionalists and even 
religious non-constitutionalists against the common enemy, the oriental despotism. 
The alliance with the non-constitutionalist faction (the Nuri coalition) disintegrated 
quickly after the establishment of the first Majlis in dispute over the secular or 
religious nature of the constitution and its principles of equality before law and 
freedom of speech (Afary, 2005), which led to the coup against the constitutional 
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order. After the restoration of the constitutional order and in the second Majlis the 
alliance with the religious constitutionalist coalition (the Behbehani-Tabataba’i 
coalition) collapsed following the assassination of Behbehani, which was perceived 
to have been committed by one of the members of the Taqizadeh coalition (Ajodani, 
2003: 115, 119-20).  
Before the constitutional era, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, one of the leading figures 
in the radical modernizer coalition, successively entered into the Babi-Azali religious 
faction, Afghani pan-Islamist coalition and even tried to form a fleeting coalition 
with Zel-al-Soltan, the hated governor of Isfahan and one of the members of the 
monarchy, to topple Nasir-al-Din Shah as the emblem of oriental despotism (see 
Adami’yat, 1970). Agha Khan Kermani was one minute in one camp and the next in 
another; one minute in Babi-Azali camp and the next in Afghani’s camp and still the 
next trying to  form coalition with Zel-al Solatan to topple the shah, and ultimately 
ending up acting as an irreligious and a free thinker and a socialist. 
This zigzag in positions would add to the confusion and internal division within the 
Taqizadeh coalition. This created an atmosphere of bitter hatred and animosity which 
ultimately poured into a series of assassinations and executions. This led, as Ajodani 
(2003: 121-2) attests, to attempts by the radical modernizers to impose the separation 
of religion and state by force and violence. This process involved even attacking the 
public and their ignorance and even saying that “even if the population of the whole 
country are with you (the anti-constitutionalists), the population of the world is with 
us” (Ajodani, 2003: 139), demonstrating the ‘belated inbetweenness’ dimension of 
the political economy of truth. As such, the state of belatedness had left no time and 
space for capacity and consensus building exercises, and the debate on whether 
Taqizadeh was directly involved in the ordering and planning of assassinations may 
seem to be irrelevant or inconsequential as the theoretical, ideological, and verbal 
hatred and spitefulness permeating the social space would eventually translate itself 
into the physical violence with or without any conspiratorial plots. Thought 
assassinations and character assassinations eventually lead to physical assassinations. 
It was genuinely thought that Iran was on the verge of embracing modernity in its 
constitutional form and only some backward characters like Nuri, Behbehani or 
Mohamad Ali Shah were preventing Iran from entering the heaven of modernity. 
They felt the urgent need to take people to the heaven of modernity by will or by 
force.  
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The strife within the Taqizadeh coalition became even more pronounced when the 
episodes of verbal and physical extremism prompted influential faces like Ali Akbar 
Dehkhoda and Mohammad Khiabani to voice their dissatisfaction (see Ajodani, 
2003: 129 for Khiabani’s letter of dissatisfaction to Taqizadeh) and ultimately to 
leave the radical modernist coalition and join the moderate constitutionalist side. The 
radical modernists were plagued by division and conflict within themselves. 
Lambton (Ra’in, 1976: 180) reports about the existence of factional strife within the 
Secret Society (one of the influential societies founded by the radical modernizers), 
leading to the emergence of Second Secret Society (on societies and associations and 
the divisions between and within them see Sohrabi, 2011: 311-2; Kharabi, 2007; 
Bayat, 1991). The fact is that almost on any issue, for instance on land distribution, 
gender relation, the use of violence, the use of insult against the rivals, whether Islam 
needed to be deployed in the service of constitutionalism or be attacked and if so 
which aspects of it, which elements of Persianism needed to be valorised and which 
marginalized, among others, there were marked differences between members of the 
Taqizadeh coalition (see for example Ajodani, 2003: 430), and these shades of grey 
had frequently created factional strife within the Taqizadeh coalition and made it 
highly volatile and unstable. This is attested by Ajodani (2003: 437-8): “In the 
secular intellectual fronts, deep chasm emerged too”.  
Bahar, one of the leading members of the Taqizadeh coalition, for instance, “backed 
Vosuq and [deeply controversial] 1919 agreement” (Katouzian, 2013: 186) and 
expressed fierce opposition to Jangali modernizing and constitutionalist movement 
in the north of Iran, as Ajodani (2003: 442) observes, in the name of preserving the 
national unity and in fear of spread of separationist tendencies, and when the strong 
state arrived in the name of national unity, he started opposing that one as well 
(Abrahamian, 1982: 122; Katouzian, 2013: 218).  
One example which can clearly demonstrate how alliances and coalitions could 
break quite easily and turn bitter in the most extreme sense is the initial friendship 
and subsequent animosity between Akhundzadeh and Moshir-al Douleh in the pre-
constitutional era (Adamiyat, 1970: 89). Akhundzadeh launched a severe attack on 
Moshir-al Douleh while he used to be one of his closest allies; Adamiyat says that he 
even wrote deeply insulting poems against him.  
The issue was the deep difference in their emotional economies of nationalism and in 
their associated structure of power/knowledge which erupted when Akhundzadeh 
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was introduced to the Turkish Ottoman authorities for his novel ideas in reforming 
the alphabet and script. Moshir-al Douleh who at the time was the Iranian 
ambassador and Akhundzadeh’s host and patron in Istanbul was deeply offended by 
Akhundzadeh giving his satire writings which had targeted Nasir-al Din shah and his 
courtiers to the Turkish authorities. This move turned the relation between the two 
from alliance for reform and friendship to deep animosity and division in no time, 
which is one of the constant patterns of Iranian modern history due to irreconcilable 
differences emerging in the biographically-based degree of attachment to different 
regimes of truth and their dimensions of power, knowledge, and subjectivity 
(emotional economy).  
Despite being in the same modernist camp, the attachment of Moshir-al Douleh to 
the system of monarchy (orthodox Persianism) was much deeper and markedly 
different from almost total detachment of Akhundzadeh (who was working for the 
Russian system, which had occupied Akhundzadeh’s homeland (see Cole, 1996)). 
Furthermore what Moshri-al Douleh had allegedly said to the Turkish authority 
about Akhundzadeh being anti-religion and anti-state was accurate but as 
Akhundzadeh was pursuing a practical project of social engineering with regard to 
the change in alphabet he did not want anything to hinder the success of his project 
including the knowledge of his opposition to religion and state.  
The same was true for Moshir-al Douleh whose pragmatic project was to work with 
the Qajar system to reform it from inside, while Akhundzadeh’s action of giving his 
satire books to the Ottoman authorities, when he was introduced by Moshir-al 
Douleh to them and when he was his guest in Istanbul, was deeply offensive to him. 
Officially Akhundzadeh was the guest of the Iranian government and was introduced 
by a high profile member of this government to the Ottoman government and 
Akhundzadeh giving his satire books ridiculing the head of Iranian government and 
the whole system was deeply offensive for Moshir-al Douleh.  
In a sense both were right in different ways in being offended. They had two 
different projects and two different symbolic orders, which shows the need of all 
sides to apply hermeneutics of understanding and free association to understand each 
other’s dreams and world of significations. This dispute was a clear case of mutual 
misunderstanding.  The dream of Akhundzadeh was to revolutionize the world of the 
Islamic east, and especially Iran, while Moshri-al Douleh as a representative of the 
Qajar state who had introduced Akundzadeh to the Ottomans did not like him giving 
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them his works on ridiculing Iranian state. In that particular context his discontent 
can be easily understood as the topic of concern was the alphabet and not the 
features of the Iranian state bureaucracy and secondly Akhundzadeh was associated 
with Moshir-al Douleh as his guest and had formed a bigger transient assemblage in 
that context. Moshir-al Douleh might not have had any problems if the Ottoman 
authorities had accessed and read Akhundzadeh’s works independently (here we try 
to apply Kogler’s (1996) version of devil’s advocate).  
Both sides were looking to implement their own projects, and the emergence of 
obstacles would naturally fill them with rage. As such they moved from deep 
alliance to even deeper animosity in no time due to the tragedy of confusion. The 
fact is that each member of the Taqizadeh coalition, like Bahar and Dehkhoda and 
Taqizadeh himself, was trapped in the state of tri-polarity between the three regimes 
of truth and their internal division between orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, politics of 
piety and politics of ordinary alongside their black and white books.  
The internal divisions would inevitably result in the self-destruction of the radical 
modernists, as Ehtesham-al-Saltaneh attests (Ajodani, 2003: 23), where in his 
opinion it was a blessing that Mohammad Ali Shah attacked the Majlis in a military 
fashion, prompting the constitutionalists to unite in their pursuit of constitutionalism. 
Otherwise, they would have imploded earlier under the weight of their own incessant 
infightings.     
This coalition used the clergy against the oriental despotism and then in the 
affirmative stage of the revolution they embarked on a second revolution in trying to 
cleanse the constitutionalism from the impurities and obstacle caused by the clergy 
(Ajodani, 2003: 126-7). For them, no true and genuine constitutionalism and 
freedom could be delivered from the starting point of Islamic laws. The fundamental 
dispute was whether Islam, modernity or Persianism needed to be taken as the ‘main 
base’ for theorizing, inspiring, and justifying the programs of social reform, and 
whether verses of the Quran, or quotations from the modern philosophers and 
modern texts, or the poems of Ferdowsi needed to be deployed to act as the master 
signifier for discursive and non-discursive practices leading to the writing of the 
constitution and achieving social transformation. Every voice was attempting to 
shape and monopolize the agenda of the social movements and change.  
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The disputes revolved around whether modern phenomena such as secularism, 
freedom of speech, republicanism, atheism, land distribution, science, art, social 
freedom, gender equality and free love help or hinder to the move towards achieving 
social common good? Nobody knew for sure. The same were true with regards to 
aspects of Islam and Persianism; which elements of Islam and which elements of 
Persianism or which combination of them would help or hinder the pursuit of 
common good? There was no consensus and no method of achieving consensus.  As 
such, every little or big issue could generate bitter split and strife within coalitions. 
The issue is that harm and benefit, and common good and the significance attached 
to different issues were conceived and prioritized differently within and between 
different truth camps and in different language communities. Passions, emotions and 
affectivities were attuned differently as well. 
Different rationalities with their unique dictionaries associated different denotations 
and connotations to the notions such as harm, benefit, science, consumption, 
constitution, justice, freedom, woman and all other signifiers due to their distinctly 
different world of signification with their distinctive ontologies, epistemologies, 
methodologies, ethics, aesthetics, and their associated discursive and non-discursive 
practices and affiliated forms of affectivity and emotional economy.  The society 
trapped in the state of belated inbetweenness cannot have a consensual and 
commonsensical conception of harm and benefit. As such good and bad modernity, 
true and false Islam, progressive and regressive Persianism, whatever they may mean 
for the social actors, enter the truth market in bizarre and unexpected forms and 
contents and are exposed to the process of selection in the market for truth. We know 
that selection is a social phenomenon closely associated with the notion of 
emergence. Social outcomes are the unexpected and unintended consequences of 
interaction of forces (the principle of emergence). Confusion over the nature of 
social phenomena and the theory of selection is at the heart of perpetuation of the 
confusion associated with the intersection between the state of inbetweenness and 
the state of belatedness.  
The failure of the constitutionalist model of adoption of modernity led to return to 
experimenting with the more rooted option of oriental despotism and deploying it as 
the leverage to achieve techno-bureaucratic modernity in the Reza Shah era in the 
hope of achieving deeper levels of modernity at subsequent stages of socio-economic 
development (Abrahamian, 1982: 121-4). The radical constitutionalists like all other 
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Iranians were ultimately interested in the practical outcome of different project of 
social engineering (as Akhundzadeh frequently stressed) in saving Iran from the 
verge of annihilation in the encounter with modernity (the state of belatedness) and 
as such they were ready to experiment with any permutations of the three regimes of 
truth as long as they could offer a glimmer of hope to save the deeply sick patient of 
the mother “Iran”.  The intersection between the state of inbetweenness in the 
context of culture and the state of belatedness in the context of situation and the 
naive theory of selection (ignoring the incommensurability and embeddedness of 
social phenomena and the role of vanishing mediators and the process of emergence 
in any attempt to graft new elements to the social order, and ultimately the issue of 
multiple realizability) sewed the failure of any coalition and their associated project 
and subprojects of reverse social engineering.  
The state of belated inbetweenness had turned even the selfhood of each of these 
faces into unstable coalition of a society of selves. Even Akhundzadeh who 
possessed the most consistent position in the pre-constitutional era against the 
religious and oriental forms of despotism and in support of a liberal order, became a 
pragmatic modernist when he tried to engage with the social reality through his 
program of reform in the alphabet and script, where he occasionally retreated from 
his uncompromising positions against Islam and/or monarchy in the hope of 
achieving tangible reform within his general strategy-narrative of modernization (see 
Adamiyat, 1970: 79-80;  Ajodani 2003: 42).  Shoukat (2006) reports on how 
Taqizadeh himself turned into a revolutionary despot, as part of a 20-member 
revolutionary council (hei’at-e modireh), after the defeat of the minor despotism in 
order to control the chaotic situation after the restoration of the constitutional order.   
4.3.2.2. Taqizadeh as an Unstable Coalition 
In effect, not only his coalition but Taquzadeh himself was an unstable coalition. 
Taqizadeh zigzagged between alternative and sometimes contradictory positions in 
his stormy public life (see Ansari, 2012). As Katouzian (2013: 49, 53, 59) reports, 
the biggest regret Taqizadeh had was the mistake of not compromising with 
Mohammad Ali Shah after the defeat of the Shah’s coup against the 
constitutionalists. In a sense, Reza Shah was the best example of the return of the 
repressed and the zombie which came back to haunt the radical constitutionalists like 
Taqizadeh. He resisted Mohammad Ali Shah and forced him to abdicate, leading to 
the eventual collapse of the Qajar dynasty, and almost quarter century later after the 
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failure of the constitutional revolution he had to compromise with Reza Shah. But 
the analysis offered in this thesis shows that even if he had compromised with 
Mohammad Ali Shah it would not have worked and he would have only lost his 
credibility and reputation earlier at the time, and would have been marginalized as he 
became marginalized and defamed in later stages of his life when he took a 
pragmatic approach to social change. When a radical or pragmatic position is left 
vacant it is filled by other faces as in the case of oil-nationalization movement where 
the radical position was occupied by Mosaddegh while Taqizadeh had already 
moved to a moderate position; Katouzian (2003, 2012) says Taqizadeh frequently 
saw his own earlier radical self in the clothes of others.  
The turbulence in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness had reflected itself in 
the turbulence in Taqizadeh’s life. As Katouzian (2012: 195) reports:  
In his memoirs he used the term tufani (tempestuous) in describing his own 
life, and that is how it appeared in the title of the posthumous publication.  
 
The boom and bust in the truth cycle is evident in the following observation from 
Katouzian (2012: 203 added emphasis) where Taqizadeh moves from being a 
genuine devotee of the Iranian people to expressing deep contempt for them:  
Taqizadeh, who during the constitutional revolution often signed his name as 
fada’i- ye mellat (devotee of the people), had become thoroughly 
disillusioned with his compatriots, such that he had written to a friend: 
“Most, in fact virtually all, Iranians are spineless, two- faced, sycophantic, 
liars, who play up to authority, hide their views . . . and each day, depending 
on their position, subscribe to the idea which happens to be in vogue . . . And 
they are constantly busy making plots and intrigues”. 
 
 Taqizadeh’s observation on the chameleon-like features of Iranians is repeated by 
almost all observers in the modern history of Iran, and was used to demonize people 
while in the beginning of the movement they used to treat people as angelic victims 
of demonic forces inside or outside the country. Ironically, Taqizadeh with a c-turn 
in his position on oriental despotism and on wholesale Westernization was himself 
one member of this chameleon-type nation. It is another incidence of 
misunderstanding if we essentializes this attribute in the Iranian people and their 
elites and attach active agency and blame to them. In effect, just like chameleon, the 
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change of colours between and within regimes of truths was a coping strategy for a 
people trapped in a complex interaction between the state of inbetweenness and the 
state of belatedness in search for practical remedies for the malaise of socio-
economic backwardness and for constructing a new house of being based on 
coordination of three incommensurable forms of rationalities.  
In the state of belatedness, where everyone is turned into a campaigner to save the 
nation, it is rational to “hide” your views to form fleeting coalitions with strange 
bedfellows to find practical solutions to urgent problems. This property has little to 
do with the old Shia practice of taqya (the act of dissimulation of religious belief in 
order to be safe), which was deployed by Keddie (1963) and repeated by Poulson 
(2006: 55) to make sense of prevalence of this feature amongst contemporary 
Iranians. Alongside the active use of secrecy and silence, in the state of belated 
inbetweenness, it is quite natural to change your mind frequently and convert to 
alternative truth camps if you find your adopted truth camp and your particular shade 
of grey and its associated project and subprojects of reverse social engineering 
cannot deliver the utopia and the dream of escape from socio-economic 
backwardness and/or other ideals.  
4.3.2.3. Instability of Radical Constitutionalist Coalition as Manifested in the 
Example of Agha Khan Kermani 
Another case of selfhood as unstable coalition is Agha Khan Kermani (see 
Adamiyat, 1978). Kermani was the member of both Islamic and anti-Islamic 
coalitions, and amongst those who wanted to activate the role of the clergy and those 
who wanted to marginalize them. He moved between these positions depending on 
what the context of situation primed and the strategy-narrative of saving Iran 
demanded.  He oscillated between extreme positions ranging from pragmatism 
(Ajodani, 2002: 120-1) to the unconditional adoption of the Western modernity to 
declaring the clergy as the champions of the progress in Iran despite the clergy’s own 
wariness about intervening in politics and being afraid of making a mess of it. 
Kermani (1925: 57) was critical of the messy synthesis made by Mirdamad, the 
famous Safavid philosopher, while he himself was a highly volatile synthesis and an 
explosive cocktail of contradictory forces.  Kermani (1925: 99) made criticism of 
Iranians’ lack of principles (spinelessness in the language of Taqizadeh) and their 
semi-modernism by pointing to their tendency to excessively and conspicuously 
imitate the foreign others.  
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Adamiyat (1978: 251), in turn, points to the eclectic mind of Kermani and Kermani’s 
own form of spinelessness (corresponding to Hedayat’s notion of lakkategi, as 
mentioned in the chapter 3 of this thesis). It is ironic that while Kermani attacks 
Mirdamad for being a useless eclectic (lakkateh) he himself becomes a modern 
lakkateh. Here we see everyone accuses everyone else of spinelessness while they all 
are the unconscious victims of the state of belated inbetweeness and its associated 
property of exuberant and impatient tri-polarity, resulting in perpetual zigzag 
movements between alternative regimes of truth.  
Kermani (as reported in Adamiyat, 1978: 272) writes an  important poem on wishing 
the bride of Iran not to suffer from being raped by the Russians and the British, 
which demonstrates his practical concerns to save Iran at any cost even at the cost of 
sleeping with bizarre bedfellows. These practical concerns in the state of belatedness 
turned almost all sides into promiscuous social actors (lakkateh) and unstable 
coalition of a society of selves in the search for finding sound-bite solutions to save 
the bride of “Iran” from irreversible demise. Different facet of Kermani’s identity 
was primed and activated at different context of situation (see Kermani, 1925: 100). 
Saving Iran required constructing a modern nation-state and all Kermani’s zigzags 
can be understood as attempts to make a national house of being out of the resources 
available to him, predominantly from the regime of truth of modernity, but also from 
Persianism and Islam whenever there was lack in modernity. 
His nationalism was a composition of good Persianism (good governance with 
reference to the assembly of consultation in the pre-Islamic period, good gender 
relations, good Zoroastrianism, good glories, good language) plus good modernity 
(science and technology plus good political and non-political philosophies) and good 
Islam minus bad Persianism, bad Islam, and bad modernity (colonialism and quasi-
modernism), and minus bad Arabs. Here the image of utopian Iran as a bride with its 
pure beauty is reminiscent of the heavenly girl of Hedayat (see Kermani’s influence 
on Hedayat (Adamiyat (1978: 281)). All of his chameleon-like positions should be 
summarized through his modernist nationalism and how it required the stretch 
towards joining Babis-Azalis at one time, Islamic nationalism/internationalism at 
another time, and Persianist nationalism at yet another and international humanism at 
still another.  The main guide for understanding his zigzag approach in public life 
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and his theory and practice of selection and his particular cocktail is manifest in the 
very important principle alluded to by Adamiyat (1978: 381) in the hermeneutics of 
understanding  “the meaning of his words should be understood through knowing his 
purpose”.  
His will and his purpose were willed by multiple regimes of truth in the state of 
belated inbetweenness. His strategy was based on the creation of modern nation state 
and his narrative was an ad-hoc and rhizomatic combination of a set of pluses and 
minuses, affirmations and negations, demonizations and glorifications, through the 
operations of addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth, where the 
prominence was given to modernity over and above Islam and Persianism and where 
he, for instance, launches an attack on Iranian people for choosing the religion of 
their attackers (Adamiyat, 1978: 284-5), which according to him, in his particular 
genre of discourses and narratives of decline, culminated in the general deterioration 
of Iranian people in all walks of life. Kermani (1925: 102) addresses the issue of 
truth and talks about gradualism, patience, and wisdom (see Adamiyat, 1978: 43), 
which he does not consistently adhere to (as Adamiyat maintains). While he attacks 
Mirdamad for the mishmash of his system of thought he himself inevitably 
constructs a bizarre mixture of his own as Adamiyat (1978: 151) observes. 
4.3.2.4. Remarks on the Instability of Taqizadeh and Kermani 
In the pre- and post-constitutional era, each face was a coalition acting as the vessel 
through which the rival forces implanted their particular cocktailed voices. This is 
manifest in the (in)famous case where Taqizadeh defended his role in signing of the 
1933 oil treaty with Britain in Reza Shah era by denying his own active agency and 
declaring himself as “instrument” (a’lat-e fe’l), conduit, or mouthpiece of another 
active agency (see Katouzian, 2013: 68-9). This shows how the philosophical and 
theoretical stances on the nature of agency have practical implications in history and 
in the everyday experiences. In this case he perceived Reza Shah as the real agent 
behind the signing of the infamous treaty, while in truth Reza Shah himself was 
another instrument in the chain of passive agency. The active agents were the three 
regimes of truth and how they were combined to form multiplicity of voices, 
implanting themselves in particular faces depending on their particular biographies 
and the trajectory of their life histories. Akhundzadeh, for example, alluded to how 
coming into contact with a teacher in his particular biographical context changed his 
life trajectory and put him on a path towards liberal form of modernity (see 
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Adamiyat, 1970). His path took him from Islamic jurisprudence to mysticism and 
from there to liberal modernity.  
Taqizadeh’s alleged “principled compromise” (Katouzian, 2013: 64, 79) with Reza 
Shah was as radical as his old revolutionary radicalism against Mohammad Ali Shah, 
leading to the severe loss of his reputation, as the agent of the British and other 
accusations and ultimately, “the instrument” (one of the common meanings of the 
word a’lat in Persian is penis or phallus). Katouzian (2012: 207) observes that:  
Until the end of his life Taqizadeh was often contemptuously referred to as 
a’lat-e fe’l (the instrument [of the act]), alluding to his Majlis speech where 
he had said that if a mistake was made, it was the fault of the decision taker, 
not the instrument.  
 
In effect, he was blamed both for his radicalism and his pragmatism as both positions 
were untenable because they were severely un-theorized and unjustified. He was a 
“confused dreamer (gong-e khabdideh)” and the rest of the world “deaf (a’lam 
tamam kar)”. For him, his positions were principled but for the others (and even for 
his later self) they were clear cases of spinelessness or “excessive exuberance” 
(Ansari, 2012: 47).  
This is the classic case of mutual misunderstanding, and transference and counter-
transference. As he saw people of Iran as spineless many saw him as equally 
spineless. This was to the extent that Mosaddegh, who was once Taqizadeh’s close 
friend (Majd, 2001: 205), in the 14
th
 Majlis had said that “Mother nature has not 
given birth to any traitor like Taqizadeh” (Sahabi, 2007: 244).  Taqizadeh’s life was 
a turbulent one enshrined in the move from pragmatic radicalism to radical 
pragmatism, which immersed him in the controversies of revolutionary reign of 
terror and in the signing of the 1933 oil treaty. As such he moved from one extreme 
of radicalism in the controversy of assassinations of Amin-al Soltan and Behbehani 
to another extreme of pragmatism in signing the oil treaty under Reza Shah. Ajodani, 
(2003: 116) alludes to how Malak-al Motakallamin and Sayyed Javad Vaez Isfahani, 
Taqizadeh’s close allies, were reported to be involved in the assassination of Amin-
al Soltan. Both types of radical or pragmatic positions were futile in producing any 
lasting effects on the Iranian social order except for contributing to its truth cycle of 
boom and bust, exuberance and disillusionment in the market for truth and political 
economy of truth and its associated waves of innocent cruelty. 
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4.3.3. Remarks on the Unstable Coalitions 
As a result of state of belated inbetweenness and its associated tragedy of confusion, 
in this era we encounter how radicals frequently turn into pragmatists and change 
sides. Alongside the examples supplied in the various coalitions of this section, two 
sharp observations by the immediate actors and observers of the era will support how 
the state of confusion permeated all realms of life from state to civil society and 
culminated in fluctuations and instability in coalitions, positions, and selves. Nasim-
e-Shomal’s observation enshrined in a piece of poem (Mir, 1993) captures the sense 
of instability and fluidity in identities, which he, like almost all actors, falls into the 
trap of blame game and blames people for being excessively unstable and 
chameleon-like, which is based on an implicit philosophical position of treating 
people as active agents of history in the spirit of Cartesian cogito rather than passive 
instruments of various forms of embedded, emergent, and incommensurable 
worldhood in the spirit of Heideggerian dasein as manifested in the following poem 
by Nasim-e Shomal: 
We, the nation of Iran: 
We, the nation of Iran, are all clever and astute,  
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour, 
We are not afraid of insult and blame, 
We do not incline toward the signs of health, 
If there is no wine we say hooray to the drug, 
We have passed the state of being concerned with reputation as we are all 
inclined towards disgrace, 
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour, 
At times we are disturbed and are in plenty of pain because of our concerns for 
Constitutionalism, 
In this we became thin [lost weight] as we miss our Majlis deputies, 
One day we act like a person who is not concerned at all and at another time 
like a person who is deeply concerned, 
In the night we think of wine and on the dawn we are using drugs, 
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour, 
The tools of progress became all ready, 
The youth are flying to the starts, 
The ship of science are flowing in the sea, 
We are drowned in the sea of ignorance like whales, 
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour, 
O’ my God, why did Muslims’ positions become so miserable? 
Why have they ignored Islam and the Quran? 
The righteous all confirmed the Quran, 
We, the wishy-washy, are following the laws of the Westerners, 
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour, 
Out of piety and asceticism, we blame Salman [the most pious], 
We all have the desire for the heavenly women and men, 
Not an unbeliever, not a Christian, not a Jew, not a Muslim, 
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Not a pure Roman and not a pure non-Roman, 
Alas, we, like chameleon, change our colour.
38
 
 
Here we see that the essence of instability of identities and positions is captured in 
the notion of Iranians not falling into any known categories of identities and 
constantly shifting between them. The poet himself shifts between modernity and 
Islam in the framework provided by Persianism (Persian poetry); he is the perfect 
example of what he is blaming, being an ad-hoc mishmash of everything and 
anything.  
The American financial expert, Shuster, hired by the constitutionalists to organize 
the public finance of the Iranian government makes similar observation. Shuster’s 
(1912: xv) remarkable description confirms Nasim-e Shomal’s observation on the 
Iranians’ constant changing of colours:  
The first point is that Persian political affairs, fraught as they are with 
misfortune and misery for millions of innocent people, are conducted very 
much as a well-staged drama I have heard some critics say, as an opera 
‘bouffe’. The reader will find the same old characters weaving in and out of the 
story, at one time wearing the make-up of a Royalist Minister, at another the 
garb of a popular patriot. Cabinets are formed and dissolved with unreal 
rapidity. Men high in the councils of the nation sink in a day into perfect 
obscurity, only to emerge again as the ceaseless whirl of intrigue drags them 
into public favor.  
 
While descriptively accurate, both observations (Shuster’s and Nasim-e Shomal’s) 
suffer from counter-transference in their negative judgemental connotations. Rather 
than asking why things are the way they are and why and how Iranians developed 
these coping strategies, they embarked on making value-judgements based on their 
favoured or utopian state of affairs where there are stable regimes of truth, stable 
minds and institutions and stable subjectivities and selfhoods. As such, they fall into 
the trap of intentional fallacy and counter-transference. The constant movements 
between the two positions of radicalism and pragmatism among multiple regimes of 
truth should be understood as the translation of the two options of 
complementarity/substitution and subsumption (appellation) between regimes of 
                                                          
38
 See the original Persian version of the poem in the following address: 
http://ketabnak.com/comment.php?dlid=15757. 
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truth in order to find viable solutions for the problems caused by being thrown in the 
state of belatedness.  
In the state of belatedness, the actors desperately search for the cure for the fatal ills 
of the society, which is deemed to be on the verge of death, amongst the resources 
available in the three regimes of truth through constant application of operations of 
addition and subtraction. Each promised solution fails and they are driven to move to 
test alternative cocktails and potions (ma’joon), which are ad-hoc and un-developed 
and as such cause more problems than they solve. The intersection between the states 
of belatedness and inbetweenness, hence, causes the property of changing colours 
and being like chameleon. Accordingly, agents move in different directions at any 
particular moment of time due to the trajectory of their bitter experiences and their 
level of exposure to different forces and voices. Only at the fleeting time of 
revolutionary euphoria and at the time of total disillusionment almost all voices and 
faces converge in the same direction, which soon collapses after a honeymoon of 
optimistic or nightmare of pessimistic state of near-equilibrium.   
4.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
This section demonstrates how the tragedy of confusion alongside its resultant 
unstable coalitions led to the establishment of dysfunctionalities and deformities in 
the processes and outcomes of building institutions. First, the general patterns behind 
the experience of institutional failure are explored and then this section embarks on 
providing an overview of a few social realms to demonstrate how the experience of 
dysfunctional and deformed institution was widespread in the Iranian social order at 
the time. The disruptions, reversals, abortions, and deformities experienced in the 
process of conception, gestation, birth, growth and maturity of institutions is 
explored in the case of the institution of nation-state. The extensive discussions on 
the failure in building other institutions (such as constitution, polity, economy, legal 
system and education) were further explored but excluded from this work due to 
word limitations. Furthermore, this section attempts to compare the rare cases of 
institutional success as opposed to the common experience of institutional failure in 
this era in order to explore the reasons behind the widespread experience of 
institutional failure at the levels of worlds of signification, complex adaptive system, 
and causal reductionism.  
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As we addressed in our methodological and theoretical chapters, institutions emerge, 
they are not designed. Even when there is an element of conscious design involved 
in their construction, the consciousness itself is the emergent product of the regimes 
of truth alongside the fact that the interaction between the conscious and unconscious 
decisions and actions of multiple agents give rise to the emergence of institutions (as 
such institutions are embedded, incommensurable and emergent phenomena).  
4.4.1. Rare Examples of Stable Institutions in a Sea of Dysfunctional 
Institutions 
It is worth emphasizing that consciousness and conscience are two emergent 
institutions constructed by regimes of truth (as we extensively addressed in the 
chapter on methodology). To appropriate Marx’s famous statement, as quoted in 
Abrahamian (1979: 381), on the relation between mode of production and 
consciousness, we can say:  
The mode of [regime of truth] conditions the social, political, and intellectual 
life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, the social being that determines their 
consciousness.  
 
By providing an example of institutional success and making a contrast with the 
common experience of the emergence of dysfunction and deformed institutions in 
the context of the constitutional era, we can shed light on how the inner working of 
the state of inbetweenness in its interplay with the state of belatedness creates the 
experience of institutional failure, which would in turn leads to dysfunctional 
governance structures and dysfunctional price system (in Williamson’s four-level 
analysis), and ultimately the experience of chronic underdevelopment.  
The public religious ritual is the site where Iranians could achieve high level of 
cooperation and collaboration in conducting a set of relatively coherent and 
harmonized public actions. Thus, what was not possible in the realm of socio-
economic development and political governance was possible in the realm of rituals. 
Here we observe that different class of Iranians in the Qajar period could actively 
participate in the enactment of the religious rituals through coordinated and 
harmonized performances based on clear division of labour and a coherent emergent 
and consensual script. The language game of Ashura processions and their associated 
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sets of discursive and non-discursive practices were fully familiar and internalized 
for the Iranian people at this era and they were fully fluent in conducting them with 
efficacy and efficiency. The same society-wide level of cooperation and participation 
was not possible in the realm of development, democracy, foreign policy, social 
justice, property rights, or gender relations, for instance. The subtleties and 
complexities of this cooperative institution which provided a place for all “within the 
cooperative venture of organising rituals” (Aghaei; 2005: 379) is astonishing. The 
successful yearly enactment of this religious ritual refutes the psychologism 
hypothesis of those who claim that Iranians are individualistic and bad at collective 
ventures (see Abrahamian, 1982, 1993; Katouzian, 2010).   
While the language game of Muharram rituals was performed to its highest possible 
precision and effectiveness as a form of collective action, the collective action failed 
in the realm of development or constitutional government. Beeman’s (1976) analysis 
on how Iranians’ national characters could be made understandable based on the 
subtleties of the contextualized communicative system, which can shed light on the 
logic behind institutional failure in one context and institutional success in another. 
As North (1990) observes institutions have roots in common belief systems, informal 
norms, and the mechanisms of enforcement. All of these components were instituted 
in subjectivities, vocabularies, memories and narratives, and were institutionalized in 
specified time and allocated space. In other words, the people of Iran were 
scaffolded and subjectified in the rules of the game of religious rituals and their 
meanings for centuries, especially from the Safavid era (Niazmand, 2004; Dabashi, 
2011a). Thus, the Shia regime of truth in coalition with Persian monarchy had 
managed to construct this language game and make its meanings and religious 
denotations and connotations intelligible in the larger picture of the emergence of 
Islam, the mission of prophets, the place of Shia Imams, and the perpetual war of 
good against evil.  
All of these evolved to function in the process of establishing Iranian political and 
social identity in contradistinction to the Ottoman and Christian others. These rituals 
are believed to have roots in the Persian myth and pre-Islamic rites and world of 
signification (in the perpetual war of light against darkness in Persian religions) as 
well as managing to borrow elements from similar rituals in Christianity (Niazmand 
2004; Dabashi, 2011a: 92). To institutionalize these rituals, an army of educators 
(religious clergies and other functionaries) reiterate and perform their main 
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components every year throughout the country, in rural and urban settings. These 
rituals have gradually evolved in a process of chaotic synchronization involving 
rhizomatic and arborescent movements in linguistic and non-linguistic dimensions of 
social assemblages. It means that they managed to incorporate elements from pre-
Islamic Persia and mix it with Shia theology and rituals alongside assimilating 
elements of Christian iconography and rite, and formed a cohesive whole out of all 
of them as an institution in which people could perform the discursive and non-
discursive practices associated with Shia Islam in contradistinction to Sunni Islam 
and Christianity.  
In contrast, the new game of constitutional government, which required participation 
and cooperation of different classes of people, was totally unfamiliar to the Iranian 
dasein. They did not know how to play this new game; they did not know what were 
the ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics and aesthetics behind it and they 
did not own it in a gradual process of evolutionary change. As such, its terms and 
associated passions and emotions did not become part of discursive and non-
discursive practices of people in everyday life. They had developed such practices 
with regard to the norm of namus (sexual honour), Hajj rituals (pilgrimage to 
Mecca), the rituals of pilgrimage to other shrines in Mashhad and Qom and in other 
places throughout the country, fasting in the month of Ramadan, the Persian rituals 
of Nowrouz (New Year), and Muharram rituals, for example, but not with regard to 
the games of constitutionalism, liberal democracy, or economic growth. Thus, people 
were not trained through formal and informal education to understand the 
philosophy, the stories and narratives, the small talks, and the discursive and non-
discursive practices behind the institutions of constitution, Majlis, constitutional 
monarchy and how and why these institutions emerged in the first place and how and 
why they went through different stages of development and how their latest 
reincarnations compared with the earlier ones.  
This makes the Muharram rituals a national and communal game while turned the 
constitutional government into an alien and imported one. More importantly the 
advocates of this new game did not want to go through the gradual and patient 
process of capacity and consensus building with regard to the new institutions as the 
immersion in the state of belatedness called for finding immediate cures for urgent 
ills of the society. This is the core of the tragedy of confusion in Iran; there is nobody 
to blame and there is no decline. The discourse of freedom and its relation to the 
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notions of transgression and compromise (see Sohrabi, 2012: 119) had not been even 
started to be incorporated into the worldhood of Iranian dasein and its dictionary, 
and did not have time to develop its own unique denotations and connotations the 
way Americans have developed their unique relations with gun ownership 
(Halliwell, 2008: 224) and Japanese with regard to the social norm of committing 
suicide (where the self-help book on how to commit suicide became best seller) 
(Kingston, 2004: 265-8).  
Thus, at the time the constitutional order had arrived as a package and had to be 
absorbed by different classes of people without going through the evolutionary 
process of chaotic synchronization and harmonization with other notions and 
practices such as justice, piety, spirituality, morality, sexuality, vice and virtue (amr-
e be maroof va nah’ye az monkar), body and its relation to permanence and 
impermanence, and the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth, and 
the relation between people, as new source of legitimacy, with kingship and divinity 
(the relation between the intellectual, the Persian king and the clergy and their 
corresponding sources of authority and truth, namely, people, king, and God).  
In such a process of reverse social engineering, it was not at all clear how the will of 
people could be reconciled and harmonized with the will of the king and the will of 
God. It was not clear at all when conflicts arises between these alternative sources of 
truth and authority what needed to take precedence over what and why. It was not 
clear what happens when people themselves opt to make their own will subservient 
to what they perceived to be the better judgements emanating from the will of the 
king or the will of God; people may see themselves as addicts who are seduced by 
the pleasures of the flesh promised and delivered by modernity and consequently 
willingly submit themselves to the warnings and tough love of the king (Persianism) 
or the clergy (Islam). As such, people may rebel against themselves and willingly 
and irreversibly transfer the authority to the king or the clergy (meta-preference 
overriding and vetoing preferences).  
These alternative forms of rationalities were the realms of competing sensibilities 
and imaginaries with contradictory set of priorities. People might have preferred 
Akhundzadeh’s free love or consumption of alcohol but had a meta-preference 
which questioned such preferences. People in the face of encounter with bigger truth 
frequently question their own desires and behaviours. As such their revealed 
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behaviour and expressed desire cannot be the ultimate decider of what they want, but 
whether they can defend the truth of their own behaviours and desires in the court of 
meta-preference. Hence, we see frustrated modernists frequently attacking people for 
their backwardness and for their constant changing of colours and their being like a 
chameleon. As Katouzian (2008b: 286) reports:  
Eshqi wrote …  
If the father of this nation is this bastard (i.e., Ahmad Shah)  
Then the nation and the soul of its father must be shat on. 
 
Katouzian (2008b: 285) goes on to attest that  
Aref went overboard and described the entire Iranian people as asses: 
. . . People of this lawless land are asses 
By God both commoners and elite are asses 
He who is the head of the ministers 
I swear by the God of both worlds 
Is a bigger ass than them all 
In fact he is a stable-full of asses . . . 
Sheikh, police chief and the police are all asses 
Wife, children and companion, all asses . . . 
From the bazaar to the street, asses 
Village, town and country, all asses 
Those wearing hats and turbans, all asses 
Worker and laborer, certainly asses 
The preacher on the pulpit is an ass 
From the altar to the door, asses. 
 
As can be seen, the modern rationality, sensibility, and imaginary had not been 
cultivated in the soil of Iranians’ historical and complex embeddedness. Signifiers 
such as constitution, freedom, justice, love, violence and the like gain their meanings 
through their interconnection with each other and with quilting points and master 
signifiers such as Islam, Christianity, modernity, Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Neoplatonism, Hinduism, and the like (as mentioned in the methodology chapter, 
social phenomena are signifiers embedded in incommensurable and emergent wholes 
and cannot be understood or changed atomistically).  
As such, social phenomena are not atomic they are relational and holistic. It was, 
hence, not at all clear how the people’s claim to power, knowledge and legitimacy 
could be reconciled with the rights and ideals of the Persian kingship and the claims 
advanced by the clergy in having access to divine truth; the whole social order had 
209 
 
not even began to contemplate on how the path of the mankind could be harmonized 
with the path of an ancient heritage (archaism), and both with the path of the 
prophets.     
We can see all the various dimensions of manifestation of truth from economy, to 
polity, culture, and morality present and harmonized in the Muharram procession. 
Power and prestige is produced, circulated, exchanged, and distributed in such rituals 
as well as wealth, gift, love and care, and solidarity, identity, piety and spirituality in 
a game of cooperation and competition. The Iranian historical embeddedness in its 
unique evolutionary trajectory involving rhizomatic and arborescent movements had 
managed to set up the language game of Muharram rituals and make different 
classes of people play them willingly in both cooperative and competitive spirits.  
The whole process and outcome closely resembles the organization of a football 
league. The people had to cooperate, and coordinate their actions and plan first to 
know what football is and what distinguishes it from other games and how to set up 
the league and then to play in it through different clubs (religious societies in towns 
and rural areas are the equivalent to football clubs) in a spirit of cooperation inside 
the club (hei’at) and competition between the clubs. The players gain stable 
identities inside the stable institutions whose legitimacies are not constantly 
questioned and the society reaches an emergent and stable consensus on its 
legitimacy. The ritual of Muharram, hence, was such an institution where people 
could compete and cooperate within a stable structure. Within this process, the 
market for the production of religious truths and feelings was established with all of 
its co-evolving dimensions attached to it; it was produced inside the parameters of 
the regime of truth as well as reproducing it, and depositing and sedimenting it anew 
in every incident of its re-enactment.  
After encountering modernity, people from all segments of society could participate 
at different scales in the language games or tournaments of economy (how to 
produce, distribute, and consume goods and services), polity, art, sports, education, 
gender relation, security (army, police and intelligence) and foreign policy. While in 
the game of religious rituals of Muharram people from all segments of society, and 
despite all of their differences, knew how to participate in the game and could, as 
Aghaie (2005: 379) maintains, contribute “in their own way, either financially or by 
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donating their possessions or services”, they lacked this, largely tacit and 
unconscious, knowhow with modern institutions. As Aghaie (2005: 379) attests,  
Every ritual became a massive cooperative project in which a variety of 
social relationships, such as those between elites and their various 
subordinates, were expressed and strengthened.  
 
All the conflicts and rivalries and juggling for power and pursuits of interests, and 
their associated emotional economies were at work in this communal tournament. 
This social assemblage was a tripartite assemblage with all of its diverse 
components. In its dimension of real it went far beyond the approved standards and 
entered the realm of theatre and became a realm of rhizomatic and criss-crossed 
hybridization. This provided a space where different forms of Shi’ism could compete 
with each other, as this was the space where the shah’s Shia through Ta’zia could 
compete with the clergy’s one (Amanat, 1997) and both with the Shia of ordinary 
people at the level of politics of ordinary. As Amanat (1997: 434-5) reports,  
 
The shah's expressions of religiosity beyond regular prayer and fasting, which 
he keenly recorded in all his travel diaries, also included an active patronage of 
the ta’ziya , the Shi’ite passion plays commemorating the martyrdom of 
Husayn and the sufferings of his house. A thriving aspect of popular religion in 
Qajar Iran, these plays were performed during the holy month of Muharram in 
a mixed spirit of mournfulness and fanfare. The shah’s love for the ta’ziya 
cannot be attributed merely to a fondness for dramatic arts nor to a mundane 
desire to glance through binoculars at the nobility, particularly the women, 
sitting in private boxes reserved for “society.” A deeper reason for the shah’s 
consistent support for the ta’ziya was a conscious desire to preserve an 
alternative form of Shi’ism, even in the face of the ‘ulama’s vociferous 
disapproval.  
 
This paragraph demonstrates how the society achieved social cohesion through the 
Muharram rituals and exhibits how in the common space of Muharram rituals the 
whole society, men, women, the shah, the ulama, the ordinary people and the elites 
came together mixing the symbolic/imaginary dimensions of these rituals with 
rhizomatic and un-symbolized one of turning it into a fanfare and a market for 
sensuality and sexuality (see Haeri, 1989: 11 on shrines as market for sex) alongside 
taking the rituals far beyond the control of the clergy.  
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The clergy could not establish their monopoly on how they were enacted in practice 
and were unable to keep it closed to what they perceived as impure traces being 
introduced to the rituals through the presence of women, ordinary people, and the 
shah. The dimension of ‘real’ was so present that the impurities could turn a 
mourning ritual into a ‘fanfare’, at least partially, which involves the extensive use of 
music, which is the sworn enemy of the clergy. Sex, music and the climate of 
festivity, and the profane was introduced to something which was supposed to be 
entirely mournful and sacred (see also Afary and Anderson, 2005: 48). We can see 
the dynamism of evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization at work here where 
an institution is developed internally as an emergent social assemblage following an 
inside-out model of development through interaction between different forces inside 
and outside a society without an external model disrupting its gradual process of 
creation and recreation.   
However, the spectre of de-legitimization was always haunting them through radical 
intellectuals like Akhundzadeh (who questioned these rituals as superstitious and 
reactionary; see Adamiyat, 1970) and the foreign embassies (who ridiculed them or 
found them amusing; they could not understand them from indigenous and insider 
eye view). They could exclude the foreigners from attending the ta’zia to partially 
control their destructive effects.  For example, Amanat (1997: 263) reports an 
incident where the British envoy  
 
… protested to [Mirza Agha Khan] Nuri about the exclusion of European 
missions from the annual royal ta’ziya performance (passion plays reenacting 
the tragedies of Husayn’s martyrdom in Karbala and the sufferings of his 
house), which Murray predicted would be a “clumsy and ridiculous” drama 
anyway. He was not satisfied by Nuri's explanation that, because the ta’ziya 
was considered “an amusing spectacle” by Europeans but a very serious 
occasion by the Shi'ites, the ulama found the European presence disagreeable.  
 
This is a perfect example of how stable institutions can evolve from inside and how 
they are taken to different directions alongside attempts made to de-legitimize them. 
If the British envoy had their own more advanced version of Muharram rituals and 
had introduced them as an alternative and the society had fallen into ambiguous 
situation of being not sure about the legitimacy of the indigenous or the European 
versions and the clergy, the Shah, the intellectuals and the people had taken different 
positions and changed their minds frequently on the truth or un-truth of these two 
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models of Muharram rituals the evolution of the whole institution would have been 
aborted and fallen into deformities and dysfunctionalities. The Muharram institution 
is an exhibition of what Iranian society could become in the constitutional era but 
never was; in a sense it was the Japanese face of Iranian society, where the elites and 
the people, by in large, worked together for the common purpose.  
It should be mentioned that the Tobacco movement is another case where all 
Iranians, except for royalty and the British, came together peacefully to create 
change, as Katouzian (2010) attests. This was a fleeting experience, which yet 
involved bitter demonization of more than one side of the truth equation (the 
monarchy and the British), breeding the seeds of the constitutional revolution.  
4.4.2. Modernity and the Institution of Nation-state  
This section explores the institutional failure in the exemplar case of formation and 
transformation of Iranian nation-state. Modernity, as the dominant regime of truth in 
the international order, forced all social actors to operate within the bounds of 
nation-state. The big Other of international order demanded the communities to 
organize themselves in the framework of a nation-state. As such attachment to 
nation-state became the most salient and obligatory feature of each and every social 
actor in all realms of life. Societies needed to construct a modern sense of 
nationhood alongside its twin notion of statehood to be able to gain recognition from 
the international order in order to survive and thrive. This is the same as the 
symbolic order asking for a new-born male baby to act and attain the identity of a 
man. As such, a male has to be able to perform the discursive and non-discursive 
practices associated with masculinity to be able to gain recognition from the big 
Other and to be able to survive and thrive.  
After encountering with modernity, the construction of nation-state became the most 
important project of belated societies like Iran. As such in the framework of 
international order, people could not freely move between Muslim societies based on 
their extraterritorial identity of being a Muslim. They had to act as the members of a 
nation-state and were recognized as such and nobody could stay nationless or refuse 
to attach herself to a nation. Nobody could act as the citizen of the world, as a 
member of mankind, or a member of a religion. The imposition of the notion of 
nation-state on all inhabitants of the earth and its associated discursive and non-
discursive practices alongside its institutional arrangements, discursive formations 
213 
 
and structure of power/knowledge is the most prominent sign of dominance of 
modernity at the global scale. This section, therefore, aims to show how in the 
constitutional era the state of inbetweenness coupled with the state of belatedness 
endangered dysfunctional and deformed sense of nationhood and dysfunctional and 
deformed institution of state, which made the modern Iranian nation-state a 
beleaguered one.  
As for the nationhood, facing the inevitability and urgency of the need for 
constructing a sense of nationhood in order to join the community of nations in the 
modern international order, the question was centred on how the sense of belonging 
to a shared house of being, called a nation, can be constructed to form a sense of 
social cohesion despite people’s different affiliations to various ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, communal, tribal, familial, class, gender, age, and other forms of identities. 
How could a sense of belonging to the same shared homeland be constructed out of 
so much diversity and difference? What could be used as the focal point for shared 
act of identification?  
As discussed before, the resources for constructing this new house of being was 
provided by the three regimes of truth and their three forms of time, the linear short-
term time of modernity (with its forward-looking property where future is conceived 
as the techno-scientific and consumerist utopia), versus archaic and mythical time of 
common ancestry (where Iran is narrativized as the cradle of civilization and as a 
noble cultural empire), and the atemporal time of eternity and its association with the 
prophets and infinitude.  
In the constitutional era, all sides especially the modernists activated a sense of 
patriotism and nationalism to generate adequate unity and enough momentum and 
enthusiasm to sustain the process of modernization. Modernity on its own cannot 
provide adequate materials for the construction of sense of nationhood. While it 
demands the construction of nationhood it cannot supply adequate materials to 
construct it as it is future-oriented and is based on instrumental rationality with little 
or no relation to the past and communicative and emancipative rationalities. 
Modernity lacks a blueprint for constructing a sense of nationhood amongst 
fragmented cohorts of people and even its liberal democracy, constitutionalism, and 
rule of law presupposes an already formed nationhood where they can be activated. 
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As such, ironically for the adoption of modernity a strong dose of non-modern 
heritage is needed (Smith, 1998, 1999, 2003).  
To demonstrates how the construction of modern nation-state is doomed to rely on 
non-modern materials we follow the following line of reasoning. Now that we are 
compelled by modernity as a global civilization to form nation-states, the question is 
why Azerbaijan, Gilan, Kordastan or Khorasan (or even smaller regions and cities 
within these provinces) should not be a nation of their own and try to achieve 
modernization within the boundaries set by these names. Here modernity cannot 
shed any light on which kind of people have to come together to form a socio-
political unit as a modern nation to strive for adoption of modernity. The national 
unit can be as small as Iceland or Qatar or as large as China or Russia; modernity is 
indifferent to the size of the nations. As such, what largely determines the size of the 
nation is the non-modern backgrounds. European forms of knowledge like 
archaeology or orientalism were used to makes the lost pre-modern resources 
available for the construction of modern sense of nationhood (Marashi, 2008: 60).   
For modernists ‘people of Iran’ was to be made to act as agent of their destiny 
through being recipient of techno-scientific rationality and through being 
transformed into a modern nation-state with constitutional government. 
Akhundzadeh, Malkam Khan, and Taqizadeh belonged to this category of 
nationalism where Akhundzadeh mixed his modernism with a carefully-tailored dose 
of Persianism while Malkam mixed it with an equally carefully-tailored dose of 
Islam, and Taqizadeh mixing it with a careful selection of Persianism. For 
Akhundzadeh all forms of resort to the historical heritage of pre-Islamic Persianism 
is childish compared to modernity (as for him any other achievement pales into 
insignificance compared to what modernity has achieved), but compared to other 
childish materials like Islam, he finds the pre-Islamic Persianism as better material 
for the construction of sense of modern belonging captured in the notion of 
nationhood (see Adamiyat, 1970; Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001; Ajodani, 2003; Marashi, 
2008; Ansari, 2012).  
Malkam Khan found in his bitter early experiences that modern nation-state could 
not be constructed by recourse to modernity alone and as he found the Persian 
monarchy extremely unreliable partner, he resorted to the Shia Islam and the clergy 
to create the momentum for the creation of modern nation-state (Keddie, 1980: 56). 
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Even Nasir-al-Din Shah himself, as Amanat (1997: 300) reports, felt the need to 
resort to the Shia Islam to fortify the sense of nationhood in the face of relentless 
interventions from the world powers:  
His appeal to a providential will and, more specifically, to the “founder of the 
faith” (apparently a reference to ‘Ali, the first Shi'ite Imam, rather than 
Muhammad the Prophet) to save the “Persian state,” the symbol of the “saved 
nation” of Iran, reflected a novel view of Shi'ite Islam as a source of common 
identity and national cohesion. His reference to “death with honor” and the 
“honor of the nation” versus disgrace and a whorish submission to unjust 
demands hinted at a sense of modern patriotism with a romantic tinge. 
Whether such pristine Shi'ite nationalism came to him by way of reading 
history or was the outcome of historical circumstances, it was a remarkable 
element in redefining his self-image as a modern ruler, a king with a mission 
to save his nation by means of “reason and fortitude.”  
 
Taqizadeh and others before him resorted to Ferdowsi and his Shahnameh, as 
Marashi (2009: 99; 2008: 60) attests, to create a common ideological glue for the 
generation of the sense of belonging to a modern socio-political unit called nation:  
 
In Taqizadah’s rendering of Ferdowsi, the historical, political, and ideological 
significance of the poet becomes amplified, Ferdowsi becomes more forcefully 
identified as the spokesman for the nation, and the Shahnamah becomes 
evidence, not only of a once-felt Iranian identity, but also becomes the 
blueprint for a new Iranian cultural renaissance.  
 
In the state of belated inbetweenness, the ideolegization of the three regimes of truth 
was inevitable, as each voice attempted to construct its own favoured sense of 
nationhood through a project of reverse social engineering by repressing the 
alternative ones. Shahnameh was ideolegized (used as the only or predominant 
blueprint for construction of the sense of nationhood) alongside the Shia 
jurisprudence and the Western constitutions. For the people like Sheikh Fazlollah 
Nuri, nationhood was primarily and predominantly defined in terms of affiliation to 
Shia Islam and its jurisprudence and as such his defence of Iran was due to its 
people’s adherence to Shia Islam and Iran per se appeared to have no intrinsic value 
for him (see Arjomand, 1984: 200-2; Shimamoto, 1987; Martin, 2013).  
As such, different voices attempted to construct the sense of nationhood out of 
different materials from alternative regimes of truth with different preference 
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orderings. Different voices prioritized differently in using the resources from the 
rival regimes of truth, in constructing the Iranian modern house of being. To achieve 
the sense of nationhood, they resorted to both affirmative and negating dimensions. 
In affirmative dimension they glorified the memory of Persian pre-Islamic empire 
(they activated the discourse of Persianism) and demonized the Arab ‘other’. They 
attributed all darkness and lack to this negative other and suggested some reform in 
Persian calligraphy as well (see Adamiyat, 1970, 1978). Ajodani (2002: 226-238) 
identifies the pragmatic and radical nationalism amongst the poets in the 
constitutional era, ranging from pure Persianism of Aref and Eshghi against both 
Islam and the Christian West to pragmatist nationalism of Adeeb, Bahar, or Ashraf 
resorting to Islamic and pre-Islamic heritage (Ajodani, 2002: 248) to entice people to 
coalesce around the sense of nationhood against the occidental despotism of the 
colonial powers.  
It can be noted that the site of constructing a sense of nationhood was another 
microcosm where Iranians could not come to agree on how to reconcile their 
irreconcilable differences on how to combine their three regimes of truth. As such 
any conception of truth was objected by all others, creating a zigzag between 
alternative conceptions without converging to any particular stable outcome.  A set 
of pragmatic and radical voices offered to construct the sense of nationhood out of 
different materials adopted from alternative regimes of truth, each by emphasizing 
on certain aspects while omitting or leaving others in silence. Every conception and 
the attempt for its institutionalization was challenged and blocked by the alternative 
ones, leaving the construction of the sense of nationhood in a state of deformity and 
dysfunctionality.  
The dysfunctional attempt to write a constitution was symptomatic of the impetus 
towards constructing a modern nation-state, the details of which was not included in 
this thesis due to the issue of word limitations. The extensive discussions on the 
failure in building other institutions (such as political parties, economy, voluntary 
associations, legal system and education) were further explored but excluded from 
this work due to word limitations. 
4.5. STATE OF CHAOTIC ORDER 
In each truth cycle, the process governing Iranian modern history starts from tragedy 
of confusion and end up in chaotic order passing through formation of unstable 
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coalitions and institutional failure. As Mirza Malkam Khan (1891: 239-40) observes 
in his London speech:  
each reform movement ends in revolution, each revolution ends in blood; and 
after the storm, the waters subside into the same sluggish calm, and there is 
just as little security of life and property, as little justice and freedom as 
before.  
 
Katouzian (2011: 773-4) affirms Malkm Khan’s observation by stating that: “The 
chaos that had followed the revolution had been such that constitutionalism quickly 
fell into disrepute”. Taqizadeh’s project of wholesale modernization (radical 
modernization) through constitutionalism came to its end by a thousand cuts in 1925 
when the new Pahlavi dynasty was formally founded, and initiated a new project of 
Persianized modernization through enlightened absolutism. The internal strife within 
and between different cultural tribes expressed through verbal and physical violence 
in an ambience of acrimony and antagonism and in an inevitable war of attrition 
exhausted the revolutionary movement and in its failure to create viable political, 
economic, and military institutions led to a state of chaos, culminating in the call for 
a strong man who could act as the final arbiter and Iranian leviathan to restore social 
order through the systematic deployment of coercion. As Saidi Sirjani (2011) attests,  
Even the veteran journalist Majd-al-Eslām Kermānī, in a leading article in the 
comic paper Kaškūl (5, 27 Rabīʿ I 1325/10 May 1907), expressed longing for 
an exceptional personality to take the country in hand.  
 
The demand for the strong man was met by its corresponding supply in the figure of 
Reza Khan before two other candidates, Vosuq-al-Douleh and Sayed Zia, having 
been dismissed as nonviable options for various reasons (Azimi, 2008).  
It is worth noting that events (like the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the 
subsequent Russian ultimatum of 1911 to Majlis over Shuster’s control of Iran’s 
finances and occupation of the country by the foreign forces and dissolution of 
second Majilis; see Keddie and Amanat, 1991: 206-7) per se could not be seen as the 
causes of the collapse of the constitutional order. They functioned as triggering 
factors in the context of deep division and bitter conflict within and between groups 
and institutions, and the chronic lack of social cohesion due to the intersection 
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between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness. In other contexts, 
such events could even lead to cementing a stronger sense of social cohesion as in 
the case of Japan after the humiliation of “the so-called Unequal Treaties regime” 
(Goto-Jones, 2009: 16). Depending on what they historically denote and connote for 
a community, emergent events have different causal influences in different complex 
systems of meaning and worlds of signification. Causation, as we extensively 
addressed in the methodology chapter, works within complex adaptive systems 
(system-specific causality) with non-linear criticality (butterfly effects and path-
dependency) and both operate within the regimes of truth and worlds of signification 
with their affiliated affirmative and negating facets and associated dictionaries and 
accompanying denotations and connotations.  
As such, foreign intervention or any other events cannot, per se, be deemed as the 
prime mover in the collapse of the constitutional order but the lack of social cohesion 
can.  
A series of events from Mohammad Ali Shah’s coup, to Anglo-Russian ultimatum 
over the demand for the dismissal of Shuster, chronic experience of rampant 
inflation, Iran’s reluctant entanglement into the quagmire of first World War, 
alongside occurrence of famine and epidemics, incidences of rioting, looting and 
pillage, the emergence of local and regional movements instigating the fear of 
secessionism, and the British attempt to turn Iran into its protectorate through the 
1919 agreement with Vosug-al-Douleh’s government (Azimi, 2008: 43; Katouzian, 
2011: 773-4), served as the thousand cuts for the death of the constitutional 
revolution in the framework of lack of social cohesion due to irreconcilable 
differences within and between different social assemblages.  
At the deeper level and away from all these events, what created the condition of 
possibility for the collapse of the constitutional order was the Iranian dasein’s 
confusion between alternative regimes of truth, exacerbated by the urgency to find 
immediate solutions for the ills of the society and the impatience to implement them 
through the act of reverse social engineering. Ultimately what caused the chaos was 
the fact that each cultural tribe tried to capture the centre and implement its own 
favoured package of reform or anti-reform without paying adequate attention to 
building capacity and consensus.  
219 
 
Iran needed to act urgently to the military, economic and cultural challenges of 
modernity without possessing adequate theoretical and philosophical capital on how 
to combine the three regime of truth in a viable and productive fashion which could 
coordinate and harmonize instrumental, communicative, and emancipative 
rationalities and their associated discursive and non-discursive practices. In the war 
between alternative regime of truth, each cultural tribe (which was the product of ad-
hoc combination of three regimes of truth through addition and subtraction, 
emphases, silences, and omissions) inevitably embarked on the antagonistic war of 
good against evil, and glorification of self and demonization of the other. This led to 
a war of attrition which exhausted the energy and goodwill of all sides and ultimately 
resulted in the call for the emergence of final arbiter, who could supposedly once for 
all resolve the irreconcilable differences in one direction or another, and restore the 
social order even if by resort to extreme violence. This approach rested implicitly on 
a theory of selection and a methodology of analysis of social phenomena which was 
based on Cartesian subject-object relation where the social order could be made the 
object of social engineering and intelligent design, without any attention to their 
properties of embeddedness, incommensurability, and emergence.  
If they had had a theory of selection and a methodology of social science based on 
Heideggerian dasein and the notion of being-in-the-world and free association, they 
would have embarked on non-violent acts of mutual understanding and the 
associated acts of capacity and consensus building. Such language and theory was 
not available to the historical actors at the time and as such they embarked on 
practicing transference and counter-transference and could not understand each 
other’s different worldhood with different dictionaries, and denotations and 
connotations. This led to seeing the other as evil and false and the self as good and 
true. This inevitably led to the ‘politics of elimination’. What else they could do? 
They had to embark on eliminating evil and establishing good; it is not clear how the 
compromise with evil could be legitimized for them. It was foreclosed to them to see 
the contemporary age as the age of belated inbetweenness and not the age of the 
conflict between good and evil, modern and traditional or any other form of binary 
oppositions.  
The prevalence of post-revolutionary chaos is attested by Azimi (2008: 47) in the 
following description of the central government, where it was deemed to be suffering 
from “political fragmentation, chronic cabinet instability, administrative incapacity, 
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and lack of effective means and resources, particularly an adequate military force”.  
The post-revolutionary chaos was the result of all sides exhausting each other in the 
war of attrition and eroding the political and social capital of the revolution; the 
chaos was the outcome of the continuum of voices (manifested in the multitude of 
societies and associations competing vehemently and violently for the capturing of 
centre of power and influence; see Shoukat, 2006) originating from the intermingling 
between the three regimes of truth. These multiple voices and cultural tribes could 
not manage to come into consensus to form stable coalitions to establish the 
institutions of modern nation-state to achieve the purpose of stable and legitimate 
modernization.  
The society could not organize itself into stable political parties, as there were 
differences of emphasis between different individuals and groups on how to combine 
different regimes of truth.  With the change in context of situation, different 
components of the complex repertoire of truth were activated, making behaviours 
unpredictable and prompting the ambience of mistrust, conspiracy theory, and 
impatience.  The bitter division between radicals and pragmatists emerged within 
and between groups and these divisions further developed into the forms of extreme 
radicalism such as Amo-oghli’s (see Sheikholeslami, 2012) and extreme pragmatism 
like Vosuq-al-Douleh’s (Azimi, 2008).  
In line with these developments, new groupings and associations were emerging 
throughout that period by the function of the operation of addition and subtraction 
over the set of three regimes of truth. Civil society was as much divided as the state 
(see Schirazi, 2002: 49-50; Fadaee, 2012: 75, 127). The state of inbetweenness in 
intersection with the state of belatedness gave rise to frequent incidence of “innocent 
cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 150), where both the perpetrators and the victims fell prey to 
the tragedy of confusion while each working for what they perceived to be true 
causes. In the meantime, Reza Khan’s suppression of Jangali movement, culminating 
to the death of its constitutionalist idealist leader, Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali 
(Azimi, 2008: 46) was one example amongst many of such incidents of innocent 
cruelty (see Abrahamian, 1982: 122). Each side was attacking the black book of the 
other while relying on the white book of the self; each side embarked on de-
legitimizing the other based on the other’s politics of ordinary and promoting itself 
based on their own politics of piety.  
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They wanted good modernity, good Islam, and good Persianism, without paying 
attention to the fact that you cannot have goodness of any regime of truth without the 
less good and bad sides emerging with it. As such the politics of piety cannot emerge 
without the politics of ordinary. They further ignored the fact that one person’s bad 
thing maybe another’s good one and one entity’s ordinariness is another one’s piety. 
Ultimately the immersion in the hyper-complex state of belated inbetweenness led to 
the emergence and collapse of the constitutional revolution, as all cultural tribes did 
not possess adequate tools to understand each other and as such misunderstanding 
created violence and chaos, leading to the re-emergence of Iranian leviathan as the 
final arbiter.  
4.6. CONCLUSION 
We need to look at the rise and fall of Mashroteh as an instantiation of principle of 
emergence; revolutions come and go without having any specific creator or 
intelligent designer (Skocpol, 1982; Selbin, 2010). At the time the three types of 
diseases striking the Iranian social body were conceived to be the three forms of 
despotism -religious, oriental, and occidental- themselves manifestation of the 
malfunctions of three forms of rationalities evolved to solve the despotism of three 
varieties of finitude associated with the despotism of nature, despotism of man, and 
despotism of death (as manifestation of existential finitude).  The three regimes of 
truth constitutive of Iranian embeddedness offered diagnoses and cures for the three 
diseases. The three general types of doctors of society emerged on the scene were the 
intelligentsia, the clergy and the people of pen in Persian bureaucracy (as part of the 
long tradition of house of wisdom in the Persian history) and Persian poetry. As 
such, those regimes of truth, which were parts of the problems, were parts of the 
solutions as well.  
Based on the three regimes of truth and their internal divisions into orthodoxy and 
non-orthodoxy, and their perceived dark and bright sides (none of them being virgin 
regimes of truth), and whether they could be mixed (pragmatism) or segregated 
(radicalism; puritanism), multitude of positions, voices and strategies emerged based 
on the applications of two operations of addition and subtraction. These multitudes 
of voices gave birth to numerous forms of cultural tribes personified in groupings, 
societies, and associations. These societies formed the basis for the emergence of 
fleeting number of unstable coalitions. These coalitions in turn shaped the 
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configuration of forces behind the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary fronts. 
The multitude of forces, voices and faces instigated and at the same time hampered 
and disrupted the gestation, birth, or maturation periods of institutionalization, which 
in turn gave rise to the emergence of deformed and dysfunctional institutions. These 
deformed institutions produced a chaotic order which in turn prompted new round of 
soul searching and the end of one round of Iranian truth cycle.  
4.6.1. Major Features of the Constitutional Era  
In the constitutional era, the dominant methodological approach guiding the soul 
searching cycle (the attempts made to identify the root-causes of the ills of the 
society) was reductionism, which led to the discourse of decline and the dangerous 
and violent form of blame game, and subsequent waves of acts of reverse social 
engineering leading to layers of institutional deformities and dysfunctionalities.  
The common outcome of the reductionist methodology, when applied to human 
relations, is misunderstanding. As a result, in the Mashroteh era individuals, groups, 
and societies constituting the social body misunderstood each other frequently. In 
effect, the main failure was the failure in mutual understanding.  Each self failed to 
understand the other, which culminated in the lack of self-understanding and self-
discovery as in the state of inbetweenness understanding the other is constitutive of 
the understanding of the self.  
The constitutionalist side failed to understand the internal logic of Nuri’s approach to 
life and ultimately executed him. The Nuri’s Sharia-centred side also could not grasp 
why the modernizers wanted to send women “naked” into the field of social 
interaction: they failed to understand the signifiers of “woman”, “sexuality”, 
“nudity”, “dress code”, “social interaction” in the life world of modernity and 
unpack their wide range of historical and situated sets of connotations and denotation 
in the dictionary of modernity, which are completely different from the free 
associations and conventions reflected in the dictionary of Islamdom. Furthermore 
they failed to understand the secrets of the Iranian fascination with modernity. This 
failure to analyse social phenomena in their singularity was at the heart of 
institutional failure and ultimate failure of the constitutionalist project of 
modernization.  
The actual workings of methodological reductionism can be reconstructed in the 
following ways. The original problem in the pre-constitutional era triggering the 
223 
 
whole series of revolutions and reform movements in the last two centuries was the 
encounter with modernity in its two white and black faces. The society was put in the 
position of therapy and not theory (the immediacy and gravity of the problem left no 
time for theorization and only time for therapy). The doctors of society 
encompassing the intelligentsia, the clergy, the poet, and the royalist house of 
wisdom offered diagnoses and solutions to the problem based on the textbooks of the 
three regimes of truth and their orthodox and non-orthodox divisions.   
A set of prescriptions were recommended incorporating different doses of 
modernity, Islam, and Persianism. In this era, the predominant purpose was to save 
Iran from oriental despotism (the dark side of orthodox Persianism) with its element 
of arbitrariness deemed to be the main obstacle to turning Iran into an industrialized 
society. The project of wholesale modernization became the dominant paradigm 
entailing the establishment a modern nation-state.  
The alternative truth camps and their associated cultural tribes competed violently 
and relentlessly over how to define and shape the three main components of the 
projects of social engineering, namely, establishing the institutions of modern state, 
constructing a sense of nationhood aiming to achieve progress, and building modern 
institutions of techno-scientific rationality. In the face of humiliating waves of 
economic, cultural and military defeats in the hands of world powers, almost no 
voice denied the need for reform, but they disputed vehemently over the nature of 
reform, its main players, and its main winners and losers.   
In the competition between the alternative truth camps, the radical constitutionalists 
with their project of radical modernization with its three subprojects won the race 
and set the agenda for the change, and other coalitions including the pragmatic 
constitutionalists, and radical and pragmatic coalitions with Islamic or Persianist 
affiliations challenged the dominant cultural tribe ruthlessly.  
Almost all doctors of society, with different affiliations and associations to different 
regimes of truth, from intelligentsia to the clergy and the people of pen in 
bureaucracy and Persian poetry, from Taqizadeh to Nuri, Naini, Malkam Khan, 
Mostashar-al-Douleh, Dehkhoda, among others, had this causal approach to 
diagnosis and treatment of the ills of the society.  
Different modern doctors of society offered different doses of modernity to establish 
a constitutional state, from minimalist pragmatists like Malkam who advocated the 
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idea of rule of law and sweetened its bitterness to the taste of Iranian nation by 
mixing it with Shia Islam to Akhonzadeh’s advocacy for liberal democracy with 
Persianist taste. The main dilemma for these doctors of society resided in coming up 
with a comprehensive blueprint which could incorporate the white books of all three 
regimes of truth and avoid their black books. The dispute was over what were their 
white and black books and what the architecture of the new order was supposed to be 
in the sense of what regime of truth with its symbolic and imaginary dimensions 
needed to be prioritized over what and why.   
Ultimately, with some nudges from the British Embassy, the idea of radical 
constitutionalism won the day. For many, including Taqizadeh and his associates, 
the writing of constitution and the establishment of Majlis were the first steps 
towards conducting deeper reforms in all institutions of society from language to 
economy, family, education, legal system, army, and religion. The religious 
constitutionalists like Naini and others (including pragmatist poets like Adeeb or the 
Qajar kings like Nasir-al-Din Shah) offered the resources of Shia Islam in the service 
of establishing a sense of nationhood and formation of modern constitutional state. 
For the modernizers the avenues to import the new rationality and its institutions 
were activities like sending students to Europe, establishing new educational and 
legal systems and inviting foreign educators and foreign missionaries for 
establishing schools and translation of material from the European languages, and 
hiring foreign experts for establishing modern finance, modern law, and modern 
army and police and apparatus of national security. Alongside the technical 
knowledge some thinkers emphasized on the importance of philosophical 
foundations of new rationalities both in scientific realm and in political realm and 
encouraged the translation of Western books on modern philosophy.       
Yet another doctor of society (Afghani) identified the roots of problems differently. 
He put the blame for the decline of Iran and other Muslim countries not on specific 
factors in each specific country but on the disunity of Islamic world and civilization. 
This civilizational approach tried to work in the framework of civilizational conflict 
and deemphasised the notion of nationhood in favour of the unity of the Islamic 
world (Islamdom) in opposition to the forces of colonialism. This voice represented 
an attempt to revive Islamic civilization through creating reformation in 
understanding and practice of Islam internally and resisting the colonial invasions of 
Islamic lands by the West through unifying the world of Islam externally. For this 
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voice the main disease of Islamic world was occidental despotism externally and 
oriental despotism and religious despotism internally.  This approach wanted to 
actively adopt modern political organization and techno-scientific rationality without 
much emphasis on the idea of nationhood. This approach inspired the emergence of 
religious reformation in the Islamic world alongside awakening its anti-colonialist 
sensibilities.    
In opposition to the ideas and institutions of constitutionalism, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri 
and his followers felt that the cures and therapies offered by the modern 
intelligentsia was killing the patient spiritually and was disconnecting the Shia 
community from its relation with the sacred, the source of revelation and guidance 
for overcoming the terror of existential finitude as manifested in death. For this 
voice, modernity through overemphasizing the pleasures of the flesh was making the 
soul poor and was depriving the nation from its prospect of eternal happiness in 
heaven by side-lining the role of Shia jurisprudence in the organization of the 
believers’ daily lives. For this approach the diagnosis was that the modernization 
cure was more pernicious than the disease itself and as a result an attempt was made 
to treat the patient from the treatment itself by forming a coalition with Persian 
monarchy and even with part of occidental despotism (Russia) against the onslaught 
of orthodox modernity combined with traces of non-orthodox modernity and its 
associated allies in non-orthodox Persianism and Shia Islam.  
In reaction to this latter voice some ulama declared the self-sameness of 
constitutionalism and Shia jurisprudence and saw the idea of constitution and its 
associated institutions as effective ways of restricting the monarchy and the foreign 
powers, and conducive to  progress. This diagnosis reinforced the mainstream 
diagnosis and endorsed the same treatment minus the social freedom of vices which 
they deemed not inherent to constitutionalism. Alongside all of this the royalist 
voices like Amin-al-Soltan and Mohammad Ali Shah emphasised on the possibility 
of achieving progress via formation of a wide coalition inside an enlightened 
authoritarian and despotic regime like Japan and Germany, which was largely 
ignored.  
All sides in the market for truth about life, work, and language with their mechanical 
logic of reductionism and their associated discourse of decline embarked on the act 
of mutual de-legitimization leading to the erosion of the collective will to reform and 
the ultimate collapse of the whole constitutional movement.    
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This period sees the constant interplay of the notions of legitimacy and bastardity; 
many pragmatic voices and alliances and hybrid voices were seen as illegitimate and 
incoherent. The radical voices treated the pragmatic voices as examples of bastardity 
and whoredom (lakkategi) and coalitions were enjoying only partial legitimacy in 
terms of the language of one regime of truth while they were suffering from lack of 
legitimacy from alternative ones. Identities were wax-like (as Nasir-al-Din Shah was 
at pain to admit), spineless (as Taqizadeh put it) or chameleon-like (the way Nasim-e 
Shomal had put it) and were incessantly moving between different regimes of truth 
and between radical and pragmatic camps.  
In effect, this era was the site of fierce war of attrition between and within the 
radicals and pragmatists of all sides. It was inevitable that all sides felt under siege 
and would embark on brutally attacking each other verbally or physically; what 
Amanat (1997: 152, added emphases) said with regard to Nasir-al-Din Shah applies 
to all sides of the social body: “the "cannonballs of sedition" were destined to rain on 
his "castle of mirrors." These “cannonballs of sedition” were launched from all sides 
against each other’s “castle of mirrors”. The voices were highly fragile combinations 
of all three regimes of truth and the war of attrition was fully operative.  
Deploying Dehkhoda’s very influential notion of nonsense (charand va parand), we 
can see that at this era every cultural tribe treated what was said and done by others 
as nonsense (charand). All sides de-legitimized and discredited each other one way 
or another. All sides were putting each other on trial and declaring each other as 
guilty. The methodology used to analyse the position of alternative voices was the 
familiar reductive method of “compare and contrast” with borrowing examples from 
various parts of history (the destructive logic of exemplarity; see Hollander, 2008; 
Harvey, 2002), all leading to misunderstanding of the radical other. 
All cultural tribes were changing their positions and alliances frequently in response 
to the new configuration of forces in the context of situation. Britain activated the 
liberal idealism one minute and was the inspiration behind and the supporter of the 
constitutional movement, when idealism and Realpolitik were on the same side, and 
suddenly changed its position to oppressing constitutionalism due to the needs of 
Realpolitik coming into conflict with idealism of emancipatory spirit of liberalism 
and democracy. Britain supported the constitutional revolution for a while and then 
helped to curb it later due to change in context of situation.  
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In this era we had three forms of coalitions: the Persianist coalition, the Islamic 
coalition and the modernist coalition, where their regimes of truth and strategy-
narrative were distinctly different. Behbehani-Tabatabi and Nuri coalitions belonged 
to the Islamic coalition, the Taqizadeh, Malkam Khan, and even Afghani, and 
Russian-British coalitions belonged to modernist coalition and the Shah and his 
followers belonged to the Persianist coalition. These coalitions formed fleeting 
strategic alliances with each other (like the British formed a fleeting coalition with 
Taqizadeh and constitutionalist coalition, and the Russians formed a coalition with 
the Shah and Nuri). 
All sides resorted to repression and disavowal, alongside being trapped in their own 
cases of foreclosure (unable to think the unthinkable).  
Mashroteh movement and Islamic republic are mirror image of each other; both had 
a set of coalitions of seculars and religious entities, one was ultimately dominated by 
seculars (modernization project) while the other by the religious (the Islamization 
project). The revolutions’ deeper causes were rooted in the truth wars and the truth 
cycles endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness when a social assemblage is 
thrown in a state where it has to choose its own condition of possibility of choosing 
(burden of judgement). Mashroteh movement formulated its demands at all four 
Williamsonian levels; people were unhappy with the level of prices and inflation and 
hence frequent incidences of bread riots, with the governance of the cities 
(complaints against Ein-al-Douleh), with the institutions of the state from taxation to 
legal system, and hence the call for the house of justice (edalatkhaneh) to fill the gap 
between theory and practice, or/and the establishment of a new language game in the 
form of writing a modern constitution and institutionalizing it in the form of an 
constitutional monarchy, which would inevitably require a drastic change in the 
institution of mind and its associated regimes of truth.  
Here we also see how social change occurs in three levels of causation, complex 
system, and world of signification. The phrase “Inflation causing demonstrations and 
bread riots” works at the level of mechanical causation. While this small event 
turning into an avalanche for change is an example of non-linear criticality, path 
dependency, and butter fly effect, where a small event can cause a big effect. Bayat’s 
observation (2005: 400) implicitly refers to the work of non-linear criticality within 
complex adaptive systems of meaning:  
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Not all events that provoked the ulama’s second exodus from the capital 
followed a logical sequence. A series of unrelated instances of unrest in 
Tehran and the provinces, with diverse causes and involving different social 
groups, produced cumulative effects of greater consequence to the revolution 
than each one taken in isolation.  
 
The point is that social phenomena do not follow “a logical sequence”. Each system 
of meaning and world of signification develops its own unique and internal logic of 
causation, association, interpretation, and action following the rhizomatic movement 
of free association and its associated symbolization and harmonization at three forms 
of topological, typological, and axiomatic movements. All these events occurred in 
the context of encounter with modernity and the ensuing war between three regimes 
of truth and its emergent truth cycles.  
In this era, and throughout Iranian modern history, Iranians have frequently 
committed intentional fallacy, in the sense of attributing their ill fate to the bad faith 
of their rulers or alien others. This ignores the fact that passions and interests are 
shaped and operate within regimes of truth, alongside the fact that in the stable 
institutional structures even the bad intentions can produce good common goods. All 
social activities need “licence to operate”, which is issued by the dominant regime of 
truth in any social order. This is what ultimatum and trust games (see Camerer, 
2003) measured in the cross-cultural contexts (see Berry et al., 2011: 90).  
When a social assemblage cannot produce truth, coordination game, ultimatum 
game, and trust game turn into prisoner’s dilemma game. The failure to produce 
truth leads to failure to produce trust which in turn leads to the failure in the 
production of stable institutions and in turn wealth. This is what Siegfried (2006: 
106) observes:  
the relationship between trust and oxytocin is central to understanding many 
of the world’s economic ills. Oxytocin is linked to happiness, and the 
countries where people report high levels of happiness are also countries 
where people report high degrees of trust. Trust levels, in turn, are a good 
indicator of a country’s economic well-being. “Trust is among the biggest 
things economists have ever found that are related to economic growth,” ….  
 
The level of oxytocin is related to trust and trust to economic growth, leading to the 
conclusion that if a social order could produce trust it could produce wealth and 
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happiness. The production of trust was not possible in this era due to the intersection 
between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness. As we observed, 
mistrust was rife and was associated with prevalence of suspicion, conspiracy theory, 
intentional fallacy, and endemic impatience, all leading to different projects and 
subprojects of reverse social engineering, which in turn led to institutional failure 
and chaotic order as there was no time or patience for capacity and consensus 
building.  
In producing the tragedy of confusion, dysfunctionalities and deformities, and chaos, 
faces were only the instrument (a’lat-e fe’l, as Taqizadeh put it) of their affiliated 
regimes of truth.  Multiplicity of cultural tribes emerged out of the combinations of 
the three regimes of truth and engaged on existential war with each other, leading to 
the war of seventy two cultural tribes, all engulfed in the antagonizing and self-
righteous war of good against evil. Blaming these seventy two voices and declaring 
them as false (famous Hafez’s poem chon nadidand haghighat rahe afsaneh zadand, 
as they did not see the truth they travelled the path of myth) ignores the fact that in 
the state of inbetweenness every voice is constituted of a truth (haghighat), a myth 
(afsaneh), and a piece of magic (afsoon) (reference to Hafez’s poem dah roz-e mehr-
e gadroon afsaneh ast  va afsoon, the short days of this life are myth and magic), 
corresponding to three dimensions of real, symbolic and imaginary (see Gabriel and 
Zizek, 2009). The war between the radicals and the pragmatists was inevitable as 
there was no conceptual framework or platform to enable different sides to 
understand each other; and as such blaming the radicals for the failure of the 
constitutional revolution (see Ajodani, 2003; Nategh, 2003) is a futile exercise, as it 
does not address the condition of possibility of emergence and persistence of 
radicalism.  
In all of this, as Afghani (1892: 241) put it: “The dream was short-lived”. All sides 
had their own dreams and all dreams were short-lived. This dynamics was engulfed 
in the relation between universal and particular, the word and meaning (lafz va 
ma’na) (Ajodani, 2003: 371-2), and ultimately in the Heideggerian fourfold, theory 
of social phenomena, theory of language and meaning and the theory of selection 
from alternative social assemblages and alternative regimes of truth.   
Malkam Khan’s London lecture can serve as a site where all of the above set of 
cluster concepts was hard at work. Malkam’s London lecture (1891) can be treated 
as the manifesto of his pragmatic modernist coalition. His main question was why 
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we are backward and the West is advanced. He activates his own discourse of 
decline (rather than the West’s emergent exceptionalism). He tests and refutes a 
series of hypotheses on the secret of the decline of Muslim world and ultimately 
comes to the conclusion that now that we are not pioneers we have to think about 
how we can become good copyists and “copy” and “imitate” (see Ansari, 2012: 65, 
footnote 104, for the two similar notions of akhz, adoption, and eqtebas, acquisition, 
in circulation in the post-constitutional era) the western model of modernity 
successfully (see Malkam Khan, 1891: 240).  
In this lecture, Malkam demonstrates his extraordinary and rare ability to apply 
hermeneutics of understanding both (and especially) to the Islamic side and to the 
western side where he acknowledges the good intention of the western side in 
attempts being made to offer western technology and expertise to Iran, but was 
unable to extend the same treatment to the monarchy as monarchy was the 
incumbent side and in his particular form of situatedness he sees the incumbent as 
the main source of Iranian continuous experience of decline; here he implicitly sees 
the society as the product of will of the leaders. Here Malkam identifies the deep 
crisis and the issue of messianism in the Islamic world and maintains that except for 
polygamy there is nothing in Islam which opposes western civilization (and he refers 
to the issue of polygamy with which the western people are puzzled and compares it 
to what the Muslim people are puzzled, the west’s promiscuity in sexual relations), 
what seems to have evaded his sharp intellect was the state of belated inbetweenness.  
Malkam (1891: 239) implicitly identifies Islam as a ‘regime of truth’ where he says 
that  
Islam is not a religion; it is a vast system which embraces the whole society-
the man from his birth to his death. There is nothing that is beyond its scope. 
Besides the Koran, there are traditions which are as powerful and even more 
respected than the Koran itself.   
 
Malkam (1891: 241; emphases added) implicitly refers to the Muslim people’s 
preference structure  and their demand for three forms of instrumental, 
communicative, and emancipative rationalities in the search for the question of why 
Muslim people cannot ‘copy’ the western modernity in the following terms:  
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The ambition and aspiration of Musselman people are not to have railways 
and telegraphs, or great empires, although not averse to these things in 
themselves; their chief object is only to serve God, to worship God, and to 
fight against those who do not worship Him exclusively, and to die and go to 
paradise. That is the only principle that governs all Mohamedan people.   
 
He identifies the hierarchical structure of preference structure where some elements 
are given precedence over others. In his statement the phrases “chief object” and 
“although not averse to these things in themselves” capture the nature of what he 
perceived to be the Muslim people’s preference ordering (which he wrongly 
assumed to be stable and fixed). Malkam (1891:241) also alludes to the notion of 
‘repugnance’ (see Ruth 2007 for Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets) and sees 
the animosity of the Muslims with the Christians in the difference in their 
corresponding theological doctrines of unity of God versus Trinity of God and 
divinity of Jesus:  
for that reason, Mohamedan people have a great repugnance for anything 
which comes from Europe.  
 
The notion of repugnance offers the dimension of affectivity and emotional economy 
alongside the dimensions of power and knowledge, and how they all determine “the 
licence to operate”. Malkam also alludes to the structure of power/knowledge in the 
Muslim and Shia community by noting the important feature that they do not have a 
formal church and the structure of authority in the Shia community is highly 
decentralized, and suggests the ways through which this character can enhance the 
process of copying from the West.  
Malkam’s short lecture is rich with all the dimensions of social assemblage we 
addressed in the chapter on methodology. It is extremely important to note that 
Malkam points to how Muslim people see Europe as a threat to their faith due to the 
experience of crusade and their different theologies; Malkam implicitly 
acknowledges the fact that for Muslim people Europe associates with historical 
trauma of crusade and with false theology, both of which produce repugnance in 
them towards the West and its products (implicitly implying how all historical 
assemblages are immersed in their own worldhood and its associated historically 
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evolved dictionary and accompanying denotations and connotations, which shows 
the need for hermeneutics of understanding alongside hermeneutics of suspicion).  
In a sense Malkam was saying thatMuslims want progress and grand civilization but 
not at the expense of losing their beloved faith. Malkam states that that is why they 
do not call the western capitalists to come and develop their resources, which 
amounts to the rejection of foreign direct investment. This is due to the fact that for 
them the signifier of the West is associated with the robbery of their faith. In that 
sense, for Muslims it is not a good deal to do a Faustian deal with the West, to lose 
their soul for the sake of gaining material progress. This Malkam’s observation 
(1891: 242) beautifully captures what Foucault deems as the fundamental relation 
between the creation of wealth and the production of truth.   
Alas Malkam did not have adequate theoretical resources or time to develop these 
insights further. He comes up with the idea that the only way to make the Muslims 
embrace the Western modernity is to repackage it in the name of Islam by saying to 
the Muslims that all of these advances were already hidden in the Islamic laws and 
Islamic civilization, and reminding them that they only needed to recapture their lost 
heritage.  In a sense Malkam well understood the different denotations and 
connotations of signifiers such as West, Islam, Christianity, progress, freedom, 
equality, law and the like. He sees the proselytizing nature of Christianity as a 
perceived danger for the Muslim people; this was complemented with modernity’s 
proselytizing irreligiosity (which Malkam does not address).  
He comes to the impasse: we cannot develop ourselves in the sense of becoming 
pioneers (for him mainly due to the oriental despotism) and we cannot copy you, the 
westerners, as we are traumatized by you. Malkam (1891: 143) says the Japanese 
managed to copy Europe as their religion was not as strong. Here he implicitly 
acknowledges the embeddedness and incommensurability of social phenomena, in 
this case the fundamental difference in the meaning and role of religion in Japan 
compared to Iran; which implicitly acknowledges that Iran cannot follow the path 
Japan travelled.  What is the way out of the dilemma of not being a pioneer like 
England and not being a follower like Japan? His answer is simple; stop packaging 
modernity in the name of the West and repackage it as the lost heritage of the 
Muslim people themselves. Here we can understand Malkam in his own terms and 
act as devil’s advocate despite Ajodani (2003) and Nategh’s (2003) attacks for 
intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy, treating him as disgrace to the intellectuals.  
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For Malakam and his coalition the way out was to introduce western civilization in 
the garb of Islam. This is a brilliant analysis, but misses the state of belated 
inbetweenness and the fact of division within the Iranian selfhood, and within the 
clergy as well as all classes of Iranian people. Despite the fact that his analysis is 
severely unsustainable (despite all of his sharp observations), this lecture is a 
genuine analysis and he is a genuine analyst. He is innocent of almost all charges 
levelled against him by all sides. He refers to the point that in Islam, especially 
Persian version of it, there is no church (1891: 243) and sees that feature as positive 
compared to Europe. He perceives that the decentralized nature of the clergy can 
help in the process of Islamization of modernity, as some clergies can be found who 
could willingly endorse the bright features of modernity, like techno-scientific 
advances and the rule of law. He wanted to persuade the West that Islam is 
potentially modern and secondly, inviting them not to package their truth products in 
their own name, instead packaging them in the name of Islam. In the state of belated 
inbetweenness both of these features were subject to scathing attacks and war of 
attrition from all sides.  
The important point is that this was Malkam’s idiosyncratic brand of project of 
reverse social engineering (see Taqizadeh’s and the Young Iran party’s manifestos of 
reverse social engineering in Ansari, 2012: 62-8), which was inevitable to the state 
of belatedness and was bound to fail due to lack of tri-polar forms of credibility and 
legitimacy, fatal but innocent immersion in the discourse of decline, and lack of 
attention to the significance of building capacity and consensus in the state of belated 
inbetweenness and failure to consistently see social orders as emdebbed, emergent 
and incommensurable social assemblages.   
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CHAPTER 5  
THE OIL-NATIONALIZATION MOVEMENT 
History ‘Stephen said,’ is a nightmare from 
which I am trying to awake'. James Joyce, 
Ulysses 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to explore another case study with the parameters established in 
Chapter 2 and 3, which was applied to ‘the constitutional revolution’ in Chapter 4.  
This chapter provides a theoretical exploration of how after the demise of 
constitutional revolution and the transient resurgence of oriental despotism as a 
benevolent modernizer and its sudden collapse, occidental despotism gained 
prominence in becoming the new face of evil for the Iranian subjectivities in the 
events of Oil-Nationalization Movement (ONM henceforth). The three strong events 
of the last 150 years (constitutional revolution, the ONM, and the Islamic revolution) 
alongside numerous weak events along the way are symptomatic of the desperate 
attempts made by the Iranian dasein to construct a new house of being to solve the 
problem of discursive homelessness while facing the question of what materials 
should be used from what regime of truth with what logic of prioritization and 
precedence in the construction of the house. This chapter covers the period between 
the rise of Reza Shah in 1925 and beginning of the end of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 
15 Khordad (June, 5) uprising of 1342 (1963). 
It is worth noting that in the Oil-Nationalization era, the scenario was deceptively 
simple; a (supposedly) sovereign nation opted to nationalize its main natural 
resource in a process of popular uprising and democratic decision-making with its 
ensuing compensation arrangements in an age where nationalization of industries 
was a common practice (Abrahamian, 2001). This collective action aimed at 
regaining the collective ownership of the country and its resources was meant, 
consciously or unconsciously, to restore a sense of national pride, putting a stamp of 
authority and achieving real and effective sovereignty on its own affairs. This 
episode, in theory and on paper, should have ended in a civilized and amicable 
outcome for all the stakeholders, but the intersection between the ‘condition of 
situation’ and ‘condition of culture’ turned it into another tragic and traumatic 
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experience for the Iranian people and tainted the reputation and credibility of the 
West greatly and delegitimized the monarchy and created a sense of bitterness and 
disillusionment with modernity and Persianism which ultimately culminated in the 
emergence of the third strong event, namely Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Kinzer, 
2003). This chapter attempts to uncover the dynamics of interaction of forces, 
voices, and faces acting as condition of possibility for the rise and fall of the ONM 
and its traumatic reverberations in the history of modern Iran.   
5.1.1. Dreams and Interpretations alongside Trials and Judgements  
The outcome of the ONM was tragic for all sides concerned in the short- or/and 
long-term. Tragedy is not the direct and immediate product of conscious design of a 
singular actor or a group of actors but an emergent and unintended consequence of 
the conscious and unconscious actions and interactions of many independent players 
in the theatre of social life. Actions and texts in their properties as sign systems (see 
methodology chapter) possess dream-like qualities where as in analysing and 
interpreting the chain of signifiers in a dream and connecting them with their 
meanings we need to locate the dream and its sign system in the worldhood of the 
dreamer and extract the clues and keys for interpreting the dream from the singular 
and incommensurable dictionary of the dream world of the dreamers.  
As such in understanding the actions and events of the ONM our task as an 
interpreter of the dream is to extract the dictionaries of faces, voices, and forces 
involved in the rise and fall of the movement based on the internal logic of their 
singularities as embedded, emergent and incommensurable products of movements 
of social assemblages in their triple structures. One of the proximate actors and 
renowned historian of this event, Movahhed (1999, 2004a, 2004b), refers to it as a 
“confused dream of oil” (khab-e ashofteh-e naft). The notion of dream (khab) and 
truthful dream (ro'ya-ye sadegeh) plays a significant role in the constitution of the 
life world of Iranian people in this period and throughout the modern and non-
modern history of Iran (Robinson, 2003: 151). In a sense, the significance attached to 
dream and truthfulness of dreams differentiates Iranian worldhood from alternative 
life worlds. The two features of dream-like nature of social assemblages (in their 
imaginary and symbolic dimensions) and the notion of confusion in the dream-like 
assemblage of Iranian social order plays significant roles in understanding the 
meanings and significance attached to the ONM and its tragic consequences.  
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In the interpretation of this confused dream it is easy to fall into the trap of 
countertransference and impose analyst’s dictionary (and its own denotations and 
connotations) on the dictionaries of the actors and voices and faces involved in the 
unintended creation of the events associated with its rise and fall. This is what 
frequently happened; the historical actors and historians have been immersed in the 
dynamics of transference and counter-transference, and misunderstanding. As such, 
the Iranian subject was a confused dreamer (gong-e khab dideh) and the rest of the 
world deaf (a’lam tamam kar) to his actions, words, and emotions (Fischer, 2004: 1).    
With regard to the dream-like nature of social orders, it is acknowledged that the 
human life is wrapped in different layers of first-order, second-order, and ultimately 
nth-order interpretations (see Britten et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2011); the 
denotations and connotations of actions, talks, and texts need to be deciphered based 
on the actors’ own accounts and the best defence and rationale which can be 
constructed for them based on the logic of their own life world in the spirit of 
‘devil’s advocate’. In a sense, any historiography functions as a trial in the court of 
history, and the historiographer is required to launch the best defence possible for the 
faces, voices, and forces involved based on the internal logic of their life worlds and 
their own dictionaries in order to understand why things happened the way they did. 
The nature of historiography as a court of judgment was not hidden from the 
historical actors themselves in this era and they frequently resorted to the notions of 
‘dadgah-e tarikh’ (the court of history) or divine court (see Rahnema, 2005). 
Taqizadeh’s (Katouzian, 2003: 120-122) encounter with and response to Mosaddegh, 
where Mosaddegh accused Taqizadeh of betrayal in the signing of the British-Iranian 
oil contract of 1933, is an example of that awareness. Navvab, for instance, invited 
Mosaddegh (Rahnema, 2005: 256) to put each other on trial. 
Furthermore, Mosaddegh himself was put on military trial after the collapse of the 
ONM movement- which Mosaddegh turned into a trial for the Shah’s regime 
(Sahabi, 2007: 173)- and recently by new generations of activists, historians and 
historiographers (for example see Mirfetros, 2011; Mojtehedzadeh, 2011; 
Ghaninezhad, 2011). The military trial of Mosaddegh by the Shah is symptomatic of 
every social actor putting every other actor on trial, leading to issuing verdicts and 
passing judgments on others based on their own grid of intelligibility, which 
culminates in misunderstanding and epistemic/physical violence. The frequent 
episodes of mutual misunderstanding are endemic features of Iranian modern history 
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and its historiography. Mosaddegh, for instance, judges all other prime ministers as 
puppets of the world powers (Rahnema, 2005) or embarks on misjudging Taqizadeh, 
while almost all actors issued a negative judgement on Qavam (Shoukat, 2006). 
Thus, dreams and misinterpretations of dreams are constant feature of this hazardous 
and tragic period of the Iranian history.  
The historical actors themselves were/are deeply aware of the judgement of the 
history and some of them were deeply plagued by transference, in the sense of doing 
things for the eyes of the historical beholders and being fearful of their brutal 
misjudgement. The historical actors project the next generations as their judges and 
try to construct a defensive wall around their reputation for the time when they 
cannot defend themselves after their demise; they strive to establish a good name and 
reputation in pursuit of their symbolic immortality, while being severely frightened 
of the hell of bad reputation in the court of public opinion or in the divine court. The 
concern for symbolic immortality, hence, is part of analytic of finitude; it is a coping 
strategy against the terror of death and immerses the historical actors in the dynamics 
of intergenerational misunderstanding, where the historical actors engage on 
transference and the next generations practice counter-transference. Reza Shah, for 
example, refers to this dynamics when he was in the process of signing a new oil 
contract with the British side and explicitly expressed his fear of judgement of 
history (Rahnema, 2005).   
With reference to the concepts developed in Chapter 3, the strong events of Iranian 
modern history can be analysed based on the attempts (dreams) to overcome the dark 
sides of three regimes of truth via relying on the bright sides of the same three 
regimes of truth. In a sense, Iran’s modern history is a set of attempts to liberate the 
country and its people from three despotisms in the hope of embracing their 
corresponding bright alternatives in three different varieties of freedom and 
emancipation. In the ONM era, the turn of events put the occidental despotism as the 
main candidate for causing the ailments and decline of Iranian society (the discourse 
of decline). The identification of the chief culprit in causing the decline of the nation 
had moved from the occidental despotism in the first half of 19th century and after 
the defeats in the hands of the British and the Russians, to the oriental despotism in 
the constitutional revolution and after the gradual fall of the constitutional order and 
re-emergence of oriental despotism in the figure of Reza Shah to the religious 
despotism, and back to occidental despotism once again in the ONM era.  
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5.1.2. Reza Shah’s Dream of Persianized Modernization as Conversion of 
Taqizadeh’s Dream of Modernized Modernization  
The message of the failure of the constitutional revolution for the modernizers like 
Taqizadeh was not to prompt the abandonment of the project of modernization but to 
pursue it by other means, this time through top-down military, benevolent, and 
enlightened dictatorship of Reza Shah rather than bottom-up model of the 
constitutional revolution (see Ansari, 2012; Abrahamian, 1982). Taqizadeh’s project 
of ‘modernizing the country from top to toe’ needed to be pursued by other means, 
through coercion; it was believed that a society of illiterate and uncultured people 
deeply embroiled in superstitious and supernatural quagmires was incapable of 
knowing their best interests and pursuing them in a set of rationally planned steps. 
Consequently, the society needed to be taken to the heaven of modernity by force 
(see Abadian, 2009a, 2009b). With the disillusioned constitutionalists (like 
Teymourtash, Davar and others) providing the discursive and non-discursive 
firepower for the project of forced modernization and reverse social engineering, 
Reza Shah’s mission was to complete the project of modernization triggered by the 
constitutional revolution. In practice, Reza Shah turned the project of authoritarian 
modernization designed by the modernist intelligentsia to Persianized modernization 
of his own (see Ansari, 2012: 78-9; Katouzian, 2010, chapter 9). In a sense, Reza 
Shah succeeded where Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar had failed; they both wanted to 
subsume the life-changing power of modernity under the larger project of 
Persianization.  
The coalition formed by the modernists and the Persianists in the government of 
Reza Shah was transformed from authoritarian modernization to Persianized 
modernization, or as Koutuzian (2010) puts it from dictatorship to despotism. This 
was due to the fact that Reza Shah was driven to act, despite his initial orientation 
towards republicanism, within the regime of truth of Persian monarchy (Soudavar, 
2003; Rajaee, 1993; Lambton, 1962), which served as the re-emerged project of 
Persianization.  
The lack in modernity (Euben, 1999; Zaidi 2011) in constructing a sense of 
belonging to a national unit resulted in the reactivation of discursive and non-
discursive practices associated with the regime of truth of orthodox Persianism, 
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which led to the Reza Shah’s Persianized modernization in order to achieve 
modernized Persianism. This was an inevitable outcome of a process in which with 
the defeat of the Reza Shah’s initial project of republicanism, the intelligentsia’s 
project of modernized modernization through enlightened despotism was gradually 
turned into Reza Shah’s project of Persianized modernization through oriental 
despotism. Persianism managed to hijack the top-down modernization reform 
movement instigated and legitimized by intelligentsia like Taqizadeh, Davar, 
Teymourtash and others (Abadian, 2009a, 2009b). This was partly due to the fact 
that the project of republicanism was defeated by the Islamic and non-Islamic 
elements loyal to the ideas and ideals of constitutional monarchy (Nejati, 1999) and 
their fear of secularism (Ansari, 2012: 78-9).  
In effect, with the collapse of the constitutional revolution the modernist project of 
modernization was already in tatters, and with the retreat of religion into the safe 
ground of religious schools after the bitter experience of civil war within the 
religious camp, the only option left was restoration of oriental despotism and the 
reactivation of the regime of truth of orthodox Persianism. Modernists alone could 
not implement their project of modernization and had to go into fragile coalition with 
Islamists or Persianists to make their project practically feasible. The modernists’ 
coalition with the Islamists in the constitutional era to negate the Persian despotism 
and affirm the constitutional monarchy failed as the two main sides fought 
incessantly in a war of attrition to shape the new order in their own image.  
In effect, after the bitter experience with modernity (in its form of constitutional 
monarchy) and Islam in the constitutional era, it was time for the Persianism to 
return as the final arbiter to save Iran from falling into anarchy. This explains why 
the Reza Khan’s collective modernizing dictatorship, as Katouzian (2010, chapter 9) 
puts it, turned into oriental despotism; such transformation was inevitable as he was 
acting within the bounds and parameters of Persian monarchy where the king is the 
shadow of God and effectively owns the whole country (Soudavar, 2003; Rajaee, 
1993; Lambton, 1962).  Reza Shah’s project collapsed due to the severe deficits in its 
modernist, Islamist and Persianist (Persian house of wisdom) credentials and 
legitimacies.  
The whole dynamics of movement from the failure of the constitutional movement to 
the failure of Reza Shah’s project is indicative of the fact that in the Iranian state of 
240 
 
belated inbetweenness no regime of truth could single-handedly shape the new 
Iranian order and the infightings and discontents within and between coalitions of 
forces were bound to lead to the collapse of both projects.     
The historical accounts demonstrate that Reza Shah’s attempts against tribalism, 
although brutal (Cronin, 2007; Katouzian, 2010), was largely successful but against 
Islam and communism enjoyed far less success. This is due to the fact tribalism was 
not, at the time, a powerful regime of truth on its own and was not actively and 
unconditionally supported by any of the three main regimes of truth in the Iranian 
landscape. Reza Shah’s regime can be characterized by its antagonization against 
religious despotism and revolutionary (communist) despotism in a coalition formed 
between occidental and oriental despotisms to Persianize the country through 
modernization
39
, in which elements of modernization and Islamization were 
deployed in the services of Persianization.  
5.1.3. How The Occidental Despotism Became Enemy Number One?  
After Reza Shah’s fall, the monarchy lost its strategic position as the source of 
problem and/or the source of solution (as oriental despotism was severely 
weakened), and occidental despotism through the allies occupation of the country 
and their subsequent attempts to control Iran and its resources became once again the 
source of the problem. The story of why and how the West in its colonialist and 
imperialist incarnation (occidental despotism) was turned into the new main enemy 
(tazad-e asli) (Rahnama, 2005) for the Iranian dasein (after the two failed 
experiences of Taqizadeh’s constitutionalism and Reza Shah’s Persianism to replace 
the oriental and religious despotisms) is a fascinating one. The irony is that the 
structure of oppression already experienced with regard to Persinaism and Islam was 
replicated in modernity. A liberating force once again had turned into an oppressive 
one. Despite retaining large portion of its liberating potentials, modernity in its 
encounter with non-modern societies turned into occidental despotism (colonialism 
and imperialism) to satisfy its urgent needs for expansion into new regions in search 
for raw materials and for the new markets for its finished commodities, and in its 
general proselytizing need to conquer new physical and cultural territories (Foran, 
1993, 2005).  
                                                          
39
 The family resemblance was established between the West and Iran through Indo-European 
language family and the myth of common racial background in Aryanism (Marashi, 2008. 2009). 
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Western expansionism, as such, was a contingent attempt to overcome the limits of 
finitude. Western exceptionalism (Fukuyama, 2011) and expansionism (Bhaabha, 
1990b) created waves of chaos in the international order and greatly eroded the 
credibility and reputation of the Western modernity. There was no ethical discourse 
or binding legal mechanism in modernity asking its agents to unilaterally practice 
discursive and non-discursive dimensions of liberal democracy and principles of 
fairness and equality in their encounter with its non-modern societies and colonized 
subjects. Like all regimes of truth, it possessed dark and bright dimensions; the logic 
of realpolitik where ‘might is right’ and domination over the alien non-modern other 
is the aim operated alongside a set of emancipatory ideas and discourses in science 
and technology, in freedom, democracy and rule of law, and in the discursive and 
non-discursive practices of unstoppable drive for wealth creation and socio-
economic equality and justice (socialism). The ‘might is right’ approach (Redbeard, 
2005) almost always relies on ‘right is might’ principle (Wetherill, 1991) in the long-
run (Henkin et al., 1991) (see the methodology chapter on the topics of power and 
knowledge).  
As such Western modernity’s exceptionalism and expansionism turned the realm of 
international order into a realm of occidental despotism and romantic imperialism 
(Makdisi, 1998) ironically in the same way that oriental despotism was practised at 
the national level. The lack of unified regime of truth at the national level in Iran led 
to the emergence of the Iranian model of final arbiter and Iranian leviathan, and the 
emergence of the same phenomenon at the global level led to the emergence of 
global model of final arbiter and global leviathan in the form of the Western 
imperialism or the Soviet totalitarianism. Inside the Western societies, with the 
emergence of a dominant regime of truth in the form of orthodox modernity, there 
was no need for the emergence of a final arbiter; in the realm of Western nation-
states and their internal affairs, the discursive and non-discursive practices of liberal 
democracy was prevalent as a binding mechanism (at least in some Western and 
modern societies). Modernity in its British incarnation, for instance, was an angle 
(liberal democrat) internally and a devil (in its colonial face in India and elsewhere) 
externally due to the particular evolution of regimes of truth at the national and 
global levels.  
Modernity like all social assemblages possesses the dual structure of 
idealism/realpolitik, politics of virtue and politics of ordinary. In encountering with 
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radical others, the discursive and non-discursive practices of liberal democracy and 
human rights would be suspended and deactivated and the expediencies and 
pragmatism of realpolitik would prevail. This dual structure makes any regime of 
truth tainted and inevitably results in loss of their ideological credibility and their 
moral high grounds to their oppositions.  
The emergence of the ONM shows once again the demand for freeing the Iranian 
people from the state of semi-colonialism and a state of “state within a state” 
(Abrahamian, 2001), which was back on the agenda after the defeats of about 100 
years ago in the hands of Russia and the British. The ONM was an act of therapy, a 
coping strategy evolved in order to cure the Iranian soul, mind, and body from the 
sense of humiliation and inferiority inflicted on them for more than a century by the 
forces of occidental despotism. 
Despite Mosaddegh winning his battles on legal aspects of his project of 
nationalization of oil in the formal structures of international order (like Hague and 
United Nation), the West determined in resolute pursuit of its interests for the 
survival of ‘free world’ (Abrahamian, 2001) acted upon the principles of realpolitik 
and forced Mosaddegh and his ONM into submission, culminating in the West being 
accused of hypocrisy and double standard (Ansari, 2006).  As Bhabha (1990b: 218, 
added emphasis) reminds us: 
That ideological tension, visible in the history of the West as a despotic power, 
at the very moment of the birth of democracy and modernity, has not been 
adequately written in a contradictory and contrapuntal discourse of tradition. 
Unable to resolve that contradiction perhaps, the history of the West as a 
despotic power, a colonial power, has not been adequately written side by side 
with its claims to democracy and solidarity.  
 
As such, in the state of belated inbetweenness, the people of Iran are faced with the 
dark and white sides of all regimes of truth side by side.  The example of 
Mosaddegh’s ONM is a case of these three dimensions of despotism coming into 
conflict and ultimately occidental despotism becoming the dominant face of Western 
modernity for the Iranians and appearing as their main enemy. In effect, the 
international order immersed in the state of cold war and institutionalized via the 
prevalence of national democracies amongst the Western nations and prevalence of 
capitalism at the global scale alongside the lack or weak institutions of global 
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citizenship plus the internal crisis of a nation trapped in the state of belated 
inbetweenness led to the killing of one democracy (the Mosaddegh’s one) by a 
coalition of two others (the UK and the US) in front of the watchful eyes of the 
global community of nations, leading to the tragedy of Western democracy killing an 
emerging democracy in its infancy, and damaging its own reputation greatly in the 
process.  
In the rest of this chapter we explore the fate of the ONM and its associated events 
through the mechanism characterized by four cluster concepts of tragedy of 
confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order. 
The demand and supply dimensions of the ONM were further explored but excluded 
from this work due to word limitations. 
5.2. TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION 
In the ONM era, we encounter the permutation and multiplication of voices and 
strategies stemming from the creative and rhizomatic intermingling and criss-
crossing of the three historical forces of Islam, the West (in its latest reincarnation 
for the Iranian dasein in the form of Western modernity) and Persianism. These 
forces (as elaborated extensively in the methodology and theoretical framework 
chapters) are unities in multiplicities. There are ‘differences within’ and ‘differences 
between’ each one of these forces and these differences are emphasized to create de-
territorialisation and multiplicities or de-emphasized to create territorialisation and 
unities.  
In the ONM era, the period between the rise of Pahlavi in 1925 and the fully-fledged 
emergence of political Islam as a political force in 1963/1342 (which we treat as the 
beginning of the end of Pahlavi dynasty), a multitude of voices and strategies 
emerged based on the operations of addition (affirmation) and subtraction (negation) 
(what the voices affirm in three axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity and what 
they negate in repression, disavowal and foreclosure). Voices/strategies are hybrid 
social recipes constituting of multiple ingredients drawn from the three sets of Islam, 
Persianism, and modernity with different doses and different emphases. The 
phenomenon which causes the state of tragedy of confusion is exactly this dynamics 
where hybrid voices borrow different elements from diverse regimes of truth with 
failed or no attempt for legitimization (alongside numerous attempts of de-
legitimization).  
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We are faced with a continuum of voices stretching from non-orthodox modernity 
(communism) to social and liberal democracy and nationalism to revolutionary and 
radical Islamism, where the gaps in between groups and orientations were filled with 
bridging voices like Fatami towards the left and Bazargan towards the right. 
Effectively we have a continuum of voices from radical communism to radical 
Persianism and Islamism with different degrees of pragmatism filling the gaps in 
between the radical sides. Altogether, the voices as a whole map the complexities 
and nuances of the general and particular preference structure of Iranian dasein.  
What was on offer in the market for truth reflects a range of demands signalled to the 
truth entrepreneurs. The immensely colourful and incredibly complex nature of the 
carpet of Iranian social existence charts the forces acting on and shaping its grid of 
intelligibility, desires, wants, likes and dislikes. Here the voices are categorized in 
terms of their dominant and general preference components. We have all classes of 
people like intellectuals, clergies, royalists, workers, women, literary figures on all 
sides of the continuum of voices and forces.  
The following section, hence, discusses the rival regimes of truths in operation at the 
time via exploring the ONM through the parameters formulated so far. 
5.2.1. The Voices of Islam 
In this era, we have a multitude of Islamic voices forming around five figures: 
Navvab, Kashani, Boroujerdi, Behbahani, and Borgha’i (Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 
2007). The voices are generated from the intermingling of Islam with orthodox and 
non-orthodox modernity and orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism.  
In the state of belated inbetweenness, the recipes and prescriptions for social reform 
and social therapy of the ills of the nation were created by mixing different doses of 
various components of Islam, modernity and Persianism. As our methodology 
requires, we try to listen to their unique voices based on their own accounts, their 
own discourses, their own subjectivities, and their own emotional economies 
(motivations, passions, emotions and intentions). In the spirit of ‘devil’s advocate’ 
and ‘suspension of disbelief’, we supplement their own accounts with other 
accounts, data, and theories to produce the best possible defence of their position in 
order to bring to the fore the articulated and unarticulated rationalities and rationales 
of their positions based on the affirmative and negating dimensions of their own 
social assemblages.  
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Ultimately we try to apply Mirfetros’ (2009) principle of motherly treatment to all 
sides of the ONM equation without exception and without bias introduced to the 
analysis due to the analyst’s or historian’s favouritism (favouring one regime of 
truth, voice, or face over another due to the nature of the researcher’s embedded 
experiences in life). Ultimately, as we elaborated in the methodology chapter to 
understand the daseins we need to be both a dasein and a cagito.   
The following section explores the Boroujerdi’s voice and the exploration of other 
voices such as Kashani’s and Navvab’s alongside the general characteristics of 
Islamic voices were further explored but excluded from this work due to word 
limitations.     
 
5.2.1.1. Boroujerdi’s Voice 
Ayatollah Boroujerdi (a marja, or source of emulation) was the custodian and 
captain of the ship of orthodoxy in Shia jurisprudence (Rahnema, 2005; Bayandor 
2010), whose main and immediate obligation was to complete the task of 
reconstruction of the house of Shia jurisprudence in Iran initiated earlier in 
1301/1922 by Ayatollah Haeri Yazdi, who had founded Houzeh-ye Elmieh (centre of 
religious studies) in the city of Qom.  
In this period Shia jurisprudence was going through a recovery episode in its 
evolution after the sharp fracture in its midst, an episode amounting to almost a civil 
war amongst the religious jurists (ulama) themselves, culminating in the execution 
of one mojtahed (jurist) by another in the constitutional era, and the existential 
attacks launched by Reza Shah on Shia orthodoxy in severely restricting the number 
of religious schools and clerics and banning many of the core Shia rituals and 
symbols (like banning religious turbans and veiling alongside Ashura processions).  
In a sense, this period is a survival period for the religious orthodoxy with the aim of 
retaking the lost core territories; as such Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s main aim was to 
preserve the centre of religious studies in Qom and to help it to educate new 
generation of clerics who could help to promote and propagate the teachings, 
institutions and rituals of religious orthodoxy in the entire country. As such, he acted 
as a quietist and attempted to be quite impartial and apolitical in his positions with 
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regard to the ONM, as he had seen initial euphoria and ultimate collapse of the 
constitutional revolution before. In effect he would not trust the people or the secular 
and religious elites and saw the ONM as another uprising, which could soon collapse 
under its own weight (Rahnema, 2005). He could not afford to invest his fragile 
social capital on a very uncertain joint venture, as his investing strategy involved a 
strong ‘wait-and-see’ option rather than investing his meagre capital on any 
particular horse. He was cautious not to make the same mistakes committed by his 
predecessors on both sides of the truth divide in the constitutional revolution.   
It should be noted that he was worried exactly about the nature of ONM as an 
ambiguous and confused dream which starts with sweetness and end up in nightmare 
as Movahhed (1999, 2004a) put it. Alongside his immediate aim in establishing the 
institutions of religious studies, his long-term aim was to preserve the pillars of 
religiosity in the Iranian nation.  
In Boroujerdi’s dictionary the real oilfield of Iran was the wells of Islamic beliefs 
and passions as they were the fuels of spiritual and material revival of the nation; as 
such, according to him, by preserving and enhancing people’s religiosity, Iran’s 
long-term happiness in this world and the next would be assured. His traumatic 
experience in Mashroteh’s disastrous outcome in Nuri’s execution, Akhond 
Khorasani’s regret, Ayatollah Naini’s disillusionment (Nasri, 2007) and lack of trust 
in long-term commitment of people made him extremely cautious. We see here how 
his traumatic experience in the Mashroteh era shaped his positions in the ONM era, 
which makes the analysis of the whole phenomenon resembling a psychoanalytic 
session, a cultural psychoanalysis as Shayegan (2012a) puts it.  
As such, the three components of ONM, ‘oil’, ‘nationalization’ and ‘movement’ 
denoted and connoted differently in the dictionary of Boroujerdi’s world of 
signification. The long-term affirmative dimension of his voice made communism as 
its main enemy. For him, the forces of orthodox modernization and monarchy ranked 
at a lower level of risk in terms of undermining the pillars of religiosity. As such his 
declared aim was only to intervene in religious matters and not in the political ones. 
But as we will see in the following sections of this chapter in the state of belated 
inbetweenness, no differentiation of social spheres is possible and as such his 
intervention in ‘religious’ matters inevitably dragged him to his intermittent 
interventions in almost all realms of life from the affairs of the state, to the economy, 
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education, culture and entertainment. Even his passivities and silences carried their 
own intentional or unintentional political reverberations. In the state of belated 
inbetweenness, life, work and language are inevitably experienced as politics.  
In summary, Boroujerdi’s main aim was to retake and expand the ethico-legal and 
spiritual homeland lost to the forces of modernity and Persianism in the earlier 
periods. Based on the configuration of forces in the context of situation the main 
existential enemies in this task were the forces of non-orthodox modernity 
(communism), Bahaism, and Kasravism (Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 2007; Nasri, 
2007). Orthodox modernity and the forces of Persianism (orthodox and non-
orthodox Persianism) were ranked as lesser evils (based on the principles of 
prioritization (Alahm falaham) and secondary rulings (ahkam-e sanavieh) in the 
science of Principles of Shia jurisprudence; see Mottahedeh, 2003), which could be 
strategically deployed to block the advancement of non-orthodox modernity and/or 
Bahaism and Kasravism. As such, his priority could not be material resources like 
oilfields (Rahnema, 2005).  
It should be noted that due to the decentralized nature of Shia jurisprudence (Mir-
Hosseini, 1999; Malkam Khan, 1891; Khalaji, 2011), Boroujerdi’s authority as the 
leader of Shia community was frequently challenged, weakened or undermined 
internally by other ulama in the same circles of orthodoxy in Shia jurisprudence and 
from the angles of political Shia Islam in its moderate and radical versions as 
manifested in two figures of Kashani and Navvab (Jafarian, 2007).  
Boroujerdi’s hybrid voice in its affirmative and negating dimensions could be 
summarized as:  
eternal salvation and this-worldly prosperity requires religiosity (the 
social utility function is defined over two worlds and two eternal and 
ephemeral times, in two horizons of permanence and impermanence, 
finitude and infinitude marked by death as the demarcation line) = the 
establishment of centres of religious studies (in order to educate the 
religious scholars who could teach people to keep and enhance their 
levels of religiosity= production of religious truths) + religious rituals 
(the sites of reproduction of religious truths on ontology, epistemology, 
methodology, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence and political economy)+ 
Shia monarchy (the Shia monarch supporting the dominance of Shia 
Islam in Iran) + technical modernity (in science, medicine and 
engineering)- communism and Marxism- Bahaism- Kasravism- political 
intervention of ulama- modern social vices- occupation of Muslim/Shia 
homeland by the alien forces.  
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This was Boroujerdi’s recipe for cooking the food of truths for generating happiness 
and prosperity, whose substance was drawn from the cookbooks of Islam, 
Persianism and modernity. Accordingly, his voice was constructed out of affirmative 
(power, knowledge, subjectivity) and negating (repression, disavowal, and 
foreclosure) dimensions. His voice was constituted of the materials and the ordering 
he could offer at the time for constructing a house of being, a discursive homeland 
for the Iranian dasein. His emphases, elisions, and silences constructed the distinct 
nature of his voice among other Islam-centred voices (via the play of general and 
particular preferences in his voice).  
5.2.2. The Voices of Modernity 
This section aims to map the landscape of voices organized around the central and 
defining theme of nationalization of oil, as a project inspired by modernity. We can 
use the ONM as a site to explore the voices whose main affiliation was to the regime 
of truth of modernity, which can help us to see the map of voices committed to 
modernity in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness at the time. It is important to 
note that the project of oil nationalization by Mosaddegh and his associates in the 
National Front was originally part of the larger project of modernization in the spirit 
of constitutionalism and the creation of a modern nation-state following the ideals of 
the constitutional revolution, as the establishment of modernity was deemed to 
require the creation of an independent nation-state. For this voice, the discursive and 
non-discursive practices of nationalism as manifested in the site of ONM were the 
prerequisite for building a constitutional government. The ONM was considered to 
be a site where the Iranian dasein could form and exercise its will (through collective 
action) and gain the ownership of the country in order to take the country back from 
the direct and indirect control of the British (Katouzian, 2010; Abrahamian, 2001).  
As mentioned already, the fall of constitutional revolution alongside the collapse of 
the Reza Shah’s variant of benevolent and modernizing oriental despotism, and the 
severe weakness of the religious despotism (after the experience of civil war within 
the clerical establishment and the relentless attacks launched by the Reza Shah’s 
oriental despotism against the religious despotism and attempts made by him to 
nationalize religion), occidental despotism in the form of monopolistic control of 
Iranian oilfield in the south of the country by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 
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became the evil incarnate and the main enemy of Iran’s revival.  After the 
retreatment of the two other perceived enemies of Iranian people (oriental and 
religious despotism) to their safe territories in order to lick their wounds and renew 
themselves, the only active enemy left on the scene was the occidental despotism. 
After the collapse of the constitutional movement with its big project of 
modernization and its three subprojects of modernized modernization, modernized 
Islamization, and modernized Persianization, and the collapse of Reza Shah’s big 
project of Persianization with its associated subprojects of Persianized 
modernization, Persinaized Islamization, and Persianized Persianization, the ONM 
had come to revive the big project of modernization with its associated subprojects 
through taking the occidental despotism as the main enemy. The site of the ONM 
was an alibi to revive the modernization project with its associated attempt to build a 
modern state and a modern nation.     
When the force of nationalization of oil was launched different orientations 
attempted to take control of it and redirect it towards their own larger projects 
(subsume it under their own general preference). The Mosaddegh’s project of 
‘nationalization in the service of modernization’ was tried to be redirected towards 
an alternative project of nationalization for Islamization by Fadaiyan-e Islam, 
nationalization in the service of communism (non-orthodox modernity) by the Tudeh 
Party, and nationalization for Persianization, later on, by the royal court and the 
monarchy, alongside the pragmatic project of economizing the ONM pursued by 
pragmatists like Razmara and America (both strived to empty the movement from its 
nationalist feelings and bestow it a pragmatic logic of economic cost-benefit analysis 
in the status quo of the map of Realpolitik).  
This latter voice wanted to deploy the oil question in the service of turning Iran into 
a normal country invested with normal national interests. This was an impossible 
dream, as Iran was immersed in the political economy of truth and its associated 
identity crisis, and lacked an established regime of truth, and as such could not be 
treated as a normal country with a well-defined set of interests and strategic 
alliances. 
 In a sense, although the agenda for nationalization of oil was originally set by the 
Mosaddegh’s orthodox modernity but other regimes of truth were naturally striving 
to highjack it and redirect it into their own life world and put their own stamp on it 
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and take the leadership and ownership of it, largely through the act of appellation 
followed by associated discursive and non-discursive practices.   
In effect, the movement was pulled and pushed in five different directions, in the 
process being redefined at least as five projects in one, namely Mosaddegh’s 
modernization project of revitalizing constitutionalism, the Fadaiyan project of 
Islamization, the Tudeh project of non-orthodox modernity, the Shah’s project of 
Persinaization, and the American-Razmara project of normalization (economization) 
all organized in opposition to the British project of preserving the status quo.  
As can be seen in one movement, that is the ONM, five projects were competing 
with each other to define the dominant characteristics of the movement against the 
counter-project of keeping the control of oilfields in the hands of the British by the 
British government and Iranian Anglophiles like Sayyed Zia (Milania, 2011a). 
Mosaddegh was effectively operating inside the parameters of orthodox modernity 
(such as constitutionalism, liberty, democracy and rule of law) although he later on 
moved gradually towards non-orthodox modernity of a democratic version, social 
democracy rather than liberal democracy.  
As for Mosaddegh’s political identity, Khalil Malaki (1998) sees him initially as a 
liberal democrat and criticizes him (also see Katouzian, 2013) for not caring 
adequately for social justice. The various components of prism of Mosaddegh’s 
preference structure were activated at different context of situation. This is how 
priming worked with regard to Mosaddegh; while he performed his religiosity in 
front of largely non-religious Reza Shah’s Majlis (de Bellaigue. 2012: 75;  Nejati, 
1999) he performed secularism with regard to the demands of the Fadaiyan for 
implementing the rulings of Islam (Rahnema, 2005). As can be seen, in different 
context of situation different element of general or particular preference ordering 
was activated by Mosaddegh. He was instinctively playing with the cards 
(discourses, power relations and affectivities) available to him to enhance his own 
project of reverse social engineering.  
The success in implementing his ultimate goal of building a modern nation-state (of 
the liberal democratic colour or social democratic persuasion) required mobilization 
of people in mass to compel the forces of British occidental despotism into 
submission to the will of the nation. The will of the nation needed to materialize 
itself in the open for all to see. To mobilize people from all walks of life, 
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Mosaddegh’s social capital (Badescu and Uslaner, 2003) from his credential in 
orthodox modernity was severely inadequate as a way to motivate people to invest 
their time, energy, their heart and mind and even their lives in the service of the 
nationalization project.  
It should be noted that as Mosaddegh’s Islamic and Shia credentials was important 
but negligible he needed the support of other regimes of truth in order to be able to 
communicate with people in convincing them to invest heavily and to stay 
committed to the success of project in good and bad times. That required passion and 
sacrifice and the active participation of religion and religious leaders in the 
movement. Ayatollah Kashani, who favoured the religious constitutionalism of 
Mashroteh era-in a sense was committed both to religion and constitutionalism-, and 
who had political credentials in being the political prisoner of the British forces in 
Iran and in his fight against the British occupation of Iraq lent support to the cause 
and incited the crowd in religious occasions to call for the nationalization of oil in 
their demonstrations and street movements (Abrahamian, 1968). Kashani was 
striving to deploy the religious passions and emotions in the service of the success of 
the project, all ultimately in the hope of a restabilising constitutional nation-state 
with a religious colour.  
While Mosaddegh and Kashani were involved in the same project their differences 
were stark, contributing to the failure of the project. The difference between Kashani 
and Mosaddegh was in the level of commitment to religion; while Kashani was a 
religious pragmatist generally in favour of preserving the Shia spirit of the country, 
Mosaddegh put less emphasis on this dimension, while not being totally alien to 
these kinds of concerns as well. The accent of Mosaddegh’s constitutionalism was 
predominately liberal or socialist followed by traces of concern for Shia Islam, while 
for Kashani it was predominantly religious followed by commitment to elements of 
liberal and/or socialist modernity.  
These two faces (alongside their associates and supporters) and their inhabiting 
voices were not rich enough in terms of street politics, as social capital, for invoking 
actual presence at the level of violent and non-violent clashes in streets, mosques, 
and bazars (see Sahabi, 2007 for the need for street politics in this era). The voice of 
Fadaiyan came to fill the gaps at this level (of the need for active street politics). In 
other words, they used the forces of Fadaiyan, who were persuaded by Kashani to 
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lend support to a largely irreligious force with strong secular outlook, in the form of 
several steps leading to the success of the ONM. These steps included monitoring 
over the elections for “the Constitutional Assembly, 16th Majlis election, and First 
Senate” (Kazemi, 2012) to prevent them from being rigged (Sahabi, 2007:78, 98-9; 
Kazemi, 2012), as well as committing assassinations of Hazhir and Razmara 
(Rahnema, 2005; Azimi, 1989; Abrahamian, 1982; Katouzian, 2010).  
The assassination of Razmara was done with the approval of the Mosaddegh’s 
National Front (Sahabi, 2007: 99-100) and was further supported by freeing the 
assassin via the intervention of the Majlis (Rahnema, 2005, Mirfetros, 2011; 
Mojtahedzadeh, 2011). What Fadaiyan wanted in return was the implementation of 
the rulings of Shia jurisprudence after the success of the movement, which was 
promised to them by the main members of National Front, which was reneged later 
(Rahnema, 2005). In this, Fadaiyan represented the attempt to redirect the 
nationalization movement in favour of Islamization (Kazemi, 2012). The Fadaiyan’s 
attempt to Islamize the oil-nationalization movement is supported by the fact that, as 
Sahabi (2007: 100) reports, the National Front leaders saw Razmara as “the 
imminent main danger” and saw him as the agent intending to “sell Iran to England” 
alongside the fact that Navavb asked the National Front leaders “whether they would 
promise to implement the Islamic rulings after Razmara’s elimination, which they 
responded affirmatively”. Sahabi (2007: 100) further affirms that “the death of 
Razmara was very effective in the nationalization of oil [to such extent that] the oil 
industry was nationalized within a week [after the death of Razmara]”. The active 
and effective participation of Fadaiyan in the process of Majlis election (leading to 
the election of National Front leaders) (Sahabi, 2007: 109) and their effective 
attempt to remove the (perceived) obstacles towards oil nationalization (Sahabi, 
2007: 123-4, 140) and their explicit deal with the National Front leaders and their 
subsequent rift with the National Front after National Front’s reneging of the terms 
of the deal (Sahabi, 124-5) demonstrates their (failed) attempts to Islamize the 
movement (see also Jafarian, 2007: 192-8 on a set of evidence on Fadaiyan’s 
attempts to Islamize the ONM). This is further evident in the assessment made by 
Ayatollah Taleghani (1979), one of the actors in the ONM movement, in the early 
days of the Islamic revolution on the tomb of Mosaddegh: “Fadaiyan-e Islam, 
passionate and faithful young men who opened the way and removed the obstacles, 
removed the first obstacle [reference to the assassination of Hazhir] and the free 
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election began. They removed the next obstacle [reference to the assassination of 
Razmara] the oil industry was nationalized in the Majlis. … What happened next? … 
They [the agents of colonialism …] said to Fadaiyan that you were the ones that 
started the movement. Fadaiyan were saying “we wanted a total Islamic 
government”. … Late Dr Mosaddegh said “I am neither the man of Islamic 
government nor want to be your ruler and prime minister forever; give me a chance 
to resolve the case of oil”. [In response] Fadaiyan-e Islam said “we have made a 
large contribution and you have to implement our demands””.   
Abdekhodaee (2010) refers to the overarching tendency towards Islamization in 
Navvab Safavi, the leader of the Fadaiyan in the following terms: “I went to visit 
Navvab Safavi in the Ghasr prison and said to him “stop opposing Mosaddegh”. He 
said “[if] they implement Islamic rulings we will have no problems”. … Hence for 
Navvab Safavi, there was no difference between Mosaddegh and the shah, as both 
did not agree with his ideals”. Navvab’s unrelenting pursuit of Islamization project 
in all walks of life is fully evident in his 1953 declaration entitled “I am not a man of 
compromise”. Fadaiyan maintained that the aim of the ONM could be better 
achieved under the discipline and dedication of Islamization away from corruption 
and pursuit of self-interests by the secular elements; for them, true modernization, in 
science, technology and economy, could be achieved without the modernity’s 
perceived dark side in promulgation of social vices (Jafarian, 2007). For them, 
Islamization would automatically achieve true modernization and nationalization. 
As Mosaddegh leaned towards the model of social democracy and authoritarianism, 
this would remind us of the other two failed voices in the process of modernization, 
namely, Mashroteh model of revolutionary and bottom-up modernization which led 
to the sudden turn of the disillusioned constitutionalists and other modernists into the 
top-down project of reviving oriental despotism as the means to achieve the desired 
end, modernization. This voice, as represented in Taqizadeh, had an ambiguous 
position towards the ONM; while supporting the main agenda of the ONM 
Taqizadeh was reluctant to lend his unconditional support to the radical spirit 
governing some of the strategies, tactics, and narratives adopted for achieving that 
aim.  
Another force which could lend support to the ONM at a later stage was the voice of 
non-orthodox modernity. The Tudeh party initially opposed the nationalization bill, 
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as they sought to grant the access to the oilfields in the north of Iran to their big 
ideological brother and their Mecca, namely Moscow (Azadi, 2011). Later on they 
converted to the cause of the ONM. Through raising their class consciousness, 
Tudeh Party, initially acting as a national front under the leadership of socialists, was 
able to mobilize the people of middle class and working class in urban settings in 
support of the ONM. In return they attempted to redirect the country towards 
communism and alliance with the Soviet camp, to the extent that originally they 
asked for the implementation of ‘positive balance’ in bestowing the right to the use 
and control of the oilfields in the north of Iran to the Soviet Union in order to 
counter-balance the British privileges in the south and with the excuse of Mosaddegh 
being the American agent who was deemed to have the intention of making the new 
imperialist America the new master of the Iranian oilfields (Katouzian, 2010; Zabih, 
1966).  
They were acting in the framework of the global communist community and their 
commitment to the cause of international communism had priority over their 
commitment to particularities of the oil industry or the Iranian national interests. 
They used the language of ‘imperialist’, ‘capitalist’ and ‘feudalist’ as evils incarnates 
against the British and Americans as well as the monarchy and royal court, and the 
liberal and Persianist democrats. In their ideological positioning, therefore, initially 
they severely attacked Mosaddegh for being the puppet of the American imperialists 
(Zabih, 1966: 186). As for their preference structure, their global preference was for 
non-orthodox modernity and as such they were against all signifiers of orthodox 
modernity like freedom and human rights, monarchy (their original support for 
constitutional monarchy later turned into support for republicanism), and religion 
(although they were more pragmatic with regard to religion). In addition, in terms of 
economic policy, they were able to activate a strong dormant demand for social 
justice and redistribution (except in the rural areas as reported by Kazemi and 
Abrahamian (1978)). In effect, they were operating in the framework of global 
community of socialist camp against the capitalist camp.  
As such it is quite understandable for Tudeh to sacrifice their national homeland and 
their national interests for the greater good of their ideological homeland of socialist 
internationalist camp. It is quite similar to Islamists giving precedence to the 
interests of wider Islamic community (ummah) at the cost of particular national 
interests. When one joins a faith community, one is obliged to prioritize the good of 
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the faith community over any lesser/smaller unit, whether that unit is self, family, or 
country.  
Tudeh Party was operating within the parameters of a philosophy whose mission was 
to create a just society and to free mankind from the oppression of capital and its 
resultant structural discriminations in the form of class and income inequalities. As 
their purpose was noble they perceived it as even nobler to sacrifice their inherited 
and habitual attachments for the sake of a much bigger good, the good of mankind. 
Despite this, at times they zigzagged between supporting the global socialist camp in 
public and national interests in private (Abrahamian, 2008). Labelling them as 
traitors or betrayers is a clear example of misunderstanding and another case for 
counter-transference, as betrayal is when one disregards or acts against what one 
believes in, and as their global preference centred on international socialist camp, 
their actions and words cannot be classified as betrayal. We should not forget the 
fact that at the time the Leninist-Stalinist model of social change was deemed to be 
the fastest and most efficient and just method of modernization, something similar to 
Reza Shah’s benevolent modernization but this time in the socialist camp rather than 
in the Western camp.  
Similar to the approach taken by intellectuals who supported Reza Shah, for Tudeh 
intellectuals the proletarian dictatorship was the most efficient method of 
modernization for a backward society (revolutionary leviathan) and the notions of 
freedom and human rights could be luxuries that backward societies could not afford 
alongside the fact that freedom in practice was perceived to mean the freedom for the 
rich and powerful (the elites of land-owners, the newly-formed industrialists and the 
royal court and army) and not for the poor, dispossessed or the newly formed 
industrial workforce. The notion and institutions of human rights were deemed to 
function as freedom and would have reinforced the rights of the few at the expense 
of the many. For them human rights and freedom could take their real meanings in a 
level playing field, and reaching such context required socialism.  
It should be mentioned that Tudeh Party’s negative image was sealed due to their 
ideological support for occupation of Azerbaijan by the Soviet forces, which led to 
the Soviet’s ultimate withdrawal due to the Qavam’s diplomatic trick in promising 
the Soviet the north oil concession (Shoukat, 2006; Milani, 2011a). Their excessive 
attacks on Mosaddegh alongside their internal infightings over the unshakable 
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commitment to the Soviet and their overt support for republicanism after the first 
failed coup against Mosaddegh culminated in them being portrayed as the main 
enemy in the framework of politics of fear; fear of communism was activated and a 
large section of Mosaddegh’s former allies of deserted him as a result and the 
context became fertile for the success of second coup and the eventual collapse of 
the ONM project. Ultimately what created their failure in capturing Iranian 
imagination and social order was their perceived ideological opposition to religion. 
In the war of regimes of truth they would negate more than what they would affirm.  
As regards to their contributions to the Iranian social order, Tudeh Party’s great 
influence can be seen in reviving and modernizing literature, philosophy and art in 
Iran and in putting the issue of social justice and social critique on the social agenda 
of all forces and voices (Mirsepasi, 2004). They created a space of social justice 
which was almost unprecedented in the history of Iran (excepts for vague traces of it 
in the figures of Mani and Mazdak in the Sassanid era and in the mythical reputation 
of Anoshrivan the Just; this ancient perception of justice was largely a kind of 
equality before law and not social justice in the sense of vertical mobility and the 
ideal of a more equal society in terms of class divisions). Thanks to the efforts of 
socialists-Marxists-communists, the space of social justice became so entrenched as 
part of national psyche with associate unshakable demand for a more equal society 
where monarchy and religion in their own different ways wanted to highjack this 
space and assimilate it under their Persianism or Islamism and embarked on 
appropriating it through the relevant policies and the act of naming (appellation). 
Their contribution made the theme of social justice the fixed element of discursive 
and non-discursive practices in the demand and supply side of political economy of 
truth.   
In Tudeh Party’s radical and unshakable support for and dedication to the homeland 
of communism, the Soviet Union, they greatly resembled Fadaiyan-e Islam, as the 
Tudeh Party was the devotees of communism (Haghshenas, 2011). Katouzian (2010) 
affirms their genuine dedication and love for their ideological homeland Russia. It is 
interesting to note that this further division into orthodox and non-orthodox, and 
radical and moderate branches would occur in all regimes of truth alongside the 
segregations in terms of three levels of depth and intensity of commitment, namely, 
formalism, dedication, and thoughtfulness: we see these three in non-orthodox 
modernity as well; people like Khalil Malaki belong to the thoughtful branch 
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(Katouzian, 2013), while Kianuri and others belong to the formalist branch of 
socialism alongside many who were dedicated devotees of it (see Behrooz, 2000).  
In the camp of non-orthodox modernity, the Tudeh party represented the orthodoxy 
and the reformists (the voice of protest against the orthodoxy in the non-orthodox 
modernity), like Khalil Malaki, formed the non-orthodox branch of the non-orthodox 
modernity. This non-orthodox form of non-orthodox modernity formed the social 
democrats of the Third Force (see Poulson, 2006, 156-8). This force was 
distinguished by their advocacy for socialism in the framework of nationhood and 
not international community of socialism-communism and in their promotion of 
democracy and the idea of gradual change rather than sudden revolutionary and 
violent form of change advocated by the orthodox form of non-orthodox modernity 
of Tudeh Party. This voice loyally supported Mosaddegh’s ONM but criticized his 
passivity with regard to poverty and class divisions and lack of active agenda for 
redistribution of land and other resources.  
In effect, while they approved the negation of occidental despotism they were highly 
critical of the orthodox elements in the Mosaddegh’s core alliance. Furthermore, 
Khalil Malaki (1998) did not have an essentialist understanding of the forces of 
imperialism, and saw enough bright side and internal divisions within the imperialist 
camp, allowing the possibility of effective dialogue with them if a unified national 
position could be forged (on Kkhalil Malaki see Mirfetros, 2011; Katouzian, 2013). 
This formula could offer a way out of the phenomenon of misunderstanding of the 
radical other (the dynamics of transference and counter-transference among 
historical actors themselves), but it was not adequately theorized, lacked sufficient 
level of social capital, and was not consistently applied to all sides of truth divide in 
the compound state of belated inbetweenness.  
Lastly, another voice emerging through the operation of addition and subtraction was 
the voice of national socialism, combining the glory of Persian pre-Islamic 
civilization with the ideas of socialism. They supported the ONM project but their 
spiritual homeland was Germany and they negated other branches of socialism as 
well as different branches of Islam and orthodox modernity. Alongside these voices 
we encountered the voice of anglophiles like Vosuq-al-Douleh (in the case of 1919 
agreement with Britain) and Sayed Zia who supported the close alliance between 
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Iran and Great Britain (Milani, 2011; Azimi, 2008). As Kia (1998: 35, note 63) 
reports: 
Vosuq od-Dowle was the prime minister responsible for signing the famous 
1919 Anglo-Persian agreement which caused the eruption of anti-British and 
nationalistic feelings in Iran. He, therefore, had a reputation for being an 
anglophile and an ardent supporter of a close alliance between Iran and Great 
Britain. 
 
5.2.3. The Voices of Persianism 
This section explores the voices affiliated to orthodox and non-orthodox Persianism, 
through which we briefly address the voice of monarchy and leave out the voices of 
the institution of vizier (the voice of Persian statecraft enshrined in faces like Qavam 
or Foroughi) and the voice of non-orthodox Persianism due to word limitations.     
As regards to Orthodox Persianism or Monarchy, in this era we see the presence of 
Persianism at different levels (Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005). Regarding the voice 
of the orthodox Persianism (monarchy), the Shah’s position was eerily similar to the 
position of the king of religiosity, Boroujerdi. The two kingdoms of Iranian history, 
Persian kingdom and religious kingdom, were both on the retreat and unsure of 
themselves and in desperate attempts to strengthen their niche markets. Both of their 
kingdoms suffered severe damages and as such they went for the option of wait-and-
see rather than actively committing to one or the other side; the Shah was trying to 
act based on the principle of positive balance, the principle where the weak tries to 
keep almost all powerful sides happy by giving them the impression that he is with 
them. The Shah nominated the Tudeh Party and National Front as two enemies of 
Iran and in the meeting with the British Ambassador declared the latter as more 
dangerous in terms of the ambiguity of its demands and its negating dimensions 
(Rahnema, 2005: 522-3). The details of the Shah’s position can be seen in the 
following sections. 
5.2.4. Summary Remarks 
As the preceding discussion identifies, the site of oil nationalization was, in a sense, 
turned into a battleground in the political economy of truth. The question was how 
the issue of oil needed to be approached; how was it to be mediated through 
alternative regimes of truth, what could have priority over what? The specificity of 
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oil and its various knowledge/power structures was immersed in a larger framework 
of the warring regimes of truth battling to gain the right to become Iranian 
embeddedness. In other words, nationalisation of oil was a microcosm around which 
various socio-political powers and their associated regime of truths battled for 
dominance and supremacy.  
Once again the inability in production of truth hampered the production of wealth as 
Foucault maintains. The question revolved around what was going to act as the main 
truth-production factory. Iranians once again were called to choose the condition of 
possibility of their own choices in the guise of the ONM project. In this 
categorization, the general preference, which gives unity to a voice and differentiates 
it from any other, was different for different voices and faces. The priorities were 
different for different social assemblages, creating a spectrum of preferences over 
what could take precedence over what, when things come into conflict with each 
other. It was not clear whether the protection of faith (emancipative rationality over 
the fear of death) needed to take precedence over the protection of national 
sovereignty (communicative rationality) and how they could both be harmonized 
with the pure economic logic of cost-benefit analysis and the logic of realpolitik 
(instrumental rationality), as each voice attached different denotations and 
connotations to the signifiers such as oil, independence, national unity, economic 
well-being, people, the shah, the clergy, the foreign powers and the like, and was 
filled with different fears, hopes, and dreams, and emotional economies.  
The narrative-strategy associated with progress was competing with the narrative-
strategy of preservation of spiritual homeland and both with the establishment of 
autonomous constitutional nation-state and all with joining the global camp of 
socialism. The pragmatic and radical voices and cultural tribes affiliated with each 
regime of truth were fighting within and between each other relentlessly over 
discursive and socio-cultural territories and loyalties. In this, silence and fear, 
alongside disavowal and repression, played significant roles in this period on all 
sides, in what they did and said privately and publicly (as in the fear of Anglophiles 
and economizers and pragmatists on the nationalist modernist side; and on the 
religious side on the repression of voice and action of Fadaiyan by Boroujerdi’s 
orthodoxy). The working of repression was evident in the behaviour of Boroujerdi, 
for instance, and his followers against the Fadaiyan’s discontent from within.  
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In this process, due to the state of belatedness, we witness the social body being 
permeated with the politics of silence and how silence reflects ambiguity and holding 
one’s options open rather than investing on one entrepreneurial project or another; in 
terms of portfolio management Boroujerdi and his camp were opting to keep their 
options open. On the other hand, Abrahamian (2008: 111) reports on the politics of 
secrecy and silence in the case of the Tudeh Party in the following terms:  
Bullard [the British ambassador] reported that many Tudeh leaders had 
privately informed the prime minister that they opposed the Soviet demand 
and instead supported the official policy of postponing all oil negotiations 
until after the war.  
 
Here we see the phenomenon of polyvocality in the Tudeh Party members, breaking 
the assumed rule of one man one voice (Tizro, 2011), where they publicly supported 
their ideological mecca and privately their thoughts and feelings were with the 
nationalist independence approach. This is alongside the fact that Soleiman Mirza 
Eskandari, the Tudeh Party leader, “was well-known for his strict observance of 
religious duties” (Katouzian, 2010: 234). Abrahamian (2008: 111) refers to this state 
of confusion amongst the Tudeh Party members in the following terms:  
Iraj Iskandari later revealed that the Tudeh leaders had publicly supported the 
Azerbaijan and Kurdish Democratic Parties for the sake of socialist solidarity 
with the Soviet Union, but privately they had remained “bewildered,” 
“surprised,” and “shocked.” They had even sent a protest letter to the Soviet 
Communist Party. One leader wrote to Moscow insinuating that the whole 
disastrous scheme had been cooked up by local leaders in Baku to further their 
own “personal interests and dictates” against both Iran and the Soviet Union.   
 
Here we see the state of how Iranian subjects suffer from discursive homelessness. 
They were unable to construct a coherent voice out of contradictory materials from 
warring regimes of truth. As such, they were driven to resort to the politics of silence 
or politics of disavowal and two-facedness. The sentence Boroujerdi said to 
Mosaddegh is very telling in wishing success for Mosaddegh where he “accords 
precedence to the strengthening of Islam and then Muslim affairs” (Jafarian, 2007). 
The confusion was over what should be given precedence to what and why.       
In effect, while in Mashroteh era the purpose was to take the people back from the 
absolute power of monarchy, in the ONM era the purpose was to take the country 
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back from the occidental despotism, in both cases with the larger affirmative purpose 
of establishing a constitutional order. While in the constitutional era modernity was 
tried to be adopted through antagonistic opposition to the oriental despotism, in the 
ONM era modernity was tried to be appropriated through antagonistic opposition to 
the occidental despotism; in the period in between the two, Reza Shah attempted to 
adopt modernity within the parameters of orthodox Persianism through antagonistic 
opposition to religious despotism, tribal despotism, and revolutionary despotism of 
non-orthodox modernity (communism).  
In the ONM era, we face a spectrum of positions and voices from the British one to 
Mosaddegh’s, Tudeh’s, and Fadaiyan’s Islamic one, and in the middle Razmara, 
Qavam, the Shah, Kashani, Boroujerdi, Sayed Zia, Baqa’i and many others. These 
are the names of positions and voices, like the hybrid voice of Razmara who had 
constructed a middle-way position, a hybrid strategy-narrative of a win-win option; 
but his discourse was infuriating for the majority and was poorly theorized. The 
hyper-complex nature of the proliferation of these voices and their resonances for the 
Iranian dasein was at the heart of the tragedy of confusion in this era. Once again, 
Iranian subject was in the position of Sophie’ choice in the concentration camp of the 
state of belated inbetweenness. 
5.3. UNSTABLE COALITIONS 
Dr. Mosaddegh you are taking us to the hell but we will go 
with you to the hell. Khalil Malaki (Katouzian, 1981: 36) 
In the ONM era, we face coalitions, which are quickly formed and dissolved 
between faces inhabited by voices, which were the outcomes of the combination of 
forces. The tragedy of confusion led to formation of unstable coalitions. In the state 
of belatedness coalitions were needed to form collective will and actions in order to 
implement projects of reverse social engineering to combat the grand issue of 
backwardness. Formation of coalitions was a coping strategy to organize and 
mobilize voices and faces into forces for social change. As such, the Iranian social 
space became littered with multitude of unstable coalitions in this era. The voices 
were formed through the operation of addition and subtraction applied on different 
components of the three regimes of truth and their internal divisions between 
orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, radicalism and pragmatism. These voices inhabited 
faces through the trajectories and singularities of particular biographies and 
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genealogies. The vectoral interaction (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 33) between 
different forces, voices, and faces generated events (such as 30th of Tir, 14th of 
Azar, 4th of Khordad, 9th of Esfand, 28th of Mordad), which shaped the fate of the 
country in this era (Rahnema, 2005; Mirfetros, 2011).  
This section aims to show that the warring regimes of truths, which were competing 
to shape the characteristics of Iranian embeddedness or to act as Iranian 
embeddedness, produced social assemblages and entities (whether individuals or 
groups, organizations or institutions), which were themselves the outcomes of 
unstable coalitions between different components of these three regimes of truth.  
This population of social assemblages (themselves as unstable social coalitions) 
formed successive waves of new unstable coalitions with each other to achieve 
negating and affirmative aims in their radical or pragmatic projects of Persianization, 
Islamization, and modernization. Each face is characterized by the particularity of its 
inhabiting voice and its internal preference ordering with its general and particular 
components (the notion of preference orderings was used in Rahnema, 2005: 475 
and in page 528 of the same reference the notion of the difference in taste or 
ekhtelaf-e saligheh is the code for difference in the general and particular 
components of the preference structure and their ordering). Each face is named 
through the particularity of its thrownness or embeddedness; for individuals this 
process works through their familial affiliations and for the groups and organizations 
or institutions through the particular context of culture in which they emerge.  
The line of argument in this section is deceptively simple. We show over a set of 
defining events how unstable coalitions were formed around the negation of an ‘evil 
other’, what Rahnema (2005) calls the main conflict or tazad-e asli. In the process of 
opposing the evil other, they go through a fairly short honeymoon period (Rahnema, 
2005: 112) and then they disintegrate at the affirmative phase of social movements. 
Events such as ‘30th of Tir’ or even ‘28th of Mordad’ coup were the coalescing 
point and product of the interaction between several broad forms of coalitions. In the 
process of coalition formation, everyone courted everyone else but at an affirmative 
dimension there was no stability.  
As if the algorithm of the Iranian social order was as follows: ‘antagonize and 
polarize, form a strong coalition, defeat the antagonized opposition and start 
infighting, find another instantiation of polarization and eliminate another evil other; 
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and iterate this process until the total collapse of the order and its disintegration into 
ungovernable components; in such states resort to a final arbiter and save the order 
from chaos and disintegration; repeat the same cycle’. To counter the process of 
disintegration the iron fist of the benevolent dictator, the despotic Mosaddegh, Shah, 
Khomeini is needed to act as the final arbiter and Iranian leviathan to stop the 
psychotic process of total disintegration. Alongside this iron fist of order, what holds 
the order together is exactly what makes it slide towards the state of un-
governability, namely, Islam, Persianism and the West, as manifested for instance in 
Ashura rituals, Persian language and Nowrouz, and insatiable desire for material 
progress, social justice, and consumerism.  
The examination of these events shows that the process of coalition formation and 
disintegration occurs at incredibly fast speed within and between social assemblages. 
The constant and drastic change occurs within and between social assemblages 
(individuals or collectivities), for instance, inside Fadaiyan (coalition formation and 
disintegration in Navvab and in Fadaiyan), in Kashani and Mujahedeen-e Islam, 
Mosaddegh and National Front, Baghaei and the Workers’ Party, Khalil Malaki and 
Tudeh Party, the Shah and royal court, Sayed Zia and his party, Qavam and his 
party, just to name a few. In this process every class of people can be seen in all 
sides. Merchants, intelligentsia, clergy, royalists, ordinary people, and women can be 
identified on the religious, royalist or modernist camps. The state of inbetweenness 
in its intersection with the state of belatedness creates fleeting coalitions and 
divisions within and between different social assemblages. We cannot find stable 
organizations and fronts based on clearly defined ideologies and/or interests. We see 
clerics against clerics, thugs against thugs, workers against workers, intellectuals 
against intellectuals, middle class against middle class, women against women (see 
Rahnema, 2005; Jafarian, 2007) and selves against selves. 
We can identify the role of middlemen in creating a continuous and compact social 
space. These middlemen were the opposites of missing links; they were connecting 
links and bridging social capital, hooking the favourable sides of the people from 
opposing camps together. In this process of intermingling, attempts were made by 
alternative regimes of truth to antagonize the social space (based on binary 
oppositions such as good against evil, modern against tradition, Persian versus 
foreign), which created a chaotic phase, which then moved to a (apparently) stable 
phase where one kind of cultural tribe dominated and then ultimately it reveals its 
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deep problems by being toppled or severely challenged and de-legitimized in a 
constant war of attrition.  
Change in coalition structure would occur either through the drastic change in 
general preference or the reordering of the components of particular preference. An 
example for the change in general preference is Hakamizadeh who was the son of a 
grand ayatollah and moved to Kasravi’s side (Ridgeon, 2006: 22) and the example of 
change in particular preference is the change in Mosaddegh’s position from being a 
liberal democrat to a social democrat at a general level (Sahabi, 2007: 149), and at a 
more situated level from his performance in the Reza Shah’s assembly for changing 
the Qajar dynasty as a firm believer in the Quran (de Bellaigue, 2012: 75; Nejati, 
1999) to his kissing of Queen Sorya’s hands (which was referred to by Fadaiyan as a 
signifier of his transgression from the codes of Islamic behaviour; different contexts 
of situation primed different components of the preference ordering) (Mirfetros, 
2011). What we see at this era is the degeneration of any and every coalition at an 
individual (individual as a coalition of selves) or collective levels into its constituent 
parts. The process of generation of strife, divisions, and subdivisions progresses at an 
astonishing speed and rate in all groups and assemblages of any colour or persuasion, 
from the religious to the modernist and Persianist.  
Here we have a complex sets of forces, voices, and faces interacting at a bewildering 
pace of taking positions, forming coalition, changing positions and forming new 
coalitions, and changing sides and colours, voices and sides at an incredible speed, 
resembling something like “speed dating”. Kashani dates Mosaddegh and Tudeh and 
even Anglophiles (while he was a known dissident in the occupation period and was 
in British prison for 23 months) like Sayyed Zia and then changes side and dates 
with the royal court (Sahabi, 2007; Rahnema, 2005). Mosaddegh has allies like 
Kashani who connects him to Islamic circles of different shades of colour and at the 
same time is in close alliance with people like Fatami who has close friendship with 
the Tudeh Party (Sahabi, 2007). The same is true with Boroujerdi who through 
Falsafi and Behbehani was connected to the Shah’s circle and ends up sending a 
telegram to the Shah for his return to the country after the success of the coup 
(Movahhed, 2004a: 154; Sahabi, 2007: 161; Jafarian, 2007: 197). Thus, the voices 
and faces were spread on a continuum creating a network of connections where we 
see in these connections the map of Iranian preference structure unfolding.  
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If subjectivity is a fold, social reality is an unfold and manifests map of the set of 
connections formed in the Iranian mind. Mind and reality are two manifestations of 
the immersion in the two states of inbetweenness and belatedness at two different 
scales. Social reality is the map of the mind which through these interconnections 
reveals that there is no discontinuity in the Iranian preference structure and in Iranian 
social reality, and that is why no stable set of coalitions can form, and antagonization 
(as a strategy for the creation of coalitions) does not work in the long run. If there is 
any lasting antagonism it is the conflict of self with itself in itself for itself. And 
Critchley’s (2010: 4) saying that individual is ‘dividual’ holds more fully than 
anything for the Iranian assemblages in this era.  
We have coalitions of Navvab-Kashani-Mosadegh form which Navvab and Kashani 
were insiders in the religious circles as part of the religious family, and that is why 
they could go to Boroujerdi’s house and protest and moan and plea for help while 
Mosaddegh’s circle did not have similar access to this social capital in the same way 
that Fadaiyan did. Fadaiyan-e Islam could provoke the sympathy of young religious 
students (Montazeri, 2001) and put immense pressure on Boroujerdi’s circle; while 
seculars could negotiate with Boroujerdi they could not wrap their demands in 
religious performatives and rituals. Navvab and Kashani, in this sense were part of 
the religious language community and their internal dialogue of the religious 
kingdom and part of their discursive and non-discursive practices, which creates the 
dysfunctional network of Boroujerdi-Kashani-Navvab.  
We have the coalition of Navvab-Kashani-Mosaddegh, which after a while is 
trimmed into Kashani-Mosaddegh one, until its total dissolution into opposite 
coalitions (Sahabi, 2007: 155). These processes create a continuum between 
religious and nationalist modernist camps with the bridging figures like Kashani who 
could move in both camps in Majlis and in religious circles. Then we have 
Mosaddegh-Fatami coalition and the loose coalition of Fatami-Tudeh, which creates 
a continuum from religious space (the dominant regime of truth in bazar) to the 
space of orthodox modernity (liberal democracy and constitutionalism among 
students and in Majlis and formal institutions) and to the non-orthodox modernity.  
There is no clear-cut distinction in terms of group affiliations and identity markers. 
Then we have Mosaddegh-Fatami-monarchy connections and the connections 
between National Front, nationalist socialists, social democrats, liberal democrats 
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and religious socialists. The three regimes of truth were interwoven in this way 
through coalitions within and between individuals and assemblages. All faces from 
Navvab-Kashani to Haerizadeh-Makki (nationalist modernists) to Tudeh and Sayed 
Zia (anglophiles) participated (see Rahnema, 2005: 126 on Sayyed Zia-Tudeh-
Kashani-Mosaddegh coalition) in the anti-Hazhir coalition (and in anti-despotism 
coalition of journalists). The role of middlemen like Makki, Rafie, Ashrafi was 
crucial in creating links between different leaders and different realms. Mehdi 
Mirashrafi acted as a middle man who had loyalty and sympathy to both sides, to 
Kashani and the Shah and the national Front people like Baghaee, Makki or Fatami 
(Rahnema, 2005); these middlemen figures acting as bridges were extremely 
important as they turned the space of Iranian social life into a ‘continuum’ rather 
than a ‘discrete space of unities’ endowed with fixed identities playing a game of 
cooperation or competition with each other. 
Due to the demands of the state of belated inbetweenness, coalitions are suppliers of 
truth (truth entrepreneurs) and collective actions, and instigate and advertise their 
truth products to create and sustain adequate demand for their own products. The 
Buddhists, for instance, were not part of the truth supply chain at the time as there 
was no tangible demand for their products in the Iranian embeddedness. And the 
extreme fascist group such as Sumka were tiny in comparison due to the low demand 
for their brand of supply, based on the principle of revealed preference. We have five 
names as signifiers of various voices: the Shah, Mosaddegh, Kashani, Navvab and 
Boroujerdi; almost all of these figures had to lead a coalition while attempting to be 
a national figure of unity over and above all forms of factionalism; the state of 
belated inbetweenness creates such a paradoxical state. We also encounter an 
organization, namely, Tudeh Party, and an external coalition of Anglo-American 
alliance, which with their associate groups and societies and countries shaped the 
destiny of Iranian in this era. The fire of antagonization ultimately engulfed 
Mosaddegh, Navab and Kashani in itself, until the revival of oriental despotism in 
coalition with occidental despotism extinguishing it only temporarily and redirecting 
it towards religious despotism and revolutionary despotism of non-orthodox 
modernity.  
In the following section we briefly explore the features of the Shah coalition as an 
example of instability of coalition formation in the ONM era. 
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5.3.1. The Shah Coalition in the ONM Era 
The Shah was a complex social assemblage constituted of the institution of kingship 
alongside the personal figure of Mohammad Reza as a particular person with a 
particular biography (see Milani, 2011a; Afkhami, 2009). In this era, the institution 
of kingdom was composed of the royal court (Persian institution of vizier and its 
associated house of wisdom, manifested in the figure of Hazhir or Qavam), the army 
(manifested in Razmara, for instance), the conservative clergy (manifested in the 
figure of Ayatollah Behbehani), and Anglo-American alliance (the Shah owed his 
reign to the powerful external forces from whom he would frequently seek advice 
(Rahnema, 2005: 667)). The person of king himself was a relational being 
constituted of his family and his individual self, as an unstable coalition between 
Persianism, modernity (largely orthodox and partly non-orthodox modernity), and 
Islam (his personal affiliation to the dream of being protected by infallible occult 
Imam or in the case of especial prayer of protection being read in his ears by Hasan 
Imami whenever he was going to long trips (Rahnema, 2005: 607), and the case of 
his mother’s religiosity as opposed to his father’s fierce secularism; Islam had potent 
(largely unconscious) presence in his life world whether he wanted or not) (see 
Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005).  
After the death of his father, his family, who were the source of tension in this 
period, was composed of queen mother, his twin sister Ashraf, and his brothers. The 
order of precedence in his preference structure was from Persianism to modernity 
and Islam. In most of this period, there were strategic differences between the Shah’s 
wildly fluctuating positions and the position of the institution of kingship as these 
difference existed between any leader and his institutional affiliates, close associates 
and coalition members; in Mosaddegh’s case this was between him and the National 
Front, equally prevalent in the cases of Kashani’s, Navvab’s, and Boroujerdi’s 
circles as well.  
There were multiple layers of schism and division inside the core royalist coalition 
between the Shah and the institution of vizier in the tension between the Shah and 
Hazhir, the Shah and Razmara, and the Shah and Qavam in 30
th
 of Tir. The Shah had 
tension inside his own family with his big sister and his mother and brothers (see 
Rahnema, 2005: 595-6 on anti-Mosaddegh coalition incorporating queen mother, 
Ashraf and the opposition deputies; Mosaddegh complained about the activities of 
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Ashraf and had the Shah send her into exile in the West). The Shah had 
disagreements with conservative clerics in the events of 9
th
 of Esfand 1331 (1952) 
when he wanted to leave the country for a self-imposed exile while Behbehani and 
his associates in the form of the men of street (thugs) opposed it. The Shah was, 
most of the time, non-complaint or hesitant towards the advice given by his foreign 
masters. The Shah was dividual in his subjectivity as Mosaddegh was in his; the 
modern sensibility in his subjectivity, for instance, was awakened towards the end of 
Mosaddegh era where he had fully accepted to act as a constitutional king (Rahnema, 
2005).  
The Shah’s coalition was, composed of layers of internal divisions, unified around 
the ancient institution of kingship and the figure of the king.  The Shah was seen and 
made to act as the figure-head in the coalition of oriental and occidental (democratic) 
despotisms and a thin layer of religious despotism against the religious despotism of 
political Islam in pragmatic and pious versions and the irreligious and undemocratic 
despotism of non-orthodox modernity (communism) and the anti-colonialist 
despotism of radical orthodox modernity (Mosaddegh’s coalition) with its constant 
resort to direct democracy (later on deemed as an example of Mosaddegh’s 
populism).  
The institution of kingship, the royal court (darbar) and their leading figures (such 
as Hazhir) were largely against the movements for free and fair election and 
nationalization of oil industry, while anglophiles like Sayyed Zia were sometimes 
with and other times against the movements (Milani, 2011a; Rahnema, 2005). We 
witness the presence of ambiguous figures like Qavam in the institution of vizier 
who initially became national hero for his use of shrewd diplomacy to free 
Azerbaijan from the Soviet occupation during the occupation of the country by the 
allies forces during the World War II and later on was turned into a villain due to his 
harsh and uncompromising stance against the ONM project (Shoukat, 2006). In a 
sense, Qavam antagonized the antagonizers, and took a radical uncompromising 
stance against the radicals, in order to solve the issue of disorder arising from the 
ONM (Rahnema, 2005: 658). This was a paradoxical position where he was 
launching waves of radical pragmatism regarding one set of players (the external 
powers) and currents of pragmatic radicalism with regard to another set of actors (the 
internal pro-ONM coalition). He was attempting to reach a compromise with the 
external powers at the cost of antagonizing the internal pro-ONM coalition. 
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The Shah did not favour Qavam as he was too powerful of a figure for him to be able 
to handle and only agreed to nominate him for prime ministership to get rid of 
Mosaddegh who was asking for the control of ministry of war. The Shah had been 
fearful of Razmara as well due to his immense power in the army and his general 
persona as the next strong man who was deemed to be likely to conduct a coup and 
abolish the Pahlavi dynasty altogether and establish a new one in his own name 
(Abadian, 2011). Razmara was almost a universally hated figure as all sides had 
grudges against him including his Anglo-American allies who were not content with 
his lack of firm opposition to the demands of the ONM. Later on towards the end of 
Mosaddegh’s era, the Shah’s position was in sharp contrast to his minister of royal 
court, Ala (Rahnema, 2005:896). While Ala was an active member of anti-
Mosaddegh coalition the Shah was favouring the support for Mosaddegh and was 
coming to an agreement with the Mosaddegh’s vision of the Shah as a proper 
constitutional king.  
In this period while the Shah was turning into Mosaddegh (Rahnema (2005: 896) 
maintains that Mosaddegh had managed to awaken the Shah’s internal Mosaddegh), 
the chaotic nature of social order was awakening the shah in Mosaddegh. 
Mosaddegh was increasingly turning or was perceived to be turning, even by his 
close allies like Kashani and his close friends and aids like Haerizadeh and Makki, 
into an unconstitutional shah himself (Sahabi, 2007; Mirfetros, 2011). In these 
moments of Iranian history, we could clearly see another example of how the liquid 
state of belated inbetweenness was manifesting itself in the make-up of the 
institution of selfhood, revealing individuals as dividuals and as unstable coalitions.  
The Shah’s aim throughout this period was to protect and prolong his kingship but 
after the disgraced fall of his father from power (his forced abdication with the 
consent of his former foreign allies (Katouzian, 2010)), the institution of kingship 
was severely weakened and its bad reputation as the seat of oriental despotism 
greatly enhanced. The legitimacy of the institution of monarchy was severely under 
question and the watchful eyes of the civil society were on him in order to prevent 
him from becoming another cruel despot like his father. He could not trust anybody 
and nobody could trust him. He could not even trust his Anglo-American allies who 
had forced his father to abdicate and put him on the crown; as they could 
conceivably do the same to him and they had put him on probation (Milani, 2011a). 
His position was precarious; his best option after the severe damage being inflicted 
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on the credibility and reputation of the monarchy was for him to retreat to the safe 
ground of royal court in order to rebuild it as a viable force again.  
He could not afford to commit himself irreversibly to a particular side at the expense 
of alienating others. He had to remain promiscuous. He was effectively an investor 
in a turbulent market for truth and as such he was trying to diversify his portfolio to 
generate a balance between risk and reward. That is why he was extremely hesitant 
and indecisive in his decisions and actions (Milani, 2011: 176, 224, 298). The Shah 
was not in a stable coalition with almost any side including himself. There was a 
conflict between Mosaddegh and the Shah over the ministry of war (Rahnema, 2005: 
648-9), where the Shah could not trust Mosaddegh and Mosaddegh had to remind 
the Shah of his oath of allegiance to the Shah in the 14th Majlis (Mirfetros, 2011). 
The Shah’s original position was to govern in the framework of the constitution and 
avoid bloodshed (Rahnema, 2005: 668; Milani, 2011a: 103-4) and he mistrusted the 
British while the British were advising him not to strictly adhere to the terms of the 
constitution (Milani, 2011a: 142), which was a clear case of occidental despotism. 
The Shah resisted the pressure put on him by the Americans and the British 
(Rahnema, 2005: 669). His best option was a wait-and-see policy quite similar to 
Boroujerdi’s one.  
They were two kings whose kingdoms suffered severe blows from the past course of 
events and both were trying to rebuild their kingdoms. But the negative side of the 
wait-and-see policy is that it exacerbates the climate of mistrust, and makes all sides 
suspicious of him and discontent with his silences and inactions (which could for 
them have the echo of conspiring behind the scene). For instance, the Shah paid the 
ultimate price for his silences, inactions, indecisions and hesitancies by carrying the 
ultimate responsibility for the massacre of 30th of Tir (Rahnema, 2005: 670-1). 
Silence, hesitancy and inaction have their own high prices especially in the state of 
belated inbetweenness. In that climate of mistrust and inaction, towards the end of 
Mosaddegh era he came to see Mosaddegh as the only viable option for managing 
Iran, as Rahnema (2005: 648) reports, and started to turn to Mosaddegh’s side and 
ignored the demands of the British at the exact time when Mosaddegh was becoming 
more suspicious of the conspiratorial Shah and his deceiving royal court (as the Shah 
and his court were moving in opposite directions and Mosaddegh was not 
theoretically aware of such internal inconsistencies within the royal camp). When the 
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Shah was zigzagging in one direction Mosaddegh was zigzagging in the opposite 
direction.  
While the Shah had taken steps to meet Mosaddegh’s demands regarding the Shah’s 
family’s interferences, and the need for the royal lands to be transferred to the 
government (Rahnema, 2005: 939), Mosaddegh had lost his trust of the Shah after 
the events of 9th of Esfand 1331 (Rahnema, 2005: 940), which led to Mosaddegh’s 
avoidance of meeting the Shah (Rahnema: 839), which in turn left the Shah’s ears, as 
a battleground, vacant for others to ‘pray’ in. In the state of belated inbetweenness, 
middlemen of all sides can suddenly, in an example of butterfly effect, change the 
direction of movement of their leaders. The leaders are led by their followers; as they 
are the product of state of belated inbetweenness they have receptivity towards 
diverse forms of forces and voices; we witness the same phenomenon with regard to 
Khomeini in the Islamic Republic.    
After the success of 30th Tir uprising for the pro-ONM coalition, the royalist clerics 
(Behbehani and associates) started to mobilize their resources against Kashani and 
the coalition of Kashani-Mosaddegh (Rahnema, 2005: 605) and in a strategic move 
activated the demand for the implementation of second article of the constitution 
calling for the presence of five mojtahids in Majlis to monitor and ensure the Islamic 
character of the laws passed (Rahnema, 2005: 606); this is the part of the constitution 
which was actively forgotten by the whole system including the Kashani-Mosaddegh 
coalition. The second article was the white elephant in the room for the 
constitutionalists as well as the clergy. This once again reminds us of the incomplete 
contract nature of the laws passed at any level. The faithful implementation of the 
law (see Tizro, 2011; Aghion and Holden, 2011) requires a society-wide consensus, 
which requires settling down of the fundamental debates and the convergence of 
ideas and life styles or achieving consensus on how to agree to disagree, both of 
which were impossible in the state of belated inbetweenness. This confirms the 
observation made later by Shams Ghanatabadi (Rahnema, 2005) on how the 
constitution was used as a wax to serve the aims and interests of different groups. 
The proper use of law requires a stable embeddedness where the supply of truth is 
homogenized and unified under a universally legitimate master signifier, like Islam, 
communism, liberal democracy and the like.  
272 
 
Here the conservative clerics suddenly realized that by activating the second article 
they had a chance to block the advance of Mosaddegh-Kashani coalition in Majlis. 
The state of belated inbetweenness is at the heart of the enigma of rule of law on the 
question of why in Iran, despite more than one hundred years of struggle for 
constitutionalism, rule of law cannot be achieved in practice. The theory of 
incomplete contract and bounded rationality can help us to understand it deeper (see 
Ginsburg, 2013: 41, 192; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009: 5). We can see the hybrid nature 
of the pro-monarchy clerics in striving to strategically combine Islam and monarchy 
against Tudeh Party and communism. They saw communism as the main enemy and 
as such naturally their narratives and strategies differed drastically from the pro-
Mosaddegh, pro-ONM coalition. 
The decentralized nature of the clergy would allow different groups of clerics to join 
different side of the truth divide in Iran. In the ONM era some clerics would join the 
Ksahni-Navvab camp of political Islam, while others would stick to the isolationism 
of Boroujerdi, still others would join Mosaddegh’s side of constitutional nationalism, 
and still others would join the pro-monarchy coalition, and many move between 
these camps nomadically depending on the latest configuration of forces, voices, and 
faces (like Navvab who moved from pro-ONM to anti-Mosaddegh and Boroujerdi-
type isolationism). A coalition between old and experienced politicians such as 
Qavam, Majlis deputies, and conservative clerics who did not see the Western 
colonial powers as the main enemy was formed against the Mosaddegh-Kashani 
alliance; and their antagonism was directed against anti-religiosity of communism 
(Rahnema, 2005: 614). The decentralized nature of the clergy would allow the 
conservative clerics like Behbahani and Falsafi to ask the Shah for a severe attack on 
Tudeh Party (Rahnema, 2005: 607) or to act against Mosaddegh without the Shah’s 
or Borouhjerdi’s knowledge or agreement; in the latter stages of the Mosaddegh’s 
rule they formed a loose coalition with Kashani against Mosaddegh, while they were 
bitter enemies early on.  
While the Shah was converging towards Mosaddegh’s position through  another 
middleman, Qa’em Maqam-e Rafi’ as the link between Mosaddegh and the Shah 
(Rahnema, 2005: 900, 941), who had sympathy with the slogan of Ham Shah Ham 
Mosadegh, both Shah and Mosaddegh, (Rahnema, 2005: 904), the components of 
institution of kingdom (royal court, the army, the pro-monarchy clerics and their 
Anglo-American allies) were busy plotting against Mosaddegh via organizing coups 
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against his government three times, in Mehr 1331 (Rahnama, 2005: 695), 25
th
 of 
Mordad 1332, and 28
th
 of Mordad 1332, the third of which succeeded in 
overthrowing Mosaddegh’s government and returning the Shah from exile back to 
his thrown.  
Zahedi was the reincarnation of Razmara, another figure from the army who had 
significant impact on the course of events in this era. While early on in the 
Mosaddegh camp, he later on became the focal point of anti-Mosaddegh campaign; 
he activated the discourse of the threat of regime change and the dangers of 
communism to coalesce all anti-Mosaddegh forces around himself (Rahnema, 2005: 
695). Kashani, formerly in the camps of anti-oriental and anti-occidental forms of 
despotism, joined his former enemies, pro-monarchy clerics like Behbahani and 
Falsafi, through some middlemen (Rahnema, 2005: 755) to finally overthrow 
Mosaddegh’s government. Kashani changed sides both due to the growing power of 
the Tudeh Party (and the looming spectre of communism, which prompted a shift in 
his priorities in a butter-fly effect) and due to his perception of Mosaddegh 
increasingly turning into an authoritarian figure (Abrahamian, 1982: 274).  
A set of tactics were deployed by the anti-Mosaddegh coalition to undermine, 
weaken, and delegitimize his government. One of the tactics used by the plotting 
coalition was the creation of manufactured crisis through kidnapping and murdering 
of some key members of the Mosaddegh’s government (Rahnema, 2005: 914-5). The 
group in charge of creation of violent episodes were largely formed of retired army 
officers who were equivalent to a kind of Fadaiyan-e Islam in reverse; they were 
Fadaiyan-e Shah, the devotees of the Shah. Mosaddegh’s coalition’s implicit or 
explicit endorsement of the use of terror and assassinations against Hazhir and 
Razmara (Mirfetros, 2011) was coming back to haunt him and his government. As 
pro-Mosaddegh coalition used violence to remove obstacles towards their 
‘legitimate’ aims, pro-monarchy, anti-communism coalition was using the same 
tools to remove the obstacles from the pursuit of the aims they deemed legitimate 
and justifiable. They were creating skirmishes in the provinces (Rahnema, 2005: 
911-3) to project an atmosphere of insecurity, whereupon they could activate the 
discourse of the need for security and the discourse of patriotism highlighting the 
dangers of Iran’s disintegration and collapse, and falling prey to communism 
(Rahnema, 2005: 931-3).  
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There were middlemen like Khatibi (Rahnema, 2005: 914) and Rashidiyan 
(Rahnema, 2005: 819) who connected Baqa’i (and his Toiler’s Party) and the British 
with the Shah in order to attract the Shah’s support for the coup. The Shah could be 
hooked to different coalitions through different middlemen as he had soft spots (local 
preference) for almost all of them. Almost all voices had resonances for the Shah and 
for all others (all of whom were the product of the state of inbetweenness) as 
Kashani could be hooked to Tudeh Party or America, or the British (for example 
through Sayyed Zia) and the same with Mosaddegh and the clergy. The Shah, for 
instance, in conversation with Khalil Malaki said ‘I am a socialist’ and Khalil Malaki 
replied but socialism is against monarchy (Amirkhosravi, 1996: 185-6).   
Another tactic they deployed was waging a psychological war through the spread of 
rumours (Rahnama, 2005: 920); the climate was ripe for all kinds of rumours and 
activating different scenarios on, for example, the murder of Afshartous, 
Mosaddegh’s chief of police force. They spread rumours in the free media 
(Rahnema, 2005: 933) as a tool to delegitimize the Mosaddegh’s side largely through 
activating the discourse of falling into the camp of Iron Curtain (Rahnema, 2005: 
935).  The show of strength by Tudeh Party in 30th of Khordad and the holding of 
referendum by Mosaddegh to dissolve the Majlis were effectively used to 
substantiate these forms of propaganda (Rahnema, 2005: 936).  
Alongside these, Mosaddegh with his transgressions provided great alibi for the coup 
coalition; de-legitimization of Mosaddegh’s government could be achieved by 
reference to the bill of national security, maintaining of martial law (hokomat-e 
nezami), alongside the gaining of emergency powers and separation of ballots in the 
referendum (Rahnema, 2005: 971-2). They also activated the discourses of dangers 
of Bahais alongside the dangers Tudeh Party (threat to the institution of property 
rights and the ownership of land) inciting Boroujerdi into action (Rahnema, 2005: 
996). The Shah activated the discourse of resort to Islam against Tudeh Party 
(Abrahamian, 1982), which shows the Shah’s inevitable promiscuity and lakkategi.  
In a small project involving the collaboration between Behbehani and his circle and 
the British Embassy to intensify the politics of fear of communism, they managed to 
produce a book called “The Guardians of magic and myth (Negahbanan-e sehr va 
afsoon)” and broadly disseminated it amongst the people and droped it in the house 
of many top clerics. This book was against, religion, religious taboos and the clergy, 
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in the name of the Tudeh Party, enticing people to take revenge of “these guardians 
of  magic and myth” namely the clergy, taking advantage of the previous episodes in 
which the Tudeh Party gatherings threatened a clergy-less future (Sahabi, 2007: 
162). 
In the final coup, Behbehani activated his men of street (thugs) (Rahnema, 2005: 
950) in the service of coup’s street actions. The anti-Mosaddegh coup had 
propaganda wing as well as the street wing. The irony is that some members of 
Fadaiyan-e Islam (Va’hedi and his circle) had joined the coalition with ultra-
nationalist parties like Arya and Sumka (Rahnema, 2005: 1014; Jafarian, 2007) 
while Nabvvab, Fadaiyan’s leader, was adopting Boroujerdi’s position of 
impartiality and cultural isolationism. While Fadaiyan were involved in the 
assassinations of two pro-monarchy elements (Hazhir and Razmara) and an anti-
religion pro-Reza Shah thinker (Kasravai) and were catalyst in the rise and 
manifestation of popular feelings against the pro-monarchy forces through the 
generation of climate of fear and martyrdom (Sahabi, 2007; Jafarian, 2007), this time 
they joined the opposite side and were inadvertently and indirectly instrumental in 
overthrowing their former allies.  Overall, this section demonstrated how and why 
the Shah and his coalition were zigzagging between alternative forces, voices, and 
faces. 
5.3.2. Remarks on the Instability in the Shah and His Coalition  
Ultimately, the Shah’s move from a constitutional monarch to the coup leader 
damaged his reputation and legitimacy greatly, leading to the collapse of his dynasty 
in the Islamic Revolution.  The Shah, however, was driven to act as the final arbiter 
and his contradictory positions in promising to act as a constitutional monarch and 
reneging on it (Milani, 2011a) can be resolved, in the spirit of devil’s advocate via 
constructing the best possible defence of the Shah’s position, in the following way: 
the Shah was bound to renege on the promise of being a constitutional monarch as 
Iran was immersed in a turbulent market for truth where no language game including 
the language game of constitutional monarchy had been consensually legitimized. 
The constitutionalism was a new game in town and was frequently used just as a 
strategic ploy in the hands of various historical actors rather than a consensual 
framework establishing the rules of the games of life, work, and language.   
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What the Shah was doing in declaring allegiance to the rule of law in theory while 
undermining it in practice was what almost everybody else was doing as well.  
Almost all players were activating and deactivating constitutionalism (and other 
discourses like martyrdom) when and where suited them best. They were allowed to 
play games with constitutionalism exactly because it was a new game in town and 
there was no deep and unshackle consensus on its parameters and how it needed to 
be played. Nobody could play games with Ashura or Nowrouz that easily as they 
were deeply entrenched and disrespect towards them or violation of their terms 
would incite strong sense of public outrage, repugnance and abhorrence. The 
widespread public repugnance in the case of violations is the main sign of the 
entrenchment of a language game and its main enforcement mechanism.  
Ghanatabadi’s observation is extremely significant when he complains about how 
the constitution was treated as a wax in the hands of people to turn it in whatever 
shape and direction they desired (Rahnema, 2005: 862). This is related to the 
incomplete contract nature of the constitution and how the law is activated and 
deactivated depending on the spirit of time, like the example of the second article 
and its total abandonment and reactivation by Behbehani and his circle to serve their 
transient purposes. When there is no historical consensus on the nature of 
fundamental laws, their sources, their dominant spirit and their direction of 
evolution, constitution becomes a tool in the hands of historical actors and at every 
era the constitution becomes a battleground for alternative faces and voices over the 
rights and obligations of various figures and institutions, and their boundaries 
become a matter for deep theoretical and pragmatic disputes. In the context of 
belated inbetweenness constitution or any other form of laws cannot act as ‘binding 
mechanisms’ and can encourage opportunistic behaviour in the light of bounded 
rationality and the inevitable gap between ex ante and ex post eventualities (see 
Forte and D’Amico, 2007: 300; Furubotn and Richter, 2005: 411).  
As the constitution becomes reshaped in the image of different forces and voices, it 
loses its credibility and legitimacy as a binding commitment device, which then 
permeates into the whole realm of law and the principle of rule of law. This is an 
important point of conflict and discontent in the modern history of Iran: the 
mechanical resort to the principle of rule of law without settling the fundamental 
disputes on the big questions of life and the state of inbetweenness where alternative 
regimes of truth offer contradictory truths regarding those big questions. As such, 
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law lacks the condition of possibility of emergence as a credible and mutually 
binding commitment device for all sides involved in the political economy of truth. 
Even the Shah’s Western allies were strategically activating and deactivating the 
discourse of being a constitutional monarch depending on the context of situation 
(Milani, 2011a: 142); the British could not easily activate and deactivate the 
principles of constitutionalism at home in the British context due to the long and 
entrenched tradition of constitutionalism. When there is no consensus on a set of 
discourses, the actors activate and deactivate them strategically which leads to 
instability, acting as a barrier to conflict resolution (see Arrow, 1995).  
The reason why the Shah behaved the way he behaved is as follows. From outset, the 
Shah felt under siege from all sides, effectively facing the same problem as Nasir-al-
Din Shah, where “the "cannonballs of sedition" were destined to rain on his "castle 
of mirrors" (Amanat, 1997: 152). Rival figures from the army like Razmara or 
Zahedi or strong figures from the institution of vizier like Qavam could gather 
adequate support and momentum to topple him the way his father toppled the weak 
Ahmad Shah Qajar; he could not trust his masters (Western allies) as they could 
easily replace him with a better alternative as they did with regard to his father and 
as they frequently indicated to him that he was on probation (Milani, 2011a: 104); 
the spectre of republicanism was hovering over the country; Islamists and Tudeh 
Party were fancying entirely different models of political governance. These series of 
existential threats alongside immense pressure and expectation directed at him by the 
royal court and society at large (the big Other), demanding him to act according to 
the parameters of a proper Persian king would inevitably drive him to act as the final 
arbiter (this dynamics of big Other is implicitly attested by Bahar, as reported in 
Katouzian, 2013: 186, when he says that “as soon as a strong man appears, he is 
surrounded by a few ‘tramps’ who would” invite him to act as a Persian king).  
As such, it was quite rational for the Shah to express his fear about “the end of all 
regimes of constitutional monarchy” and frustration that “It was … “impossible to be 
a constitutional ruler” in Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 124). Ironically the answer he 
received from the British ambassador that “A dictatorship was also impossible” 
(Milani, 2011a: 124) was also true, showing the long-run non-viability of any form 
of final arbiter in the state of belated inbetweenness. It was inevitable that the Shah’s 
‘public’ belief in “democracy and rule of law” (Milani, 2011a: 103) would come into 
conflict with his ‘private’ belief in the role of a “powerful king” in the progress of 
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Iran (Milani, 2011a: 103). We notice here how in the state of belated inbetweenness 
the gap between public and private views re-emerges as a structural property time 
and again (see Kuran, 1995 on how this gap leads to sudden changes like 
revolutions). 
The irreconcilable differences between and within truth camps in the state of belated 
inbetweenness makes the rise and fall of final arbiters, and the constant threats of 
collapse, inevitable. In the state of belated inbetweenness “the consent of the 
governed” (Milani, 2001a: 107) cannot be formed in any stable manner, making 
democratic governance impossible alongside making “dictatorship” and 
“constitutional monarchy” equally impossible.  This was true with Reza Shah, who 
initially wanted to establish a republic, and was made to be an enlightened despot 
through being in a coalition with the modernists who wanted him to act as a modern 
benevolent dictator, ultimately becoming an oriental despot through being a Persian 
king, and Khomeini who wanted to delegate the political power and authority and act 
only as a monitor and keep the clergy from the executive branch of state, ending up 
in suggesting and embodying the theory of absolute authority of Faqih.  
We extensively explored the formation of seven salient unstable coalitions which 
were instrumental in the formation of collective actions in the ONM era; these 
explorations were excluded from this work due to word limitations. It is important to 
note that the social life at the time was littered with multitude of unstable coalition in 
all realms of life, work, and language and these seven unstable coalitions are the 
most salient ones and are given as examples of a general trend towards the formation 
of unstable coalition in this era. These seven social assemblages are Mosaddegh’s 
coalition, Kashani’s coalition, Boroujerdi’s coalition, Navvab’s coalition, the Shah’s 
coalition, the Tudeh coalition, and the Anglo-American coalition.  
5.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
As stated by North (1990, 2005), institutions make life predictable and stable, as 
they establish the rules of the game in different realms of work, life and language. 
Institutions such as money, language, market, court, family, state and church- as 
Hayek (1988) alongside Sugden (1989) and Heiner (1989) theorize them- are the 
spontaneous and unintended product of evolutionary processes (see also Backhaus, 
2005; Thelen, 2004).  
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With this theoretical background in mind we need to note that the question in this era 
revolved around how Iran could move from the state of belatedness (backwardness) 
to the state of progress, which required building new institutions. The answer was 
deemed to be simple as Taqizedeh and Rasoulzadeh declared in Kaveh magazine 
(Katouzian, 2003, Abadian, 2009b; Ansari, 2012). They stated that the blueprints 
and recipes for building such institutions were already ready for us; the Westerners 
had done the hard work of inventing all of them; we just needed to import them, 
adopt them faithfully and implement them. The blueprints for a modern army, 
modern economy, modern family, modern polity, modern security forces, modern 
education system, modern bureaucracy were there, we just needed to adopt them by 
sending people to learn them from the Western countries or inviting their experts to 
teach us. In these set of institutions, some gave priority to the realm of polity, some 
to the economy (such as Davar) and others to education, army or legality. Having the 
minimum human capital for progress required the founding of schools, polytechnics 
and universities, and it was assumed that following such measures Iran could be on 
its way toward total modernization. The same prescriptions were issued for the 
design of other institutions. 
There were only two small problems with this model of catching-up and theory of 
selection where one already has easy access to the modern perfect recipes, which 
only needed to be implemented. Firstly, this was a case of reverse social engineering, 
which totally violates the condition of possibility for the emergence of stable social 
institutions, which has to be achieved through an evolutionary process of chaotic 
synchronization and the work of vanishing mediators. Secondly, it is intimately 
relates to two other regimes of truth in the Iranian embeddedness that have claims 
into the right to shape Iranian life world and to furnish it with institutions. The 
dispute was over the logic of substitution and complementarity and the logic of 
subsumption.  
All three projects aimed to modernize (to actualize the will-to-progress), while 
subsuming it in different larger projects, one through ‘assurance of the right-to-
eternal-happiness’, the other through the ‘right-to-restore-ancient-glories’ and the 
third through the ‘right-to-temporal-pleasures’. What is common to all these projects 
is that all of them are unconsciously engulfed in the modern spirit of Cartesian social 
engineering, a logic of change and a theory of selection where the society is 
refurnished with new institutions by intelligent design. This spirit of reverse social 
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engineering sweeping the developing countries was due to immersion in the state of 
belatedness. The chief engineer has been an Islamist, a Persianist, or a modernist. 
The state of belatedness and catching-up prompts all sides into the act of reverse 
social engineering as opposed to evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization 
manifested in gradualism, enfranchisement, and negotiation between different 
regimes of truth, different layers of time and space, and their associated voices and 
faces.  
As such, the main problem with building institutions in this era resided in misguided 
theory of social phenomena and inadequate theory of selection from alternative 
civilizations and cultures. The rare example of institutional success in this period is 
the successful management of the case of Azerbaijan through the shrewd diplomatic 
movements of Qavam in collaboration with religious and secular elites in Majlis and 
religious circles outside of it to save the country from an enormous crisis (Shoukat, 
2006). Other successful cases include the change of calendar, standardization of 
weights and measures, establishing the institution of family names and obligation to 
obtain birth certificates, and compulsory military conscription in the Reza Shah 
period (Ansari, 2012: 77). These success contrasts with the institutional failure of 
nationalization of oil. Other examples of the emergence of new and/or (relatively) 
stable institution are the emergence of modern poetry (she’r-e nou) or poetic 
modernity in the language of Karimi-Hakkak (1989, 2012; see also Karimi-Ḥakkak 
and Talattof, 2004) alongside the rituals of Nowrouz and Ashura. In this era, 
remaking a community in the form of a nation-state was basically deemed to be an 
engineering project, resembling the construction of an airport or a stadium.  In other 
words, remaking society or social assemblages was deemed to be a construction kind 
of project; this urge for reverse social engineering happens when societies encounter 
an alternative truth package, which inspires people to demolish the old order and 
replace it with a ready-made one with a well-defined set of blueprints.  
In contrast in the pioneering countries, when there was no such a ready-made 
alternative an organic process of gradual emergence of bits and pieces of new order 
was at work; encountering with a whole new alternative turns social change into an 
engineering project. We face two types of change, engineering one versus 
evolutionary one. This shows why encountering Islam or any other invader was not 
an engineering project for rather a gradual process of bringing all components 
together in a process of trial and error, blind watchmaking and chaotic 
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synchronisation, like the process of emergence and spread of universities, modern 
family, new sexualities, voting systems, constitutional monarchy, emergence of 
cinema in the Western world. In the case of the institution of cinema, for instance, it 
started from an embryonic stage, which in interaction with other components of 
society evolved gradually in a process of blind watchmaking; the same process of 
gradual change happened with regard to the emergence and evolution of highways, 
for instance. The society went through gradual process of capacity and consensus 
building.  
In the case of developing countries, the dynamic of situation (being thrown in a state 
of belatedness and catching-up) gave rise to the emergence of social engineering (or 
conscious watchmaking) as the dominant approach in making new societies and 
building new nation-states and their associated institutions. The application of the 
logic of reverse social engineering in a state of inbetweenness and in its interaction 
with the state of belatedness culminates in the construction of deformed and 
dysfunctional institutions, which in the word of Davar, one of the architects of 
modern legal systems in Iran (Mohammadi, 2008), is referred to as “dying young” or 
“javanmarg shodan” (Abadian, 2009b: 34). The womb of Iranian dasein mis-carries 
any program, any forms of life or any institutions at any colour, which is not blessed 
with tri-polar form of legitimacy. 
In the following section the dysfunctionalities and deformities experienced in the 
realm of institutionalization of social virtues and vices in the ONM era is briefly 
explored as an example of institutional failure arsing due to the tragedy of confusion 
and formation of unstable coalitions. 
5.4.1. The Institutionalization of Social Vices in the ONM Era  
The site of social vices is one of the leading microcosms in the battle of regimes of 
truth to conquer the terrain of morality and act as the only supplier of truth about the 
nature of virtue and vice and institutionalize them. The topic of enjoining to virtues 
and preventing from vices (amr-e be maroof va nahy-e az monkar) is one of the 
central topics in Islam (re-emerging throughout the modern history of Iran as one of 
the main concerns of religious people against modernity; see Najmabadi, 1987). 
Persianism has also a famous ethical advice inviting people to “good thought, good 
talk, good deed” (Farazmand, 2009: 36) while modernity is deemed to be equivalent 
to advocacy for the ethic of citizenship while lacking strong moral commandments 
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and commitment aimed at attainment of moral excellence and is deemed to be 
tantamount to advocacy for permissive society (see Larmore, 1996: 74; Srigley, 
2011: 78; for the notion of “moral poverty of modernity” see Sevenhuijsen, 1998: 18 
and for the notion of “moral blindness” of liquid modernity see Bauman and 
Donskis, 2013) . The demand for truth about the nature of virtue and vice revolves 
around “What is virtue? What is vice?” And “How can we effectively eradicate (or 
reduce) the vice and promote the virtue among a people?”   
Different regimes of truth offer different conceptions of vice and virtue and how they 
manifest themselves in the social order. In a long process of philosophical, cultural, 
and social evolution, modernity baptized many of the traditional vices into virtues 
while creating its own set of new vices and virtues. The two main old vices of greed 
and lust were baptized by Mandeville (and Smith and others) and de Sade (Shapiro, 
1993). Other vices such as drinking alcohol or gambling were decriminalized and 
gradually became part of fabric of permissive society (Collins, 2007). Modernity in 
large part valorises the pleasures of the flesh and celebrates almost all physically 
non-harmful forms of exciting the body. Through the fundamental change in the 
philosophy of life and death, beginning and the end, the material and the spiritual 
modernity revolutionized the system of values and made many of the old vices as 
new virtues and vice versa (see Israel, 2001). It changed the balance between the 
permanence and the impermanence, the ephemeral and the eternal, the body and the 
soul.  
Modernity drastically reversed the traditional hierarchy invested in these binary 
oppositions in favour of the body, the ephemeral and the impermanence (see 
Blackburn, 2004 for the life-affirming property of lust in the modern imagination). 
Modernity has created its own set of social vices such as poverty, illiteracy, infant 
mortality, unemployment, inflation, child labour, domestic violence, and recently 
smoking, obesity, aging, and even death itself. At its heart, modernity disdains pain, 
decay, death, and whatever detrimental to the pleasures of the body and mind and 
whatever harmful to the survival and health of the body and mind, which is 
institutionally constructed as vices.  
The open and unrepentant celebration of human sexuality and the relentless and 
unashamed pursuit of self-interest (Force, 2003; Rogers, 1997) alongside almost 
total evaporation of the discourse of chastity and service to people, pursuit of moral 
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excellence, godliness, and the intimate relation with the sacred were amongst the 
biggest shocks for the Iranian life world. Iranian people may have been as 
materialistic or as lustful as any other nation but their ideal model of existence had 
always condemned these ways of existence and treated them as immoral and leading 
to the loss of their eternal happiness.  
This duality between preference and meta-preference, between action and the value 
system allowed people to always have the possibility of genuine repentance, even in 
the last minutes before death, which would reconnect them with the realm of the 
eternal. Throughout their sinful lives they would never step out of their regime of 
truth, they had only occupied one of its categories “the sinner”. Modernity 
revolutionized the vocabulary of vice and virtue and gradually the category of sinner 
was eliminated from the public discourse. For Iranian dasein modernity with its new 
vocabulary, while has plenty of positive resonances in its new set of vices and in its 
praise of wealth-creation and its ability to promote science and technology, prohibits 
the possibility of collective access to the truth about the realm of gods and how it 
relates to the realm of mortals in everyday existence. It vanished the highway 
between the sky and the earth as it turned the sky into another form of the earth and 
transformed the sky, as the realm of supernatural, into an illusion or at best an 
entertaining fiction. This was a prohibitively expensive price to pay for the Iranian 
dasein to attain modernity (see Milani, 2004).  
The Western dasein had internalized and developed a sense of ownership towards 
modernity and its new set of vices and virtues; they had actively participated in its 
creation at different levels through their philosophers, their politicians and their civil 
wars and active participation in societies, groups, cults and new religious 
denominations. Modernity was the outcome of an evolutionary process of blind 
watchmaking; it spontaneously emerged out of intermingling of ideas and blood in a 
long and gradual process of embedded emergence. Even large and sudden changes 
like revolutions occurred inside a larger framework of gradual and internalized 
change. When Iranian dasein encountered modernity as an almost finished product in 
the 19
th
 century and more fully throughout 20
th
 century, it had not severed or even 
loosened its connections with the eternal and with its deep mythical history.  
The encounter with modernity was not an encounter with an embedded entity; it was 
an encounter with a piece of real. As such Iranian embedded womb was not ready to 
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receive the seeds of modernity; it wanted something from modernity, for example its 
constitutionalism and rule of law which for the Iranian dasein echoed constraining 
man’s arbitrariness (slavery to whims) through God’s rule and as such could relate to 
it and try to appropriate it as religious constitutionalists tried to do, but they could 
hardly find resonance for modernity’s reverse value system. No human order 
beforehand defended and praised and worshiped the pleasures of the flesh so openly, 
so wholeheartedly, and so unashamedly (Wilson, 2008: 268).  
They could not fathom the piety of unbelief (Caputo, 1997; Fraser, 2002; Buckner 
and Statler, 2005); they could not relate to the story of how in the history of the 
West, when oppression, exploitation and demonic values had captured the kingdom 
of god, spirituality, and truth in the Medieval Europe, the truth had to flee from the 
realm of religion and free itself from the shackles of untruth by migrating to the 
realm of untrue. For the Western dasein truth was now working in the guise of 
traditional untrue while untrue was residing in the traditional realm of truth, 
affirming the fragility of goodness. Modernity for Western dasein was a liberation 
movement freeing mankind from the shackles of oppressive kingdom of divine. In 
this instantiation of modernity, life is nothing but the pursuit of self-interest and 
pleasure of the flesh and, as Foucault (1977: 30) phrased it, “the soul is the prison of 
the body”. 
That long experience and that long escape to freedom were not replicated in the 
experience of Iranian dasein. The encounter with modernity was through cultural 
invasion, material intervention and the act of social engineering. As such modernity 
in its permissive value system was a totally misplaced and alien entity for the Iranian 
dasein. This led to the operation of addition and subtraction on the three sets of 
regimes of truths. Iranian dasein wanted modernity in its science and technology and 
maybe in its constitutionalism without its permissive value system. People like 
Taqizadeh (see Katouzian, 2013; Ansari, 2012) frequently condemned what they 
called as pseudo-modernism of Iranian society, in immersion in what they treated as 
superficial and immoral aspects of modernity (modernity’s politics of ordinary).  In a 
sense they wanted freedom without freedom, good freedom without bad freedom. 
They wanted Islam without superstition and religious despotism and intolerance and 
they wanted Persianism without its oriental despotism. In a sense they wanted 
modernity without modernity, Islam without Islam and Persianism without 
Persianism. They wanted to travel ‘with modernity against modernity’, ‘with Islam 
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against Islam’, and ‘with Persianism against Persianism’, alongside applying the 
white book of each against the black book of the other. 
They were applying the values of Islam on modern freedom (while the main claim of 
modernity was a set of new truths about good and bad, virtue and vice; the notion of 
good and bad themselves were being challenged and replaced, bad with good and 
good with bad) and were turning them into Islamic freedom and they were applying 
the values of modernity on Islam and turning it into modern Islam (while for the 
finished modernity the whole of religion was nothing but superstition, and for Islam 
the whole point of religion was opening the horizon of supernatural and miraculous 
to the material world of animal kingdom; for Islam the whole project of modernity in 
its obsession with the material and the embodiment and the pleasures of the flesh 
was the biggest illusion ever in the history of mankind; man was from God and was 
returning to God and anything denying this fact was the biggest betrayal to mankind 
and “the” biggest crime against humanity; the crime of modernity was killing human 
soul while as Foucault (1977) said the mission of modernity was to free the body 
from the prison of soul) and they were applying the values of modernity to 
Persianism and declaring it despotic while it perceived itself as being gifted with the 
divine grace.  
A deep series of philosophical work was needed to contemplate on the contradictions 
and inconsistencies of such a rhizomatic demand involving the intermixing of 
competing systems of values and philosophies. It could have been invented in a long 
process of evolutionary philosophization but Iranian dasein never seriously 
attempted it due to the impatience of the state of belatedness. Many positions 
emerged from radical modernity to radical Islamism and radical Persianism and 
numerous pragmatic hybridization of the three sets, each carrying their own 
inconsistencies and contradictions and each totalizing its own truth into the one and 
only truth (different ideologies of radicalism versus different ideologies of 
pragmatism as the work of imaginary order). In this context, the ONM era witnessed 
the battle over the site of virtue and vice.     
One of the sites where the battle over social vices occurred in the Mosaddegh 
government was the bill of banning the production, distribution and consumption of 
alcoholic drinks (Rahnema, 2005: 482-8; Shoukat, 2006: 308-10). The demand for 
the bill was created through sending petitions, letters, and telegrams to the 
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government and Majlis by the religious circles in the country. The supply side 
prompted the demand for its own product through the act of marketing; like all 
businesses, the clergy who were in the business of production of truths promoted the 
demand for their own products. In their attempts to create a favourable atmosphere 
for banning of alcohol to put pressure on the government and the deputies in Majlis, 
Ayatollah Sayyed Kazem Shariatmadari in a letter to a Majlis deputy asks for the 
banning of alcohol and calls alcohol the mother of all evils and Ayatollah Sadr asks 
for religious punishment of lashing to be applied to the transgressors (Shoukat, 2006: 
309-10).  
There were no public disputes about the principle of categorization of drinking 
alcohol as a social vice. Kazemi, the minister of economy, summarized this 
consensus in the phrase that “there is no difference of opinion on the principle itself” 
(Rahnema, 2005: 488, Shoukat, 2006: 311). This bill was used to reaffirm the fragile 
coalition between National Front and Kashani. The supporters of the bill reactivated 
a number of discourses on the evilness of drinking alcohol from the embedded 
archive, a set of discourses ranging from the role of alcohol in the promotion of 
crime, sexually transmitted diseases, health, moral decadence and opposition to 
religious teachings. These discourses were activated by the secular members of the 
National Front as well as the clerical deputies (Rahnema, 2005: 482-8, Shoukat, 
2006: 308-10). The alternative discourses activated by the opposition to the bill 
revolved around its impracticality in the process of implementation as it opposed the 
habits of people and could even harm religiosity of the people as it could lead to the 
increase in the underground consumption of alcohol, its adverse effects on the tax 
revenue (which Mosaddegh was desperately in need of due to the confrontation with 
the British on the oil front) and on jobs and employment (Rahnema, 2005: 483).  
Here none of the opposition could openly object the validity of the theoretical claims 
on the viciousness of drinking alcohol; their opposition revolved around practical 
considerations. Hazhir, one of the outwardly non-religious prime ministers, had 
already banned alcoholic drinks in the three religious cities of Mashhad, Qom and 
Ray while leaving it free in other cities (Jafarian, 2007: 194; footnote 2; Rahnema, 
2005: 466).  Here the non-religious were accepting the legitimacy and potency of the 
religious discourse by applying it in three cities. The immediate question raised was 
why not to extend the ban to all other cities; if it is banned in the Quran it is banned 
for all Muslims in all cities not only for ultra-religious cities; this was the position of 
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Fadaiyan-e Islam who wanted to use the site of alcohol consumption (alongside other 
social vices like gambling, films and women’s veiling; see Fadaee, 2012) to promote 
their own project of reverse social engineering, namely, Islamization (see Jafarian 
2007 on their passionate manifesto for the Islamization of the country).    
This clearly demonstrates that in this realm the religious discourse of Shia 
jurisprudence had monopolized the supply of truths about the nature of relation 
between man and alcohol. In the market for discourses about social vices the Islamic 
discourse was the incumbent one which was setting the agenda for debate and public 
policy as compared to the issues relevant to the establishment of parliamentary 
democracy where modernity was the incumbent regime of truth and was setting the 
agenda and the other regimes of truth had to challenge or moderate the incumbent to 
find a niche for themselves in the market. This demonstrates how the traditional 
division between secular and religious categories does not strictly apply to people in 
the state of belated inbetweenness, as they have nomadic identities and float between 
boundaries of regimes of truth. Kashani, a top religious leader, activates the 
discourses of constitutionalism and secular deputies and secular government 
ministers use the religious language on viciousness of alcohol; people are multi-
lingual in the state of belated inbetweenness where, depending on the context of 
situation, they may shift from speaking in the language of religion to the language 
and vocabularies of modernity or the language of Persian poetry or Persian rituals 
and civilization or Persian mythology.  
Similar phenomenon was witnessed in the age of the Islamic Republic where Akhavi 
(1983: 209) observes that “Principled coalitions, in the sense of group adherence to 
an internally consistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify”. Selves were 
unstable coalitions. This is why the criticism levied by Shoukat (2006: 310) on the 
secular politicians about their deviance from the secular language and secular 
program is misplaced as the secular regime of truth in Iran did not have a viable, 
sound, and widely accepted discourse on the nature of good and evil, virtue and vice. 
Iranian people were not divided into clearly demarcated and distinguished 
communities of all-or-nothing type of identities. It was not politicians’ fault; the 
Iranian embeddedness in its philosophical and theoretical capacity did not even 
begin to address the fundamental questions on the pleasures of the flesh and their 
opposition or association with the pleasures of the soul. Behind the religious circle in 
Majlis were Ayatollahs and a long tradition of religious reasoning and long tradition 
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of Persian poetry celebrating purity of love; nothing much was there in terms of 
theoretical legacy and heritage behind the secular deputies to equip them with 
alternative discourse on the nature of alcohol and its relation to body, soul, 
permanence and impermanence, this world and the next.  
As religious circles had nothing substantial on parliamentary democracy the secular 
circles had nothing much on the nature of virtue (maroof) and vice (monkar) distinct 
from the religious or Persian epistemes. The politicians are only the passive agents of 
the historical embeddedness; they only play with the cards available to them (Billig, 
1995).  This is also a great example of how the Foucauldian chain of statements, 
discourses, discursive formation, archive, and episteme works in practice. Even those 
who were monarchist, like Farrokh (Rahnema, 2005: 483), had to disguise or 
reformulate their opposition to the bill in the name of its unintended adverse effects 
on the level of religiosity of people (this is the level of discursive formation). He 
could not say that the promotion of people’s religiosity should not be the purpose of 
public policy or claim that the right to drink alcohol at a moderate scale is the right 
of every rational Iranian.  In this context, the discursive formation was the total 
adherence to God’s commandment in the Quran on the banning of alcohol in the 
Islamic society (as mentioned in the Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s letter, Shoukat, 2006: 
309).      
One of the themes emerged in the site of demand and supply of the bill for banning 
alcohol was the strategic use of this bill by Kashani and his circle to pursue their 
political aims (the politicization of the bill). Rahnema (2005: 467-8) questions the 
sincerity of Kashani and his circle in the case of apparent contradiction in his 
behaviour; when he was in opposition he passionately activated the demand for the 
bill for banning alcohol to be passed in Majlis and then implemented without delay 
but when he was in power he chose to quietly ignore the bill and let it fall out of 
Majlis agenda. Kashani and his circle seem to have activated and deactivated the 
discourse of social vices at will. They launched and silenced the discursive missiles 
in the service of their strategic interests. Here again we see the false duality between 
knowledge and power and the application of intentional fallacy. The apparent 
inconsistency in the position of Kashani can be removed by applying the principle of 
devil’s advocate and the charitable application of hermeneutics of understanding and 
the careful application of hermeneutics of suspicion in revealing the affirmative and 
negating dimension of his social assemblage and its unintended consequences.  
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If we listen to Kashani faithfully, we hear that he mentioned in many contexts that 
what was significant for him was taking charge of the ship of social order as its pilot; 
when he was the pilot he could assure its long-term direction towards Islam-based 
order and he could afford to suspend the actual implementation of Islamic rulings 
regarding alcohol based on the principle of expediency inherent in the topic of 
secondary rulings in Shia fiqh as well as the principle of prioritization (al-aham-fal-
aham), indicating that the more significant issues should be given priority over the 
less important ones. But when he was out of power and in opposition, the pilot of the 
ship was someone else who could not assure the long-term direction of the ship 
towards Islam-based outcome and as such he activates the discourses of the social 
vices to mobilize his core supporters and his cultural tribe in order to take the 
leadership of the ship and capture the centre.  
The discourse of social vices, or any other discourse, has two different functions in 
and out of power. This applies to almost all social assemblages. The West activates 
the discourse of human rights against the regimes which are not its allies and 
deactivates it in favour of the regimes which are its allies. There is a logic behind it 
and it is related to the long-term direction of the ship of international order.  
Mosaddegh himself famously activated the discourse of the evilness of the demand 
for emergency powers and its oppositions to the principles of the constitution and 
deactivated the same discourse when he himself was in power (Sahabi, 2007; 
Rahnema, 2005). This applies to almost all social assemblages at micro, meso 
(family, organizations), or macro (societies and states) levels.  The demand for 
banning social vices far outweighed the single issue of alcoholic drinks. Fadaiyan 
(Jafarian, 2007: 217-8) and Kashani (Rahnema, 2005: 141, 467, 285) had a long list 
of social vices including prostitution, dance clubs, gambling, women working in 
public offices, abortion, drug consumption, non-religious education, broadcasting 
music from the national radio, and many more. Mosaddegh was forced to abolish 
music from radio in the month of Ramadan due to the incessant pressure from 
various corners (Rahnema, 2005: 481).  
Even Kasravi (1946) (a famous historian and supporter of Reza Shah’s 
modernization project) severely criticized the blind adoption of Western mode of 
free intermixing of the sexes in the name of girls being exploited by the devious men 
who only had one thing in mind in their relation with women. The constant unease 
with social vices and the difficulty in finding viable and stable way of coping with 
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them created constant fluctuations between the positions of banning and toleration, 
which in turn gave rise to dysfunctional sets of institutions in charge of handling the 
issue of social vices. The theme of social vices and their prevalence always created 
waves of discontent with the nature of the social order and created attempts to recast 
the system. The issue of social vices and social freedom (which opposes spiritual 
freedom from slavery to animalistic desires; see Dinani, 2010b) has been one of the 
great faultlines in the history of Iran and a cause for the de-legitimization of any 
form of socio-political order.    
We extensively investigated how the states of tragedy of confusion and formation of 
unstable coalition led to the emergence of deformed and dysfunctional institutions in 
the ONM era; the details of this investigation were excluded from this work due to 
word limitations. A number of institutions were probed to demonstrate the general 
and specific patterns and dynamics involved in the miscarriages of modern 
institutions. The excluded explorations incorporated the realm of polity and the 
attempts made to institutionalize the sense of nationhood. It also covered the 
exploration of the institutions of state and political party, language, foreign policy 
and diplomacy (incorporating all voices from the British, to Tudeh Party, and Qavam 
at work in the microcosms and battlegrounds of the ONM project).    
5.6. CHAOTIC ORDER 
The Iranian embeddedness was oscillating between alternative regimes of truth 
throughout this period; as the social order fluctuated between extreme cases of chaos 
and limited experience of stability while experiencing fundamental instability and 
tension throughout this period. In other words, the volcano of Iranian social order 
oscillated between states of total apparent inactivity and sudden eruptions, while 
experiencing small scale eruptions and disturbances throughout this period. This 
period started with Reza Shah’s coup and ended up with his son’s coup, while in the 
middle experienced considerable level of turbulence manifested in Reza Shah’s 
forced abdication, episodes of terrors and assassination and constant daily battles 
between the forces, voices and voices in politics and in other realms of social order.  
The social space was bursting with discontent, hatred and various forms of verbal 
and/or physical violence.  
Katouzian’s (2010) and Movahhed’s (Jafarian, 2007: 197) descriptions of the chaos 
in the time interval between the fall of Reza Shah and the 1953 coup are 
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symptomatic of general state of chaos in the social order in this period. Chaotic order 
is a continuum governing the whole period and made manifestly visible in the events 
of abdication, terrors, bitter strife between and within groups and individuals within 
the establishment and outside of it, and the coup followed by periods of icy stability 
established by the emergence of the final arbiter or the Iranian modern leviathan. The 
establishment of security was in inverse relation with the level of freedom. The 
chaotic dimension of the Iranian social assemblage was manifested in the emergence 
of divisions between the voices and faces, while the dimension of order was 
manifested in the emergence of final arbiter. Paradoxically, the forces which created 
division and difference guaranteed the prevention of the collapse of the society into 
the state of failed state.  
In this period, three final arbiters emerged two (two Pahlavi shahs) in the name of 
Persianization with their own subprojects and one (Mosaddegh) in the name of 
modernization with his own subprojects. The system fluctuated between the state of 
chaos in the beginning of the Pahlavi era and then in the period of 10 years after 
forced abdication to the state of oppressive order enforced by iron fist in the Reza 
Shah’s reign and post-coup establishment and partially in the last months of 
Mosaddegh reign (as he was accused of despotism even by his best friend like Makki 
and Haerizadeh, for example) (Mojtahedzadeh, 2011; Mirfetros, 2011; Sahabi, 
2007).  
The chaotic order was rooted in the ‘tit for tat game’ of de-legitimization and 
discrediting, entrenched in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. The 
blame game inspired by the discourse of decline was incessantly played out 
throughout this period, leading to the discrediting of all forces, voices and faces by 
all forces, voices and faces. Mosaddegh’s reputation was possibly the only exception 
to the rule (Sahabi, 2007: 173), which was restored through his gaining the status of 
eternal victimhood for being overthrown by the 1953 Anglo-American coup. He 
became victim par excellence in the modern history of Iran. However, Mosaddegh’s 
reputation for incorruptibility (Abrahamian, 2008: 115; for a recent biography of 
Mosaddegh see De Bellaigue, 2012) had/has corrupted Iranian social order through 
unintentionally and unconsciously immersing it in the perpetual dynamics of 
culpability/victimhood. Iran and its people formed a perception of themselves as the 
powerless victim of forces, voices and faces beyond their reach. The perpetrators 
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changed from oriental, to occidental and religious or even revolutionary forms of 
despotisms but the sense of victimhood remained intact.  
It seems that there was some grain of truth in the Iranian sense of powerlessness 
against the powerful forces, but these powerful forces were not the forces of world 
powers, the West and the Soviet Union or their internal agents and conspirators, but 
the impersonal forces of tragic battle within and between alternative regimes of truth 
inside Iranian subjectivity and social order. The multiple forms of regimes of truth 
created incommensurable forms of rationalities with multiple grammars of 
legitimacy and countless forms of language communities and language games. The 
irreconcilable differences in knowledge had created irreparable rupture in power and 
subjectivity. This in turn made the power extremely diffused and dispersed as 
reflected in the resort to the notion of the difference in taste or ekhtelaf-e saligheh 
(Rahnema, 2005: 528) for explaining the chaotic state of affairs. As such Iranians 
were the victims of the particularity of their own history as a whole and not 
particular forces, voices or faces inside or outside the country. This demonstrates that 
the discourse of decline is a highly poor conceptual scheme for understanding the 
state of affairs in the Iranian modern history (see Sadeghi, 2013 and Sohrabi, 2012 
for examples on critique of the discourse of decline or the paradigm of declinism or 
enhetatgeraee). 
With regard to the incessant blames directed at America and Britain as sources of 
chaos in Iran for their participation in the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh’s 
government, it should be noted that America and Britain could be treated as a 
resource like oil, a force of culture and a piece of real which could be used for 
creating stability and development if and when the indigenous country had a sense of 
unity of purpose and direction like Japan, South Korea or Germany. America was 
not the invincible force it was deemed to be as it could not break the resolve of little 
island like Cuba in its own backyard. It is worth stressing that Mosaddegh’s battle 
with the West was a battle inside modernity (see de Bellaigue, 2012: 134, for 
instance, on how Mosaddegh “regarded Britain's constitutional monarchy as the best 
model for Iran's government”), asking the West to honour its own ideals and act 
upon them rather than acting upon Realpolitik. Even without the coup, Mosaddegh’s 
government was deeply in trouble, as the whole social order, the forces within the 
Mosaddegh’s coalition or beyond it, were deeply divided on almost all aspects of 
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how to organize the realms of life, work and language. This is what Sahabi (2007: 
155) alluded to:  
As Bazargn once said “the coup saved the National Front” [from total 
annihilation] as the level of discord within the Front was such that the 
internal strife would have become scandalous and destroyed its reputation, 
ultimately ending up in dismantling the Front.  
 
This is similar to the observation made by Ehtesham-al-Saltaneh (Ajodani, 2003: 23) 
in the constitutional era on how  Mohammad Ali Shah’s coup against Majlis was a 
blessing for the constitutionalists as it united them in their pursuit of 
constitutionalism; otherwise they would have imploded earlier under the weight of 
their own internal strife.    
As a result, the whole social order was in a state of flux, to the extent that, to restore 
security and order it was called for the re-emergence a final arbiter and another 
reincarnation of the Iranian leviathan. This final arbiter was deemed to be either 
Mosaddegh (or Tudeh party) or Kashani (alongside Navvab and Boroujerdi) or the 
Shah; these three figures represented three regimes of truth, namely modernity, 
Islam, and Persianism each with their own projects and subprojects of reverse social 
engineering. At the time, the balance of power favoured the Shah, as the other 
candidates were much more divided and their forces were in tatters, paving the way 
for the Shah to emerge as the lucky winner with the support of his foreign allies. The 
Anglo-American alliance formed in support of the Shah only acted as the catalyst in 
the inevitable collapse of the Mosaddegh’s coalition which was imploding from 
inside. Mosaddegh’s version of modernity had much shallower root in the Iranian 
embeddedness than the Shah’s orthodox Persianism or the Ayatollah’s Islam. 
Thus, in both the constitutional and the ONM eras, it was demonstrated that the 
voices and faces supporting the modernization project of constitutionalism and rule 
of law were the more fragile one compared to the two other projects of Islamization 
and Persinaization, but all of them were under siege and deemed themselves to face 
the existential threat of annihilation, as in the state of belated inbetweenness no 
single project can dominate the social order for long.  As such embarking on 
different waves of the blame game, whether blaming the Shah, the West, Kashani, 
Mosaddegh (Mirfetros, 2011; Mojtahedzadeh, 2011; Ghaninezhad, 2011), or the 
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Tudeh Party misses the point that the tragedy was produced by the context, and the 
actors were only the instruments in an unfortunate and unintended tragic plot 
generated by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness.   
The loss of legitimacy on all sides was the outcome of a ‘tit for tat process of de-
legitimization’ and ‘war of attrition’ through strategic activation of different 
discourses of the black book of the other and the white book of the self, involving 
the contrast between their own politics of piety versus the others’ politics of 
ordinary. This was manifested in the discourses such as the other being despotic, 
reactionary, idiot and illiterate, being puppet of the foreigners (see Rahnema, 2005), 
and in mutual hatred and disgust, creating a tense and volcanic social order (a 
version of Hobbesian war of all against all) fraught with an atmosphere of 
impatience, distrust, and spitefulness. In this process, almost all sides embarked on 
physical and/or verbal violence and resorted to physical assassinations and/or 
character assassinations, due to their particular matrix of classification borrowed 
from their affiliation to particular regime of truth in opposition to the rival ones.  
At the end of this period almost all sides lost legitimacy to different degrees. 
Abrahamian (2001: 213-4) refers to this fact in the following observation: “In short, 
the coup struck a hard blow at liberalism as well as at socialism and secular 
nationalism”. Even the reputation of the religious factions were severely damaged by 
the ONM experience and the (inevitable) zigzags in the positions of Boroujerdi, 
Kashani, and Navvab, to the extent that the revival of the religious movement 
required the passing of ten years and the death of the old generations like Kashani 
and Boroujerdi for a new wave like Khomeini to be able to enter the scene with a 
revolutionary discourse of political Islam in the 1963 uprising.  
During this era, ‘discursive war’ (war of words) had turned into ‘power struggle’ 
(war of swords) and ‘war of emotions’ (the mutual senses of spitefulness, hatred, and 
repugnance). In the physical and epistemic war of de-legitimization, the sides 
exhausted each other and eroded the social order and sucked the revolutionary 
energy out of the ONM into begging for the emergence of yet another final arbiter. 
Excessive exuberance for the “Thing” itself once again produced intense 
disillusionment and bitter disappointment. They all suffered from the lack of art of 
understanding the radical other, who in the state of inbetweenness is always already 
constitutive of the self. While the art of understanding is the art of legitimization of 
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the voice of radical other, almost no force, voice or face embarked (or could embark) 
on such an exercise at a societal level.  
They all resorted to the strategy of inclusion/exclusion where some forces, voices 
and faces were always classified as residing on the side of darkness and evilness. 
This misunderstanding was further enhanced by their theory of selection from 
alternative orders and their naïve theory of transformation of social order, according 
to which the social order could be shaped in the image of this or that project of 
reverse social engineering through exclusion of what were perceived to be dark 
forces. This is in sharp contrast with the nature of social phenomena as the outcome 
of spontaneous and evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization (and not the 
outcome of intelligent design) involving the work of vanishing mediators and 
leading to the phenomenon of multiple realizability.  
As an example for such tragic cases of reverse social engineering, Katouzian (2010: 
219-220) maintains that Reza Shah’s decree in 1936 on compulsory unveiling of 
women “was tantamount to a decree in Europe at that time that would have forced 
women to go topless in public”. Katouzian’s observation is confirmed by an 
eyewitness, Nesta Ramazani (2002: 2), in the following terms: “Suddenly women 
were faced with having to go out in public unveiled. There were few options: either 
go out feeling “naked” or stay at home”. The point is that women ‘can’ end up going 
topless in public but such an outcome needs a series of vanishing mediators (like no-
pants day) emerging and disappearing in an evolutionary process of chaotic 
synchronization where the society comes to inspect various dimensions of novel way 
of being, seeing and living and comes to own a way of life and normalize it and 
practice it freely and out of their own free will via discursive and non-discursive 
practices. Mosaddegh’s nationalization of oil was another case of project of reverse 
social engineering like Reza Shah’s compulsory unveiling, both without going 
through the painstaking and patient process of capacity and consensus building. It is 
worth comparing the Reza Shah’s success in the cases of institutionalization of new 
calendar, standardization of weights and measures,  or compulsory military 
conscription and his failure in the institutionalization of unveiling or nationalization 
of religion (among many other failures or deformities in the act of 
institutionalization).   
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These experiences of reverse social engineering were further exacerbated by the 
misguided theory of social order where the role of unconscious forces and processes 
were not adequately identified or taken as subservient to the forces of consciousness. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that immersion in the state of belatedness further 
magnified the role of consciousness and intelligent design in the transformation of 
social orders. The Cartesian theory of social order- attempts directed at redesigning 
ontic, ontological or epistemological assemblages from ground zero; the desire to act 
like God by commanding 'Be! And it is' (Kun Fayakun) - was at the heart of the 
phenomenon of chaotic order in the Iranian society at the time, and ever since.    
In this war of mutual de-legitimization, each side wanted to use the other only as an 
emblem and instrument to advance its own project. Each project of reverse social 
engineering had its own subprojects designed to assimilate bright and popular side of 
alternative regimes of truth in its own framework. That is why project of 
modernization had its own subprojects of modernized modernization (critique of the 
western occidental and democratic despotism by resorting to constitutionalism), 
modernized Islamization (resort to religious sensibilities by Mosaddegh against Reza 
Shah’s plan for crowning himself as a new king, or using religious passions and 
discourse of martyrdom in the events of 30
th
 Tir to advance the cause of the ONM) 
and modernized Persianization (Mosaddegh’s quest, for example, for the Shah to 
restore calm to the country in the days before the coup and his general and consistent 
support for a constitutional monarchy, which would keep monarchy as part of the 
package). The example of what Mosaddegh said to Makki (1996: 20) with regard to 
the Shah and Kashani is very telling in this regard: he said to Makki that “the Shah 
and Kashani should be kept in a castle as emblems, only to be taken out where and 
when they are needed”. All sides wanted to do the same and treat the voices and 
faces of alternative regimes of truth as emblems, ready to be activated and 
deactivated strategically. But no force, voice or face wants to be only ceremonial and 
decorative entity; they all desire to shape the social order in their own image and 
subsume the alternative forces under their own appellation. This dynamics 
culminates in a state of chaos, which then is resolved partially and temporarily 
through resort to the final arbiter. 
What was needed was a harmonized combination of all three regimes of truth 
without a priori prioritization of one regime over the others, which was partially 
pursued by the original founders of the Tudeh Party (Katouzian, 1991: 162) which 
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was supposed to act as a broad church for progressive forces, which was not possible 
to sustain in an uninterrupted fashion as it required a non-violent space of mutual 
respect where the organic combinations would emerge through a spontaneous and 
evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization, where new well-developed and 
consensual philosophies could emerge to support new ways of thinking and living. 
The emergence of such an organic space of selection would be impossible in the 
state where each regime of truth operates in the binary space of good against evil, a 
state in interplay with the state of belatedness calling for quick and sound bite 
solutions to urgent social ills.  
The outcome would be the emergence of a truth cycle where each project of reverse 
social engineering with its subprojects attempts to dominate the social order and 
shape it in its own image, only for its efforts to be aborted, reversed or perturbed by 
alternative regimes of truth and their machine of de-legitimization, which leads the 
process to tilt towards the emergence of a new truth incumbent. The final outcome 
would be a social order immersed in the state of chaotic order, where it fluctuates 
and zigzags between alternative regimes of truth via going to the brink of the state of 
total chaos (failed state) and ending up in a dysfunctional order, culminating in the 
bitter experience of perpetual dysfunctionalities and deformities constitutive of its 
state of underdevelopment.  
The traumatic experience of the 1953 coup, equivalent to the experience of slavery 
or colonialism for other nations, has haunted Iranians and their relation with 
themselves and with the foreign forces, especially the West ever since. The coup has 
connoted in the Iranian dictionary with the West’s violent disruptive intervention in 
the sweet dream of an indigenous democracy. The blame game and sense of 
victimhood inherent to the state of belated inbetweenness makes the understanding 
of the experience of Mosaddegh’s government almost impossible as all sides project 
their own grid of intelligibility and their own emotional traumas and affective 
investments on it, turning it into another tragic site of mutual misunderstanding.  
It can  be argued that in the counterfactual case of no intervention from any external 
forces from any of the two camps in the cold war, the Mosaddegh’s government had 
two options, either converge towards the state of becoming the final arbiter, the 
direction it was increasingly moving into by its change of emphasis from liberal 
democracy to social democracy and by resorting to constitutionally illegal actions 
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such as referendum and the particular manners it was held, or it had to collapse and 
pave the way for the emergence of another final arbiter, the Shah, or an internal 
coup, the repeat of Reza Shah’s coup against the weak Ahmad Shah Qajar. In reality, 
whatever route having been taken would have culminated in the experience of 
dysfunctionalities and deformities. It would have made little difference which policy 
options or projects were adopted, it would have been destined to failure; the adoption 
of doctrines of positive balance (movazeneh-ye mosbat) or negative balance 
(movazeneh-ye manfi) with the world powers, constitutionalism or monarchism, 
Islamism or socialism, no project of social transformation or any form of internal or 
external policies were viable in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness.  
Alas, the conflicts and irreconcilable differences between the three regimes of truth 
and their internal divisions are also reproduced in the site of historiography of the 
ONM experience. In reality, the state of belated inbetweenness had made any form 
of social consensus impossible, leading to the experience of anarchy in the 
management of the country, itself culminating in the act of people voting with their 
hands or feet for the final arbiter.  The hands acted in the Mosaddegh’s referendum 
and the feet in the Shah-West 1953 coup referendum (where they voted with their 
silences and inactions). In line with these, those Iranians who could not understand 
the reality of their compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness and its genre of 
tragedy of confusion where the traumatic outcome happens due to no fault of any of 
the historical actors (and how tragedy of confusion manages to produces repeated 
bitter experiences of failures and defeats in their modern history) had to resort to 
conspiracy theories, like “if you lift the beard of any cleric it is marked with the label 
made in Britain” (Mojtahedzadeh, 2011), to make sense of the presence of evil in its 
social order. Furthermore, they had to recourse to the fantasy of a perfect utopia, 
where the ‘Thing’ itself, object petit a, could be embraced and jouissance and the 
intense experience of fullness (socio-political orgasm) would be achieved.  
This fantasy blamed the West for the Iranian messy reality and for stealing Iranian 
jouissance (democracy, independence, or spirituality) from them. The West- or for 
some other forms of historiography other forces, voices or faces who had betrayed 
the ideals of the ONM like the Tudeh Party or the religious leaders or even the 
people themselves with their sudden change in allegiance to the Shah and his forces 
through direct support or through staying silent- became the quintessential evil other, 
robbing the nation from its mojo (see Marshall Goldsmith and Mark Reiter, 2010) 
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and its development. This lethal blame game guaranteed the experience of 
subsequent waves of chaotic orders in the Iranian modern history.    
5.7. CONCLUSION 
The ONM era started with the end of Mashroteh modernization project and the 
commencement of Pahlavi Persianization project, which was disrupted only 
temporarily by the Mosaddegh’s restoration of modernization project, and ended 
with the burgeoning seeds of Khomeini’s Islamization project in 1963. In contrast to 
the modernization project of constitutional era, this era was largely the era of the 
Persianization project of the Pahlavi dynasty, only being momentarily interrupted by 
the Mosaddegh’s restoration of the Mashrtoeh project of constitutional 
modernization in the garb of the ONM. As the Pahlavi dynasty was the zombie of 
the Qajar project of Persianization in new form, Mosaddegh’s ONM was the zombie 
of Mashroteh project of modernization in a new disguise, leading to the re-
emergence of the zombie of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri’s and Navvab’s project of 
Islamization in the Islamic Revolution of 1978.  
This chapter demonstrated how Iranian social order went through four stages of 
tragedy of confusion, unstable coalition formation, institutional failure, and chaotic 
order in the site of the ONM due to immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness 
with its hyper-complex forms of embeddedness, incommensurability, and 
emergence.   
The state of belatedness turned all regimes of truth into projects of reverse social 
transformation (ideologies, fantasies or dreams and blueprints). While Pahlavi’s 
revolutionary project of Persinaization and its three subprojects of Persianized 
Persianization, Persianized modernization, and Persianized Islamization was a top-
down program of social transformation Mosaddegh’s movement was a bottom-up 
one. Both, however, culminated in the bitter experiences of instabilities, 
dysfunctionalities and deformities as Iranians suffered from discursive homelessness 
due to their immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness.  
As such, it would have made little difference whether the source of change and 
transformation was elites or people, top-down or bottom-up. Both the elites and the 
people suffered from immense level of confusion and fluidity of subjectivities, 
culminating in the experience of sudden or gradual change between alternative 
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regimes of truth. Around the dynamics generated by the state of belated 
inbetweenness, elites and people were equally the sites of battle between alternative 
regimes of truth plaguing Iranian social assemblage with its affirmative axes of 
power, knowledge and subjectivity and negating facets of repression, disavowal and 
foreclosure, and their associated irreconcilable differences and their accompanying 
ruptures and inconsistencies.  
Consequently, In Iran it does not make much difference whether the social 
movements are top-down or bottom-up, they are done through reform or revolution; 
they are destined to end up in failure as they suffer from fundamental problems at the 
philosophical level of embeddedness (ontological and pre-ontological), which is 
common to both forms of movements. In this era, each force and its associated 
project of reverse social engineering desired to take the Iranian people by will or by 
force to their own heaven of Persian utopia, modern utopia of socialism or liberalism 
or the Islamic utopia of piety (as in the case of Fadaiyan-e Islam whose project was 
followed by Ayatollah Khomeini). Regardless of whether the utopia was located in 
Paris, Moscow
40
, Persepolis or Karbala/Mecca, each time the pursuit of utopia 
inevitably prompted by the state of belatedness produced dystopias of various forms 
and shapes. Iran became the house of madness (dar-al-majanin or lunatic asylum) 
(Katouzia, 2013: 250) or the haunted house of confused dreams and nightmares. As 
Westwood (1965: 135) puts it: “all is changed and all remains the same”.  
The inertia in the sedimented layers of embeddedness is ignored and sudden eruption 
of exuberance for one project or another fools many into believing that Iran has 
fundamentally changed irreversibly (see for example Zabih, 1966: 124 on Tudeh 
Party’s “widespread illusion of … imminent victory”), while the mode of change, 
outside-in model of change triggered by the requirements of state of belatedness, as a 
non-engaging, abrupt and/or coerced form from outside, leaves the sedimented layers 
largely unchanged. The more they change the more they stay the same as Zizek said 
in another context.  
The irreconcilable differences between and within the forces, voices and faces 
culminated in the Iranian social assemblage going through four stages of tragedy of 
confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, experience of institutional failure, and 
                                                          
40
 Milani (2011a: 124) reports on how the Azerbaijani separatist “adopted Moscow time, half an hour 
behind Tehran” when they came to power.   
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the emergence of a chaotic order.  This process oscillated between freedom-induced 
chaos and oppression-induced order of the final arbiter (formerly known as despot; 
there is no traditional despotism in Iran and it seems that the notion of despotism is a 
poor and bankrupt concept for understanding the unique compound state of 
inbetweenness-belatedness). The final arbiters are the saviours of the social order 
(and not despots) as they frequently are at pains to remind the people and the 
historians.  
Despotism as an explanatory concept has only meaning, relevance and application in 
a homogenized regime of truth where it is legitimized as a tool against anarchy. Iran 
with its immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness is far from a homogenized 
(or even a hetrogenized) society, it is a ‘troubled society’ and the resort to final 
arbiter emerges as the pragmatic last resort (without tri-polar form of legitimacy, 
which paves its eventual demise) to save the whole social order from collapse. This 
fact alongside the associated fact that the cultural tribes has replaced the ethnic tribes 
in the modern era due to the emergence of political economy of truth (which means 
that people lack fixed ethnic identities or do not attach prominence to their ethnic 
identities) distinguishes Iranian modern history from its pre-modern one; while in the 
modern era we have final arbiters relying on hybrid cultural tribes, in the pre-modern 
era we had despots depending on ethnic tribes and relying on the institution of 
kingship and its discursive and non-discursive practices.  
This is due to the fact that the compound state of belatedness-inbetweenness is 
unprecedented in the whole history of Iran; in the pre-modern history of Iran we had 
the state of inbetweenness without suffering from the state of belatedness 
simultaneously. As such, the Iranian social assemblage in this period, like other 
periods of modern age, managed to produce a chaotic order where it did not collapse 
into disorder and it did not produce a functional order either. The experience of 
discontent emanating from the experience of deformities and dysfunctionalities 
culminates in the collapse of final arbiter and initiation of new project, which 
produces a new final arbiter with its own experience of deformities and 
dysfunctionalities.  
As the discussion so far indicates, each project had its own period of spring of 
freedom followed by the winter of discontent induced by the so-called despotism of 
the final arbiter, while all having roots in the tragedy of confusion and are manifest 
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of tragedy of confusion. This is why towards the end of his reign Mosaddegh was 
increasingly turning into a figure of final arbitration for conflict resolution. Much of 
the political struggle during Moṣaddegh’s short term in power took the form of a 
constitutional crisis, with the arch-constitutionalist Mosaddegh demanding 
emergency powers from Majlis and his conservative and non-conservative opponents 
resisting them in the name of constitutional order (for details, see Azimi, 1989: 257-
338, amongst others).  
It can be argued that the strategic activation and deactivation of discourses operates 
as one of the condition of possibility of perpetuation of conflict (see Mirfetros 2011: 
94 on quick changes in positions in the ONM era), but this is due to the fact that 
almost all discourses have valid truth claims and some resonances of truth for the 
Iranian dasein (such as Mosaddegh activating the Islamic discourse when it was 
required or National Front deputies activating the Islamic discourse of social vices 
more fervently ahead of their clerical opponents; see Rahnema, 2005). This makes 
social life into a game of music chair where faces constantly move between voices 
and forces, preventing the possibility of emergence of a synchronized embeddedness 
and achieving the state of unity without uniformity and the shared logic of agree to 
disagree. Kashani’s move between the initial pro-ONM radicalism of his life and the 
final pro-monarchy radicalism and the pragmatism in between is the effect of the 
context of belated inbetweenness; the instability of the state of belated 
inbetweenness is folded and reflected in Kashani’s subjectivity as unstable coalition; 
the stable selfhood is the effect of stable regime of truth and stable institutions, 
which cannot emerge in the state of belated inbetweenness.  
In reflection, as Foucault states, when the society fails to produce truth, it fails to 
produce wealth. The root-cause of the problem resides in the interplay between the 
‘context of culture’ and ‘context of situation’ and not in particular forces, voices or 
faces inside or outside the country. The ‘context of culture’ is plagued by irreparable 
rupture, as it is immersed in the state of inbetweenness, while the ‘state of situation’ 
is characterized by the state of belatedness inducing the turning of regimes of truth 
into projects of reverse social engineering. In concluding, the rise and fall of these 
projects and the instabilities experienced even in their periods of domination, is the 
outcome of lack of understanding of the radical other, constitutive of the self, and 
misdiagnosis of social order as a case of declinism, and treating it as the object of 
reverse social engineering in the spirit of Cartesian cogito rather than seeing it as the 
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outcome of Heideggerian dasein with its three principles of embeddedness, 
emergence and incommensurability. As such the problem is philosophical and 
methodological rather than technical or personal. Character is not the destiny, the 
context is. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 
Me and you are the story of an old book, aren’t 
we? We are a question, a question with no 
answer, aren’t we?  
Bizhan Samandar sung by Shajarian 
Islam is not an inn where you can get in and 
out of. Hojataloeslam Daneshmand (2012) 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The modern history of Iran is a continuum of nested events, whereas each strong 
event is a reaction to and in dialogue with the others. Islamic Revolution was a 
reaction to the ONM, and the ONM a reaction to Reza Shah’s brand of Persianized 
modernization, and Reza Shah’s reign a reaction to the failures of the constitutional 
revolution, and this in turn a reaction to the humiliations suffered by the Iranian 
people earlier for military defeats and economic concessions granted to the world 
powers.  A logic of intertextuality- involving the dialogue between the Quran 
(Taghavi, 2005: 90), Shahnameh (Molavi, 2002: 45-6) and the texts of Western 
constitutions (Arjomand, 1984: 200-2)- and intercontextuality was at work in the 
Iranian social assemblage and in its manifestations in social events. Each strong 
event was inspired by a ‘return to’ discourse (return to the Quran, return to 
Shahnameh, or return to the Western texts) and was using a larger strong event in 
history like French revolution, Cyrus’ treatment of the Jews in the Achaemenid 
conquest of Babylon (Brosius, 2006: 70; Holliday, 2011: 49), or the revelation to the 
Prophet Mohammad as its reference point. In the Islamic Revolution the dominant 
discourse was the discourse of return to the Quran (Lafraie, 2009), with all its 
affirmative and negating facets, largely unbeknownst to the historical actors 
participating in the events of the revolution.  
As a result, the details of the Shah’s record in terms of socio-political, economic and 
cultural indicators and whether they were predominantly black or white were less 
important than what the character of Shah’s regime was (its affiliation to a particular 
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regime of truth in contradistinction to the alternative ones) and what particular set of 
truths it affirmed and negated. The Shah’s regime was a monarchy-centred 
(Moaddel, 1993: 63) corporate state (Akhavi, 1983: 197) supplying a particular 
selection or basket of truths to its people under the discourse of ‘return to Shhnameh’ 
with Cyrus as its historical reference point. As Harmon (2005: 27) indicates:  
What Pahlavi wanted for Iran was what his father had wanted: a modern, 
industrial empire that would be as glorious, in its own time period, as ancient 
Persia had been. 
 
At the time when Islamic Revolution happened, Iran was boiling from inside, which 
as Mehdi Bazargan (1984), its first prime minister, states needs to be studied in its 
two movements: in ‘its negating movement enshrined in the opposition to the Shah’s 
regime’ and ‘in its affirmative movement in the act of establishing the Islamic 
Republic’. The negating dimension was driven by the repulsive nature of Shah’s 
regime, and the affirmative dimension was guided by the mysteriously seductive 
dimension of the Islamic alternative to the Shah’s regime and its contingent 
superiority over other candidates (the left and the liberal alternatives, for example).  
With the Islamic revolution, once more Iranians in their incessant attempts to 
conduct large-scale social experiments developed a combined hatred for one side of 
the social divide as ‘evil incarnate’ and the other as the ‘goodness made flesh’. This 
time the binary logic of good against evil targeted the coalition of oriental and 
occidental despotism (the Shah-West coalition) alongside their thin layer of alliance 
with religious despotism as the root of all evils in the Iranian society. In this, the 
dark sides of all three large forces of Iranian embeddedness were deemed to have 
united on one side of the truth divide and the bright sides of the same three forces 
(different factions of revolutionary Islam in alliance with liberal nationalists and 
Marxists) on the other side of the divide.   
The process of anatgonization was fairly bloodless in the negating stage of the 
revolution compared to other revolutions and extremely bloody in the affirmative 
dimension of the revolution. The Shah’s antagonization and repression of ‘black and 
red reactionaries’ (Abrahamian, 2008: 152) had culminated in the return of the 
repressed and the sudden eruption of unexpressed energies in the form of destruction 
of the Shah’s house of cards. The collapse of Shah’s regime of truth can be 
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approached at least at three levels, at the level of triggering events, at the level of 
socio-political indicators, and at a more holistic level on the status of Shah’s regime 
in the Iranian worldhood and embeddedness.  
The event-based approach enumerates a number of seminal events and traces their 
subsequent implications, leading to the eventual collapse of the Shah’s regime and 
its replacement with the Islamic Republic. This leads to the act of periodization of 
the time landscape based on the distance between seminal events. The analysis based 
on indicators (balance sheet approach) is based on the notion of causality and 
assesses regimes’ successes and failures in terms of socio-economic indicators, while 
the worldhood analysis is an analysis based on the nature of the social phenomena as 
being-in-the-world and not primarily as a particular point in a causal chain of events 
(each worldhood has its own grid of intelligibility and way of categorization leading 
to different balance sheet analysis and different periodization, and different system-
specific causality). Social actors in parallel with the historians deployed a set of 
cultural, economic and political indicators to challenge the legitimacy of the Shah’s 
regime, while another set of indicators were deployed to embolden the legitimacy of 
the Shah’s regime by its supporters.  
While the Shah was valorising his own white book of achievements, his opponents 
were expanding on the list of his sins and adding pages and volumes to the black 
book of his failures (see for instance Banisadr’s indictment of the Shah’s record in 
Dabashi, 1993: 374). Despites all of the usual cost-benefit analysis (Amuzegar, 
1991: 305-6), the main reason behind the Shah’s sudden collapse was not his normal 
successes and/or failures (Ramazani, 1982: 19 and 2013; Kurzman, 1996: 153), as no 
finite socio-political system can be whiter than white and be free from minor and 
major failures. Each social assemblage and its associated regime of truth with a 
history has a white and a black book and is experienced as a Janus-faced entity. 
Baring (2010: 245) alludes to one instantiation of this general pattern with regard to 
France:  
Tillion distinguished between “two Frances, the Beauty and the Beast”: the 
France of Voltaire and Rousseau and that of the tortures and killing. Her 
dearest hope was that Algerian independence would mean renouncing only 
the latter.  
 
307 
 
Each social assemblage through its two faces of beauty and the beast generates its 
magnetic field of attractions and repulsions. The Shah’s social assemblage was 
another case of a Janus-faced entity. 
If Iranian society had been happy with the Shah’s brand of regime of truth and his 
implicit or explicit social contract with the people of Iran, or at least a powerful 
section of Iranian society (for example middle class) had been consistently content 
with his particular recipe for how to organize the social order, they would have 
supported him in thick and thin and would have attempted to amend his failures and 
expand his successes
41
.  
‘Normal’ countries with stable embeddedness rarely embark on socio-political 
regime change even in the face of catastrophic failures and costly blunders. In every 
social system there are winners and losers - Axworthy (2009) enumerates some of 
the winners and losers of the Islamic revolution - an stable society with strong social 
cohesion (or Ibn Khaldun’s asabiya; see Zaidi, 2011: 21, 93-98) either convinces the 
losers to blame themselves for lack of efforts or persuades them to condemn the 
forces of destiny and bad luck, or embarks on suppressing the losers’ social protests 
and resistances and their attempts to change the situation, or tries to win their 
allegiances through expanding the fruits of the success to the losers through gradual 
step-by-step reform (like the emergence of welfare state in the West) (see, Bayat, 
1997: 39). However, Iran in the last one hundred years rarely followed the routes of 
a normal country; it had proved that it was the country of revolutions (Foran, 1994).  
Iran, for example, in the century before the Islamic Revolution had experienced two 
widespread movements (the Tobacco Movement of 1892 and the Oil-Nationalization 
Movement of 1951), two revolutions (the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 and the 
top-down reform of so-called ‘White Revolution’ in 1963), two coups (the 1299 
coup in 1921, and the 28th of Mordad coup in 1953), two popular uprisings (30th of 
                                                          
41
 The example of Japan (which has played significant role in the Iranian public imagination since the 
time of constitutional revolution) as one of the most stable societies in the world after the catastrophic 
defeats of the second world war is an extreme example of a society which did not rebel against its 
emperor and its fundamental beliefs at a large scale; state and society, elites and masses together 
changed direction and accepted to join the American-led, Western club type pursuit of progress (see 
Thurow, 1993; Goto-Jones, 2009, for example) . The contrast between Japan as one of the most stable 
and Iran as one of the most unstable countries in the world my offer us the deeper insights into the 
nature of their unique social orders and singular worldhoods. The stability of the Japanese system and 
the instability of the Iranian system cannot be fully explained relying on event-based or indicator-
based analysis (as the Japanese should have been more of a revolutionary nation based on such 
indices after the horrors of the World War II), but on analysis of their distinct worlds of significations.  
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Tir uprising in 1952, 15th of  Khordad uprising in 1963), the assassination of one 
shah (Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar in 1896), the exiles of three shahs (Mohammad Ali 
Shah Qajar in 1909, Ahmad Shah Qajar in 1923, and Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941), 
the assassination of three prime ministers (Amin-al-Soltan in 1907, Razamra in 
1951, and Mansur in 1965), the execution of one top-ranking Shia clergy (Sheikh 
Fazlollah Nuri in 1909) and countless events of violent nature and incidents of social 
disturbances (such as separatist and dissident movements or imprisonment, torture 
and execution of dissidents or sending them into exile). Thus, the Iranian society 
after its military encounter with modernity in the first half of 19
th
 century has been 
constantly in turmoil (Behnam, 2004: 11). Therefore, the occurrence of Islamic 
Revolution needs to be analysed in this wider history of a country in perpetual 
turmoil (Foran, 1994).  
If we embark on deconstructing the interpretation of the historical actors and the 
historiography of the Islamic Revolution we see the reference to a set of socio-
economic indicators, a few triggering events, a set of master signifiers like Islam, 
modernity and the pre-Islamic Persia, and the presence of strong element of surprise 
in the emergence of national figures and in the turn of events. The resort to a wide 
range of indicators, from military, to cultural, economic and political, demonstrates 
the co-evolutionary nature of the social order while reference to particular events 
(Harmon, 2005: 47-8; Katouzian, 2013: 97) like the sudden rise in oil prices in 1973, 
the insult directed at Ayatollah Khomeini in a national newspaper, or the events of 
Cinema Rex in the city of Abadan, among others, represent the prevalence of 
butterfly effect (non-linearity) in the social order. The constant reference to 
allegiance to Islam, modernity and Persian monarchy as the master signifiers and 
regimes of truth refers to quilting point and worldhood nature of the social order.  
The incessant allusion to the unexpected nature of events in this period points to the 
destructive eruption of real, breaking the symbolic and imaginary webs of social 
arrangements. 
For the West, the unexpected nature of Islamic Revolution (Kurzman, 2004, 2009) 
was clearly manifested in the Carter’s famous “oasis of stability” speech. Other 
historical actors and commentators expressed their amazement of the speed and 
direction of change in the oasis of security and stability. The phenomenon of 
“dramatic rise to prominence” (Harmon, 2005: 49) experienced frequently in the 
Iranian history (in figures or organizations like Sayyed Zia, Reza Shah, Mosaddegh, 
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the Tudeh Party, Ayatollah Khomeini, Shariati, Banisadr, Mujahedeen-e Khalgh, 
Khatami, and Ahmadinejad, among countless others) is another symptom of being 
immersed in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. In this state, those 
socio-political entrepreneurs who can offer to deliver the marginalized dimensions of 
Iranian identity gain sharp rise to prominence. The compound state of 
inbetweenness-belatedness is the condition of possibility for the unexpected rise to 
prominence of groups and individuals and their subsequent sharp or gradual fall from 
grace (Boroujerdi, 2010). 
This chapter, thus, provides an in-depth analysis and theoretical reading (and not 
event-based or chronological reading) of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 by 
following the methodological and theoretical strategies and insights established in 
other chapters of this study.  
The detailed explorations the general characteristics of the Iranian embeddedness 
acting as condition of possibility for the Islamic Revolution were excluded from this 
work due to word limitations.. 
In the rest of this chapter we will follow the forces and voices operating in the field 
of Iranian social reality in the section on tragedy of confusion. Then we will proceed 
in the section on unstable coalitions to explore how these forces and voices 
integrated and disintegrated to form coalitions to formulate and implement collective 
actions to achieve social change. In the section on institutional failure we will 
address the dysfunctionalities and deformities emanated from instability of coalitions 
and constant zigzag movement between forces and voices. In the section on chaotic 
order we will explore the effects of institutional failures on the landscape of Iranian 
social reality and its two simultaneous features of chaos and order.  In the conclusion 
section we will provide a holistic picture of the map of forces, voices and faces and 
how they interacted to create a truth cycle which gave rise to the birth of 
dysfunctional institution and a social order littered with reversibilities, ambiguities 
and epistemic and physical violences, which creates a tragedy of confusion in the 
form of production of a society permanently in crisis. 
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6.2. TRAGEDY OF CONFUSION AS CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY OF 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979 
Any social order is the emergent outcome of a series of events produced through the 
vectoral interaction between embedded and incommensurable forces, voices and 
faces. The 1979 Iranian revolution was an instantiation of this general pattern. This 
section, hence, aims to explore the anatomy of forces and their rhizomatic symbiosis 
into voices, which were invested in faces. Forces are the elements of embeddedness 
which combine to construct incommensurable voices inhabiting faces; their 
interaction produce events unexpectedly which is manifestation of principle of 
emergence.  
As before, we can trace the signs of the three common forces of Iranian history 
(Islam, Persianism, and modernity) throughout the pre- and post-revolutionary stages 
of the 1979 Iranian revolution. Their interactions and rivalries produced a volatile 
market for truth.  
The notion of market for truth- the supply and demand for ‘truth about’ life, work 
and language- and competition between rival regimes of truth are acknowledged in 
the following passages, as reported by Lambton (1964: 134), from Motahhari, one of 
the leading thinkers in Ayatollah Khomeini’s coalition:  
The mardji’ would also become free and the mosques would no longer be 
markets in which the members of the religious classes displayed their wares for 
sale … As long as there is no central financial organization and the religious 
classes depend upon the support of individuals, it is inevitable that there should 
be rivalry among them to attract followers. In such circumstances the religious 
classes are forced to trim their sails to the desires and will of the masses.... if 
Islam and the religious institution do not offer a positive answer to the needs 
and desires of the people and satisfy their aspirations, they will turn to new 
ideologies and the very existence of Islam will be threatened.  
 
Here we see the traces of mosques as markets and the threat of new ideologies to the 
niche held by Islam in the Iranian market for truth. This market is not a normal form 
of market and is not a perfectly competitive one either. Rather, it is an oligopolistic 
form of implicit market with half a dozen or so truth producers who are active in the 
supply side, which is composed of formal and informal sectors, where the formal 
market exists around the underground or black market for truth. If we consider both 
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formal and informal dimensions of the market for truth, there is no barrier to entry to 
the market as a whole, although there are huge numbers of barriers for entry into the 
formal market for truth.  As indicated in Motahhari’s utterance, the suppliers, like 
Islam, are threatened with the consumers changing their loyalty and switching and 
converting to alternative producers of truth (however, there are heavy ‘switching 
costs’ associated with such cases of change of loyalty and incidences of conversion).  
In the market for truth, people reveal their preferences through supporting particular 
faces and voices via voting by feet and/or by hands. The demand side of any social 
movement (as a market for truth) is evident in the following excerpt from the leftist 
group the Fadaii ‘Minority’(aghaliat) in a 1981 publication (Alaolmolki, 1987: 225):  
The power and potential of the revolutionaries lie in the fact that their 
movement is in accordance with mass interests. Their success is dependent 
upon mass mobilization. A revolutionary upheaval can only become a reality 
with the presence of the vast power and support of the masses. Therefore, the 
revolutionaries must adopt strategies for mobilising the masses. 
 
Here we see clearly the characteristics of social agents as entrepreneurs of truths in 
the business of winning the allegiances of people. Voices which fail to capture public 
imagination drift away into oblivion and have to exit the market for truth. Ayatollah 
Khomeini referred to the same dimension of social movement, when he famously 
said to the crowd in his first speech after arrival in Iran that “with your support I will 
appoint a government” (as opposed to the Shah-designated government of Bakhtiyar) 
(Coughlin, 2009: 27). All of these interactions in the market for truth happen in the 
intersection between context of culture (the state of inbetweenness) and context of 
situation (state of belatedness).  
Voices emerge as recipes for making sense of and ordering social life from the 
intermixing of different components of the three large regimes of truth. The 
application of operations of addition and subtraction on three regimes of truth 
produces a wide range of voices in the field of Iranian social reality. This 
phenomenon was instinctively detected by many observers in the name of 
hybridization, eclecticism or syncretism (elteqat, equivalent to Hedayat’s lakkategi) 
and was frequently condemned by them, while they were unaware of the rhizomatic 
nature of voices where each voice has roots in other voices and there is no purity. As 
reported by Jafarian (2007: 392, added emphasis), Ayatollah Taleghani (who was a 
312 
 
fatherly figure for almost all groups opposing the Shah’s regime) refers to this 
phenomenon in the following terms in a speech in 1980:  
sometimes our intellectuals mix Islam with some other issues, some other 
schools of thought, a bit of communism or capitalism, or [something] from 
here or there, from socialism; no, brothers, sisters, our children, Islam is 
neither communism nor capitalism or socialism, Islam is Islam.   
 
This indicates the attempts made to create new voices out of rhizomatic combination 
of the master signifiers of Islam, capitalism, communism, and socialism, which are 
examples of regimes of truth as synchronized wholes producing truth about life, 
work, and language. The truth menus constructed out of mixture of these regimes of 
truth are voices and these voices inhabit faces like Ayatollah Taleghani through the 
lived experiences of biography, and they all form the supply side of the market for 
truth. We can clearly see the work of three notions of forces, voices and faces in the 
above quote from Ayatollah Taleghani. Ironically, Taleghani, himself being 
inhabited by a hybrid voice, here acts as a voice of territorialisation against the 
voices of de-territorialisation.  
These voices lie on a spectrum where each radical voice may be deemed as 
pragmatic from a point closer to radical end of spectrum and each pragmatic voice 
can be deemed as radical from a point closer to the pragmatic end of the spectrum. 
To give an example, Behdad (1994: 782) observes that:  
Shariati regards property as a source and a manifestation of oppression. 
Mutahhari does not. Shariati views total destruction of property relations as 
the necessary condition for human liberation. Mutahhari does not.  
 
Their positions on the sex segregation, dress code or foreign policy, and all other 
issues of social life, lie on a spectrum as well. A voice which has radical components 
in terms of its position on property rights may consist of pragmatic positions on 
dress code or foreign policy. And overall depending on the composition and order of 
priority in the internal structure of the voice, they may be dubbed as pragmatic or 
radical depending on their position on the spectrum of voices and whether the 
judgement is made within or between regimes of truth.  
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These forms of ‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ voices determine their 
categorization as radical or pragmatic of particular persuasion. For a predominantly 
liberal voice, for instance, both Motahhari and Shariati are dubbed as Islamic 
radicals, while for Motahhari only Shariati may be dubbed as contaminated, hybrid 
and impure. Motahhari’s own voice is dubbed as contaminated and impure by the 
conservative and scholastic version of Islam in the religious seminaries. Depending 
on how their additions and subtractions are organized, they may be perceived as 
radical or pragmatic, elitist or populist, genuine or eclectic, true or false, progressive 
or regressive, impure or pure. Every radical voice may be deemed as pragmatic from 
a slightly different position. Thus, every voice becomes an island of truth in itself 
while sharing with other voices in their affiliation with the three master signifiers of 
Islam, Persianism and modernity. As each voice deems the other as impure, false, 
radical or pragmatic, the voices become antagonistic towards each other and as such 
no harmonized and synchronized whole can emerge (no agreement and no agreement 
to disagreement). 
Following our theoretical Focauldian concepts of ‘analytic of finitude’ and ‘market 
for truth’ with its associated ‘forces, voices, and faces’, in the Shah’s reign the 
incumbent assemblage (the Shah-West coalition of truth) was exuberantly 
oversupplying truth products in the realms of instrumental and communicative 
rationality and severely undersupplying them in the realm of emancipative 
rationality. This supply package did not fully meet the demand pattern of the Iranian 
dasein and consequently, the search for missing element found immense 
significance, intensity and urgency. In the dynamics of preference ordering what is 
missing finds greater significance over what is taken for granted (see Liu, 2011). As 
such,  the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in a sense, was a collective search for jouissance 
and experience of fullness (Taylor, 2007: 10), a series of moments of drunkenness 
and ecstasy in order to embrace the ‘Thing’ itself (Cheng, 2008: 1169). In a 
collective madness (histeri-ye omomi) (for the notion of collective madness see 
Gupta, 2001: 11, 63; Almond, 2007: 37; Glazov, 2009: 192), as argued by Reza 
Pahlavi (2010), the last Shah’s son, the population was seduced by the positive 
freedom from the small pains and pleasures of isolated everyday modern life of 
struggle for survival (rat race) in the modern urban environment where, as Agamben, 
(1998: 181) maintains, the concentration camp is the “biopolitical paradigm of the 
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modern age". In the search for jouissance as a political factor (Zizek, 1991; 2007), as 
Afary and Anderson (2005: 36) attest,  
The Islamists and many others who joined the Iranian Revolution seemed to 
believe that by adopting an attitude of “freedom-toward-death,” by 
recognizing and submitting to the finitude and limitation of their own 
insignificant human existence, and by aspiring to a cause greater than 
themselves, they could bring about the collective authentic existence of the 
Iranian community.  
 
The sense of spiritual unity and solidarity created in the process of revolutionary 
activities (as the truth product of the Khomeini coalition) liberated people from the 
pains of existential finitude and gave them the chance to be part of a larger 
movement and a bigger whole bestowing them, as Freud (1929: 2) puts it, “oceanic 
feeling” (see also Parsons, 1999) and allowing them to go “beyond the pleasure 
principle” (Freud, 1922). That experience generated the flavour of the experience of 
fullness and abundance, and emancipation from finitude and fear of death and loss. 
This is attested by Brumberg (1997: 42) in the following terms:  
By proposing methods of regaining a sense of spiritual “wholeness” that were 
both practical and cathartic, Khomeini captured the imaginations of millions 
of people.  
 
The methodology chapter of this thesis has already addressed the significance of the 
search for the experience of fullness and wholeness in the attempts to escape the 
finitude and lacks of ‘symbolic’ and ‘imaginary’ orders and in the longing for 
returning to the infinitude and abundance of the ‘real’. The agony and ecstasy of 
participation in the revolution and in the post-revolutionary events such as the 
hostage crisis and Iran-Iraq war offered the limit-experience of embracing the 
‘Thing’ itself, incomparable with small pains and pleasures offered by instrumental 
rationality of cost-benefit analysis supplied by modernity or ancestral calculus of 
magnanimity and continuity (Ansari, 2012: 177) of communicative rationality 
offered by Persianism.  
There was a simple logic of supply and demand at work. People wanted more of ‘it’ 
and wanted to stay on the state of high forever. In ordinary mundane experience of 
everydayness, life is a house of cards susceptible to the threat of collapse from the 
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forces of real; attempts aimed at holding those cards together turns life into a rat race 
with inevitable spectre of defeat and doom looming large. In the context of Iranian 
particular evolutionary trajectory, revolutions and large movements have emerged 
as coping strategies allowing people to liberate themselves from the pains of modern 
existence and to embrace a bigger truth. This is why, unbeknownst to himself 
regarding the depth of his own insight, Reza Pahlavi (2010) saw the events of 1979 
as “revolutionary madness (jonon-e enghelabi)” of Iranian people, “immersing 
themselves in a state of religious ecstasy and drunkenness (khalseh va nash’agi-ye 
maz’habi)”. In line with this, Fatemi (1982: 61) observes the traces of madness and 
confusion in the Iranian social order at the time:  
By the late 1970s, more than any other time in its history, Iran had become a 
land of contradiction, bewilderment, distraction, and diversion. Economically, 
it was a nation of nouveaux riches; sociologically, it was a nation in confusion, 
if not madness; and politically, it was a nation of phobias, fear of failure, fear 
of SAVAK, and in general, fear of the future.   
 
Iranians, with their embedded desire for spirituality, needed to throw themselves into 
the search for the experience of fullness and oneness with the ‘Thing’ itself to escape 
the madness of contradictions, and liberate themselves from being ‘a nation of 
phobias’.   
The Shah himself in his book ‘White Revolution’ (1966: 22-3; see also Ansari, 2001, 
2007, 2012 and Summitt, 2004) alludes to the role of spirituality in the balance and 
survival of nations. In a sense spirituality is an answer to the problem of being-
towards-death which itself is a subset of the problem of loss and the threat of loss, 
which is a subset of the problem of impermanence and finitude.  We see the traces of 
Heideggerian fourfold at work here. In the Shah’s (1966: 17) attempt to fulfil the 
nation’s five basic needs (food for all, health for all, education for all, shelter for all, 
and clothing for all) there was no plan for spirituality for all. Spirituality is a 
collective product like any other and at the time in Iran there was a comprehensive 
network of mosques, shrines, pilgrimage sites, alongside an army of interpreters of 
the text of spiritual experience and the experience of the sacred text with huge 
number of specified occasions and dates to collectively produce the precious 
commodity of spirituality. But the legitimacy of this network for the production of 
spirituality as well as recognition of spirituality as a fundamental need was severely 
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undermined by the emergence of modernity (for the notion of spiritual capital and its 
depreciation and depletion see Zohar and Marshal, 2004; Verter, 2003; Nasr, 2001).  
As such, the national endeavour for attaining progress and pleasures of the flesh had 
left almost no place for the legitimate collective production and consumption of the 
experience of fullness (to counter the terror of death) in the Shah’s reverse social 
engineering project of Persianized modernity. At its basic ordinary level, it meant 
that the nation had lost its collective connection with the eternal, the sacred, and the 
infinitude. In Islam, the experience of fullness is more than a momentary event at a 
particular period of time; Islam deems spirituality as more of a basic need than food 
and shelter. With Islam every experience from defecating, to making love, working 
in the farm, trading in the market, and doing politics can be and should be turned into 
spiritual experience like praying (Rajaei, 2007).  
As such, Iranian nation starving from the lack of legitimate collective spiritual 
experience, in a place where spirituality and its symbols were deemed as a sign of 
backwardness and out-datedness in the public settings at the time (see Sahabi, 2007 
on how, for instance, praying in university settings was deemed as a sign of 
backwardness), the nation lunges itself into Islam to liberate itself from the 
experience of fragmentation and division and homelessness brought in by the 
modernity and its Persianist ally. The Shah’s lavish festivities for the celebration of 
twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of Persian Kingdom by 
Cyrus the Great in 1971 (Ansari, 2007: 221) and how it was performed was the 
perfect symbol of modern and Persian ignorance (jaheli’yat) manifested in the 
unholy alliance between orthodox Persianism and orthodox modernity (techno-
bureaucratic modernity) to embrace the material and the impermanence and to forget 
or marginalize the spiritual and the permanence.  
Alongside the Shah’s and Khomeini’s voices, Bazargan’s voice served as one of the 
main suppliers of truth at the time. It should be noted that while Bazargan’s main 
concern was Iran’s place in the modern league of nations and the Shah’s was 
primarily centred on Iran’s position in the history of civilizations, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s concern was Iran’s place in God’s eye and in the league of eternal 
happiness. The sharp disparity between the Shah’s, Bazargan’s, and Khomeini’s 
contrasting conceptions of what is the essence of Iranianness became strikingly clear 
in that single word ‘nothing’ uttered in the airplane by Khomeini (when asked about 
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his feeling of returning to Iran after 15 years in exile) (Taheri, 2010: 54; Redjali, 
2013: 348). The ‘shock’ value of his response became more pronounced when one of 
his aides (Qotbzadeh), in a state of bewilderment, (mis)translated his remark into “he 
made no comments”. This is a clear example of breakdown in the hermeneutics of 
understanding, where Khomeini was a confused dreamer (gong-e khabdideh) and 
Qotbzadeh and the rest of the world was totally deaf (a’lam tamam kar).  
For Khomeini, the material life and its illusionary pains and pleasures pale into 
insignificance (nothingness) compared to the enormity, magnanimity, and 
magnificence of eternity (reminiscent of Pascal’s wager). That dual experience of 
nothingness/abundance through transcending the mundane pains and pleasures of 
everyday life was what Ayatollah Khomeini was going to offer to the Iranian nation 
as the essence of being. The other side of the experience of negation (nothingness) 
was the experience of affirmation, the experience of fullness. Therefore, immediately 
after his landing, in his first speech in the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery (see, Axworthy, 
2013), where he visited the graves of the martyrs of the revolution, Khomeini 
elaborated on his vision of advancing the nation’s spirituality alongside taking care 
of its material well-being while stressing on the decadent sins of the former Shah and 
his regime (Moin, 1999: 201-2).  
Khomeini’s vision entailed achieving material progress and social justice inside the 
larger framework of living a spiritual life as measured and operationalized by being 
obedient to God through implementing His Shari’ah. Such a connection between 
obedience to Shari’ah and ‘spirituality for all’ (a kind of democratization of 
spirituality and egalitarian access to the experience of fullness), as a bridge between 
politics of piety and politics of ordinary, had roots in the Islamic sciences, for 
example in the case of Ibn Khaldun, as attested by Zaidi (2011: 90, added emphasis):  
Contrary to the philosophers, Ibn Khaldun is adamant that while rationality is 
useful in its own sphere, intuition, faith, and adherence to religious law alone 
provide inexpressible happiness, because they connect man to the supra- 
human realm and ultimately to God.  
 
With eruption of excessive materialism of modernity and orthodox Persianism in the 
Shah’s reign, the nation had missed the taste of spirituality and unity and solidarity 
offered by Islam with its widespread local and global networks. The nation needed to 
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have a honey moon with Islam to the dismay of modernity and Persianism. The 
Islamic Revolution, thus, can be deemed as a collective experiment in “the search of 
the sacred” (Nasr, 2010; Bennett, 1996), or the “search for perfection” (Moin, 1994). 
The search for the impossible is constitutive of possible (Irwin, 2002).  
It is worth noting that all other segmentations and divisions in social existence such 
as ethnicity, generation, class, gender, education, region, type of settlement (urban 
versus rural or tribal), profession, etc. act through and mediated by the three regimes 
of truth.  As such class and other divisions between people became less pronounced 
in the collective search for the sacred inspired by Islam and Persian poetry.  
Throughout the pre-revolutionary, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary eras we 
witness the strong traces of these three regimes of truth and their competition for 
attaining the monopoly of supply of truth about life, work and language to the 
Iranians. This time, in the Islamic revolution, the leadership had fallen to the clergy 
in contrast to the other big occasions.  In this period, after the failures of previous 
attempts, as Zibakalam (2009: 86) observes:  
Many Iranians perceived the Islamic Revolution as a “third way” between 
Western capitalism and Eastern communism. The great slogan of the 
revolution “na sharghi, na gharbi” (neither the East nor the West) reflected the 
conviction that Islamic Iran would be a truly independent state — independent 
from both Western and Soviet domination. Gradually, however, the notion of 
“neither the East nor the West” turned into an ideological crusade implying the 
superiority of the Iranian-Islamic model that had been established in Iran since 
the revolution. The bitter eight-year war with Iraq and a host of other problems 
which emerged in the country persuaded many Islamists not to greatly boast 
the merits of the Islamic Republic to the West or the East. The ideological 
crusade receded during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s term as President (1989-1997), 
and receded further during the reformist period under President Muhammad 
Khatami (1997-2005). 
 
During the revolutionary process, alongside a plethora of leftist and Islamist groups, 
the main three voices which generally reflected the predominant affiliation to the 
three regimes of truths were the voice of the Shah (with Persianism as its overriding 
master signifier), the voice of Ayatollah Khomeini (with Shia Islam as its main 
regime of truth) and the voice of Bazargan (with modernity as its overriding frame of 
reference).  
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For the Shah, the true nature of Iranianness was defined by its Persianist heritage of 
pre-Islamic Persia, while for Ayatollah Khomeini it was captured by Iranian people’s 
historical dedication to Islam throughout centuries; for him that signalled the fact 
that Iranians prioritized the homeland of Islamic spirituality (manifested 
predominantly in Shia jurisprudence and complemented by Shia mysticism and 
Islamic philosophy) over and above their attachment to the geographical and cultural 
land of Iran. In fact Iran was immensely precious and the defence of its territory was 
immeasurably obligatory, because of Iranian people’s sense of exceptionalism 
(Zibakalam, 2009: 85) in being the only nation on the face of the earth to embrace 
the truth of Shia Islam collectively and unshakably throughout a turbulent history 
(officially from the Safavids onward). Bazargan’s voice, in contrast to both other 
voices, was the continuation of Mosaddegh’s school of thought where Iranian 
affirmative dimension is defined by its dedication to modern constitutionalism and 
rule of law. Bazargan gave more weight to Islam in constructing of the sense of 
nationhood compared to Mosaddegh, while committing to his project of building the 
apparatus of modern nation-state based on the spirit and articles of constitutionalism.  
As attested by Chehabi (1990: 55), Bazargan famously referred to this difference in 
emphasis and order of priority between his position and Ayatollah Khomeini’s one 
by saying that ‘we want Islam for Iran while Ayatollah Khomeini wants Iran for 
Islam’ (see also Dabashi, 1993; Jahanbakhsh, 2001). The Shah, Khomeini and 
Bazargan differed in their preference orderings and their final destinations (their 
utopias); what Bazargan wanted to arrive at was Paris, London or New York with 
special flavours of Islam (especially on how to live an ethical life) and Persianism 
(especially the heritage of Persian poetry as a repertoire of wisdom about how to live 
a moral life) (see Dabashi, 1993: 330). For him the source of law was modern human 
rights and the liberal constitution and national democratic Majlis (alongside modern 
science and technology), and Islam and Persianism were used to complement 
modernity’s lack in ethics and spirituality (which itself required monotheistic 
ontology). In a sense he wanted to graft Islam minus jurisprudence (which was 
largely perceived as religious despotism) and Persianism minus oriental despotism to 
the Western modernity minus its colonialism, its permissive ethics, and its nihilistic 
metaphysical ontology (here we see the operation of addition and subtraction on the 
three sets of truth at the level of Heideggerian fourfold).  
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Where the Shah wanted to arrive at was the gates of Great Sassanid and Achaemenid 
kingdoms and used modernity selectively to realize his dream of “march towards the 
gates of great civilization”, while Islam was largely and inherently perceived as an 
obstacle unless and until the threat of non-orthodox modernity (communism) became 
serious (Milani, 2011a; Abrahamian, 1982), where Islam was promoted 
instrumentally as a shield and as an effective firewall to fend off communism (this 
shows how pragmatically Islam was absolutely necessary for the survival of 
monarchy and its dreams).  Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to take his nation to a 
journey into a modernized Kerbaka/Mecca, the spiritual homeland of Islam and 
selectively used modernity’s techno-scientific achievements, constitutionalism, and 
search for social justice alongside Persianism’ sense of belonging to a common 
Persian homeland and common Persian language to realize it; for him Iran could 
become that spiritual promised land, and that modernized mecca as the spiritual 
homeland of Shia and Muslim ummah.  
Ayatollah Khomeini, thus, was driven by the compound state of inbetweenness-
belatedness to use modernity and Persianism strategically to produce that dream of 
discursive home of spiritual Shia Islam. As Harmon (2005: 31) observes:  
While Khomeini and other Iranian clerics were concerned primarily with the 
heritage and lineage of the prophet Muhammad, Shah Pahlavi was more 
interested in the heritage and lineage of the bygone Persian Empire.  
 
In this sense, ‘each voice was composed of the traces of all three regimes of truth but 
with different orders of priority and distinct architecture’. The belated tri-polarity of 
Iranian embeddedness compelled each voice to possess a tri-polar structure with 
different order of priority. The traces of three regimes of truth in Bazargan’s works, 
for example, can be found in the following quote from Chehabi (1990: 78) where 
Bazargan’s eclecticism is evident in the economy of referencing in his book “Rah-e 
Tey Shodeh” (The Path Travelled), indicative of state of belated inbetweenness:  
For his historical data Bazargan cites such diverse sources as the Quran, the 
Belgian symbolist poet Maurice Maeterlinck’s book le Grand Secret, and one 
Major Owrang’s opus Yekta-parasti dar Iran-e bastan (Monotheism in 
ancient Iran). 
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Here we see multiple forms of legitimacies, rationalities and vocabularies operating 
in Bazargan’s work. Here Bazargan’s voice as a truth supplier attempts to offer a 
synthesis of multiple regimes of truth by referring to Islamic source of truth (the 
Quran) alongside the modern regime of truth (the Western sources), and Persian 
regime of truth (in a source from ancient Persian house of wisdom).  
The presence of the three regimes of truth with their multiple dimensions can be 
found in Shariati’s (1970k: 36) contemplation on the question of the constitution and 
composition of his own selfhood. The selves he identified in himself, as Rahnema 
(1998: 155; see more extensive elaborations in Shariati, 1970k: 36-42) reports, were 
as follows:  
 
First he identified a religious and faithful self, whose orientation was towards 
Mecca. Second, he recognized a rational and Cartesian self, who did not 
possess faith. Whereas the religious self was born in Medina, this rational 
self was born in Athens and alien to Medina. The Third self was that of a 
young author and orator. It was the personality that was more renowned than 
the others and had obtained some fame; yet according to Shariati it was the 
most alien to him. The fourth self was that of a brave hero. It represented the 
adventurist, the dare-devil popular revolutionary, bent on avenging the 
disinherited of this world. This self thrived on breaking asunder the chains of 
the people and basked in the applause and the praise of the people. This was 
Shariati’s political personality. Finally Shariati acknowledged his fifth 
personality or self, which he maintained was the last to blossom in him. This 
novel self was the one he had long waited for; it was his real or gnostic self.  
 
Here we see Shariati as being a perfect example of and best elaborated embodiment 
of the forces at work in the Iranian embeddedness. Here he, as an individual, was the 
name of the collective; he was an incommensurable emergence in the Iranian 
embeddedness. He was rhizomatically driven towards constructing a hybrid selfhood 
and eclectic regime of truth matching the needs of a society in a state of belated 
inbetweenness. To achieve such synchronization, Shariati’s leading theory was the 
thesis of “return to self”, whose details were further explored but excluded from this 
work due to word limitations.  
We can follow the traces of the three forces (regimes of truth) and their associated 
hybrid voices and faces in the realm of literature. Literature is the site where 
historical forces battle for territory and dominance. The literary imagination of any 
society is the archaeological site of battle of forces and philosophies operating in its 
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history (Gyekey, 1995). It is true that literature can act as history and as philosophy 
(see Okolo, 2007: 22-3, for example). The literature in the pre-revolutionary period 
attests to the active presence of the three regimes of truth and the resulting 
prevalence of “confusion”: as Tornesello (2011: 105) reports in his reading of 
Pedersen’s (2002) work:  
Pedersen provides a reading of some works by three writers and intellectuals 
(Sadeq Cubak, Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ahmad Golshiri) of the period between 
the end of World War II and the Islamic revolution—one he regards as ‘a 
confused time, also in the field of literature’. Around this time, Iranian 
writers attempt to:  discover what was, and still is, the core of Iranian culture 
and identity. The country has witnessed a progressively stronger Western 
influence from the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty. At the same time, an 
Islamic and pre-Islamic culture several thousands years old still persisted.  
 
Literature turned into a battleground revolving around the conception of Iranainness 
and the three forces which could define it, as Tornsello (2011: 106) reports:  
Hedayat attempts to find ‘Iranianness’ in Iran’s pre-Islamic past as well as in 
a chauvinistic form of nationalism. Al-e Ahmad and Golshiri point to the 
Islamic history of Iran as the main key to Persian identity, while Cubak 
questions both Islam and ‘the Pahlavi-state nationalism’ as traits of an 
authentic identity.  
 
In these literary works, the dark sides of the three regime of truth and their politics of 
ordinary and their decadences and superficialities come under attack from the 
revolutionary and non-revolutionary literary voices and faces. In the battle of 
regimes of truth where the black book of each regime of truth becomes the centre of 
attack the question of “true” modernity, “true” Islam, and “true” Persianism would 
dominate the agenda. The bewildering permutation of voices on the true and false 
versions of various regimes of truth generates the immense heaviness of the ‘burden 
of judgement’ for the Iranian dasein and is at the heart of the Iranian state of ‘tragedy 
of confusion’. True modernity, for instance, is sought in libraries and laboratories 
rather than pubs and clubs, gambling houses and brothels (see Nasri vol 2, 2007: 25-
42). The same voice is repeated in the Islamic Republic era when Soroush, for 
instance, calls for learning from the West of the day rather than the West of the 
night.   
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The formalist and ritualistic dimension of Islam and Persianism were equally under 
attack in the literary works. Vulgarities of all three regimes of truth were under 
attack in different works of literature. As Ahmad (1982: 296) puts it  
It is important to underline that throughout the twentieth century the 
dominant trends in Iranian literature - political, fictional, and poetic - have 
been overwhelmingly reformist or socialist, democratic and, frequently 
anticlerical. Even Jalal Ale-Ahmad and Ali Shariati, who are credited with 
cultural and religious revivalism in contemporary Iran, were anticlerical, lay 
thinkers.  
 
The literature was a battlefield for the white and black books of the three different 
regimes of truth and their internal divisions and contradictions. The literary works 
were the site of social criticism with various accents leaning towards anti-monarchy, 
anti-Western or anti-clerical and sometimes even anti-Tudeh and anti-Soviet 
orientations (Dabashi, 1993: 57, 63). The fragmentary and confused being of Iranian 
selfhood is most clearly expressed in the following honest and genuine assessment 
made by Al-e Ahmad of himself and reported by Dabashi (1993: 59), which is a 
clear manifestation of the state of belated inbetweenness:  
"You have run for a lifetime," Al-e Ahmad once addressed himself: searched 
every corner, and before you reach some understanding of yourself, you have 
committed stupidities, have gone ways astray, banged your head on walls, and 
from all these you have none but fragmented records.  
 
Despite their inevitable hybridity, each voice tried to establish its own purity. In 
order to defend its own ‘imaginary’ unity, identity and totality, each voice tried to 
disavow the presence of the alien elements in its heart and/or rename them 
(appellation via Persianization, Islamization, or modernization, by saying ‘Islam is 
Islam’, ‘modernity is modernity’, and ‘Persianism is Persianism’) and/or repress the 
unwanted element of the alternative regime of truth (like repressing the West of the 
night or Islam of jurisprudence or Persianism of formalistic poetry). Khomeini, for 
example, as Abrahamian, 2008: 163) reports, refused formal acknowledgement of 
any need for any alternative regime of truth with the following argument:  
What the nation needs is an Islamic Republic – not a Democratic Republic 
nor a Democratic Islamic Republic. Don’t use the Western term ‘democratic.’ 
Those who call for such a thing don’t know anything about Islam.” He later 
added: “Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because 
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Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word 
near the word Islam, which is perfect.  
 
For him, modernity without the Islamic appellation was ‘pernicious’ (Ridgeon, 2012: 
127) and an iron cage depriving man of his right to spirituality and freedom from the 
fear of death. He frequently insisted that “We accept Western civilization, but do not 
accept their decadences” (Moasseseh-ye Farhangi-ye Ghadr-e Velayat, 2001: 244; 
added emphasis). Khomeini repeatedly changed and enriched the composition of his 
voice through his response to the evolving context of situation, largely through 
improvisation with little or no systematic attempt in symbolization, and 
standardization (theorization), which exposed his particular cocktail (ma’joon) to the 
threat of de-legitimization from rival all truth camps.  
Shariati shared Khomeini’s mistrust of modernity. Shariati sees modernity in its 
capitalist form as a reductionist and hedonistic force intent on commodification of 
culture and faith, and homogenization and standardization of life on earth, depriving 
mankind of its spiritual biodiversity. For him capitalism equalled cultural 
imperialism and the death of difference and heterogeneity, manifested in turning all 
human being into the consuming machines in the utopia/dystopia of techno-scientific 
consumerist hedonistic pleasure island. Here Paz (1985: 172, added emphasis) 
captures Shariati’s (and Khomeini’s) concerns for pernicious homogenizing power 
of the West.  
 
Our cultural crisis, for perhaps the first time in history, is the same as the 
crisis of our species. . . . It is not Western culture that is in danger of being 
destroyed tomorrow, as the cultures of the Greeks and the Arabs, the Aztecs 
and the Egyptians were destroyed in the past: it is man himself. The old 
plurality of cultures, postulating various and contrary ideals, and offering 
various and contrary views of the future, has been replaced by a single 
civilization and a single future. Until recently, history was a meditation on 
the many truths proposed by many cultures, and a verification of the radical 
heterogeneity of every society and archetype. . . . All of today's civilizations 
derive from that of the Western world, which has assimilated or crushed its 
rivals. . . . World history has become everyone's task, and our own labyrinth 
is the labyrinth of all mankind.  
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This passage, in effect, bemoans the emergence of modern global village under the 
homogenizing force of American Disneyfication (Bryman, 2004) and 
Mcdonaldization (Ritzer, 2012).  
As such, Khomeini’s vision was in sharp contrast with the Shah’s. The Shah 
deployed the pseudo-scientific discourse of Aryan race and the linguistic theory of 
Indo-European language family to portray Iranian people’s racial affiliation with the 
European people and their disassociation with the Semitic race and Middle Eastern 
topology of neighbourhood (Zia-Ebrahimi, 2011: 450, 461). Zia-Ebrahimi (2011: 
446) points to this fact by saying that  
 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—who had himself titled ariyàmehr, the 
“Light of Aryans,” a title without any previous incidence in Iranian history—
declared in 1973 “Yes, we are Easterners, but we are Aryans. This Middle 
East, what is it? One can no longer find us there. But Asia, yes. We are an 
Asian Aryan power whose mentality and philosophy are close to those of the 
European states, above all France.”  
In a private audience, he confided to then British ambassador Sir Anthony 
Parsons that as “Aryans,” Iranians were in fact members of the European 
family and that it was a mere “accident of geography” that Iran found itself in 
the Middle East rather than among its fellow European nations.  
 
Each voice carried its own forms of foreclosure (inability to think the unthinkable), 
which due to lack of space, we were compelled to leave out of this thesis.   
We extensively explored the most significant voices of this era- the voices of the 
Shah, Khomeini, Bazargan, Shariati, the literature, the left, and the West- but 
excluded them from this work due to word limitations. In the excluded section we 
demonstrated in details how these voices were formed out of the operation of 
addition and subtraction on the three sets of regimes of truth. It is worth noting that 
these voices were natural species of the compound state of inbetweenness-
belatedness and its associated tragedy of confusion, and profoundly contributed to 
perpetuating the tragedy of confusion in Iran.  
6.3. UNSTABLE COALITION 
This section explores the logic of formation and decay, generation and degeneration 
of coalitions in the pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian compound context of belated 
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inbetweenness. Encounter with modernity and its transformative nature created the 
state of belatedness and necessitated and provoked various forms of collective 
actions to incorporate, reject or selectively adapt it to the Iranian historical 
background. Organizing collective actions in order to attain appropriate social 
changes requires the coordination of discourses, strategies and actions emanated 
from individual and groups, which leads to the formation of different species of 
coalitions.  
It is worth noting that Iran is known to be the country of unstable coalitions (Nategh, 
1983; Abrahamian, 1989). Coalitions appear and disappear at the speed of light; they 
are simultaneously easy and impossible (sahl va momtane). The dynamism of the 
formation/disintegration and degeneration/regeneration or collapse/re-formation of 
the coalitions was succinctly captured by the following observation from Akhavi 
(1983: 220; emphasis added):  
Simultaneously, shifting and even unprincipled coalitions, which have 
characterized the social reality of the revolution since its inception, continue 
to appear. The analyst of the Iranian revolution, therefore, can only try to 
record the variations and seek explanation of their meaning in the cultural 
and social contexts of Iranian history.   
 
The ‘power to affect and be affected’ among the components of three 
incommensurable regimes of truth engenders synthesis between highly volatile truth 
materials, which makes the resulting compounds highly unstable and short-lived. 
Contrasting and even contradictory forces, voices and faces join to form highly 
volatile and explosive coalitions to materialize their own brand of projects of reverse 
social engineering through collective actions. This dynamism bestows Iranian social 
fabric its two paradoxical features, factionalism and strife alongside high-level of 
connectivity; first we address its continuity, compactness, and convexity and then we 
explore its factionalism, rupture and strife.  
6.3.1. The Convexity of the Social Space  
The social space constituting of world of signification in Iran spans from the 
orthodox and non-orthodox modernity to Shia and Sunni Islam, and orthodox and 
non-orthodox Persianism. Many faces of Islam intermingle with many faces of 
Persianism and many faces of modernity. There are bridges and hybridities making 
the social space compact and connected without any structural hole (Burt, 2004) or 
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gap except for the gap emanating from the order of real which is due to finitude of 
all worlds of significations (comprising of symbolic and imaginary orders). We use 
the Shah and Khomeini as two pillars around which coalitions were formed; in the 
compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness all social assemblages (individuals, 
groups, and organizations) are different types of unstable coalitions. These two faces 
acted as the sites around which different forces, voices, and faces coalesced in an 
antagonized repositioning of regimes of truth.   
It should be noted that Iranian social fabric has been continuous as everyone was 
linked to everyone else. The lines between various segments of Iranian social fabric 
and its constituent regimes of truth were not sharply drawn. Salient identities 
constituting the social order have not been in the zero-one or all-or-nothing forms, 
instead they have been configured in the fuzzy form of a continuum.  In this, each 
face has had multiple truth affiliations and has been subjectifed in manifold 
structures of power/knowledge, institutional arrangements, and discursive 
formations, and each voice was a unique synthesis of different components of 
alternative regimes of truth. In the language of Chehabi (1990: 223), each voice and 
the face carrying it has one foot in each truth camp: “the religious movements around 
him [i.e. Bazargan] had one foot in the Nationalist, liberal opposition to the Shah, the 
other in the religious camp under the leadership of Khomeini”. This premise does not 
only apply to Bazargan and his circle, it applies to almost every face in the Iranian 
social order. Hossein Nasr (2010), the prominent theorist of traditionalism and the 
doctrine of Islamic monarchy, acted as a bridge between the Shah’s circle and the 
Islamic circles like the Allameh Tatatabaei’s philosophical circle, which 
incorporated Ayatollah Motahhari who was the prominent member of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s circle (Dabashi, 1993; Jafarian, 2007). In the above two examples 
Bazargan acted as a link (bonding social capital) between liberal modernity and Shia 
clergy, and Nasr acted as the link between monarchy and the Shia clergy. Nasr’s 
(2010) notion of tradition incorporated both Pre-Islamic wisdom and Islam, and 
unified them under the notion of search for the sacred (this unification strategy 
resurfaced in new form recently in the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei’s discourse).  
Such connectivity indicates that the circle of links between alternative landscapes of 
truth was complete. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was a link between rival truth 
realms of Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism alongside 
a link to modernity through his strong connection with religious intellectuals like 
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Banisadr and Ebrahim Yazdi.  As reported in Jafarian (2007: 390-5), Ayatollah 
Taleghani (and other high-profile clerics like Montazeri and Hashemi Refsanjani 
particularly in the pre-revolutionary era) acted as a link between Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Mujahidin-e Khalgh; the latter itself had developed close connections with the 
Marxist group Fadaiyan-e Khalgh; the link was so intense that some of the financial 
help collected from the traditional Shia believers of bazar by the political clerics like 
Rafsanjani would end up in the hands of Marxist Fadaiyan through Marxist-Islamist 
group Mujahidin (Jafarian, 2007: 462 and 478, footnote 1). Because Taleghani acted 
as a bridge between Fadaiyan Islam and Mosaddegh’s National Front in the 
Mosaddegh era, he effectively served as a long and multi-layered bridge between 
contradictory fields of truth from Mo’talefeh (who were, in a sense, the reincarnation 
of Fadaiyan-e Islam) to Fadaiyan-e Kalgh. As Taleghani was also a bridge between 
Bazaergan and Khomeini (Jafarian, 2007: 391-2), he was effectively a bridge 
between jurisprudential political Islam of Ayatollah Khomeini, Marxism of 
Mujahidin and Fadaiyan, and liberalism of Bazargan.  
While Ayatollah Shariatmadari acted as a bridge between the Shah and the clergy 
and the wider community of Shia believers (which created rifts between him and 
Khomeini), Ayatollah (at the time Hojjatoleslam) Sobhani acted as a bridge between 
him and Ayatollah Khomeini (Jafarian, 2007: 311). Each single social assemblage 
whether individual, group or organization was a web of interconnections in a wider 
cluster and network of interconnections. The principle of ‘six degrees of separation’ 
in the formation of networks (West and Grigolini, 2011: 265) prevailed in the Iranian 
social fabric at a much tighter level. This meant that the social space could not be 
clearly divided into separate camps and distinct language communities and 
associations with clearly demarcated competing agenda for social change.   
6.3.2. Factionalism  
This super fluidity and conductivity of social space made it prone to astonishing 
levels of break-up, strife and factionalism due to the immense levels of variability 
afforded to the social agents to construct new voices through conversion to 
alternative regime of truth (changing their preferred regimes of truth) and 
rearrangement of the old components as primed by new context of situation. As 
mentioned before, faces move between various voices and, positions of pragmatism 
and radicalism, moderation and extremism, politics of ordinary (popular culture) and 
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politics of piety (high culture), black books and white books of alternative regimes of 
truth, and politics of mainstream and politics of streets in a dynamics of conversions 
and rearrangements triggered by the reorganization of forces and voices in the ever-
changing context of situation. If the realm of politics is captured by a voice 
constituted of orthodox Persianism and orthodox modernity, for instance, a mass 
exodus occurs towards Islamism and non-orthodox modernity at the level of civil 
society.  
As a result, state and society move in opposite directions due to the economy of 
lacks and abundances (analytic of finitude). As such, the realm of culture, for 
instance, may be totally dominated by the opposition forces and voices while the 
formal terrains of politics are captured by the incumbent one. When the state is 
conquered by a coalition of Islamism and non-orthodox modernity the society moves 
towards orthodox modernity and Persianism. When the realm of politics, for 
instance, is colonized by a rising new voice and a new cultural tribe, the newly 
defeated and marginalized voices and tribes migrate to the realm of culture, 
underground economy, popular culture, street politics, and colonize the realm of 
informality and civil society. In the Iranian society it is quite normal for the realms 
of politics and state to be controlled by one cultural tribe, and the realms of culture 
and public opinion to be dominated by an entirely different cultural tribe (see 
Mirsepasi, 2004 and Milani, 2011a on how the left had colonized the realm of 
culture, arts and literature in the Shah’s reign and how the lapsed Marxists had 
captured the queen’s circle and the Hoveida’s circle, for example). In this flurry of 
activities old connections break up and new ones emerge, culminating in the 
emergence of new fronts, coalitions and alliances. If one potion or cocktail does not 
work another is tested. The whole social order is engaged in the art of mixology and 
alchemy. The faces occupying the positions of radicalism of different persuasions 
move towards pragmatism of various colours and old pragmatists become new 
radicals, or new radicals from the new generation fill the seats of radicalism left 
vacant.  
The observations made by Chehabi (1990: 307-8) attests to the high-level of 
volatility in the process of territorialisation/de-territorialisation (fusion/fission) in the 
social fabric of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness:  
The radicals of 1953-63, the NRM/LMI, were the moderates in 1977-79. The 
self-same people who, in 1957 and 1960, had accused the leader of the 
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National Front, Allahyar Saleh, of maintaining too much contact with the 
American embassy in Tehran now had privileged access to the U.S. 
ambassador, whom they tried to reassure about American interests.  
 
This process leads to groups, societies, parties, organizations and coalitions to have 
short life-span. They frequently degenerate into smaller and smaller groups until they 
implode into nothingness. One example among many is the case of Mosaddegh’s 
National Front leading to the emergence of Bazargan’s Freedom Movement, itself 
triggering the emergence of Mujahidin-e Khalgh and Sahabi’s religio-nationalist 
group (Sahabi, 2007: 227, 248-9). Mujahidin further violently split into Marxist and 
Islamic factions. This particular genealogical trajectory of degeneration and 
regeneration had originated from Mosaddegh’s constitutionalist nationalism and 
ended up in radical Marxism, passing through Bazargan’ Islamic 
liberalism/constitutionalism and Mujahidin’s Islamic Marxism. The speed and 
multiplicity of mutations are bewildering and mind-blowing. Various forms of 
monstrosities (mutant cultural tribes) emerge from each other in a perpetual process 
of violent discontent, dislocation, and disorientation. The Marxist-Mujahidin (later 
named Paykar) group later divided into smaller groups until it totally vanished from 
the socio-political space (Behrooz, 2000: 121). Social space with high level of 
connectivity creates immense amount of strife, divisions and factionalism. Groups 
split into two (or more) and the two further split into two or more until the process 
leads to the total annihilation of the original entity. Simultaneously alongside these 
decays and collapses new forms of socio-political coalitions are fashioned under new 
doctrinal compounds, which after a short period of flourishing follow the same fate. 
As Akhavi (1983: 208) observes  
Factions and splits have characterized the Iranian revolution. The cleavages 
are characteristic not only of relations between clerical and secular groups, as 
might be expected, but within the clergy itself.   
 
The fact that the clergy is divided is affirmed by Abrahamian (1982: 436-7) and 
Jafarian (2007: 238-241) where, for example, Jafarian attests to at least four different 
orientations amongst the clerics regarding their political stances to the Shah’s 
regime. The same observation was made regarding the Iranian left by Alaolmolki 
(1987: 233): “This inability to unite is perhaps the most graphic demonstration of the 
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left's collective political immaturity”. In addition, Jafarian (2007: 378) reports of the 
split in Mo’talefeh between those who were in favour of armed resistance as opposed 
to those who preferred non-armed one (see also, Abdkhodaee, 1980). The same 
disease of excessive division was reported to have plagued the opposition of the 
Islamic Republic by Homayoun (2004).  
There are always so many dimensions and issues, big or small, around which split 
can occur in the groups and organizations from foreign policy to the issue of 
interpretation of the Imam Hossein’s uprising against Yazid (Jafarian, 2007: 853-
866) to the issue of founding cinema in Qom (Jafarian, 2007: 241, 246; Sadr, 2006: 
129 ), for instance.  In the post-revolutionary era, the anti-Shah, Khomeini-based 
coalition degenerated in successive stages, which was  triggered by strong and weak 
events such as the first referendum on the nature of new political system, the rights 
and obligations of various ethnicities, the process of writing of the new constitution, 
the imposition of veiling on women in public space, the implementation of the law of 
retribution (qesas) in the criminal justice system, the land reform, the  hostage-taking 
crisis, the management of Iran-Iraq war and the role of private and public sectors in 
the management of economy, the attempted Nouzhe coup against the system (with 
alleged involvement of Shariatmadari and Qotbzadeh) (see Hiro, 2011), the 
treatment of the political prisoners (split with Ayatollah Montazeri), the Rushdie 
affair (serious rift with the West), post-war reconstruction policies of liberalization 
and deregulation and advocacy for socio-economic freedom (the split with Hashemi 
Rafsanjani), and in the instigation of Khatami’s reform movement (advocacy for 
political freedom).  
Due to affiliation to different regimes of truth and being inhabited by different 
hybrid voices, a wide range of conflicts appeared in the revolutionary front tearing 
apart the initial anti-Shah coalition. These conflicts appeared as there was no 
common regime of truth acting as pre-ontological riverbed, unconscious a priori 
(Foucault, 1970: 6), shared embeddedness and consensual background, which could 
serve as logic of negotiation and bargaining on rules of the game for sharing power 
or for ‘agreeing to disagree’ or achieving “unity without uniformity” (Zibakalam, 
2008: 228). This lack of common calculus of give and take (calculus of compromise) 
was at the root of the excessive level of conflicts erupting immediately after the 
victory of the revolution as no force, voice or face could bestow legitimacy to the 
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radical other as their regimes of truth dictated on them to view the radical others as 
evil, reactionary, falsehood, infidelity (kofr) and the like.  
They could not share power because their master signifiers and their associated 
discourses and narratives on every issue of life and its meaning and the relation to 
the Heideggerian fourfold of mortals, gods, earth and sky were entirely different. 
They belonged to the multiplicity of different language communities although each 
could understand a bit of the other, they were trapped in the depth of 
incommensurability and disjointed and fragmented forms of embeddedness 
producing dissonance and confusion.  Banisadr (1981: 173), the first president of 
Iran, enumerates some of these bewildering arrays of rifts in the following terms:  
 
conflicts between the clergy, happening also at the top level of “sources of 
emulation” (marjas); the conflict between new institutions and within these 
institutions among different orientations; creation of conflicts with the 
political groups while taking the position of eliminating them; the conflict 
between new and old institutions; the conflict within the religious-political 
closed circle participating in the Khomeini’s leadership: [in the cases of] 
provisional government of Bazargan, Islamic Republic Party and us 
[Banisadr’s circle], the conflict was more with provisional government in the 
beginning and then with both; foreign conflicts; regional conflicts; conflicts 
in the articulation of Islam; ….   
 
These conflicts caused the gradual degeneration of the original anti-Shah coalition 
led by Ayatollah Khomeini.  
Furthermore, the opposition to Khomeini’s coalition has been even more divided. 
Akhavi (1987: 198) alludes to this point in the following observation:  
At bottom, the elite is unified enough to prevent the opposition from 
mounting a challenge to its rule. But this is largely due to the fragmentation 
of that opposition, which itself is riven with factionalism. The political 
system is centralized around the faqih and key judicial institutions. But the 
system is far from monolithic, and the contention between factions on socio-
economic issues seems quite strong. 
 
These conflicts between and within groups and coalitions often manifest themselves 
in the particular configuration of exchange of violence between the incumbent 
coalition and the opposition where the dominant coalition resorts to the physical 
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violence and the dominated and marginalized opposition retaliates by performing 
epistemic and verbal violence. One side imposes the physical restriction on the other 
or aims for the physical annihilation of the other and the other aims at symbolic 
destruction and de-legitimization of the incumbent. 
The common theme is ‘demonization of the other and glorification of the self’ 
(Rabie, 2001: 2; Beeman, 2005) and using antagonistic language and physical 
violence against the radical other due to the specific functioning of the regimes of 
truth in the state of belated inbetweenness. Banisadr (1981: 161) captures this 
dynamics succinctly where he refers to both sides of the conflict embarking on the 
gradual process of mutual destruction in a war of attrition (namadmali) between his 
circle and the rest of Khomeini’s coalition:  
We and they, both, were using Khajeh Nasirddin-e Tusi’s method in 
gradually pressurizing the other to death; they were restricting the power of 
the president and we were discrediting them amongst different classes of 
people in the society. … Khomeini himself told me that you want to destroy 
me.  
 
These observations demonstrate that any relation in the state of belated 
inbetweenness is highly unstable and volatile, and prone to inherent high dose of 
mistrust (Abrahamian, 1993: 4, 127-8) and sudden surge of animosity and 
antagonism. Alliances and friendships suddenly and unexpectedly turn sour and 
waves of animosity and incriminations engulf the relations. Old enemies become 
friends and old friends become enemies at a remarkable speed.  
This is strong evidence that all socio-political groups, classes and communities 
whether in power or in opposition, religious or non-religious, left or right, political 
or non-political, within state or in civil society have been plagued by internal 
divisions and were subject to the dynamic working of the state of belated 
inbetweenness.  
The dominant and driving force behind the process of coalition formation is negation 
and antagonism against something (a common enemy) rather than affirmative force 
of being for something. Basically the negation of a common enemy motivates the 
formation of coalitions and the affirmation of a project of reverse social engineering 
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prompts the disintegration of the coalitions. And this dynamics is evident in the 
Katouzian’s (2013: 110) description of the post-revolutionary processes:  
The single unifying aim of overthrowing the Shah and the state having been 
achieved, it was now time for each party to try, not to share, but to grab as 
much as possible the spoils of the revolution. Apart from the virtually 
powerless liberal groups, headed by Bazargan’s provisional government, most 
of the players were highly suspicious of one another’s motives, hoping to try to 
eliminate their rivals as best they could from the realm of political power. 
Apart from the liberals no one was interested in sazesh (compromise), the dirty 
word of Iranian politics.  
 
As we will see in the coming sections of this chapter, this dynamical process of strife 
and split is driven by the inherent features of the context of culture and context of 
situation  characterized by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness and its 
associated warring regimes of truth and not by the bad intentions or power-
hungriness or ignorance of its historical actors; the ‘no compromise solution’, 
frequently mentioned and lamented in the Katouzian’s writings, is due to the absence 
of a common logic of ‘give and take’ and ‘agree to disagree’ and lack of legitimate 
method of arriving at mutual recognition of all truth entrepreneurs and interlocutors 
(on “Compromise and Rotten Compromises”, see Margalit, 2009).  
In effect, there was no legitimate logic of granting mutual recognition to each other 
and there was no big Other making them see and feel each other as belonging to a 
shared community. As such, cultural tribes with irreconcilable truth claims were 
fighting each other to death. This was motivated by the emergence of irreconcilable 
differences on all small and large issues of life, work and language, which is the 
natural outcome of the operations of addition and subtraction on the three regimes of 
truth with their internal divisions. Abrahamian (2008: 169) attests to this fact in the 
following observation:  
Many lay people – royalists, leftists, secular nationalists, and members of the 
intelligentsia – tended to look down upon the clergy as out of place in the 
contemporary world. They certainly did not consider them capable of running 
a modern state.  
 
The clergy inevitably reciprocated such negative sentiments towards almost all 
others from the intellectuals, to the monarchists, and the Westerners. This was the 
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dictates of their rival grids of intelligibility. With such mutual perceptions how could 
rival social assemblages compromise and cooperate with each other in a climate of 
freedom? Each incumbent force with any colour or persuasion would find itself 
‘under siege’ from all angles. As Abrahamian (1993: 131) points out “One does not 
compromise and negotiate with spies and traitors [or reactionary, despotic, 
backward, misogamist, criminal or oppressive forces, for instance]; one locks them 
up or else shoots them”. How can one compromise with the forces of evil and 
darkness? This demonstrates that the notion of compromise is highly under-
theorized, especially in the state of belated inbetweenness.  Consequently, the 
volatility of coalitions and the existence of ‘no compromise solution’ was the 
inevitable default position in the state of belated inbetweenness. The highly volatile 
state of collation formation in Iran is summarized in the following terms: “Ann 
Lambton, in a much quoted work from the 1950s, remarked that "factionalism, in 
one form or another, has remained a feature of Persian life down to modern times 
(Abrahamian, 1989: 113; see also Behrooz 1991, 2004; Siavoshi, 1992; Moslem, 
2002)."  
Akhavi (1987: 182) identifies the phenomenon of lack of internal coherence amongst 
the clergy (despite their homogenous education) as a paradox: “paradox is that the 
clerics' homogeneous training is not sufficient to ensure their unity”.  The above 
quote ignores the role of pre-ontological background and unconscious a priori. The 
paradox can be resolved by noting the fact that the clergy like the rest of society is 
subjectified in a larger social order (in family enironments, streets, and other 
institutional contexts through small actions, cheap talks, nonverbal gestures and 
postures, and habitual forms of organizations of objects), which exposes them to the 
variability and multiplicity of the state of belated inbetweenness. The regular raid to 
religious school dormitories by Ayatollah Golpaygani’s special squad to find 
unwarranted books and pamphlets (Jafarian, 2007) was one example of all classes of 
people being exposed to the rainbow properties of the Iranian worldhood.  
The factions and groupings emerging in this process of degeneration and 
regeneration, which are endemic to the state of belated inbetweenness, do not follow 
the categorization and classifications pertinent to the homogenous or heterogeneous 
societies. Ayatollah Khomeini frequently pointed to this fact instinctively in his 
public speeches that the left and right in Iranian politics do not have the denotations 
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and connotations of classic left and right in Europe. Akhavi (1983: 209, added 
emphasis) confirms the point in the following terms:  
“traditional labels of “leftist” and “rightist” do not serve the purpose of 
analysis very well. Principled coalitions, in the sense of group adherence to 
an internally consistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify. 
 
6.3.3. Philosophical-Theoretical-Empirical Dimension of Coalition Formation 
As it has been fully explored in this research, one of the leading reasons why the 
Iranians frequently failed to produce stable markets for the production of truth and 
wealth is their failure in producing a common logic of agree to disagree. This logic is 
developed when the rival voices acknowledge and even welcome the truth claims of 
the alternative voices and accept their status as legitimate interlocutor in the process 
of societal level of dialogue and deliberation; when the alternative voices cannot find 
a legitimate way of granting legitimacy to each other they frequently classify the 
radical other as the enemy and antagonize the relationship. This in turn was due to 
their being trapped in a catching-up and outside-in model of development and 
change (the state of belatedness, inducing a sense of urgency to find urgent solutions 
for pressing problems) alongside their deep-rooted state of inbetweenness (the fight 
over irreconcilable conceptions of what is the problem and what is the solution). 
Immersion in such a compound state frequently and inevitably calls for theoretical 
and philosophical contemplations on small and large issues of life, work, and 
language.  
Throughout its long history, Iranian society could not afford to be non-philosophical 
and obedient to authority due to its geographical position, which made it exposed to 
the winds of new truths from all its geographical corners (Islami Nadooshan, 2007; 
Solasi, 2007, chapter 2). Geography made the constant exchange of cultures and 
trade in alternative regimes of truth an inevitable feature of Iranian embeddedness 
(Katouzian’s (2010: 10) cross-road effect). Iranian discursive home with its fragile 
philosophical foundation has been vulnerable to the winds of change blowing into its 
lands from all angles of its borders. Despite this embedded need for philosophical 
discursive home, the speed and urgency of change brought into the social order 
through encountering with the immense dynamism of modernity suppressed and 
side-lined philosophical and theoretical and research-based contemplations which is 
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by nature incredibly slow and time-consuming and painstakingly difficult to master 
as they required mastery over multiple vocabularies and languages spanning 
tumultuous terrains from the Western philosophy and sciences and literature and arts 
to Islamic philosophy and mysticism and theology and jurisprudence alongside deep 
understanding of Persian poetry and Persian house of wisdom with its vast cultural 
heritage.  
These situational factors all worked against the reliable and constant supply of 
philosophical and theoretical thoughts and discourses despite the implicit and deep 
but hidden and unnoticed demands for them. In the state of belated inbetweenness 
the need for philosophical theorization and contemplation is more urgent than bread 
and water and eggs as it manages to produce a stable society in which bread and 
water and eggs can be produced and traded to feed the people. Since the production 
of truth is a prerequisite for the production of wealth as Foucault (1980) attests, 
founding a philosophical/theoretical/empirical factory (philosophical community of 
interlocutors) is more critical to achieving a sustainable and stable model of socio-
political development and change than any physical factory.  
The following section, hence, provides examples of the need for philosophical 
theorization which was left unmet and as a result created tragedies and crises in the 
Iranian social existence.  
One of the clear cases of instability in group and coalition formation was the 
conversion in the Mujahidin organization from Islam to Marxism (Abrahamian, 
1989). This event shocked the political clerics and the rest of the constituency of 
Islamic resistance against the Shah’s regime and created waves of mistrust and 
resentment between the Marxist and Islamic groups and within the Islamic 
movement, which erupted in violent form in the post-revolutionary era. Due to this 
event, as Chehabi (1990: 215; see also Zibakalam, 2008: 269) observes, “the unity of 
the Islamic movement in Iran was broken”; the deep roots of conversion revolved 
around the philosophical foundations of Marxism as the science of resistance (elm-e 
mobarezeh) and on the philosophy of history and the nature of modern world and 
property rights and class war and the role of belief in metaphysical entities like God 
and the hereafter and the angles in this structure.  
It should be mentioned that the Mujahidin were tested by Khomeini in their 
philosophical foundations and were rejected as un-Islamic (Haghshenas, 2012; 
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Jafarian, 2007). The problem was that there was no strong religious philosophical 
alternative to the Marxist option and the conversion to Marxism for the militant 
forms of resistance was almost inevitable, as they were in urgent need of ready-made 
philosophical packages to legitimize and guide their resistance against the Shah’s 
regime and its Western backers. The tension between the two sides of the resistance 
divide was clear in “the state of prison in prison”, as described by Mohammadi 
Gorgani (2005; see also Jafarian, 2007; Zibakalam, 2008: 265-6 and 270-2), and the 
bitter strife between the fiqh-based religious and Marxist sides of resistance, where 
the religious side would count them as untouchables (najes) (Abrahamian, 1999: 
111; Abrahamian, 1993: 46), while the Marxist side would bitterly complain about it 
and treat the religious side as backward and reactionary and metaphysical (a kind of 
modern najes).  
This was deeply related to the issue of piety of unbelief (Fraser, 2002; Shang, 2006) 
and the question of whether unbelievers, in their search for truth, can attain truth 
through their thoughts and actions (see Jafarian, 2007: 392, footnote 1 on 
Taleghani’s understanding of the piety of unbelief). This is, at a larger scale, related 
to the status of man as man and not as believer and ultimately the relation between 
the path travelled by mankind and the path travelled by prophets (rah-e anbiya va 
rah-e bashar) (Chehabi, 1990: 78, 211; Abrahamian, 1989: 92). The questions over 
the nature of science and modern world, metaphysics, good society, Islamic 
jurisprudence, its method of inference and the nature of reality, knowledge and truth 
and ultimately between two incommensurable regimes of truth of non-orthodox 
modernity (Marxism) as a science of resistance and Islam as a science of salvation 
and eternal happiness, were at the heart of these conflicts inside and outside the 
prison in the pre- and post-revolutionary eras.  
The questions tabled by Ayatollah Talaghani’s son’s letter (Jafarian, 2007: 487-8; 
Taleghani’s son was amongst those who had converted to Marxism) indicate the 
genuine ideological and philosophical problems facing every concerned soul at the 
time (see also Zibakalam, 2008: 270 on the deep ideological problems of Mujahidin). 
To satisfy these philosophical needs, lay study groups emerged at all levels. The 
militant groups called such make-shift theoretical activities as the act of organizing 
the revolutionary ideology (Zibakalam, 2008: 266-9); the truth was that except for 
Ayatollah Tabatabei’s work there was no substantial philosophical treatise on the 
fundamental questions of life, work, and language and as such there was not 
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adequate indigenous and owned knowledge upon which the Islamic revolutionary 
ideology could be built (see also Sahabi, 2007: 297). Lack of philosophical capital 
showed itself in the subsequent conflict and violent rift, which emerged in the 
Mujahidin organization (Abrahamian, 1989: 148). The deep philosophical and 
ideological issues had been previously buried under the urgency of pressing issues of 
anti-regime movement (Zibakalam, 2008: 118). Once again the impatience induced 
by the outside-in model of change and development, the urgency to find a blueprint 
for the rescue of the nation from imagined or real threat of annihilation and collapse, 
took precedence over the deeper unresolved philosophical and theoretical questions 
on the main questions related to life, work and language.  
The emergence of various forms of study groups (Molavi, 2002: 50; Boroujerdi, 
1996: 91; Taghavi, 2005; Jafraina, 2007; Zibakalam 2008) like "the new Shahnameh 
discussion group", ‘the Quran study group’ or ‘the Western philosophy discussion 
group’ is one of the common phenomena of the modern history of Iran, where they 
functioned as quick make-shift hospitals in the middle of truth war zones to treat the 
philosophical and theoretical injuries and illnesses induced by the encounter with 
modernity and in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness, where the 
ideological blueprints for a successful transformation were quickly assembled. The 
theoretical activists were almost all lay philosophers and theorists. As these activities 
were conducted in isolation and without a dynamic knowledge community and in the 
atmosphere of urgency without calm and measured national dialogue they would 
soon run into trouble and collapse.   
The attacks launched by Ayatollah Motahhari on Shariati for not knowing adequate 
level of Islamic sciences (Jafarian, 2007: 545, note 5) alongside the attacks launched 
by Shayegan (1992: 124) on Motahhari for not knowing adequate level of Western 
philosophy and the attacks launched by Taheri (2010: 234) on Khomeini for not 
knowing adequate level of Persian poetry and lacking mastery over Persian language 
and Persian house of wisdom demonstrate the complex picture and the daunting task 
of founding philosophical and theoretical production line in the Iranian context of 
belated inbetweenness, requiring respect for and mastery over multiple traditions of 
scholarship and erudition. Basically, the particular hyper-complex discursive 
formation associated with the state of belated inbetweenness demanded that on any 
issue one has to follow the pattern of ‘Kant said that’, ‘Imam Ali said that’, and 
‘Ferdowsi said that’ and be able to theoretically justify such a hybrid approach to 
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constructing a line of argument; otherwise the label of lakkategi (whoredom) and 
monstrosity was ready to be stuck by the puritans of all sides. Bazargan and Shariati 
were examples of such hybrid approach without being able to methodologically 
justify their adopted mode of reasoning. 
The socio-political concerns over reaching the promised lands of modernity as 
quickly and smoothly as possible overshadowed the philosophical ones. Few had the 
patience and tolerance for philosophical and theoretical contemplations. Non-
philosophical approach is the hallmark of outside-in model of change, which can 
work in one context of culture like Japan and not in another one like Iran, which has 
had a long tradition of philosophical thought (see Malkam Khan, 1891).  The poverty 
of philosophical thought both in the religious schools (see Dabashi 1993, Jafarian 
2007, Legenhausen, 2007:171, for the perils of teaching philosophy in religious 
seminaries) and in universities and intellectual circles was at the heart of violence of 
conversion of large segment of Mujahidin to Marxism (and later conflicts of all 
against all in the post-revolutionary era, and the reverse conversions of Marxists to 
the ideology of Islamic Republic in the Khomeini era; see Javadzadeh; 2011), which 
exacerbated the deep mistrust permeating the Iranian social space as Mohammadi 
Gorgani (2005) reports, where he was suspected of attempting to convert top clerics 
like Ayatollah Montazeri and Taleghani into Marxism in the guise of his apparent 
adherence to Islamic ideology and rituals.  
Bizarrely and ironically Khomeini’s political Islam managed to capture and convert, 
at least politically, significant sections of Marxist groups (see Javadzadeh; 2011) 
while a few years back Mujahidin-e Khalgh were captured by the Marxists. This 
demonstrates the multilateral truth wars between the Shah and the West with the 
Islamists and Marxists and liberals and Persianist nativists and how fast people could 
change sides in this truth war. Paradoxically, the Revolution led to total annihilation 
of the left, a bitter reality which was addressed by Alaolmolki (1987: 218):  
 
Why did the Iranian left cease to exist as a major political factor so soon after 
the revolution, given the role it played in its inception? There were two 
principal factors in the author's view. The first was the leftists' debilitating 
organizational factionalism and the alienation of the middle class leftist 
intellectual elite from its mass following. The second was an external factor-
the lack of both political and ideological cohesion on the part of Marxism-
Leninism as an international movement. As long as the Iranian left remained 
underground, the significance of these factors remained latent and unfelt. 
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With the advent of the revolution and the surfacing of the left, however, they 
became manifest. Paradoxically, the left seemed unable to survive the 
fulfilment of one of its chief wishes.  
 
Any new leftist group would soon divide into a number of mini groups in successive 
waves of divisions due to theoretical differences in their positions on various aspects 
of national and international issues and events.  
Akhavi (1983: 220) observes how the prevalence and depth of division amongst all 
social assemblages in the Iranian social order including the clergy had roots in 
philosophical and theoretical issues:  
The very high degree of factionalism exhibited by social actors in the Iranian 
revolution is complicated, furthermore, by the tendency of individuals to 
have differing orientations within a particular ("leftist," "moderate," or 
"rightist") perspective. Thus, on a variety of issues, including communal 
relations, due process, civil rights, constitutionalism, autocracy, corruption, 
and intraelite relations, a high level of conflict has been characteristic of the 
last five years.  
 
Harmon (2005: 67) follows where Akhavi has led:  
The mullahs disagreed on so many things that they left the average Iranian in 
a state of fear and confusion.  
 
Bashiriyeh (2009: 35-6) makes an observation along the same line:  
the clerical ruling elite differed over a number of important issues ranging 
from cultural and economic policies to how to interpret the laws of Islam. 
 
As these observations indicate each individual, whether a cleric or an intellectual or a 
poet or a monarchist or an ordinary citizen, is a unique hybrid of forces and voices; 
they all take different positions on any and every single issues facing the social 
order. The following passage is the self-description of an ordinary citizen, an 
educated professional, reported by Molavi (2002: 45, 49), who is the perfect example 
of a society of selves, Hedayat’s notion of lakkategi, and an explosive cocktail of 
various materials from alternative regimes of truth (what Iranians colloquially call 
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shotor-gav-palang or camel-cow-tiger, as the effect of bricolage and the act of 
improvisation):   
Mr. Ghassemi described himself succinctly, in short, declarative sentences: "I 
am a nationalist. I revere Mossadeq. I despise our clergy, but I have religious 
faith in a Sufi [mystical] way. Reza Shah, our greatest king, was right to 
attack our clergy. Ferdowsi is our greatest poet. He rescued our Iranian 
identity when the Arabs tried to swallow us." … "I admired Khomeini for his 
bravery in standing up to the Shah, but I didn't think the clergy should run 
our government." 
 
This causes the individuals, as unstable coalitions, to join a coalition for a while and 
leave it soon afterwards. This dynamism is starkly manifest in the figure of 
Khomeini himself, as alluded by Brumberg (2001: 98, added emphasis), when, in 
late 1983, he stated publicly that he was not above making mistakes and admitted the 
time-inconsistency of his positions and tried even to theorize it and make a virtue of 
the property of ‘one man, many voices’: “I may have said something yesterday, 
changed it today, and will again change it tomorrow”.   
Another example of the urgent need for philosophical and theoretical products is 
when the Shah ordered ideological and theoretical foundations of his Resurrection 
Party (Hezb-e Rastakhiz) of 1975 to be formulated based on the principle of 
dialectics. As Milani (2011a: 383) reminds us:  
The Shah, strangely, ordered the new party ideology to be based on 
“dialectics,” which opened the door for both lapsed Marxists and 
Heideggerian anti-Semites to legitimately leave their dialectical mark on the 
party.  
 
Here again the belated model of outside-in form of change and reverse social 
engineering alongside a logic of demand-supply was at work. Here the Shah ordered 
a philosophical product (like a ordering a jet to his American ally), and philosophical 
entrepreneurs of Marxists orientation were supposed to supply it. Rather than an 
evolutionary process of philosophical developments and exchanges flourishing into a 
manifesto for political party, the outside-in model of intelligent design was initiated 
from the need to import the ideas and institutions of political party to the country to 
attain both modern legitimacy and its effectiveness as a rational tool of governance; 
as such the Shah ordered its construction like the construction of a dam or a steel 
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mill and by the miracle of intelligent design it was supposed to be based on the 
principle of dialectics. The Shah’s desire for dialectics was not strange, contrary to 
what Milani (2001a: 383) says, as it was part of the intellectual fad at the time and 
Marxism had the ideological hegemony in the realm of culture and literature 
amongst the opposition forces even among the religious ones like Mujahedeen and 
more importantly Shariati. This was part of larger process of eclecticism (Hedayat’s 
lakkategi) inspired by the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness.  
This demonstrates that while Persianism had captured the political realm, Marxism 
had large influence in the cultural terrain (Mirsepasi, 2004: 230-1; Matin-Asgari. 
2004: 46). The Shah like all voices in the Iranian context of inbetweenness opted to 
construct an ad-hoc synthesis of the best of modernity, Islam and Persianism under 
the umbrella of master signifier of orthodox Persianism and monarchy. Amongst the 
best of others was socialism which was incorporated in his project of White 
Revolution and now he wanted to incorporate dialectics into the philosophical 
foundation of his new party to bestow it an aura of intellectual grandeur and 
respectability and to disarm the opposition from their prized intellectual tool, 
dialectics. Furthermore, dialectics as a methodology would fit the oppositional 
thinking of the Shah and his war of ‘good against evil’ against the red and black 
reactionaries. What was lacking was a logic of difference. 
This need for ideologues and theorists opened a demand for philosophical thinking 
of people like Fardid and also lapsed Marxists (Milani, 2011a: 382-3). This in turn 
demonstrates the deep and unassailable demand for viable and potent philosophical 
and theoretical thinking in Iran due to its state of belated inbetweenness and being 
immersed in the warring regimes of truth alongside its long history and tradition of 
philosophical thinking. The outside-in model of social change, and the urgency and 
impatience to transform the country alongside the need to import the best from the 
West which results from universalist mode of thinking inhibits the development of a 
viable philosophical community amongst Iranians, which could organically combine 
the languages of modernity, Islam and Persianism.  
The urgency of the state of belatedness prohibited Iranians from developing deep 
philosophical thinking in an evolutionary process of dialogue and exchange in the 
spontaneous market for philosophical and theoretical thinking on the big questions of 
life and existence from ontology to political philosophy, as they always had to 
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assemble something quickly to satisfy the needs of different political projects of 
reverse social engineering, which itself was innocently triggered by the state of 
belatedness. The urgency of the situation gives the quality of ad-hocness to the 
philosophical products and eradicates the role of vanishing mediators, which 
seriously harms their credibility and viability and as a result, they become perishable 
and disposable products; by the time they arrive at the market they are already out of 
fashion as better and newer products are available in the Western market of 
philosophy and theory. The breakdown in Shariati-Motahhari collaboration with 
violent ramifications is another example of the need for philosophical theorization, 
the detailed analysis of which was excluded from this thesis due to word limitations.   
In an attempt of providing more substance, the fate of different coalitions were 
extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word limitations; the 
excluded section was the extensive study of the logic of coalition formation in the 
context of a series of strong and weak events leading to the generation and 
degeneration of different species of coalitions which spontaneously emerged in the 
landscape of Iranian social order.  As the Islamic revolution was the outcome of the 
clash between the Shah’s coalition and the Khomeini’s coalition, their features and 
properties were extensively explored but excluded from this work due to word 
limitations; the excluded section also addressed the Shah’s coalition with the clergy, 
the intelligentsia, the people and the West in details alongside pondering on the 
properties of the Shah’s selfhood as an unstable coalition. The excluded section 
further explored the Khomeini’s coalition with the clergy and the intellectuals like 
Bazargan and Shariati and the left.  
6.4. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
In this section we explore how tragedy of confusion and formation of unstable 
coalitions lead to institutional failure, failure in building viable and functional 
institutions, which could bestow predictability to the social transactions in the realms 
of life, work, and language. The process of institutional building was frequently 
aborted, reversed, halted or informally ignored. This section focuses on how the 
attempts to build viable institutions in different realms of life, work, and language 
ends up in failure due to the confusions and contradictions arising from the 
particularities of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness. We start with examining the 
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institution of nationhood and then move briefly to the institution of state and leave 
the rest of institutions out of this work due to word limitations.  
 
6.4.1. The Formation of the Sense and Institution of Nationhood 
With the Islamic Revolution, the project of Islamization of all walks of life including 
the narratives and institutional arrangements associated with nationhood took 
precedence over two other enveloping projects of modernization and Persianization. 
Once again, the sense of nationhood became the battleground for alternative regimes 
of truth and their corresponding hybrid voices; different voices desired to build the 
new house of being based on different composition of resources from the three 
regimes of truth with different priorities and different architecture and different 
appellation. In the Khomeini coalition, the sense of nationhood needed to be rebuilt 
based on Islam, modernity and Persianism, in that order. As such the Khomeini’s 
project of nationalism was a form of Islamic nationalism in contradistinction to 
Persianist nationalism of the Shah and his father and the modernist nationalism of 
the constitutionalists, Mosaddegh and Bazargan (for the notion of Islamic 
nationalism, see Martin, 2013: 6, 27; Fazeli, 2006: 14, 167).  
It is worth noting that Khomeini’s coalition did not challenge the legitimacy of 
modernity’s project of nationhood per se, instead it opted to subsume it under the 
project of Islamic universalism, entailing the ultimate formation of a unified Islamic 
ummah. This is evident in the following excerpt from one of Khomeini’s speeches, 
as reported in Algar (1981: 302):  
“To love one’s fatherland and its people and to protect its frontiers are both 
quite unobjectionable, but nationalism, involving hostility to other Muslim 
nations, is something quite different” and contrary to the Qur’an and 
Muhammad’s teachings. 
 
In this sense, the formation of the Iranian Shia nation in the short-run was a stepping 
stone towards the eventual formation of larger Islamic ummah in the long-run. As 
such, for Khomeini Islamic nationalism would not necessarily come into conflict 
with Islamic internationalism (see Sheikh, 2003: 60-1), although their relations have 
remained largely unarticulated and poorly theorized. The issue revolved around how 
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to coordinate the national interests with the interests of global Islamic ummah and 
the rights and obligations of being part of global international order, dominated by 
modernity.  
At the civilizational level (international order), the new order had to act within the 
limits of a nation-state while at the cultural level it needed to act globally in support 
of the oppressed of the world, the Muslim ummah, and the Shia community. These 
contrasting levels of affiliations frequently came into conflict with each other and it 
was not clear at what context what aspect needed to be prioritized over what for what 
reason. The issues of Rushdie affair and support for Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraqi 
Shia are examples of acting within global Muslim and Shia communities which 
came into direct conflict with what was perceived to be the national interests. As 
such, the conflict can arise at the international, Muslim, Shia and national levels. But 
such apparent conflicts were deemed by the Khomeini coalition to be based on 
parochial modern pursuit of materialist national interests, while in the long run the 
Islamic internationalism could be harmonized with the Islamic nationalism (note that 
even modern nation-states sometimes sacrifice their narrow national interests for the 
preservation of modern international order, like entering the coalition of the willing, 
which is deemed to be in line with their national interests in the long-run).  
This becomes even more complex as at the national level what perceived to be the 
interests of the system (nezam), revolution (enghelab), the leadership (rahbari), the 
clergy, and various institutions do not easily coincide with the interests of the nation 
as a whole. This becomes even more hyper-complex when we factor in the fact that 
how the national interests are defined and prioritized based on economic, political or 
cultural measures (the defence of faith, welfare or independence of the nation) is 
perpetually contested and differs at time 2 depending on what the priority had been 
in time 1. This entanglement of issues is further exacerbated by noting the fact that 
the notion of ‘interest’ itself is heavily contested and is contrasted with the notion of 
‘service’ (like in famous Beheshti’s statement with regard to being the devotees of 
service).   
As such, whatever is done by whoever in the realm of national interest is severely 
contested and de-legitimized, leading to a dysfunctional institution of nationhood. 
Making a coherent and consensual doctrine of national security and national interest 
out of such an explosive cocktail of truth materials and resources is a monumental 
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task requiring long-term investment in philosophical and theoretical capital, which 
can be owned by the nation through a process of national and international dialogue. 
The big Others of national and international variety has to bestow ‘recognition’ to 
such a hybrid national entity. 
To see how daunting the task is, we explore a few facts. Islamic universalism, for 
example in the form of commitment to fight against global arrogance and support for 
the dispossessed of the world is enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic 
(Reda, 2014: 135; Buchta, 2001: 335), which counters the modernity’s universalism, 
demonstrating that both have their own projects of nationalism. While modernity has 
formed its own nation-states working within larger modern ummah (modern 
international order at large and so-called free world at smaller scale), Islam could 
develop an aspiration to form its own Islamic nations working within a larger Islamic 
ummah as a cultural and civilizational bloc. Both modernity and Islam share the 
sense of being exceptional (exceptionalim) and are strikingly similar in their desire 
to convert others to their brand of truth (expansionsm) (Vucetic, 2011: 30). The 
Persianist model shares the property of exceptionalism (seeing the pre-Islamic Persia 
as an exceptional form of civilization and culture) but lacked the proselytizing 
feature of expansionism (although there were traces of it in the ideology of Aryan 
race, attempting to create family affiliations between Persian civilization and the 
European one). As such it is important to avoid the common mistake frequently 
committed by almost all analysts in the form of contrasting Islam with nationalism, 
as Islam possesses its own brand of nationalism as well as its own brand of 
internationalism (this applies equally to modernity and Persianism).   
In the project of Islamic nationalism, Shia Islam was nominated as the main 
ingredient from which the sense of nationhood needed to be rebuilt; modernity (in 
the will to modernization as manifested in the selective adoption of elements such as 
constitutional arrangements, election mechanism, techno-scientific rationality, etc.) 
was also used under the umbrella of Islam to construct a viable sense of nationhood. 
In addition, Persianism was either reluctantly embraced or largely suppressed or used 
strategically in certain contexts to enhance the viability and acceptability of the other 
two main ingredients. For Khomeini, the affiliation to the pre-Islamic Iran or a 
secular Iran was largely a sign of return to the age of paganism and ignorance 
(Rubin, 2002: 118; Taheri, 2010: 54-6), and for him the salient character of Iranian 
people was their unconditional love and affection for Shia Islam, as manifested in 
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their passionate affiliations to the rituals of Ashura and Ramadan, among others. As 
such, for him, the Shia-based Islamic names, narratives, symbols, holidays, rituals 
and other forms of discursive and non-discursive practices were bound to form the 
main materials upon which the Iranian national identity were meant to be 
institutionalized. The selective components of modernity and Persian regimes of 
truth were absorbed into the mix, guided by the need to strengthen and decorate the 
basic Islamic architecture of the Iranian nationhood. 
In the project of Islamic nationalism, the Iranian people were praised only as far as 
they showed their good taste by unconditional embracement of (Shia) Islam and by 
prioritizing it over everything else. “The President has to travel in the path of Islam; 
if he opts to move against Islam and the whole nation support him”, Khomeini in 
1981 declared (Gharaviyan, 2012), “I would single-handedly stand up to them” (see 
also Banisadr, 1981). In Khomeini’s voice, the unconditional prioritization of will to 
modernization was the sign of selection of paganism and ignorance, equivalent to 
Sen’s (1982) notion of “rational fools”, over the eternal happiness promised by the 
Islamic faith. The revolutionary slogan of ‘neither the East nor the West’ (na sharghi 
na gharbi) summarized the policy of non-reliance on any form of modernity-whether 
communism or capitalism- as the main overriding component of the project of 
‘nationalizing Iran’.  
The issue of the coordination between general and local preference structure 
becomes a matter of dispute and strife within all forms of nationalization. In 
Khomeini’s project of nationalizing Iran, Persianist components are sacrificed for the 
modern and the modern components are sacrificed for the Islamic ones when the 
survival of the whole system is at stake. When such threat is not pressing, the order 
of preference can be revered locally and modern or Persianist components can be 
temporarily given precedence over the Islamic ones. The guiding principle in the 
project of Islamization is, hence, the dominance of Islam in the definition of 
nationhood; elements of modernity and Persianism could be synchronized with Islam 
and assimilated under its linguistic and non-linguistic integrity and appellation as 
much possible, and when conflicts arise the elements perceived to be in opposition to 
the content and form of Islam are discarded and suppressed.  
The clear example is hijab (veiling) which spontaneously emerged as the sign of 
Islamic Revolution in the latter stages of the Shah’s reign and was formally 
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reinforced as the flag of new sense of nationhood after the victory of the revolution 
(Sedghi, 2007; Paidar, 1995). The economic and social participation of those 
national and international voices openly objecting Islamic veiling was sacrificed for 
the preservation of this salient feature of Islamic character of the nation. In this, 
veiling, effectively, emerged as the emblem of the nation. For the Khomeini’s 
coalition the legalized use of veiling in public space (the institution of veiling), like 
wearing ring in a marriage, served as a “commitment device” (Frank, 2001: 57; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 177) and was the sign that Iran was permanently 
wedded to Islam in rejection of other possible suitors; it was a public sign, which 
differentiated Iran as a nation in the family of nations from any other nation on the 
face of the earth.  
It can therefore be argued that veiling effectively served as the national flag in the 
post-revolutionary era (Sedghi, 2007: 210). As a result of the Islamisation project, 
large sacrifices were made in terms of lost economic growth due to lack of foreign 
direct investment, inflow of capital, and brain drain and capital flight of Iranians who 
were objecting to, among others, the forced public veiling law (Amid and 
Hadjikhani, 2005: 89, 188; Carrington and Detragiache, 1998). As Gordon et al. 
(2008: 162) maintain “The fact that Iran also experiences a significant brain drain of 
educated professionals is both a symptom and cause of the nation's difficulties”. 
Here we see how the Foucauldian relation between the production of truth and the 
production of wealth works; the failure in the production of consensual ‘truth about’ 
veiling (and its hyper-complex relation to sexuality, femininity and masculinity, 
nationhood and their relations to the Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and 
earth), among others, was directly translated into the failure in the production of 
wealth through brain drain and other mechanisms.  
For the project of Islamic nationalism this sacrifice was worthwhile in order to 
preserve the Islamic identity of the nation. Legalizing veiling was an act of defiance 
towards the decadence of the big Other of the Western modernity with its over-
sexualisation of public life and its celebration of impermanence of the body (Crooke, 
2009). Resistance towards veiling (Afary, 2009) was an act of defiance (Khosravi, 
2008) against the big Other of the Islamic order with its over-spiritualization of 
public life and celebration of the permanence of the soul through its jurisprudential 
formalism. One was resisting the panoptical gaze of the West and the other 
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‘panoptical gaze of the ayatollah and his authoritarian God’ (Afary, 2009: 268). 
There were multiple levels of multilateral misunderstanding at work here. 
The emergence of veiling as the flag of Islamic nationalism in the Khomeini’s 
project of nationalizing Iran is the mirror image of the emergence of unveiling as the 
flag of Persianist nationalism in the Pahlavi’ project of nationalization (Najmabadi, 
2005: 150). The imposition of veiling led to the guerrilla war between women and 
the morality police and the emergence of the phenomenon of bad veiling or mal-
veiling (bad-hejabi) (Sedghi, 2007: 211; Kusha, 2002: 249-50; Moaveni, 2005), 
leading to the emergence of the dysfunctional institution of veiling, which can be 
treated as a symbol of all forms of dysfunctionalities and deformities resulting from 
the act of reverse social engineering. As a result, the zombies of Westernization and 
Persianization have returned through “politics of resistance” (Holliday, 2011: 155) to 
haunt the Islamic Republic the way the zombie of Islamism had returned to haunt the 
Shah’s Persianist order (Crooke, 2009). As both veiling and unveiling were the 
outcome of reverse social engineering lacking adequate and irreversible level of 
legitimacy and consensus, their corresponding institutionalized forms of Islamic and 
Persianist nationalism were plagued by debilitating forms of deformities and 
dysfunctionalities.    
However, within the framework of Islamic nationalism, when the Islamic dimension 
is not ‘under siege’, some elements of Persianism or modernity may be given local 
precedence over the Islamic ones; some concessions can be made and/or the system 
can turn a blind eye towards them. This is evident in the example presented by 
Molavi (2002: 50), where in 1992  
He [President Rafsanjani] invited scholars from around the world to discuss 
the poet [Ferdowsi] and praised Ferdowsi's work lavishly himself. A shrewd 
move, it said; "Look, people of Iran, we clergy also love Ferdowsi."  
 
This kind of local concession, however, is very unstable, as the incorporation of 
Ferdowsi and his Shahnameh as ‘the Quran of Persianism’ is a monumental 
theoretical task, far beyond the capability of a pragmatic figure like Rafsanjani or 
anyone else in the system. As a result, such pragmatic movements are vehemently 
attacked by radicals of all sides as signs of illegitimate forms of syncretism or 
eclecticism (elteqat) (Naficy, 1993: 18-24. 127), reminiscent of Hedayat’s lakkategi. 
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Such promiscuous movements have the features of one-night stand or at best 
temporary marriage (sigheh) rather than permanent marriage of love and mutual 
commitment. Lacking adequate theoretical foundations, the credibility of such 
movements is fiercely challenged by radicals of all sides. This leads to zigzag 
movements in the cultural policy of all sides of the truth divide (see Fazeli, 2006). 
Due to being the outcome of reverse social engineering, such policies and positions 
are reversed and aborted under the immense pressure from the radicals (or 
pragmatists) of all sides. As such, any form of hybridity was accused of not being a 
‘true’ Muslim, a ‘true’ modern, or a ‘true’ Persianist. Consequently no policies, 
whether in favour or against the three Qurans of the Iranian dasein, become stable.   
One of the prominent examples of Khomeini giving the modern and Persianist sides 
of the equation prominence over the Islamic side is in the case of Jalaladdin Farsi 
(Moin, 1999: 233) who was selected to be the candidate of the Islamic Republican 
Party (IRP) against Banisadr in the first post-revolutionary presidential election.  It 
was reported to Khomeini that Farsi’s father was born in Afghanistan. Abrahamian 
(1993: 15) refers to this episode in the following terms:  
He increasingly spoke of the Iranian fatherland, the Iranian nation, the 
Iranian patriot, and the honorable people of Iran. He even disqualified one of 
his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential elections on the 
grounds that his father had been born in Afghanistan. The nationalistic 
language, together with the use of exclusively Shiite symbols and imagery, 
helps explain why the Khomeinists have had limited success in exporting 
their revolution.  
 
As a result, Khomeini vetoed Farsi’ nomination because of his questionable 
nationality; this deprived IRP from a strong candidate (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011) 
and changed the history of the Islamic Republic in a drastic fashion. In this case, 
Khomeini opted to give precedence to the modern and Persianist dimension over the 
Islamic dimension (Farsi’s father was part of Islamic international community).  
In the writing of the new constitution, the same debate on the conditions required for 
presidency was reported in Montazeri’s memoire (Montazeri, 2001: 454). Khomeini 
deemed granting such concession to the modern and Persianist dimensions not to be 
detrimental to the survival of the Islamic nature of the whole system and as such he 
allowed the local dominance of the other two dimensions over the Islamic one. But 
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in hindsight, this choice had a butterfly effect on the fate of the system, as the 
collision between IRP and Banisadr plunged the Islamic Republic into its first huge 
internal conflict just two years after its birth. Before vetoing Farsi’s candidacy 
Khomeini had vetoed Ayatollah Beheshti’s candidacy due to him being a cleric and 
Khomeini, at that stage, not wanting for the executive posts to be occupied by the 
clergy (Banisadr, 1981: 255; Brumberg, 1997: 50; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011). It was 
likely that had Farsi’s candidacy been approved by Khomeini overriding the terms of 
constitution on the requirement for the president to be native citizen of Iran, using 
his power of issuing fatwa, the IRP machine would have worked for Farsi to be 
elected rather than Banisadr and the Islamic Republic would have been likely to 
avoid having its first devastating crisis, namely, the impeachment of its first 
president, Banisadr (Ehteshami, 1995: 12; Mohajerinejad, 2010: 123).  
The issue of synchronization between general and local preferences creates a great 
deal of tension and conflict within the Islamization project as different faces are 
invested with and inhabited by different hybrid voices with various threshold of 
sensibility for Islam, modernity, and Persianism. As a result, different voices 
undermine the dominant voice and attempt to capture the centre and reverse the 
policy or enhance it, which itself provokes new rounds of opposition and new 
sources of instability. Ultimately no stable sense of nationhood can emerge out of 
this process where the three identity markers of Islam, modernity, and Persianism 
can be peacefully and irreversibly synchronized. The zigzagging between alternative 
identity markers became evident, for instance, in Khomeini’s use of his Iranian 
national passport to enter France with a tourist visa where no Islamic country would 
accept him as an Islamic religious leader when he was expelled from the Saddam 
Hossein’s Iraq at the request of the Shah. After the revolution, Khomeini’s coalition 
insisted on his identity as a religious leader of Shia and Islamic international 
community when they invited the Iraqi Shia people to rebel against the Saddam’s 
regime, ignoring his identity as the formal leader of the post-revolutionary nation 
(Pollack, 2004: 184). In a sense, the ambiguity and confusion over Islamic 
nationalism and Islamic internationalism or pan-Islamism and how they interacted 
with other forms of nationalism and internationalism was one of the conditions of 
possibility of the Iran-Iraq war. 
Montazeri (2006) perceives as one of his own mistakes not to have taken the idea of 
sending political envoys to different countries to assure them of Iran’s non-
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threatening stance towards the international order and towards the individual 
countries, while at the same time Khomeini had given precedence to his Islamic 
identity as the Marja for the Shia and Muslims of the world over his identity as the 
leader of Iranian nation in the family of nations. The two regimes of truth required 
two different sets of discursive and non-discursive practices; while Khomeini wanted 
to prioritize his Islamic dimension over his Iranian dimension, Montazari, although 
not simultaneously but later on, favoured to act upon the notion of national interest 
(although Banisadr (1981) simultaneously favoured the policy of promoting détente 
with the Iraqi regime) and work within the limits of Islamic nationalism. The 
conflicts and ambiguities between the three dimension of Khomeini’s character and 
his prioritization of the Islamic dimension over the modern and Persianist 
dimensions was ultimately one of the contributing factor in the Saddam Hossein’s 
decision to attack Iran and the 8-year war between the two Muslim and largely Shia 
nations (Montazeri, 2001: 438 vol. 1).   
Another example of such tension disrupting the détente policy with Europe was the 
case of Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie (Malik, 2009), which led to the 
withdrawal of European ambassadors from the country, exacerbating the reputation 
of Iran as a pariah state in the international order (Taheri, 2010: 229), which had 
already been triggered by the hostage crisis. The constant tension over how to define 
the relation with Israel (Parsi, 2008) is another manifestation of the tensions and 
conflicts among the three projects of nationalizing Iran, with distinct and contrasting 
conceptions of national interests and classification of friends and foes.  
As such, the issue of how the two notions of affiliation to international Shia and 
Islamic community
42
 and commitment to the national interest of a modern nation can 
be reconciled was a matter of constant tension and a source of destabilization in the 
establishment of a stable institutionalized conception of nationhood (see Farhi, 2007; 
Ahmadi, 2007, among others). The issue revolves around how to synchronize the 
requirements of formal politics of modern nationhood organized in the family of 
nations inside the international order with its associated systems of rights and 
obligation with the street politics of affiliation with the Shia and Islamic 
                                                          
42
 There is a potential tension between Shia and Islamic dimensions as well as Shia and Sunni 
divisions may come to conflict with each other, which Khomeini’s coalition strived to curb through 
their doctrine of Shia-Sunni unity which was pursued both at jurisprudential level by viewing Shia as 
another school at the same level of the four other jurisprudential schools in the Sunni denomination 
and at political level; see Jafarian, 2007. 
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international community, and even wider global community of the dispossessed 
(Emadi, 2001).  
Ironically, the label adopted for the new post-revolutionary order fully depicts the 
destabilizing tension between alternative identity markers and how such a tension 
prevents the institutionalization of the notion of nationhood. The new label is 
‘Islamic Republic of Iran’. Taheri (2010: 76) calls it a “strange beast” and “a triple 
lie on a grand scale”, which is, once again, reminiscent of Hedayat’s notion of 
lakkategi, equivalent to a form of illegitimate monstrosity. The three notions of 
Islamic, Republic and Iran were put together in an apparently unified whole at the 
level of appellation and imaginary order. The notion of ‘Islamic’ refers to the Islamic 
dimension of Iranian embeddedness which immediately brings the whole Islamic 
regime of truth with its affirmative and negating dimension in the equation. The 
notion of ‘Republic’ refers to the modern dimension of Iranian embeddedness with 
its own discursive and non-discursive practices while the label ‘Iran’ refers to the 
Persianist and pre-Islamic dimension of Iranian identity with its association with the 
‘Aryan race’ and its orthodox and non-orthodox regimes of truth in Persian 
monarchy and its “tradition of prudent statecraft that has been created by centuries of 
experience in international affairs beginning with Cyrus the Great more than 2,000 
years ago” (Ramazani, 2009: 13) and its Persian language and Persian poetry.  
As Holliday (2011: 155) attests “the idea of the Islamic Republic itself is contested. 
This has been evident since the establishment of the Islamic Republic”. The 
lexicographic ordering is organized in terms of Islam, modernity and Persianism 
(creating the possibility of six forms of permutations, amounting to many more when 
the internal divisions between orthodox and non-orthodox and other forms of 
difference within and between truth camps come into play). The monumental task of 
synchronizing these three regimes of truth with the significant phenomena of 
‘difference within’ and ‘difference between’ these identity markers causes frequent 
derailment of the project of institutionalization of any construction of the sense of 
nationhood. The deep tension between these different regimes of truth manifested 
themselves in the adoption of national flag, national anthem, national calendar 
(Moaddel, 1993: 63), personal appearance (Molavi, 2002: 87), street names (Taheri, 
2010: 67) and the selection of national holidays and the selection of names for the 
new-borns (Abrahamian, 2008). This also reflected in the language policy on how to 
prioritize the relation between three languages of Farsi (Persian), Arabic, and 
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English (Taheri, 2010: 66-7; also see Borjian, 2013; Karimi-Hakkak, 2012, 1989; for 
a history of struggle over language in the pre-modern Iran see Azarnoosh, 2006).   
Each one of these symbols of modern nationality has been the site of immense level 
of hostility between and within truth camps, leading to revolutionary steps of 
reversal and abortion of any attempts made for institutionalization of the sense of 
nationhood under these symbols. This is due to the fact that no particular adoption of 
these particular symbols of modern nationhood gains irreversible popularity at a 
consensual level; any adoption is immediately attacked and the grinding process of 
de-legitimization is initiated and the process of ‘death by a thousand cuts’ and ‘war 
of attrition’ (namadmali) starts. This is due to the state of belatedness, which 
prompts the search for quick solutions for pressing issues of social order. The case of 
adopting a national calendar is a perfect example demonstrating the dilemmas and 
paradoxes of synchronization of different regimes of truth in a viable and stable 
institution.  
In the pre-revolutionary era, the Shah became so confident on the stability and 
viability of his particular model of nationhood that he embarked on changing the 
national calendar from the solar-based Islamic one (already experienced a change 
from lunar-based Islamic one by Reza Shah, his father) to a monarchy-based 
calendar which immediately outraged the Islamic sensibility of the clergy and 
different layers of Iranian society. Abrahamian (2008: 152) points to the Shah’s 
attempts to further enhance the materialization of his vision of Iran, while  
… denouncing the clergy as “black medieval reactionaries”; and, in declaring 
Iran to be on the road to the Great Civilization, supplemented the Muslim 
calendar, including Reza Shah’s solar model, with a new imperial calendar 
which allocated 2,500 years for the presumed length of the Iranian monarchy 
and another 35 years for Muhammad Reza Shah. Thus Iran jumped overnight 
from the Muslim year 1355 to the imperial year 2535.  
 
The direction and orientation of the change demonstrates the nature of the Shah’s 
project of nationalization. It is important to pay attention to what he did not do 
alongside what he did do. He did not change the calendar to the modern Western 
calendar; if his project was predominantly a modernization project he would have 
changed it to the modern calendar like Turkey and many other Muslim countries like 
Malaysia and with that change he would have sent the message of ‘we are open for 
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business’ and we are prioritizing synchronization with the tune of modernity and the 
West over all other concerns. Instead he opted to change the calendar to the imperial 
one to reaffirm his allegiance to Persianism over modernity and in direct opposition 
to Islam at his time of high self-confidence.  
This demonstrates that his project of reverse social engineering was Persianization 
and not modernization; modernization was made subservient to the Persianization 
project. His model of Great Civilization was not predominantly a Western one but a 
pre-Islamic one where the loyalty to the king and the regime of truth of Persian 
kingship acts as a unifying factor for the whole social order (Moaddel, 1993: 61).  
The calendar attains immense prominence for the Iranian dasein as it signifies the 
qualitative periodization of time; time is defined in terms of before and after a 
significant event acting as a turning point in the life of the nation. Calendars imply 
the non-linear shift in the meaning and significance of time, enshrined in the 
collective memory and collective emotional economy and affective investment. As 
such, the institution of calendar (with three options of Western calendar, Islamic 
calendar and Persian calendar with their internal and external permutations) 
(Moaddel, 1993: 63) faces significant level of deformities and dysfunctionalities 
(just like the institution of veiling) due to being torn between alternative regimes of 
truth and their associated affirmative and negating facets, their dark and white books, 
and their politics of ordinary and politics of piety. In 1978 Khomeini, as reported in 
Riesebrodt (1998: 129; see also Rosenberg, 2011), stressed on the significance of the 
institution of calendar in the following terms:  
He [the Shah] is against the Islamic calendar. To be against the Islamic 
calendar is to be against Islam itself; in fact the worst thing that this man has 
done during his reign is to change the calendar.  
 
The adoption of migration of Prophet Mohammad as the base of Islamic calendar 
attunes the nation with the eternal time of emancipative rationality, liberating them 
from the terror of death, while Persianist calendar puts the nation in contact with its 
imagined birth in the pre-Islamic era of great kings and grand empires and 
magnanimous civilizations in accordance with the communicative rationality, 
liberating Iranian dasein from the despotism of chaos and anarchy, while the 
adoption of Western calendar signifies the participation in the global economy and in 
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the festival of wealth creation in line with instrumental rationality, liberating Iranian 
dasein from the despotism of nature. One example of intense investment in the 
nature of calendar is the case of Ayatollah Monatzeri (2001: 421, vol 1) in his 
encounter with Heykal, the famous Egyptian journalist. In a conversation with 
Heykald during Heykal’s visit of Khomeini in Paris in 1978, Monatzeri condemned 
some Arab countries for their adoption of Christian calendar and Sundays as 
weekends and strongly recommended the adoption of Islamic calendar, and the 
revival of Islamic history and the adoption of Fridays as weekends.  
In these diverse narratives of foundational myth, the adoption of each calendar has 
its own set of denotations and connotations, which makes the creation of balance and 
synchronization between the three forms of rationalities a hard task to achieve due to 
their being packaged in three distinctive regime of truth with distinct discursive and 
non-discursive practices and distinctive appellations. Once again we see the 
Chakrabarty’s (2000) timeknot at work in this period of the Iranian modern history. 
The issue is how to override and overcome the default position of 
incommensurabilities associated with alternative regimes of truth with de facto 
incompatible linguistic and non-linguistic traditions. The tragedy of confusion with 
regard to the three regimes of truth leads to tragedy of successive experience of 
failures in the rival projects of institutionalization of ‘nationalizing Iran’.  
6.4.2 The Formation of State 
Now we briefly attend to the formation of state as a dysfunctional and deformed 
institution. The formation of modern state was another pre-requisite of formation of 
a modern nation; modern nations cannot exist but as a compound entity of nation-
state; effectively in the modern formation of social order in the community of 
nations the state acts as the nation’s consciousness. Without a functional 
consciousness, the nation-state is dubbed as a failed state, equivalent to being 
psychotic at an individual level.  
Yet again we encounter with at least three large projects of formation of modern 
state in the form of modernist state, Persianist state and Islamic state, with many 
shades of grey in-between. Here we briefly explore the Shah’s and Khomeini’s 
models of formation of modern state.  
6.4.2.1. The Shah’s Persianist State 
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The centrepiece of the formation of the project of the Persianist state in this period 
was the Shah’ White Revolution, offering a social contract to the Iranian people 
entailing a transaction involving the exchange of obedience to the Shah for material 
well-being. This social contract was supposed to rescue the Shah’s reign from being 
‘under constant siege’ from inside and outside enemies by mobilizing people’s 
unshakable support for the Shah. The whole package was an attempt to co-opt 
socialism (Milani, 2011a: 313; Moaddel, 1993: 63) and act as a firewall against the 
threat of communism and ‘red reactionaries’ and make all of them irrelevant through 
its wings of land reform policy, women rights policy, and workers’ rights policy 
(Milani, 2011a: 292). This was a transaction exchanging security and prosperity. 
People produce security for the Shah and his kingdom by demonstrating 
unconditional obedience and the Shah produces prosperity for his people (see Tizro, 
2011 on a version of such a contract in Islamic marriage) through forming alliances 
with almost all the stakeholders.   
The Shah wanted to insure his system against the threat and risk of collapse by 
giving each and every class of people from the peasants, to women and workers, to 
professional middle classes a stake in the new Persianized order (Garthwaite, 2005: 
248-9). His policies of expansion of secular and Persianized education, health, 
industry and commerce, arts, sports and entertainment alongside attempts to 
“nationalize religion” (Liu, 2000: 124), in effect, sanitizing the religion and allowing 
the expansion of religious organizations and activities (Mirsepasi, 2004: 233), were 
meant to make political Islam and ‘black reactionaries’ obsolete. This program, 
which was increasingly funded by oil as its main economic wing, was complemented 
by expansion and modernization of bureaucracy and the security apparatus (legal 
system, army, police, and intelligent service) and by establishing strategic alliance 
with the West with the leadership of America. This foreign alliance was increasingly 
and gradually expanded to the Soviet bloc as well in a foreign policy based on the 
principle of positive balance (movazeneh-ye mosbat). These were rhizomatic 
movements to incorporate the selective elements of all the three regimes of truth to 
achieve his project of Persianization of the state.  
As such, when the demand for truth has the property of hybridity matching the 
requirements of the state of belated inbetweenness the supply of truth is bound to 
have the same feature. The White Revolution ultimately led to its logical conclusion 
in the form of the emergence of Rastakhiz Party, despite the Shah originally being 
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vehemently against one-party system (Milani, 2011a: 381-2), to optimize the 
functioning of the Shah’s corporate state in the spirit of centrally planned systems of 
the communist camp with their economic successes, which the Shah increasingly 
came to admire at the time (Milani, 2011a: 224).  
As such, all components of a functional and dynamical adaptive system seem to be 
in place to take the Shah and his people to the promised land of “great civilization” 
by intelligent design and reverse social engineering. Alas, the problem was that all of 
these programs and policies were introduced abruptly without going through an 
evolutionary process of building capacity and consensus, leading to the development 
of the sense of ownership (there were no time and capacity to attempt to create the 
widest possible consensus amongst various elites and their corresponding ordinary 
followers) by the people and its diverse elites alongside the fact that they were 
labelled under the appellation of orthodox Persianism (Persian monarchy) and as 
such lacked comprehensive form of tri-polar credibility and legitimacy. As Mialni 
(2011a: 379) reports “The Shah insisted that the principles of “his revolution” could 
not be subjected to criticism”.  
The exchange of letters between the Shah and Khomeini (Milani, 2011a: 291-2) over 
a piece of legislation on election bylaws before the announcement of the Shah’s 
“White Revolution” was one of the rare lost opportunities for building an irreversible 
dynamical consensus behind a viable plan with slower pace for change, which could 
have a better chance of not suffering from abortion and miscarriage or multiple 
forms of dysfunctionalities and deformities. Some traces of alternative approach of 
dialogue-based process of conception and execution of projects for social 
transformation can be seen in the Shah’s regime, which was abandoned before they 
were fully born. As Milani (2011a: 312) reports, the trace of an alternative approach 
can be seen in Pakravan’s, the Savak’s chief, position, involving “negotiating with 
some of the regime’s stalwart enemies”; Bijan Jazani, the celebrated Marxist 
dissident, “told one of his trusted comrades: “This guy is really different and wants 
to create a dialogue.”  
Alas, the condition of possibility of such dialogue was not available as in the state of 
belated inbetweenness with warring regimes of truth and the urgent race to save the 
nation from the plague of backwardness it was impossible to build “legitimate loyal 
opposition” (Milani; 2011a: 379) or construct an order based on “unity without 
360 
 
uniformity” (Zibakalam, 2008: 228). The condition of possibility of mutual criticism 
and constructive engagement was absent.  
As such, the lack of tri-polar form of credibility and legitimacy for the Shah’s grand 
project was not because of its components but because of the abruptness of their 
introduction to the society (it was not ‘our’ project), and their quilting point and their 
master signifier.  The Shah and his coalition could not theoretically and 
philosophically justify his brand of socialist monarchy, or Islamic monarchy 
(saltanat-e Islami), all mixed in a cocktail containing alliance with the capitalist 
West and imperialist America. Any rhizomatic movement requires adequate level of 
symbolization and harmonization through an evolutionary process of chaotic 
synchronization to be able to be presentable as a legitimate package of truth. 
Rhizomatic, eclectic, and hybrid combinations can live at the unconscious level of 
the popular culture (see Naficy, 1993: 22; Willis et al., 1990) but for inhabiting the 
conscious space of public policy, for example, they need theoretical sublimation. 
That is why the Shah, seemingly bizarrely, asked for his Rastakhiz Party to be 
theoretically founded on dialectics.  
These sets of strategic discursive and non-discursive practices with their three wings 
of Persianized Persianization, Persianized modernization, and Persianized 
Islamization were deployed in the service of perpetuating the dominance of orthodox 
Persianism, which was deemed to lack genuine commitment to Islam or modernity 
and/or even to non-orthodox Persianism (Persian poetry and Persian house of 
wisdom), and as such was plagued from its inception by lack of (or at least 
questionable) legitimacy almost from all sides of the truth spectrum.  
As Milani (2011a: 293) reports: “Ironically, the Iranian opposition, even amongst the 
feminists, also never supported those reforms, dismissing them as “cosmetic” and 
superficial”. This was despite the fact that the White Revolution, according to the 
British Embassy, was “one of the most revolutionary measures in 3000[-year] 
history of Iran” (Milani, 2011a: 292). Investigating why even the secular opposition, 
let alone the clergy, did not support the Shah’s top-down revolution, despite 
Montazeri’s (2001: 207: vol 1) acknowledgement that it had some level of attraction 
for the intelligentsia, takes us to the deepest level of why the Shah’s project of 
Persianized modernization was aborted so abruptly and unexpectedly by the Islamic 
Revolution (see also Sahabi, 2007: 249-50).  
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From the Islamic angle the Shah’s project of formation of state was under siege due 
to its lack of commitment to the name and laws of Islam and its alliances with the 
enemies of the Muslims (like America and Israel)- the phenomenon of “alliance 
curse” (Root, 2008: 129)- and its support for (or indifference towards) social 
freedom and expansion of social vices (such as the prevalence of riba in the banking 
system, the widespread presence of the infidel Westerners in the security system, or 
in the economic system as investors or tourists (Brumberg, 1997: 37) intent on 
undermining the Islamic way of life and spreading Western life style leading 
ultimately to the imposition of their faith in Christianity or their faithlessness; 
unveiling, prostitution, gambling, drinking alcohol, free love, and display of nudity 
in art, cinema, and literature, and breaking the taboos of respect for Islamic saintly 
and infallible figures and Islamic texts, excessive consumerism and materialism, 
amongst others).  
From the perspective of non-orthodox modernity (socialism/communism and even 
feminism), it lacked legitimacy due to lack of genuine commitment to social justice 
and classless society in name and in content, rampant levels of corruption and 
inequality alongside its strategic alliance with the capitalist and imperialist camp. 
From perspective of the orthodox modernity (liberal democracy), despite being a 
loyal ally of the West, it lacked adequate level of legitimacy due to its lack of 
commitment to constitutionalism, democracy, liberty, human rights, and freedom of 
speech.  From the perspective of non-orthodox Persianism, it possessed questionable 
legitimacy due to its lack of genuine commitment to Persian ideals of a spiritual and 
just monarchy infused and enriched with a Persian house of wisdom (with its own 
form of spirituality, statecraft scholarship and commitment to social justice) 
alongside its increasing pseudo-modernism and vulgarity in the realm of popular 
culture. This form of Persianism represented the Persianist branch of nativism (see 
Boroujerdi, 1996; Fazeli, 2006; Mirsepasi, 2011) in the search for ‘true’ and 
‘authentic’ Persianism against excessive Westernization with the motto of a’nche 
khod dasht ze beeganeh tamanna meekard (why ask from the other what you 
yourself already have).  
All of these multiple forms of crisis of legitimacy within and without Persianism and 
their associated forms of perceived bastardities and monstrosities (lakkategi), where 
even the Shah’ prime minister Hoveida did not believe in Rastakhiz Party (Milani, 
2011a: 382), were bound to lead to “more paralysis” and culminate in the emergence 
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of armed and non-armed opposition, which in turn generated the sense of ‘being 
under siege’ and prompted the generation of rampant levels of mistrust (Milani, 
2011a: 149, 372, 440), suspicion and conspiracy theory in the Shah’s system 
(Milani, 2011a: 132, 409) and transformed it into a police state with the dominance 
of Savak, further exacerbating the legitimacy of the whole project of Persianization 
of the state. Iran was once again turned into a site of “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 
2011: 150) from all sides in the form of epistemic violence, responded or 
complemented with physical violence, all leading to making the Shah’s corporate 
and rentier state increasingly dysfunctional, culminating in its eventual “abortion” 
(Milani, 2011a: 338) through the butter-fly effects of small events.  
6.4.2.2. Khomeini’s Islamic State as a Bricolage 
With regard to Khomeini’s project of formation of state, it is worth noting that 
Khomeini lacked any detailed and well-developed blueprint for his new Islamic state 
(Harmon, 2005: 69). The Khomeini’s project of Islamization of the state with its 
three associated subprojects was almost a mirror image of the Shah’s one and was 
plagued by similar multiple forms of legitimacy crisis, identity crisis and ultimately 
truth crisis. Khomeini started where Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri had left off (Moin, 1994: 
81; Coughlin, 2009: 52, 113). Initially he wanted to establish a religious 
constitutional order (mashroteh-ye mashroah) (Brumberg, 2001: 98) and ended up in 
offering and institutionalizing the theory of absolute authority of the Islamic jurist 
(velayat-e motlagheh-ye faqih). The Islamized state as a bricolage emerging out of a 
process of trial and error and improvisation is perceived to be a form of monstrous 
hybridity in the international order (Hedayat’s lakkateh at the international level), a 
velayat-based constitutional order entailing elements of democratic and authoritarian 
systems (Farhi, 2009) in an explosive and unstable cocktail, being attacked for lack 
of legitimacy by radicals and pragmatists of all alternative truth camps. In the state 
of belated inbetweenness almost everything is a bricoalge (sar-e ham bandi) and as 
such is vulnerable to attacks from all sides.  
While it is true that he had suggested the theory of velayat-e faqih before the 
revolution, it was largely deemed to serve as a scholarly piece of work to instigate a 
debate on the nature of alternative order to the monarchy, as Banisadr (2011, 1981) 
attests in his report on a five-stage development of the theory. The guiding principle 
driving the evolution of his position was to save Islam and (Iranian) Muslims from 
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the encroachment of pernicious modernity through finding practical utilitarian 
solutions for the plights of the Muslims, drawing upon his capacity as an Islamic 
jurist (Faqih), complemented by his brands of mysticism, Islamic philosophy, and 
political Islam (see Brumberg, 1997; Moin, 1994).  This evolution was the 
unintended consequences of the interaction of forces, voices, and faces in the post-
revolutionary state of belated inbetweenness.  
Immediately after the collapse of the old regime Khomeini wanted a division of 
labour between the clergy and the intelligentsia (see Banisadr, 1981 on how 
Khomeini and Rafsanjani wanted to approve the draft constitution similar to the 
Mashroteh constitution without velayat-e faqih and how the new constitution was the 
unintended consequence of Bazargan’s position). The clergy were to perform their 
main monitoring function left unattended in the constitutional and post-constitutional 
eras alongside their normal functions in the judiciary and in the parliament while the 
realm of executive was to be left entirely to the intelligentsia (educated 
professionals, bureaucrats, technocrats, and intellectuals). As Hojjati Kermani 
(2011), one of the members of the constitutional assembly, attests Ayatollah 
Montazeri and Ayat introduced the theory of velayat-e faqih into the constitution 
(Yaghmaian, 2002: 253) to prevent the re-emergence of old regime and its form of 
despotism as experienced in the constitutional revolution and the ONM, which in the 
face of further divisions and irreconcilable differences within the revolutionary camp 
turned into absolute authority of faqih. This was only putting into the words of the 
constitution what the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness always called for: the 
emergence of Iranian leviathan as the final arbiter with absolute authority as a 
coping strategy for the resolution of conflicts over the production of truth.  
The post-revolutionary chaotic situation of unfettered freedom served as a fertile 
breeding ground for the explosive mushrooming of multitude of political parties and 
ideological groupings all over the country; they, by the dictates of their beloved 
regimes of truth, were intent on conducting a second revolution against the new 
clerical establishment and their religious intellectual allies (Banisadr, 1981). The 
threat of the return of the old system and/or the risk of Iran being turned into a failed 
state called for the emergence of final arbiter to save the system from collapse, and 
Khomeini and his coalition in an improvised process of trial and error supplied it 
(without any intelligent design or omniscient and omnipotent master plan). Once 
again there is a logic of supply and demand at work here. The strange fate, common 
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to the state of belated inbetweenness, is that the original post-revolutionary revivalist 
and theorist of the theory, Montazeri, lost his belief in it while the one (Khamenei) 
who was against the addition of the adjective ‘absolute’ to it converted to it and 
assumed its mantle (Arjomand, 2009: 34; Murphy, 2008).  
Almost all truth entrepreneurs started discrediting and de-legitimizing the theory and 
its associated institutionalized form from outset; this is true even for the non-
revolutionary clerics like Shariatmadri (Rastgo, 2008) let alone religious intellectuals 
like Banisadr, Sahabi, Bazargan, and the left and the secular liberals alongside 
Persian monarchist or Persian literati. Consequently, Mesbah Yazdi (2011) recently 
admitted bitterly that almost nobody at the highest level of authority inside the 
system believes in the theory of velayat-e faqih, ironically replicating the experience 
of Hoveida who did not believe in the Shah’s Rastakhiz Party. The misunderstanding 
of the evolution of Khomeini’s positions on the doctrine of velayt-e faqih is evident 
in almost all forms of analysis especially in Milani (2011a), Banisadr (1981), Ganji 
(2011) and Abrahamian (1993), among others, which are cases of counter-
transference. Even Abrahamian, who rejects the appropriateness of the label of 
fundamentalism for Khomeini and offers the label of populism instead, seems to 
have failed to understand Khomeini in his own terms and as a social assemblage 
immersed in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness.  
As such, Khomeini’s theory of velayt-e faqih was the evolutionary reincarnation of 
the expression of the need for the final arbiter (Iranian modern leviathan) in the 
confused state of belated inbetweenness where all social assemblages (society, 
organizations, groups, and individuals) are torn between alternative regimes of truth 
and are unable to arrive at a consensual and synchronized hybrid to function as the 
condition of possibility for the emergence of shared mechanism of conflict 
resolution, founding an order based on ‘unity without uniformity’ and ‘agree to 
disagree’.   
The events such as hostage crisis, the civil war with ethnic groups, Mojahedin and 
the left, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Rushdie affair, among others, were mixed blessing 
for the new velayat-based state. These large events ideologically recharged the 
system and deepened the investment of people in the whole Islamic order, leading to 
the emergence and strengthening of the security apparatus like Sepah (Revolutionary 
Guard), basij (the religious militia) and intelligence service while economically 
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weakening it (Buchta, 2000). Paradoxically while the system was fighting the whole 
international order by proxy (the proxy was Iraq or the hostage crisis or Rushdie 
crisis), it heavily depended on the international order for the sale of its oil. As such in 
the search for political and cultural independence the economic independence was 
frequently lost, which threatened the survival of the whole order and prompted a 
zigzag movement between various forms of radicalism and pragmatism. In the 
hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war the cultural, ideological, and political wars were 
largely won (or at least not lost) but the economic war was lost miserably, prompting 
a turn towards Rafsanjani’s pragmatism. Rafsanjani himself had already experienced 
a transformation from a revolutionary radical to an economic pragmatist.  
Pragmatism leads to economic improvement but immediately prompts the perception 
of defeats in the cultural war against the Western cultural invasion and in the 
political war in the form of losing fronts on the political independence formulated in 
the principle of negative balance (movazeneh-ye manfi) and its Islamic reincarnation 
in the form of na sharqi na gharbi or ‘Neither the East (communist bloc) and Nor 
the West (the capitalist bloc)’, all of these alongside the war on distributional justice. 
This prompts the resurgence of radicalism which grinds into halt due defeats in the 
economic war (due to the troubles with the international order manifested in 
economic sanctions and/or inefficiencies inside the system), which drive the call for 
another round of pragmatism. The failure in the economic war is due to the 
confusion and zigzags between the requirements of three models of modernist 
economics, Islamic economics, and Persianist economics, which due to the word 
limitations was not included in this thesis. The new order was plagued by experience 
of dysfunctionality in all realms of life, work and language. 
The post-revolutionary Islamic state was also plagued with the phenomenon of 
parallel institutions (nahadha-ye movazi). The same phenomenon existed in the 
Shah’s pre-revolutionary order in the form of “creating new ministers and civil 
servant posts with overlapping responsibilities” (Moaddel, 1993: 59). This 
phenomenon was the reaction of the new order to prevalence of mistrust 
(Abrahamian, 1993: 131; Ganji, 2011), impatience (Hojjati Kermani, 2011) or “the 
madness of speed” as Chehabi (1990: 259) puts it, and conspiracy theory 
(Abrahamian, 1993: 4, 127-8) between and within all social assemblages, which 
were the symptomatic by-products of the state of belated inbetweenness. The 
phenomenon of the existence of parallel institutions in the realms of security, 
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economy, politics, culture, etc., (Ahmadi Amoui, 2006; Banisadr, 1981) severely 
damaged the efficacy and efficiency of the state in performing its revolutionary and 
non-revolutionary functions.  
This was due to the fact that there were deep and irreconcilable differences on the 
theory of institution-building regarding how to build the institutions of the new state 
and what to do with the institutions of the old state. Bazargan, Banisadr and 
Beheshti, let alone Khamanei, Mosavi, Montazeri, and Friday prayer leaders in every 
small and large city, among others, differed significantly on their theory of 
institution-building (Banisadr, 1981: 51-3). Alongside this and as one of its direct 
by-products, the crisis of succession (the removal of Montazeri from the position of 
successor to Khomeini) (see Montazeri’s memoire, 2001) - emerging due to 
prevalence of excessive violence in prisons (summary executions and tortures; see 
Sadr and Amin, 2012; Abrahamian, 1999; Rejali, 1994) and in the streets which de-
legitimized the new state even further- culminated in the emergence of another 
example of dysfunctional state, this time in the form of Islamized state, in the 
modern history of Iran.   
We further explored the manifestations of institutional failure in other institutions of 
the society in the realms of formation of modern state, economy, foreign policy and 
diplomacy, and national security (in the realms such as political war, territorial war, 
economic war, cultural war, and moral war), but excluded them from this work due 
to word limitations. These constant bitter experiences of institutional failure create a 
chaotic order, which the next section explores.   
6.5. CHAOTIC ORDER 
We have seen how, based on the holistic picture offered, explored and examined in 
this study, social assemblages hang together at causal, complexity system, and 
worldhood levels. Due to the state of belated inbetweenness, Iranian society is at a 
paradoxical position where what gives unity and identity to social entities and glues 
them together, the three regimes of truth,  simultaneously creates incessant levels of 
conflicts and division on fundamental questions of how to organize life, work and 
language.  
As the analysis so far indicated, the state of inbetweenness with its associated 
confusion and dissonance created unstable coalitions within and between Iranian 
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social assemblages, which in turn culminated in the repeated bitter experience of 
institutional failure. The mistrust resulting from fluidity of subjectivities (constant 
unpredictable change in local and general preference of Iranian social assemblages) 
and the impatience prompted by the state of belatedness generated deformities and 
dysfunctionalities, which produced broad sense of disillusionment and discontent.  
This sense of frustration and discontent born out of the bitter experience of 
encountering dysfunctional institutions in everyday life in family, schools, hospitals, 
streets, etc. alongside the unhappiness with the incumbent master signifier and its 
project of reverse social engineering and its associated wings boils up in the social 
interactions creating social relations full of tensions and conflict (a social order 
ridden with conflict and violence at formal and informal levels at all sites of social 
interaction in selfhood, family to schools and hospitals and streets). The people 
develop a sense of resentment for being Iranian (self-loathing) and a feeling of 
hatred of all against all (where it was reported that even the Shah loved Iran but 
hated its people, see: Milani, 2011a), while they begin to admire the perfect others. 
They start from demonizing the other and glorifying the self but end up (through the 
work of principle of emergence and its law of unintended consequences) demonizing 
the self and glorifying the other. The state of mistrust and impatience associated with 
three projects of reverse social engineering created a state of innocent brutality, 
where the state and society, the incumbent and the opposition, and almost all social 
actors are permanently engaged in the act of mutual de-legitimization and war of 
attrition (namadmali) enshrined in demonization of the other and glorification of the 
self.  
Any project of reverse social engineering - in this period of study we witnessed the 
shift from the Shah’s project of Persainization to Khomeini’s project of Islamization- 
lacked full legitimacy bestowed by all three forms of regimes of truth; any 
incumbent socio-political order of any colour or persuasion faced the attempts to 
overthrow it. This made the incumbent order filled with the sense of ‘siege 
mentality’ which culminated in the emergence of final arbiter and resort to physical 
and epistemic brutality to repress the extreme levels of chaos caused by widespread 
conflict within and between the groups loyal or opposed to the new system. As the 
social order with any form of incumbency cannot create minimum level of social 
cohesion (Ibn Khaldun’s asabiya) or ‘unity without uniformity’ or cannot sustain the 
principle of ‘agree to disagree’ the only way to move from intolerable level of chaos 
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culminating in the collapse of Iran as a socio-political unit to tolerable level of chaos 
is through the emergence of final arbiter, which acts as a short- to medium-term 
relief from chaos and anarchy caused by immense level of irreconcilable differences 
circulating in the social order within and between different social assemblages 
(individuals, groups, organizations, and society as a whole). The final arbiter, the 
Iranian leviathan, ultimately lacks full legitimacy and can only delay the sense of 
discontent with the incumbent project and its dysfunctionalities, but cannot eliminate 
the possibility of socio-political revolutions and movements and their attempts to 
restructure society from ground zero, which leads to the activation of another round 
of cyclic passage through four levels of tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable 
coalitions, institutional failure and the emergence of chaotic order.      
Paradoxically, thus, what unite Iranians are exactly what divides them as well; what 
is the malaise is the cure too; that is why their social order turns into chaotic order, 
where it does not collapse into a failed state, while at the same time it does not 
function reasonably efficiently and effectively to keep its population content about 
the general characteristics of their own social order.  
Peter Gourevitch’s (2003: 325) notion of ‘convergent divergence’ with regard to 
globalization is an example of a compound notion which serves as a device to bring 
the conflicting concepts together to elaborate on a hyper-complex reality comprising 
opposing tendencies (for the hybrid and seemingly contradictory notion of 
glocalization see Ritzer and Atalay 2010: 319); in the context of Iranian belated 
inbetweenness the notion of chaotic order (or organized chaos) is meant to 
demonstrate how order and chaos can coalesce to create a dysfunctional social order. 
The chaotic element is manifested in the two features of the widespread prevalence 
of violence and in the diffused and atomic nature of power and its apparent arbitrary 
and discretionary nature (Moslem, 2002: 181; Beeman, 2005: 19; Poulson, 2006: 69; 
Zonis 1971: 10). With regard to the diffused and dispersed nature of the power 
structure, Rakel (2008: 32) makes the following observation: “the formal system for 
policy formulation is often ignored or bypassed in favor of the informal power 
structure, based on personal networks and power relations”. The above description is 
not entirely accurate as it assumes that the informal networks have more stability 
than the formal ones while the tragedy of confusion plauges both realms of formality 
and informality.  
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The violent element of the chaotic order refers to the widespread prevalence of social 
upheavals in the social order; these violent events entail weak and strong occurrences 
experienced both continuously and intermittently in the Iranian social order. The 
daily discharge of negative energies is associated with large earthquakes and 
volcanoes experienced in the form of social movements and revolutions (Foran, 
1994) with their associated episodes of repression and loss of lives and property and 
total restructuring of social order in an attempt to rebuild the social order from 
ground zero. The cases of political executions, imprisonment, and torture alongside 
assassinations and bombings plus large scale migration are just external 
manifestations of wider and deeper level of violence permeating Iranian social order; 
these events are supplemented by the daily hateful, vengeful, and spiteful exchanges 
in the media, within the public and private offices and in the streets, in schools and 
hospitals, and families, all releasing the dark energies generated by the constant 
clashes between embedded plates of truth, warring for dominance and loyalty. 
Violence permeated the whole social order at micro, meso and macro levels (see 
Tizro, 2011 for the case of violence against women, for instance). 
The example of immense disdain shown to Bazargan in the post-revolutionary 
parliament and his (in)famous reaction to the martyred Rajaee’s wife (Jannati, 2010), 
where he reacted angrily to what Rajaee’s wife had said against him by resorting to a 
proverb “the one who had not shat on us was the cut-tail crow (anke be ma narideh 
bood kalaghe dom borideh bood),” is clear example of daily bitter experience of 
conflict within the new system. Another example is the astonishing case of Roughani 
Zanjani’s deputies being kidnapped for the sake of the economic policies they 
advocated by security authorities; they were interrogated and subjected to 
harassment and freed in unknown locations (Zanjani in Amoui, 2006: 231). These 
are bewildering examples of how irreconcilable differences emanating from being 
located in the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness (and its impacts on 
generating mistrust and confusion on how to combine alternative regimes of truth) 
erupts into the expression of epistemic or physical violence (where the weaker sides 
predominantly resorts to verbal violence and the stronger side resorts largely to 
physical violence) in the form of mutual de-legitimization and mutual repression 
(namadmali) and the creation of waves of victimhood and culpability, where former 
victims become new perpetrators in the exercise of “innocent cruelty” (Talebi, 2011: 
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150) where every side attempts to save its favoured truth and beloved order  from the 
onslaught of the dark forces intent on overthrowing it.         
The second element of chaos is enshrined in the atomic nature of power fully 
captured by the notion of personal discretion (saligheh-ye shakhsi) frequently used in 
the social discourses and complained about. Constant waves of complaint are made 
about people holding private or public offices acting on discretion; these complaints 
are made without ever asking about the character of social order allowing its actors 
to act based on discretion. Frequently the prevalence of rule of discretion rather than 
rule of law is attributed to the wills of the individuals and groups and their bad 
intentions. They commit the intentional fallacy in attributing the fate of the social 
order to the wills of social entities inhabiting them, without asking “who wills the 
will?” and how the wills are coordinated in some context and discorded in others. 
This stance ignores the work of three principles of embeddedness, emergence and 
incommensurability in the formation and transformation of social phenomena and 
their wills, their conscience, and their actions and emotions.  
Clearly when there is historical consensus on a set of issues, there remains almost no 
social space for discretion. When it comes to sexual honour or observing the codes 
of behaviour in shrines (for instance in the case of Reza Shah’s queen entering the 
shrine in Qom without veiling, which provoked severe reactions, Sedghi, 2007: 85) 
or in mosques or in Ashura processions or in Nowruz ceremonies the rule of 
discretion is marginalized and the rule of norm and law prevails. As the issues 
around which the historical consensus has emerged are rare in the Iranian social 
context, almost all issues become sites for conflicts between different hybrid forms 
of forces, voices, and forces. What is called discretion (saligheh) (Moslem, 2002: 41, 
74, 155) is the manifestation of the phenomenon where each social entity is inhabited 
by a distinct voice or collection of voices constituted out of a particular combination 
of different regimes of truth. In the frequent act of misunderstanding every social 
assemblage treats its own positions as principled and others’ positions as arbitrary.  
The lack of unity on how to organize life, work and language culminates in the 
atomization of the nature of power, where power is dispersed and distributed in the 
social order and each individual or group can wield adequate resources and support 
and act unpredictably and in contradistinction to other individuals and groups. As 
such Power is neither centralized nor decentralized it is dispersed. The final arbiter 
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has to launch attacks to recapture the lost authority only to lose it gradually again. 
The phenomenon of parallel institution in the post-revolutionary era alongside the 
common notion of ‘states-within-states’ (doulat dar doulat) throughout the Iranian 
modern history is the manifestation of the dispersed nature of power in the modern 
history of Iran.  This means that in reality institutions or governments were not just 
restricted to serve the interests of particular groups or centres of gravity, formal or 
informal, on the scene or behind the scene, apparent or hidden, or official or mafia 
types; there were fundamental differences and divisions within any formal or 
informal centre of power.  
As such, the social order has suffered from the plague of multiple layers of 
unpredictable sources of power. Roughani Zanjani (2006: 87, 187, 230) reports on 
how the chaotic situation ruled the social relations within and between different 
institutions of socio-political and economic governance. In a sense confusion at the 
level of mind (Williamson’s level zero) has spilt over and trickled down to the levels 
of institutions and governance. The following sharp observation, made by Elaine 
Sciolino (2000: 360, added emphasis), points to this phenomenon:  
I’ve learned that it is impossible to talk about a monolithic Iranian “regime” 
any longer; the struggle for the country’s future is far too intense for that. 
Today there is no unified leadership or all-powerful governmental 
superstructure that makes and executes all decisions. Rather, power is 
dispersed among and even within many competing power centers, with varying 
agendas and methods of operation and degrees of authority. Even as I write, 
alliances are shifting. Players are adapting. Coalitions are building.   
 
The atomic and discretionary nature of power is witnessed by Ash (2005, 2009; 
added emphasis) in the following terms:  
The very fact that the system has several centers of power adds an extra 
element of uncertainty. For example, I talked to one dissident student who was 
released by the official state security service only to be rearrested a few months 
later by the Revolutionary Guards. No one knows exactly where the limits are. 
As a result, there is both a remarkable freedom of intellectual debate and a 
permanent undercurrent of fear.  
 
That is why, as Harmon (2005: 70) reports, Khomeini’s misguided policy of 
delegation of power (with the intention of effacing himself as the centre of gravity 
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and in an attempt to institutionalize the new order) in the post-revolutionary era 
almost resulted in the collapse of the new order under the weight of its own internal 
conflicts and cleavages (the new order was ridden with conflict at all levels within 
and between new and old institutions, groups and individuals as attested by 
Banisadr, 1981: 299):  
Khomeini deferred hands-on problem solving to subordinates. For the 
struggling new republic, this resulted in near calamity. While there is wisdom 
in delegating authority, in this situation it posed a dilemma of strangling 
proportions. Since his underlings did not always agree among themselves as to 
specific steps to take, the effectiveness of the new government was seriously 
impaired.  
 
Delegation of power requires a homogenized and synchronized embeddedness, as its 
condition of possibility, which was a case of impossibility in the Iranian state of 
belated inbetweenness. The power of Khomeini, when delegated to Montazeri and 
Lajvardi, for instance, produced two manifestly contrasting results and Khomeini 
himself was internally divided enough to feel sympathy with both voices until one 
(Montazeri) reached the point where Khomeini felt was equivalent to undermining 
the integrity of the new system and had to, as the final arbiter, sever him from 
attachment to the system to restore the possibility of a semblance of order inside the 
sea of chaos. That is why the phenomenon like Mafia cannot take roots in the Iranian 
context of belated inbetweenness as any strong organization with defined hierarchy 
and codes of behaviour guaranteeing loyalty and obedience requires consensual and 
shared common ground, which is impossible to achieve in the Iranian context of 
culture in its interaction with the context of situation. Abrahamian (1993: 114; 1982: 
169) reports the observation made by British consul in Isfahan in this regard: “No 
two Persians can ever work together for any length of time, even if it is jointly to 
extract money from the third party”.  
The case of hostage crisis was the clear example of atomic nature of power, where 
the leader (Khomeini) followed his followers (the Muslim students), demonstrating 
Khomeini’s change of mind and shift in emphasis. Banisadr (1981: 254) summarizes 
the point by expressing that the determining events were shaped by forces outside 
the realm of control of the leading nucleus of the revolution. Within the master 
signifier of Islam, Khomeini was ready to follow his followers in affirming the 
liberal or revolutionary versions of Islam depending on the preferences expressed by 
373 
 
the believers (as he initially affirmed the more liberal draft constitution without the 
theory of velayt-e faghieh).  
Khomeini’s subjectivity itself was deeply engulfed in the state of belated 
inbetweenness, and as such different voices could activate and awaken different 
facets of his being, inside the imaginary order of affiliation to Islam. In a sense, the 
power of voices within Khomeini himself was deeply atomic. For example, 
Rafsanjani (2011) reports how Khomeini’s mood on music and its legitimacy used to 
change depending on the character of his last visitors; his position could fluctuate 
between liberal and conservative stances in no time. This was related to the tight 
client-provider relation, supply and demand for fatwas, between the jurist and the 
believer, which would make the jurist responsive to the needs and complaints of the 
believer within the limits and appellation of the master signifier of Islam (Cole, 
2005: 66). If the people wanted to change their allegiance to alternative regime of 
truth Khomeini would stand-up to them to reshape and redirect their subjectivity to 
the right path or suffer the fate of Sheikh Fazlollah; hence his famous saying that if 
all people say something [opposing the pillars of Islam] I would single-handedly 
stand up to them and say something else (see Banisadr, 1981). This kind of standing 
up to people functions as a tool to activate and awaken their meta-preferences.    
At the root of the atomic and discretionary nature of power reside the Iranian 
preference for adopting a pick and mix approach to combining their historically 
situated alternative packages of truth; Iranians inhabit parallel truth universes and 
want to travel between them freely. The implication of this for the Iranian society is 
that what each individual with her particular biography or a group with its particular 
history picks and mixes (mixology) from each regime is markedly different from any 
other, which creates the rule of discretion (saligheh) rather than the rule of law.  
The legitimacy of the pragmatic approach in picking and mixing between regimes of 
truth, for instance, is frequently questioned by the puritans and radicals of all 
regimes of truth. As such a sharp set of irreconcilable divisions emerges between 
different social entities; these social entities lie in a spectrum between pragmatism 
and radicalism, where each point to left or to the right is categorized as too radical or 
too pragmatic and as such rarely any consensus on any issue can emerge. For 
example, in foreign relation, for some, the development of warm and cosy relations 
with the Arab allies of America in the region was considered to be a betrayal of the 
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principles of opposition to oppression deeply rooted in the Qur’anic teachings and in 
the Shia tradition of Imams and in the revolutionary ethic (a brand of ethical or 
ideological foreign policy), for others it is an acceptable position to take, as it unifies 
the Islamic world and eliminates the possibility of internal fighting between Muslims 
(like in the case of Iran-Iraq war). For these latter group normalizing relation with 
America may be deemed as the betrayal of the ideals of revolution while for still 
others it is a justifiable position to take; for still others restoration of relation with 
Israel is the only way to restore normal relation with the West and with the 
international order, while for all others this is a taboo which should never be crossed.  
We see a spectrum of irreconcilable positions, creating confusion, havoc, and zigzag 
in the Iranian foreign policy (for the notion of zigzag movements in all realms of life, 
work and language in post-revolutionary Iran see Ayatollah Khamenei, 2010). The 
complexity of situation is manifest in the individuals and groups constantly 
travelling between these positions and not taking fixed and irreversible stances. This 
is due to lack of adequate level of philosophical and theoretical capital to create 
consensus on the nature of modern world, international order, the West, America, 
Israel, Arabs, and their relation to Islam and pre-Islamic Persia and ultimately to the 
Heideggerian fourfold of gods, mortals, sky and earth.  
The same set of irreconcilable positions prevail in any other social issues related to 
life (dress code, sexuality and gender relation, to name just a few), work (the issue of 
riba or interest, property rights, accumulation of wealth, foreign direct investment, 
the use of sex in advertisements, income distribution, employer-employee relation 
and their rights and obligations, the issue of corporate and political governance, the 
relation between politics and economics, among others), or language (the precedence 
given to the three languages of Persian, Arabic, and English, the manifestation of 
eroticism and sexuality in poetry, literature and other forms of arts, the issue of 
insults direct towards the Shia infalliables, among others). In such a state of total 
rupture within and between social entities where power is atomized, and violence 
pervades the social relation, the only way to restore a semblance of order, at least in 
the short-run, is through the emergence of final arbiter (the king or the faqih or the 
intellectual or the technocrat). When, on rare occasions, consensus emerges 
discretion disappears and the norms or laws rule; but in large part the irreconcilable 
differences prevail as the default position plaguing the social relations.  
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The rule of final arbiter, while possessing stabilizing function in the short-run, has 
destabilizing property in the long run as the final arbiter is unable to attain multiple 
forms of legitimacy required in the state of belated inbetweenness. As a result, 
paradoxically while the affiliation to the three regimes of truth and emergence of 
final arbiter act as unifying forces creating order in the Iranian context, the same two 
phenomena create chaos due to the dispersed nature of power and prevalence of 
innocent brutality born out of irreconcilable differences between various forms of 
hybrid combination of the three regimes of truth and lack of full legitimacy for the 
final arbiter.  
In this paradoxical context of belated inbetweenness, mis-categorization of the 
malaise of Iranian society as the rule of superstition (Rahnema, 2011; Avini, 1997), 
Westernization (Keddie, 1980: 236), fundamentalism (Asgharzadeh, 2007; 
Riesebrodt, 1998), mafia or sultanic system (Ganji, 2005, 2008) or fascism (Taheri, 
2010: 82; Rubin, 2002), despotism (Rezagholi, 1998, 2007), predatory state (Lal, 
1984), totalitarianism (Moaddel, 2011) or populism (Abrahamian, 1993; see also 
Sayyid, 1997), or like Gellner seeing Islam or Shia as a ‘closed system’ (Eickelman, 
1998: 258; see also Bradley, 2007 Chapter 1) which have found its manifestation in 
Kuran’s (2011) thesis of inflexibility of Islamic contractual laws adds another layer 
to the sedimented piles of epistemic violence and innocent brutality as the analysts 
unwittingly commit the cardinal sin of counter-transference, and project their 
imported categories on the uniquely hyper-complex social realities of Iranian society 
in the modern era.  
In sum, as Japanese islands or American coastline are prone to the occurrences of 
natural calamities, Iranians are prone to the historical disasters emanating from being 
located in the midst of the fault-lines between plates of alternative regimes of truth. 
The calamities are the product of tragedy and not demonic nature of particular 
people or their ideologies or belief systems. The following quote is a clear case of 
counter-transference and misdiagnosis exacerbating the malaise of mutual 
misunderstanding generated by historically situated forms of incommensurability, 
which is an example of innocent brutality (in this case verbal or epistemic cruelty, 
through refusing or being unable to listen to the radical other, requiring investing 
efforts to know the other in her own terms and to combine hermeneutics of 
understanding with hermeneutics of suspicion):  
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The character of the post-revolutionary regime, however, stood in stark 
contrast to Foucault’s idealistic expectation. Far from exemplifying a new 
political spirituality in action that transcended Western secularism, a brutal 
totalitarian regime was inaugurated, displaying a remarkable resemblance to 
such known historical categories as fascism and Nazism” (Moaddel, 2011: 
128).  
 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
The Iranian society in this era (between 1963 and 1997) moved between the two 
projects of Persianization and Islamization and currently is on the verge of new-style 
Mashroteh-type project of liberal modernization in the reformist and post-reformist 
period. In this period, Iranian society demonstrated its typical characteristics 
emanating from its compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. We saw the 
patterns and regularities re-emerging in this period at four levels: tragedy of 
confusion, unstable coalitions, institutional failure, and chaotic order.  
The features of Iranian society such as the prevalence of violence and discontent, the 
flight of human capital (migration) and financial capital and its short-termism 
(Katouzian, 2010), among others, are the by-products and symptoms of fundamental 
conflicts over how to produce truth about life, work, and language and how to 
synchronize the instrumental, communicative, and emancipative rationalities (freeing 
Iranian man from the despotisms of nature, man, and death within the analytic of 
finitude) based on three historically situated packages of truth, Islam, modernity and 
Persianism, with their many faces.  
What was at the heart of Iranian malaise was the inability of Iranians to achieve self-
discovery and recognize the presence of radical others in any form of imagined self. 
This in turn led to inability to understand each other and the alien others in the West 
and the East. Iranians frequently ignored or have not developed the conceptual 
framework required in order to understand the singularity of their own situation in 
the multiverse of their belated embeddedness. As such they, under the immense 
pressure of the state of belatedness, frequently embarked on various projects of 
reverse social engineering in order to overcome the malaise of backwardness as 
quickly as possible, which marginalizes, antagonizes or demonizes alternative 
packages of truth. The Shah’s project of Persianization- while having the three wings 
of Persianized Persianization, Persianized modernization (his techno-bureaucratic 
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modernization and his brand of socialism), and Persianized Islamization- demonized 
political Islam and non-orthodox modernity (Marxism) and even sometimes 
orthodox modernity in its permissive society and its democracy as being captured by 
big businesses and their special interests and in its colonialism (see Zibakalam, 
2008). After a period of chaotic instability, the Shah consolidated his power through 
the activation of mechanism of final arbiter, which put the control of the society 
under his highly centralized corporate and rentier state. The de-legitimization of the 
Shah’s project and his version of final arbiter with its own deformities and 
dysfunctionalities led to the collapse of the Shah’s version of Persianist orthodoxy.  
Khomeini’s project of Islamization replaced Shah’s project of Persianization, but the 
same patterns and regularities re-emerged due to the same mistakes of demonization 
of the radical others and glorification of the self. Due to the irreconcilable difference 
within and between social assemblages, the same dysfunctionalities and deformities 
re-merged as the same patterns of mistrust and impatience led to the atomization of 
power and the prevalence of conflicts and divisions ultimately enacting the need for 
the re-emergence of final arbiter in the theory of velayat-e faqieh and in the figure of 
the religious leader (Khomeini and Khamaniei) (Brumberg, 1997: 42).  
In the post-war era, Rafsanjani during his reign as the president of the country started 
a top-down revolutionary pragmatism resembling the techno-bureaucratic 
modernization of Amir Kabir and Reza Shah and the Shah’s White Revolution, but 
this time in an Islamized garb and appellation. This generated its own discontent 
leading to Mashroteh-type Khatami’s reformist movement, but this time with an 
Islamized flavour. While in Rafsanjani’s period the discourse of reconstruction 
dominated the landscape of discourses, in the reformist period it shifted in emphases 
towards rule of law and political freedom and democracy. These two trends 
contrasted with the discourse of martyrdom dominated in the Khomeini’s period 
(Varzi, 2006) and the discourse of distributive justice in the first half of 
Ahmadinejad’s reign and the discourse of Persianization prevailed in the second half 
of Ahmadinejad’s tenure in power. We see how the emphases have shifted from 
emancipation from the fear of death through the discourse of martyrdom to the 
liberation from despotism of nature through techno-scientific rationality of 
Rafsanjani’s re-constructionism and Khatami’s political freedom, to Ahmadinejad’s 
communicative rationality of liberation from despotism of man over man in the 
realm of economics (justice) and man over man in the realm of communal belonging 
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(Persianism). Islamic revolution, thus, was a response to the iron cage of modernity 
and its pernicious materialism and, as David Martin (2011: xvi) states, “what Bataille 
might call the “vengeful incursions of the sacred.” This process entailed different 
forms of storytelling (see Selbin, 2010) competing inside alternative regimes of truth 
incorporating different narratives/strategies of liberation, from despotism of nature, 
man (the despotism of disorder and anarchy), and the despotism of death and the 
overall despotism of finitude.  
These dominant discourses (in every period there are traces of other discourses 
present in each brand of discourse as well) were primed by contexts of situation; the 
incidences of civil war and hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war and Rushdie affair, all 
constituted different forms of existential crises calling for activation of discourse of 
martyrdom; the post-war era primed the discourse of development, while its political 
restrictions and its inequalities primed Khatami’s discourse of rule of law and civil 
society and its inequality primed Ahmadinejad’s discourse of justice, and in response 
to lack of social solidarity, the discourse of Persianism in Green Movement were 
activated. As we see in the post-revolutionary era, the project of Islamization 
changed in emphasis in its three wings of Islamization, Persianization and 
modernization (orthodox modernization of Khatami and Rafsanjani alongside non-
orthodox modernization of Ahmadinejad, for instance).  
What can be seen is the continuous struggle in all realms of power, knowledge and 
subjectivity over how to synchronize Islam, Persianism and modernity to accomplish 
three forms of instrumental, communicative and emancipative rationality, all to 
overcome the finitude and its ontology of lack to achieve infinitude and its ontology 
of abundance. This was reflected in multiple forms of credentials at circulation in the 
Islamic Republic. By the end of this period, the allegiance to the new order could be 
demonstrated by accumulating from a pool of at least seven credentials: religious 
scholarly credential, piety credential, revolutionary credential, war credential, 
martyrdom credential, education or expertise credential, and serving-the-system 
credential.  
The constant shift in emphases within Khomeini’s project of Islamization alongside 
the opposition to the project itself from internal and external sources created 
instabilities and dysfunctionalities and gave rise to its associated brutalities and 
cruelties, which harmed the new order greatly and reduced its popularity and 
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contaminated its internal and external credibility and legitimacy. The system, hence, 
has been plagued by a sense of siege mentality in its strong sense of vulnerability 
towards the plots of external and internal sources for its overthrow, which turned all 
realms of life into a security threat for the new order provoking new rounds of 
violence, destabilizing it even further in a vicious cycle of de-legitimization and 
violence, all due to the compound state of belated inbetweenness and lack of 
capacity and consensus.  
Ultimately the tragedies and brutalities (civil war, hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war, 
succession crisis, executions and tortures alongside assassinations and campaign of 
bombings) experienced in this period was due to the unintended consequences of the 
social entities working inside their own grid of intelligibility, and largely with good 
intentions, to help the realization of their fragile conceptions of goodness, truth and 
beauty. The compound state of belated inbetweenness would not allow the 
emergence of what Bazargan (2007) desperately desired,  
one rule, one God in the country, one law, one Majlis, one government, and 
one centre of gravity; this was the wish we had when we used to go to bed 
during the nights and we prayed for the coming of such a day.  
 
Bazargan’s wish for the emergence of “one centre of gravity” could not be granted 
due to the fact that coherent and time-consistent selves with the property of “one 
man one voice (Tizro, 2011: 81)” could not emerge in the compound state of belated 
inbetweenness (see the references in this study on the Shah’s, Al-e Ahmad’s, 
Khomeini’s and Makhmalbaf’s daily change of positions, for instance).   
Ultimately in the state of belated inbetweenness there are incommensurable set of 
candidates for taking the position of “centre of gravity”, and the society and its 
various social assemblages oscillates between them in a perpetual truth cycle. The 
Shah, for example, in his interview with Oriana Fallaci (Moaddel, 1993: 63), offered 
the institution of monarchy and the figure of the king as the best option for “centre of 
gravity”, while Khomeini offered the institution of fiqh and the figure of faqih 
(velayat-e faqih) as the centre of gravity and Bazargan offered modern constitution 
(rule of law) and the figure of democratic ruler as the centre of gravity.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
One day it will have to be officially admitted that what we 
have christened reality is an even greater illusion than the 
world of dreams. 
 Salvador Dali 
  
 
is there any truth or not and if there is, what is it and 
where is it and who has it and what is its signs and 
after knowing it how can it be pursued and how can it 
be achieved? 
             Mirza Agha Khan Kermani (1925:102)  
7.1. PROBLEMATIZATION 
The subject matter of this study has been the bitter historical experience of socio-
economic underdevelopment in the modern history of Iran with all its ramifications. 
The burning questions gnawing Iranian subjectivity and its unhappy consciousness 
revolve around the enigma of why Iran has not developed into an advanced society 
despite starting its experience of attempting to achieve socio-economic development 
with Japan more than a century ago. Iranian experience of socio-economic 
underdevelopment has been associated with excessive and intense levels of socio-
political instability, coalitional repositioning, and waves of verbal and physical 
violence and institutional restructuring and emotional upheaval. As a result, the 
contrast between the level of stability and development between the two countries 
(Japan and Iran) could hardly be more pronounced.  
The enigma of the Iranian case is captured in the Shah’s bitter expression of 
astonishment and despair about his people, as reported by Milani (2011a: 3, added 
emphasis):  
More than once during the days of revolution, and later in exile, he asked, 
with unmistakable hints of contempt in the tone, “What kind of people are 
these Persians? After all We have done for them, they still chose to opt for 
this disastrous revolution.  
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The question of the bitter experience of socio-economic development is translated 
into the enigma of the nature of Persian people (Iranianness) and their social order. 
This study has set out to explore these sets of interwoven questions about the 
experiences of development and revolutions (political instability) and their relation 
to the character and traits of Persian people and their social order. This also 
represents an attempt to offer the outlines of an answer to the Shah’s dark question. 
The question of the nature of Iranianness is, in turn, translated to a wider 
methodological question of ‘How can we analyse a social order and its historical 
experiences?’, and the preceding chapters aimed at responding to this question 
within three case studies covering consecutive periods in the Iranian history by 
locating it within the theoretical and methodological formulations developed by this 
study in the initial foundational chapters. 
7.1.1. Nature of Social Order and Modes of Analysis 
The two large philosophical strands or modes of thought for the analysis of social 
phenomena are Heidegger’s ‘existential phenomenology’ (as explicated for example 
by Dreyfus, 1991) as opposed to Descartes’ subject-object relation (dasein versus 
cogito or understanding versus representation). These two philosophical positions 
are rooted in two contrasting philosophical traditions going back to Aristotle's 
metaphysics of substance as the genealogy of the Cartesian cogito and Heraclitus' 
philosophy of process-relation as the ancestry of Heidegger's dasein.  
As the summary and the analyses in the preceding chapters indicate, this study takes 
a hybrid approach by embedding the Cartesian cogito’s reductionism in the analysis 
of complex systems and both in the Heideggerian dasein’s being-in-the-world 
through its three principles of embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability. 
Being, in its compound and relational nature, is formulated as becoming using 
Deleuzian process philosophy of difference rather than Hegelian/Marxian philosophy 
of dialectics. This study treats social orders as social assemblages following 
Deleuzian process philosophy and Connolly’s application of it in his works. In 
formulating the theoretical framework of this study, the three notions of 
embeddedness, emergence, and incommensurability have been deployed to 
characterize the social assemblages according to which they are almost always 
rooted in larger meaningful wholes, are emergent phenomena, and invested with 
meaning constituting a unique package of truth about the things of this world. Our 
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world, as a social assemblage, acts as ecology of social assemblages and evolves 
through topological, typological, and axiomatic developments. This means that every 
social assemblage is located in the neighbourhood of other social assemblages, 
which act as its context of situation complementing its own unique context of 
culture, according to Malinowski’s terminology.  
The ecology of social assemblages alongside its various forms of neighbourhood 
indicate the finitude of social assemblages as each social assemblage is a form of 
bounded rationality, limited by other assemblages residing in its neighbourhood. No 
social assemblage fills the whole of space-time continuum. This leads us to the 
analysis of social phenomena as what Foucault called ‘analytic of finitude’ 
(Howarth, 2010: 21).  The limits of social assemblages put them in the dynamic 
interplay between finitude and infinitude and in relation to the Heideggerian fourfold 
of mortals, gods, the earth and the sky. As such, each social assemblage is blessed 
with its abundance and suffers from its lack. This study further offered to 
characterize the finitude of social assemblages by deploying three Lacanian orders as 
three dimensions of each social assemblage and analysed their affirmative and 
negating dimension through the deployment of Focauldian affirmative notions of 
power, knowledge and subjectivity and Lacanian-Zizekian negating notions of 
repression, disavowal and foreclosure. Furthermore, the Deleuzian process ontology 
and Castoriadis’s analysis of imagination were used to characterize the affirmative 
dimensions of real and imaginary orders.      
As a result of its hyper-complex structure, each social assemblage (at micro, meso or 
macro levels) constitutes a class of its own and, consequently, possesses its own 
unique regime of truth with its distinct dictionary and particular set of denotations 
and connotation, its own unique trajectory of evolution, and its own unique world in 
which it is rooted. As such, to analyse social assemblages in their uniqueness, we 
need a science of singularities, incorporating the universal and particular dimentions 
of social phenomena. The landscape of social assemblages is the outcome of 
Deleuzian process of differentiation attained through the vertical and horizontal 
movements of real, symbolic and imaginary orders. The science of singularity is a 
careful combination of hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion 
encompassing three levels of causation, complexity science and worldhood, and is 
produced through the mutual cooperation between the analyst and the analysand (the 
social assemblages).  
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The approach taken based on Heideggerian dasein, in contrast to Cartesian cogito, 
does not objectify the subject of study and creates knowledge in a relational and 
participatory process. Furthermore, Heideggerian dasein acknowledges the 
embeddedness of the observer as much as the observed and does not privilege the 
analyst to have monopolistic access to the truth about the observed over and above 
the self-analysis of the observed.  
As such, the observer is as much trapped and simultaneously enabled by her own 
grid of intelligibility as the observed. The most effective way to know the other 
seems to be through the art of listening achieved through suspension of disbelief and 
acting as devil’s advocate which paves the way to enter the world of signification of 
the radical other (observed social assemblages). This establishes the art of 
understanding where the analyst or observer understands his own self (his own grid 
of intelligibility) through understanding the radical other. The dilemma is that for 
knowing the subject of the study, the analyst needs to know his own grid of 
intelligibility to be able to know her own way of knowing (Derrida, 2003) to 
transcend it to be able to locate the social phenomena in the world of signification of 
the social agents. The paradox resides in the fact that his act of knowing is made 
possible through his own grid of intelligibility, which makes the paradox of how she 
can use her own grid of intelligibility to know her own grid of intelligibility to be 
able to know the other (the subject of the study, or social phenomena or social 
assemblages).  
The way out of this dilemma of incommensurability and miscarriage of 
understanding is the use of generality of language to discover its particularity 
through the act of production of meaning and signification. This approach aims to 
‘otherise’ the deceptive familiarity of the self and its negating dimensions (its 
repressions, disavowals and foreclosures) and familiarize the illusory strangeness of 
the radical other (otherization of the self and selfification of the other); the encounter 
with radical other is a chance to overcome, at least partially, the finitude of our own 
embedded selfhood and its world of signification. The property of selflessness and 
taking the other as another self can act as a method of discovery.  
The other is another me in terms of process philosophy and complexity systems and 
its butterfly effects and its path dependency. The worldhood of the other is detected 
through the particularity of the other’s chain of signifiers. The way the train of 
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signifiers are located in a neighbourhood of the chain of signification allows the 
analyst to enter the bridge of particularity of relation between signifiers through the 
apparent generality of the signifiers themselves. Each signifier appears to be 
universal while its particularity resides in how it is related to other signifiers through 
its neighbourhood and what quilting point or master signifier is deployed to generate 
meaning. Here the set of denotations and connotations associated with each 
dictionary and its world of significations are discovered through the method of free 
association which allows the analyst to understand the social phenomena in their 
uniqueness and singularity of their embeddedness, emergence and 
incommensurability.  Donaldson (2001: 186) addresses how repeatability/generality 
and uniqueness/singularity work in tandem in the process of generation of meaning 
through deploying the notion of “field of stabilization”:  
A phrase such as "dreams realize desires" will be stabilized by a series of 
relations that connect it with other statements, and the field of stabilization 
that one discovers when this phrase is employed by Freud will be quite 
different from that found in Plato, leading us to recognize that the same 
phrase can be used in more than one statement. If one fails to reconstruct the 
field of stabilization, what I have sometimes called the style of reasoning, 
that confers an identity on the concept of perversion, one will not understand 
the difference between the nineteenth-century psychiatric invocation of 
perversion and the appearance of this word in, for instance, Saint Augustine's 
moral theology. Thus one will fail to see, as Mino Bergamo has put it, that 
discontinuity can be "dissimulated under the veil of a lexical permanence”. 
 
The expression of meaning by the social actors alongside the emergent historical 
events are used to map the conscious and unconscious dimensions of their world of 
signification and how they interact, leading to the emergence of social events.  
This process combines hermeneutics of understanding with hermeneutics of 
suspicion. Khomeini’s famous phrases, for instance, “the economy is for donkeys” 
(Willis, 1999: 166) and "There is no fun in Islam" (Wright, 2000: 77) have been 
frequently and deeply misunderstood by the historical actors and historians, and even 
by his closest allies like Banisadr (1981, 2011); these cases of mutual 
misunderstandings (failure in the hermeneutics of understanding) produced actions 
and talks, which in their interactions gave rise to the emergence of small and large 
events like the impeachment of Banisadr.  The example of quadrupling of oil prices 
in 1973-74 and the Shah’s reaction to it is another case where a great deal of 
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misunderstanding of the Shah’s position has occurred. At the time this 
misunderstanding was common amongst the economic experts and the West, and 
later on amongst the historians and social scientists. This led to the misunderstanding 
of the Shah, his life world and its interaction with the life world of other historical 
actors and ultimately the causes and meanings of the 1979 revolution. As Mafinezam 
and Mehrabi (2008: 25) report:  
Treasury Secretary William Simon has publicly described the Shah as a "nut" 
and as "irresponsible and reckless.”  
 
As Khomeini’s intellectual ally Banisadr saw him as nut, the Shah’s American ally 
described him in the same way. Treating the radical other as nut or irrational is the 
tell-tale sign of the failure in the test of incommensurability and committing the 
cardinal sin of transference and/or counter-transference. Being imprisoned in one’s 
own grid of intelligibility turns the exposure to alternative regimes of truth into the 
experience of irrationality and madness (being nut). 
Zizek (1997: 13) refers to these marked differences between alternative regimes of 
truth by arguing that  
a true historical break does not simply designate the ‘regressive’ loss (or the 
‘progressive’ gain) of something, but the shift in the very grid which enables 
us to measure losses and gains.  
 
The break Zizek is referring to happens not only historically but also topologically in 
our daily encounters with the radical others. As such, the meaning of parts is 
determined in their relations with these meaningful wholes (regimes of truth). Thus, 
social phenomena (actions, talks, emotions, events) only attain strategic essence in 
their relations with a particular complex adaptive system and world of signification. 
As Sayer (2000: 88) notes:  
If the only choice is between either regarding objects as having essences 
fixed for all time or conceptualising them as merely transient or even 
ephemeral . . . then most social phenomena, which lie in between these 
extremes, will be occluded.  
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When the relation with the whole changes, as the whole itself changes, the essence of 
everything- including man, woman, child, water, tree, the sun, the stone and life and 
death, inflation and employment, prosperity and mortality, and everything else-
changes accordingly.    
Thus, empirical and positivist observations can only see the surface regularities 
without seeing the forces acting as condition of possibility for the emergence of law-
like patterns in social orders. The observed regularity of ‘spiting causes anger’ (in 
the case of Martin Luther King advising the black activists not to respond to the 
spitting provocations of the white Ku Klux Klan members; see Hazen, 2000: 93), for 
instance, holds only in larger sets of complex adaptive systems and worlds of 
signification. Spitting is part of a complex adaptive system of body which is part of 
the ecosystem of the working of earth, moon and the sun which makes life possible 
on earth and if that larger complex system is disrupted, the person who spits cannot 
spit as he could not be alive. Sayer (2000: 88), for instance, attests to the complexity 
dimension of all phenomena in the following terms: 
It helps to understand how essences or causal powers can change if it is 
appreciated that they are not wholly unconditional. The creation and 
reproduction of the essential features of animals, or of the capitalist economy, 
in terms of capital accumulation, ownership and non-ownership of means of 
production, and so on, is not automatic but conditional upon the existence of 
other things, such as oxygen, food, money and communication. Thus, change 
in these preconditions can bring about change in the essential features or 
natures of the objects, so that they diversify, attenuate or disappear.  
 
All these implies that in terms of understanding social phenomena, all of social 
relations are embedded in a larger complex system and world of signification where 
the colour of the skin is ascribed with certain meaning (a dictionary with its 
denotations and connotations) which culminates to the Ku Klux Klan’s members 
spitting on the members of black liberation movement. King’s theology disrupted the 
cause and effect, assumed to be axiomatic, relation between spitting and fury and 
rage. The different conception of culpability and responsibility in seeing the 
perpetrators as the passive agents and as the victims of larger forces of history, as 
formulated by King with regard to Bull Connor (Vischer, 2013: 22), for example, 
allowed the action and reaction to fall in different causational loop, where the 
spitting causes the sense of compassion and generosity of spirit rather than anger and 
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hatred. The application of this logic to the 9/11 case or the 1953 coup would have 
provoked different reactions from the American or Iranian society.     
The example of the relation between the government’s budget deficit, the excessive 
level of money supply and inflation is frequently observed in the Iranian modern 
history. That is the level of causation where budget deficit causes inflation. The 
reductionist approach stops at this observation and furthermore by taking a positivist 
interventionist approach attempts to embark on social engineering by assuming 
volition and agency for the government and forcing it to balance its budget while 
ignoring wider historical forces acting on government as the final arbiter and 
employer of last resort in the Iranian state of belated inbetweenness where no 
government has full multiple forms of legitimacy and there is little trust within and 
between the public and private sectors, and the government cannot rely on taxation 
for its income (as it lacks tri-polar legitimacy) and its expenditure is always on the 
rise as it has to act as a Keynesian developmental state in charge of the whole of 
economy.  
As such, the experience of inflation in Iran is located in causational relation, itself 
embedded in a complex adaptive system of macroeconomic ex-ante and ex-post 
imbalances between investment and saving, and immersion in the international 
economic order as a supplier of raw material (oil) and importer of finished products 
alongside the worlds of significations related to the notion of multiple legitimacies 
associated with multiple rationalities and their warring regimes of truth and their 
relation with Heideggerian fourfold, demonstrating the embeddedness, 
incommensurability and emergence properties of inflation. Even after the increase in 
the level of liquidly in the market due to the government budget deficit, its effects on 
causing inflation are mediated by the regime of truth, as Ranani (2010, 2012) 
maintains (see also, Schultz 2001 on the moral conditions of economic efficiency). 
People may hoard extra liquidity due to precautionary demand for liquidity (like 
current situation in the West where companies attempt to improve their level of 
capital adequacy due to experiencing a very restrictive level of access to banking 
credit or/and the pessimistic outlook towards future) and as Ranani attests the ethical 
economies suffer less experience of inflation with the same level of liquidity.  
As such, for analysing inflation in Iran we need hermeneutics of understanding in 
combination with hermeneutics of suspicion. In other words, observation at a 
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positivistic and reductionist level fails to uncover the meanings, rationalities and 
philosophical unconscious acting as condition of possibility of economic behaviour 
and the emergent properties like dysfunctionalities associated with the institutions of 
money and state, and their relation with impermanence and permanence, 
spatiotemporal and eternal existence.  This implies that ultimately every social 
phenomenon is the outcome of interplay of context of culture and context of 
situation, and cannot become the subject of reverse social engineering.  
The following sections summarize the way analytic of finitude has shaped the special 
characteristics of the Iranian social order. They further contemplate on the stylized 
facts of the Iranian modern history and on how the presence of philosophical autism 
has shaped the fate of the Iranian social order.   
7.2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IRANIAN MODERN 
HISTORY AND SOCIETY 
This section embarks on enumerating the forces, voices, and faces at work in shaping 
the general characteristics of Iran in the modern era.  
7.2.1. Analytic of Finitude 
All social assemblages with their regimes of truth assimilate elements of alternative 
social assemblages to overcome their own lacks, but some of them succeed (like the 
assemblage between modernity and Christianity or Buddhism, Connolly, 2008a) due 
to the work of vanishing mediators and some others do not succeed due to the lack of 
opportunity for the proper functioning of vanishing mediators, which itself is due to 
demands of the state of belatedness. The dynamics of assimilation of elements of 
alternative regimes gives rise to the emergence of pragmatic and radical orientations 
in each regime of truth, based on the measures of purity and impurity. In the case of 
Taqizadeh we see his zigzag movement between the height of revolutionary 
modernist radicalism against Mohammad Ali Shah and depth of his modernist 
pragmatism in front of Reza Shah where he saw himself only as an instrument (a’lat-
e fe’l) of Reza Shah’s will.  
Regimes of truth, besides adopting from each other and forming radical and 
pragmatic orientations within themselves, demonize each other by highlighting the 
black book of the others and glorify the self by resorting to the white book of the self 
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in order to maintain their monopoly over the production of truth (through the 
affirmative and negating dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary orders). As 
such truth is a thing of this world with potent productive and negating powers. The 
work of symbolization and harmonization causes for the regimes of truth to work at 
orthodox and non-orthodox levels and function at the levels of politics of ordinary 
and politics of piety.  
In the countries like Iran which is immersed in a compound state of belated 
inbetweenness, these processes become even more hyper-complex.  In the state of 
belated inbetweenness the mediating and vanishing forms are absent as the ways of 
life and ideas and institutions are imported as finished packages from the rival 
regimes of truth, which makes the whole social order deeply unstable. Furthermore 
the social agents are exposed to the heaviness of the burden of judgement and 
become confused between alternative regimes of truth and their truth claims and 
their adoption from each other alongside disavowing such adoptions and attacking 
each other’s dark sides. 
7.2.2. Stylized Facts of Iranian History 
The immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness acts as a fertile breeding ground 
for a series of features and properties, which have been regularly experienced 
throughout modern history of Iran.  
7.2.2.1 Unpredictability 
Iranian history in the modern era demonstrated a series of regular patterns addressed 
here as the stylized facts of Iranian modern history; and this work is an attempt to 
enumerate them and made sense of them.  The most well-known fact about Iranian 
history and society is that the only predictable thing about Iran is its unpredictability 
(Saghafi, 2004; Kurzman, 2004, 2009). This fact envelops the three levels of 
causation, complexity science and worldhood in itself. It refers to the sudden change 
from one state to another where small events can act as tipping points for the social 
order, driving the whole order into a new bifurcated direction. This happens at micro, 
meso and macro levels. 
This fact also implicitly acknowledges the fact that Iranian society reacts to the 
events differently due to the nature of its world of signification. The same events and 
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trends may not trigger the start of a revolution in India or Japan but they may do so 
in Iran. The unpredictability of Iranian society points to the volatile nature of its 
embeddedness and its confusion over how to synchronize different regimes of truth.  
One of the manifestations of Iranian unpredictability is the phenomenon of sudden 
rise to prominence, followed by gradual daily process of war of attrition, followed by 
equally sudden collapse into nothingness. This trend was captured by Boroujerdi’s 
(2010) resort to Iqbal’s famous poem “trashidam, parastidam, shekastam (I carved 
an idol, worshiped it and then smashed it). Iranains at various levels frequently 
blamed their own people for being ‘wax-like’, ‘spineless’, or ‘chameleon-like’. This 
study demonstrates that the people, both in the supply and demand side of the market 
for truth, have not been culpable for such ‘identitylessness’ and carving of idols, 
worshiping them and then smashing them; they were only the passive agents (a’lat-e 
fe’l) of the larger voices and forces inhabiting them. This was due to the dynamics of 
preference ordering, and the nature of supply and demand for multiple forms of truth 
in the form of instrumental rationality, communicative rationality and emancipative 
rationality. As Hanming and Loury (2005) remind us “Dysfunctional Identities Can 
Be Rational”. As such, the state of identitylessness is the logical implication of 
immersion in the state of belated inbetweenness. 
7.2.2.2 Zigzag Movements 
The discursive and non-discursive practices associated with various experiences and 
events oscillated manifestly between polar extremes in a state of tri-polarity. These 
are the zigzag movements of a drunken social order immensely confused about the 
direction it needs to take and the goals it needs to peruse. The sudden rise enjoyed by 
the constitutionalist movement, Pahlavi dynasty, the ONM, and Islamic Revolution 
has been associated with persistent threat of collapse and experience of near-collapse 
or actual collapse. All various brands of social order at all levels have been under 
siege due to lack of multiple forms of legitimacy.  All regimes suffered from being 
haunted by the spectre of collapse leading to the collapse of three (the Mashroteh, 
the ONM, and the Pahlavi) while the spectre of sudden fall hovering incessantly over 
the other. The zigzag movement is experienced at all levels (micro, meso, and 
macro) within and between the alternative regimes of truth and their associated 
projects of reverse social engineering. Ayatollah Khamanei (2010) attests to the 
prevalence of zigzag movements within the Islamic Republic in the following terms:  
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When we say "the Islamic-Iranian paradigm", we mean a comprehensive 
plan. Without a comprehensive plan, we will face confusion, just as we have 
been suffering from zigzag and purposeless movements during the past 30 
years and we have been running around without a plan. Sometimes we 
carried out a movement and then we did the opposite - in cultural areas, 
economic areas and different other areas. This was because of the lack of a 
comprehensive plan. 
 
These zigzag movements in all realms of life, work, and language were symptoms of 
a society trapped in the doubly troublesome states of belatedness and inbetweenness, 
triggering the search for a panacea and a source of jouissance acting as a sudden cure 
for all of its ailments and discontents. The phantasy of sudden embrace of “The 
Thing” itself bewildered and bedevilled Iranians to the extent of madly searching for 
the alchemy of turning all the dark and bitter elements of the social order into bright 
and sweet components of happiness and success. The search for different forms of 
utopias frequently culminated into the deep entrapment in various types of dystopias, 
which breeds an emotional economy fluctuating between excessive exuberance and 
intense infatuation and deep disappointment and bitter disillusionment. This leads 
the Iranian dasein to oscillate between the state of self-righteousness and self-
loathing.  
As a result of turbulence in the Iranian embeddedness between three regimes of 
truth, one of the prominent stylized facts of Iranian modern history is its oscillation 
between three large projects of reverse social engineering: Persianization (the 
Pahlavi dynasty’s project), modernization (Mashroteh revolution, the Mosaddegh’s 
ONM, and Khatami’s reformist movement), Islamization (Islamic Revolution).  
All of these stabilizing and de-stabilizing movements occurred in the spirit of reverse 
social engineering corresponding to the needs of the intersection between the state of 
belatedness and the state of inbetweenness. Abrahamian (2008: 152; added 
emphasis) refers to one of these social engineering projects in the form of the Shah’s 
changing of the Iranian calendar in the following terms: “Iran jumped overnight from 
the Muslim year 1355 to the imperial year 2535”.  The same series of jumps were 
taken to manufacture the desired outcomes in the realms of the women’s veiling and 
men’s dress code, gender relations, language, historiography, legal forms and 
contents (for example regarding social vices), culture, education, economy and other 
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areas of social order from the Mashroteh era, to the first Pahavi’s era, the 
Mosaddegh’s ONM, second Pahlavi’s reign and in the Islamic Republic. 
Throughout more than a century the nature of Iranian selfhood and its essence has 
been the site of violent war of attrition between alternative regimes of truth and their 
corresponding projects of reverse social engineering. All three sets of projects in the 
Iranian modern history had their own version of nationalism, entailing three different 
projects of nationalizing Iran. The social order as a whole alongside each social 
assemblage at micro and meso level oscillated between bikinis and chador, political 
anti-colonialist jihadists and lip-stick jihadists, and ultimately between three time 
zones of short-termism of modernity, medium-termism of Persianism and eternal 
time of Islam. The state of belatedness resulting from the violent encounter with 
totalizing nature of modernity acted as the condition of possibility for turning the 
three regimes of truth into three distinct projects of social engineering (ideological 
blueprints or comprehensive plans), each inducing their own episodes of innocent 
cruelty.  
The irreconcilable differences between different voices created another stylized fact 
of Iranian history which was the oscillation between anarchy and despotism where 
springs of freedom in Mashroteh, the ONM era and early years of Islamic revolution 
quickly resulted in state of paralysis or/and civil wars where widespread levels of 
social chaos and anarchy were followed by the emergence of final arbiter. The rule 
of final arbiter (Amir Kabir, Taqizadeh’s revolutionary committee, the first Pahlavi, 
Mosaddegh, the Shah, Khomeini/Khamaniei) and his discretion
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 was attacked by 
waves of de-legitimization from all sides, leading to its siege mentality and the 
possibility or actuality of final collapse, culminating to another round of truth cycle.  
This cycle breeds waves of innocent brutality in series of tit for tat courses of 
epistemic or physical violence between the incumbent and the opposition forces. The 
repression of the other frequently culminated in the return of the repressed, which is 
another stylized fact of Iranian modern history where the zombie of religion came 
back to haunt the Persianist modernizers after repression of religion in the Pahlavi 
                                                          
43
 The phenomenon of the emergence of final arbiter permeates the whole social order where every 
realm requires a smaller scale final arbiter to resolve its small scale war of attrition between various 
voices and cultural tribes emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within forces, voices 
and faces; as such the system becomes addicted to the discretionary rule of an army of final arbiters 
(with conflicts within and between them) at all levels rather than the rule of law or any other form of 
social cohesion. This is at the root of atomic nature of power in Iran as another stylized fact of Iranian 
modern history.  
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era and the return of the zombie of secularism after its repression in the Islamic era 
alongside the return of veiling and the return of unveiling to haunt two different 
projects of social engineering. The irreconcilable differences within and between the 
incumbent and the opposition forces replicated in all social groups and classes from 
the clergy to the intellectual, the poet, the worker, the merchant and the technocrat, 
and other realms of social life within families, organizations and voluntary groups 
and plagued the social order throughout the modern period of Iranian history.  
7.2.2.3 The Incessant Conflict between Radicals and Pragmatists 
Another stylized fact of Iranian modern history revolves around the fact that the 
difference within and between voices frequently translated into the conflict between 
radicals, who have been searching for ideological purity, and pragmatists, who 
lacked ideological justification but have been looking for practical solutions to 
practical problems while trying to stay loyal to the fundamentals of their affiliated 
regime of truth. The roots of these turbulent experiences within and between 
different forces, voices and faces was their theory of selection; the irreconcilable 
differences in what can and cannot be selected from different regimes of truth and 
what regime of truth should act as the base or platform for selection; in a sense what 
should be grafted to what, how and why. The two issues of selection, hence, were 
subsumption, and substitution/complementarity.  
Throughout these periods of turmoil, Iranians strived to liberate themselves, with 
different degrees of emphasis at different periods, from the religious, tribal, 
revolutionary, oriental, and occidental forms of despotism and to embrace negative 
and positive freedoms (liberation from despotisms of nature and man) alongside 
spiritual freedom from the despotism of desire and terror of death. The three regimes 
of truth and their affiliated projects of social engineering possessed their lacks and 
abundances and each attacked the legitimacy of the other based on the white book of 
the self and black book of the other.  The act of incorporating the best of other 
regimes of truth alongside the act of strategic activation and deactivation of 
discourses and disavowing such adoptions frequently led to lack of credibility and 
legitimacy for such hybrid voices and faces, which through the war of attrition 
between waves of radicalism and pragmatism bred innocent cruelty of all against all.   
7.2.2.4 Blaming the Resource Curse and/or the Alliance Curse 
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Iran frequently blamed the oil and its associated rent-seeking behaviour or the West 
for its plights. In reality, Iran cannot attain socio-economic development not 
exclusively because of the rampant level of rent-seeking behaviour, which is a small 
symptom of lack of trust due to the emergence of irreconcilable differences in all 
realms of life, but mainly because it cannot be open for business and act as a land of 
opportunity, which prevents it from combining order with change, and market 
dynamism of creative destruction with stabilizing function of welfare state (or any 
other form of safety net). The oil is not the curse for the Iranians (Smith, 2007) but 
their ruptured embeddedness and its associated confusion is. This establishes a 
general rule of our methodology where no single factor or collection of factors can 
act as a cause for backwardness or progress (or any other social phenomenon); the 
work of factors is almost always mediated by the sedimented layers of social 
embeddedness; as such the same factors have manifestly different outcomes in 
different historical embeddedness.   
If access to oil revenue acts differently in Norway compared to Iran it is because of 
their manifestly different worldhoods. What ultimately creates widespread level of 
turbulence in the Iranian social order is not the presence or absence of oil revenue, 
but the tragedy of confusion, formation of unstable coalitions, institutional failures 
and chaotic orders emerging out of the affiliation to warring regimes of truth and 
their internal divisions and the burden of judgement it puts on the Iranian dasein. 
The alliance with the West (or lack of it) is not a curse or a blessing and has a similar 
effect to the effect of oil revenue. The West is a resource and a force of nature which 
can be tamed and deployed constructively or destructively depending on the 
existence (or lack) of social cohesion (asabiya).  
7.2.2.5 The Ultimate Pattern 
The ultimate pattern governing the history of modern Iran is the four-stage 
mechanism (in the realm of hermeneutics of suspicion), which is produced as an 
emergence (unintended consequence) out of  the interaction between forces, voices, 
and faces plagued by philosophical autism (in the realm of hermeneutics of 
understanding). The foreclosure to understand the radical other through thinking the 
unthinkable led to frequent experience of multilateral misunderstanding, which in 
turn through their interaction through war of attrition leads to the four-stage 
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mechanism governing the events of Iranian modern history. Ultimately if Iranians 
are suffering from a curse, it is a truth curse and not the resource or alliance curse.  
7.3. PHILOSOPHICAL AUTISM 
The society-wide turbulence and its waves of innocent cruelty ultimately are rooted 
in the poverty of languages deployed in the process of understanding the unique and 
singular experience of Iranian state of belated inbetweenness. The languages and 
categories of thought and mode of thinking available through standard packages of 
truth (modern versus non-modern, scientific versus non-scientific, believer versus 
non-believer, Persian versus non-Persian) are not fit for understanding the nature of 
Iranian selfhood and its immersion in the state of confusion where the radical others 
of modernity, Islam and Persianism operate as the integral parts of the Iranian 
fractured selfhood with multiple loyalties and affiliations. 
Misunderstanding and its associated innocent brutality relates to the philosophical 
autism on failure to understand the radical other. Such understanding requires 
overcoming the limits of addicted grid of intelligibility and understanding the other 
in her own terms through uncovering her world of signification with its own 
dictionary and associated denotations and connotations. The inability to understand 
the other leads to inability to understand the self as the other is constitutive of the 
self. 
Philosophical autism leads to the Iranians treating each other with contempt, disgust, 
and hatred as untouchables (najes), which is another stylized fact of Iranian modern 
history. Each side treat the voice of the radical other side as a pile of “nonsense” 
(charand va parand) or at best as “magnificent impasse” (Khalaji, 2010). While 
Kasravi saw the Persian poetry and Persian mysticism as nonsense or magnificent 
impasse (Ajodani, 2003), Avini (1997) saw modernity as modern form of 
superstition, and Khalaji saw fiqh as magnificent impasse. As a result of state of 
belated inbetweenness and its associated irreconcilable differences, Iranians treat 
each other as untouchables as they lack common grounds allowing them to agree to 
disagree and have unity without uniformity, in turn enabling them to grant each other 
the status of legitimate interlocutors in the social production of truth about life, work, 
and language. 
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7.3.1 Blame Game 
As Iranians are not able to understand each other (and as a result their own selfhood) 
and fail to understand how this failure to understand each other generates the chaotic 
situation in the Iranian modern history through the functioning of a four-stage 
mechanism, they embark on intentional fallacy of blaming particular forces, voices, 
or faces as the main cause of the Iranian state of socio-economic backwardness. If 
and when the discourse of decline is replaced with the discourse of belated 
inbetweenness the need for playing the blame game disappears entirely. As such, 
within the discourse of decline and backwardness, a series of reductionist analyses 
blamed the internal or external causes for the Iranian state of backwardness, ranging 
from economism to sociologism, psychologism, environmentalism and culturalism, 
where for example the Iranian arid environment was believed to have caused a 
particular form of chronic despotism shaping the Iranian modern history. Other 
causes were deemed to include the Iranian cultural trait of intolerance or laziness and 
non-receptive attitude towards hard work, bad governance and mismanagement, the 
presence of mafia groups at all levels of society, lack of civil society, external forces 
of imperialism and colonialism and their constant interventions in the Iranian 
history, and rent-seeking behaviour induced by oil revenue, among others. These are 
a short list of the causal analysis offered for the Iranian state of socio-economic 
underdevelopment. These explanations suffer from the flaws of black box 
explanations and atomistic analysis of social order away from its embeddedness in 
complex adaptive systems and worlds of significations. 
At a more systemic level of analysis prevalent amongst almost all social actors, from 
historical actors to historians and from lay people to theorists, the following trend in 
misunderstanding of radical other and the self can be identified.  The blame is laid on 
the perceived dark side of one, two, or all regimes of truth (religious despotism, 
oriental despotism, occidental despotism or revolutionary despotism) and the remedy 
is offered in a theory of selection which prioritizes the perceived white side of one 
regime of truth as the base for selection of the white components from alternative 
regime of truth, all packaged in a comprehensive blueprint for the act of reverse 
social engineering. Almost all schools of thought (with leading figures like 
Akhundzadeh, Malkam Khan, Agha Khan Kermani, Sheikh Fazzollah Nuri, 
Taqizadeh, Kasravi, Fardid, Al-e Ahmad, Shariati, Khomeini, Bazargan, Nasr, 
Shayegan, Dostdar, Tabatabaei, Soroush, among others) can be positioned on a 
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continuum spanning over the dark and white sides of regimes of truth and their 
particular brand of the theory of selection; the detailed exploration of this spectrum 
could not be presented here due to the issue of word limits imposed on the thesis.  
The Persianists like the Shah, for instance, cursed the black and red reactionaries as 
his untouchables (najes) while Khomeini blamed the dark forces of Persian 
kingdom, and modernity and its political and materialist despotism alongside 
blaming what he called American Islam, which is a version of religious despotism. 
Many others have committed the intentional fallacy and have tried to find the culprit 
in the intensions of rulers or the oppositions in the form of their mischievous pursuit 
of power and wealth or fame. Iranians frequently activate and circulate the 
discourses of victimhood in the form of blaming a particular perpetrator in the form 
of “they came, killed, devoured and looted” (koshtand va khordand va bordand). 
This puts every new set of rulers in the status of the most familiar dark force of 
Iranian history, Genghis Khan, which allows them easily to makes sense of their 
historical plights through the dualities of rulers/ruled and perpetrators/victims. At 
any time 2 Iranians react to their bitter experience at time 1 by nominating a new 
perpetrator, while remaining incognizant to the overall patterns and regularities 
governing their modern history. The perpetrators change but their sense of 
victimhood stays the same. 
In the search for explaining and curing malaise of the Iranian society, each cultural 
tribe of any colour or persuasion frequently attribute the pursuit of truth to the self 
and the pursuit of power and wealth to the others. The self is principled the other is 
spineless. They portray themselves as following the ethics of care and service while 
the other almost always acts upon the urge for anti-ethical codes of selfishness and 
power-thirstiness, which demonstrates Iranian confusion on human values and the 
relation between truth, goodness, power, interests, and subjectivity.  
Philosophical autism in understanding the other and the self culminates in the 
emergence of truth cycles where alternative regimes of truth come to dominate the 
social order intermittently, where their dominance and their instability are 
manifested in the four Williamson’s levels of price mechanism, organizational 
governance, institutions, and mind and leads to the oscillation between the four states 
of chaos and order, creating a chaotic order. 
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 7.4. OUTLINES OF THE SOLUTION 
Iranians need to realize that they live in the genre of tragedy and not epic of good 
against evil, modern against pre-modern (tradition), or patriot versus non-patriot. 
The Iranian subjectivity, power and knowledge are trapped in the state of belated 
inbetweenness and are torn between affiliations to alternative regimes of truth. 
Iranian social assemblage (micro, meso or macro) is fractured and ruptured rather 
than being coherent and unified. As such the categories and concepts deployed for 
homogenous or heterogeneous societies cannot be applied to the troubled societies 
with ruptured embeddedness. What is needed is a non-combative, non-violent 
(epistemic or physical) approach to understanding of the alternative forces, voices 
and faces and making genuine attempts to enter the radical others’ life worlds and to 
learn their different languages and their dictionaries, discovering particular ways 
each particular voice offers to combine different rationalities. By listening to the 
various voices and offering the best and most rational defence of their positions 
based on their own particular grid of intelligibility and its conscious and unconscious 
dimensions through combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of 
suspicion, the context becomes ready for the acceptance of all voices with truth 
claims to act as legitimate interlocutors in the social production of collective capacity 
and consensus on embeddedness and its dimensions of goodness, truth and beauty.  
In terms of hermeneutics of understanding, the social agents’ accounts of themselves 
and their social order should be taken at face value to be used in the reconstruction of 
their internal rationality. Alongside this dimension, as no social agent is fully present 
to herself and has unconscious dimensions, the accounts and actions should be used, 
based on hermeneutics of suspicion, to further complement the attempt to discover 
the internal logic of different voices and faces and how they interact to culminate in 
the emergence of events and experiences. The historical agents (such as Khomeini or 
the Shah or any other) are not necessarily the best judges of their own world of 
signification (gong-e khabdideh) but their accounts, actions and emotions are 
windows and avenues, which can lead us towards the faithful discovery of their life 
worlds.  
As such, the social agents are neither totally ignorant nor fully aware of their own 
grid of intelligibility. Social assemblages and agents, as combinations of conscious 
and unconscious dimensions, require the careful combination of hermeneutics of 
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understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion in order to discover the life world of 
the other.  
What the compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness needs is the non-combative 
thinking rather than critical thinking. The condition of possibility of critical thinking 
is not available in Iran’s compound state of inbetweenness-belatedness. The exercise 
of non-combative thinking paves the way for understanding each other, which makes 
national dialogue possible, paving the way for the emergence of common grid of 
intelligibility which makes the practice of critical thinking possible. The practice of 
non-combative thinking (through avoidance of counter-transference and avoidance 
of projection of one’s own life world to the radical other) needs to be done 
unilaterally and initiated from any voice interested in ending the more-than-a-century 
of history of turbulence and violence and should be practiced towards all voices 
whether in power (incumbent voices) or out of power (the opposition voices). We 
need to announce cessation of all hostilities and declare unilateral truce.  
In effect, what is needed is declaring a unilateral truce in the incessant waves of wars 
of attrition between alternative truth camps. This includes listening to the voice of 
the ruling clerics, the opposition clerics, the West and American establishment and 
the ruling religious intellectuals or the opposition secular intellectuals and the 
Persianist monarchists and supporters of Persian poetry and literature, among others. 
The voices of radicals affiliated to all regimes of truth should be listened to alongside 
paying careful and loyal attention to the voices of the pragmatists of all sides. The 
unilateral practice of the art of listening, liberating the self from the finitude of 
slavery to the own grid of intelligibility and its associated world of signification with 
its associated structures of power/knowledge, discursive formation and emotional 
economy, is the prerequisite of the possibility of achieving change in the historical 
experience of turbulence and violence. Being a dasein allows the researcher to be a 
strategic cogito to understand other daseins through the method of free association.  
The experience of brutality from the other forces, voices and faces (the sense of 
victimhood) should not prevent any voice from exercising non-combative thinking 
since the prevalence of brutality is rooted in the confusions and dissonances 
associated with the state of belated inbetweenness, and as such is a form of innocent 
cruelty. The actions and talks of people can be criticized according to their own 
adhered regimes of truth and not the regime of truth of the observers or the analysts. 
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As Martin Luther King (Selby, 2008; Hill, 2007) states the non-violent ethic of love 
requires seeing people as passive agents of their worlds of signification. This non-
violence of care and love is required more than ever in the ambiguous context of 
belated inbetweenness in comparison to the King’s context of divided society where 
blacks and whites belonged to two different separate communities with clearly 
defined sets of interests, ideas, and identities, all embedded in a larger context of 
homogenous society and history with a dominant regime of truth in the form of 
modernity..  
What is at the roots of irreconcilable differences within and between forces, voices 
and faces is the difference in the theory of selection (in what is supposed to take the 
status of the main regime of truth and how the elements of other regimes of truth 
need to be selected and assimilated and grafted into the body of the main package of 
truth) to cure the ailments of the social order.  There is no easy or ready-made 
solution for the two issues of selection, namely, subsumption and 
substitution/complementarity. 
As such, no particular model of selection can deem itself as the only possible option 
for the transformation of social order. These different models need to compete with 
each other in a free market for ideas and ways of life, and through the process of free 
entry and exit, extinction and survival and continuous process of rhizomatic and 
symbolic mutations, new consensual outcomes may emerge, sedeminting themselves 
as the historical embeddedness, in the process providing stable regime of truth and 
historical a priori for knowing, acting and feeling. The irreconcilable differences 
between the voices and lack of mutual understanding led to the imposition of each 
project on the whole population by force in different periods of Iranian modern 
history, which culminated in the short-term restoration of order but long-term 
experience of revolutions and social movements perpetuating the experience of 
instability, turbulence and violence. It seems that in the compound state of 
inbetweenness-belatedness, resort to coercion or obedience does not work and only 
persuasion through the social production of truth can produce social capacity and 
consensus to produce synchronized and harmonized embeddedness. In a sense, the 
Iranians have to collectively produce the condition of possibility of their own 
collective and personal actions, and this seems to be possible only through 
establishing a repeated game of truth tournament (see Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and 
Dion, 1988).    
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To achieve this, the social interaction needs to be turned into a tournament for truth 
where alternative entries compete for attracting the allegiance and loyalty of the 
population in an evolutionary process of chaotic synchronization. To guarantee that 
this process does not diverge into total atomization of social space leading to the re-
emergence of anarchy and quasi or total civil war, as frequently experienced in the 
modern history of Iran, we need to start from the current default position and by 
taking a non-violent, non-combative position towards it to remove the possibility of 
another round of reverse social engineering, which allows the philosophical and 
theoretical ideas alongside ways of being and becoming (discursive and non-
discursive practices) about how to organize life, work and language to grow in 
maturity via going through several rounds of adoptions and adaptations which gives 
time and space to people to develop the sense of ownership and attunement towards 
the emergent outcomes. The main outline of the solution revolves around the 
protection of the field of social interaction where different varieties of hybrid (or 
pure) forms of truth can emerge and compete with each other, where some go extinct 
and others survive and thrive in an evolutionary and spontaneous process of chaotic 
synchronization without resort to epistemic (violent categorization) or physical 
violence even if others resort to violence.  
The solution, thus, lies, not in particular answer to the Iranian misfortune, but 
establishing a factory or process, which can produce sustainable solutions to the 
general and particular problems of the nation. The task of selection theory is to 
establish a selection process which does not favour a priori a particular regime of 
truth over others by resorting to coercion and repression of the opposite forces but by 
allowing the alternative hybrid or pure voices to compete with each other for the 
allegiance and affiliation of the Iranian people, establishing a process which through 
its non-coercive and non-combative nature can lead to the emergence of a consensual 
and synchronized embeddedness acting as condition of possibility for agreeing to 
disagree and forming unity without uniformity.  
This process of selection relies on the three principles of establishment of stable 
social orders: the principles of embeddedness, emergence and incommensurability. 
This process is our best hope for allowing Iranians to build a new house of ‘being’ 
and liberate themselves from discursive homelessness without resorting to the 
brutality of intelligent design and reverse social engineering and through exploiting 
402 
 
the spontaneous and evolutionary processes at work at the heart of emergence of 
social phenomena.  
Currently, Iranians inhabit parallel worlds with parallel time frames and want to have 
the option of free entry and exit into and from one world into another, but the 
symbolic and imaginary dimensions of each regime of truth do not endorse such 
rhizomatic movement between irreconcilable worlds. The nomadic passage from one 
truth land to another requires truth visas. This evolutionary process of social 
discovery of truth would allow the emergence of synchronized and harmonized 
symbolic and imaginary orders, paving the way for the establishment of stable 
embeddedness acting as the condition of possibility of an order happy in its own 
skins and at peace with itself and the world. This is like turning the whole society 
with all its diverse forces, voices, and faces into an R & D institute for discovering 
‘truth about’ life, work, and language. The production of truth leads to the 
production of wealth, “confirming Hegel's point that the path to truth is part of the 
truth” (Zizek, 2012: 477). 
7.5. EPILOGUE 
For me, this research turned into a deeply creative and transformative voyage of self-
discovery fraught with unpredictable waves of agony and ecstasy and resulting in 
coming to peace with my ‘Iranian selfhood’ and even coming to develop a sense of 
deep love and affection for its hyper-complexity. I found Iran in its modern history 
to be a paradoxical entity like a “wandering mountain” as Danashvar perceptively 
called. By offering a new theory and new interpretation of the stylized facts of the 
Iranian modern history through contextualizing them in the compound state of 
inbetweenness-belatedness via deploying a hybrid methodology combining 
hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this study considers  
that it has offered the theoretical foundations for the emergence of a non-violent, 
non-combative evolutionary process of production of truth acting as condition of 
possibility for the production of trust and wealth in the modern history of Iran.    
But like all finite entities this study has its own limitations. One of the limitations of 
the study was that it could not include the Khatami’s reformist movement and Green 
movement as one of its application chapters due to the word limitations imposed on 
the theses. Furthermore, it could not include the detailed analysis of each of four 
stages in each application chapters due to the issue of word limitations. The 
403 
 
expansive analysis of each section of the Methodological Chapter and Theoretical 
Framework Chapter were not included in the final draft of the thesis again due to the 
issue of word limitations. Due to the general nature of the study it could not delve 
into the details of historical events, institutions, or characters like the reactions of 
various forces, voices and faces to the oil price rise of 1973-4 or the hostage crisis or 
Montazeri’s succession crisis or the institution of religious schools, or the 
Organization for Planning and Development, or the characters of Qavam, Banisadr 
or Montazeri, for instance.  
Furthermore, with the benefit of hindsight, I would have organized the application 
chapters differently. I would have preferred to put the Mahroteh and ONM in one 
chapter to represent the project of modernization, once through opposition to the 
oriental despotism and the second time through opposition to occidental despotism. I 
would have put the first and second Pahlavi experiences in one chapter to represent 
the project of Persianization. And the Chapter on the Islamic Republic would have 
been left intact to represent the project of Islamization. In this way the nature of 
Iranian modern history would have been better reflected in the structure of this study.  
Future studies needs to apply the theoretical framework, methodological insights, 
and conceptual tools offered in this study to the study of specific events of the 
Iranian modern history alongside applying them to issues such as sexuality and 
veiling, gender relation, the relation with the West and especially America, Israel, 
and the Arab world, the formation and evolution of the Organization for Planning 
and Development, the encounter with modern topics such as human rights, freedom 
of speech and distributive justice alongside the economic issues such as taxation, 
inflation and unemployment and many other issues such as modern Persian poetry, 
literature, and Cinema. One of the clear examples of institutional failure in the 
contemporary life of Iranians is the dysfunctional road system, killing thousands of 
Iranians every year. It will be a greatly rewarding research to investigate how the 
logic of institutional building has gone badly wrong in the construction of the 
institutions of the road and transportation system, especially with regard to the use 
and abuse of cars.  
Another fascinating area of research is the investigation of how the state of belated 
inbetweenness has affected the implicit emergence of three forms of economics 
(modern economics, Islamic economics, and Persian economics) and how such 
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development created confusion in the realm of economic thought (for example on 
riba or Halal investment and modern banking system) and economic policy making 
for the last two centuries. The same applies to the realms of architecture, cinema, 
arts, and literature. Yet another fascinating area of research is to explore the details 
of the functions of the middlemen in the formation and disintegration of coalitions in 
the modern history of Iran. The detailed investigations of the relations and co-
evolution of realms of sexuality, spirituality, and economic growth is another 
fascinating area of research. The issue of how the state of belated inbetweenness 
affects the working of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is another 
fascinating realm of research. The list can go on and on. These future applications 
would lead to further development and refinement of the theory and will hopefully 
culminate in the building of capacity and consensus on the way to understand Iran 
and social phenomena in general.  
I am hopeful that these future studies will start to break the traditional division of 
labour in human and social sciences between disciplines, and will prompt the study 
of diverse issues such as inflation, Persian poetry, and foreign policy in a co-
evolutionary analysis of political economy of truth, trust, and wealth. The emergence 
of a breed of holistic researchers and thinkers, and its subsequent effects in the 
emergence of holistic policy making will be one of the rewarding outcomes of such a 
research paradigm, changing the dysfunctional relation between the creation of truth 
and the creation of trust and wealth for the better.    
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Appendix 1: Diagram 1-Approaches to Social Inquiry 
 
Approaches to 
social inquiry 
dasein 
Symbolic 
Affirmation 
Power  
 
Knowledge 
Subjectivity 
Negation 
Foreclosure 
Repression 
Disavowal 
Imaginary 
Affirmation 
Habit Formation 
Tacit Knowledge 
Creativity 
Negation 
Ideology 
Fantasy  
Real 
Affirmation 
Expression 
Content 
Negation 
Event 
Cogito 
(subject-object 
relation) 
Reductionism 
Complexity 
Sciences 
